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Tropical deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia is central to global trends of climate change, 
biodiversity loss, and agro-industrial expansion. Since 2004, new governance measures in Brazil 
have helped reduce deforestation in the Amazon by nearly 80 percent. Similar governance 
measures in Indonesia have failed to slow forest clearing, however. I explain this divergence 
through a comparative and ethnographic study focused on the programs of The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC), an international environmental organization. I conducted six municipal-level 
case studies of TNC projects and an organizational ethnography of TNC’s tropical forest programs, 
including 181 key-informant interviews and analysis of socio-economic and environmental 
datasets. I find that forest governance strategies in Brazil and Indonesia are strongly influenced by 
the ‘land sparing hypothesis,’ which holds that increasing agricultural productivity can spare land 
for conservation. In Brazil, government, corporate, and non-governmental actors have reduced 
deforestation through a land sparing model that links forest conservation to agricultural 
intensification, state-building, and socio-economic development. In Indonesia, by contrast, land 
sparing efforts have been stymied by government and corporate actors who extract resources for 
private gain. Overall, I show that deforestation reductions in Brazil favor agro-industry over small 
farmers, however, and are mostly canceled out by displacement of deforestation to extractive zones 
like Indonesia. I therefore argue that the land sparing model is a fallacy: it supports industrial 
expansion and state-building but displaces social and environmental degradation, producing 
negative global outcomes. 
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1 
PART I 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Tropical humid forests are popular with environmentalists. Indeed, the environmentalist 
focus on this biome is so strong that ‘saving the rainforest’ has become a byword for ‘saving the 
planet.’ When I was in third grade, we raised money in school to ‘buy’ acres of rainforest, spurred 
on by images of charismatic animals, exotic indigenous people, and a tropical Eden in flames. The 
immense biological and human diversity of tropical forest regions, and now also the immense 
quantities of carbon stored in tropical forest biomass, have fixated the environmentalist movement 
that emerged in the 1960s and ’70s. This fascination with humid tropical forests stretches back to 
the beginnings of modern environmentalism in the colonial era, however, when the ecological 
devastation of tropical islands by colonial extraction inflamed the European imagination as a 
harbinger that human beings, driven by commercial interests, might destroy the global 
environment and extinguish the human species (Grove 1995). 
Tropical forest conservation has thus been a cornerstone of Western environmentalist 
concern, from 18th-century colonial forest reserves to contemporary forest carbon markets. 
Nonetheless, the global march of tropical deforestation has not just continued, but accelerated 
dramatically at the dawn of the 21st century (Hansen et al. 2013; Kim, Sexton, and Townshend 
2015), even as concern over the role of deforestation in global climate change has made forest 
conservation appear all the more critical. This dissertation is a study of tropical forest conservation 
policy and tropical land use change focused on the period from 1990 to the present. I explore the 
causes and mechanisms through which forest policies in some places appear to have been effective 
 
	
	
2 
in reducing deforestation, and I explain why, despite regional conservation successes, overall 
tropical forest loss has increased. 
The importance of tropical deforestation extends far beyond the critical concerns of 
biodiversity loss, climate change, and the extinction or transformation of local human cultures and 
livelihoods. Deforested tropical lands are primarily converted to agriculture (M. Williams 2006; 
Ramankutty and Foley 1999; Sy et al. 2015),1 and these former forestlands have been the primary 
locations of tropical agricultural expansion in recent decades (Gibbs et al. 2010). In the 
deforestation hotspots of Latin America and Southeast Asia, forest loss since the 1980s has 
increasingly been driven by industrial agribusiness production linked to global markets (Rudel, 
DeFries, et al. 2009). This close relationship between forest loss and agro-industrial expansion 
places tropical deforestation at the center of debates about the relationship between environment 
and development.  
Can capitalist socio-economic development be ecologically sustainable? Or does capitalist 
growth necessarily degrade the environment? Neo-Malthusian critiques of growth, such as 
Ehrlich’s (1968) The Population Bomb and The Club of Rome’s report on “The Limits to Growth” 
(Meadows et al. 1972), permeated the Northern environmental movement of the 1960s and early 
1970s. The idea that economic development and environmental protection were irreconcilable 
created divisions between Global North and Global South that were highlighted at the 1972 UN 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, where developing countries argued that 
concern for the environment was a luxury of the rich. During the 1970s, environmentalists began 
to move away from this tradeoffs perspective, transitioning to an ecological modernization 
paradigm of ‘sustainable development’ that seeks synergies between economic development and 
																																																						
1 Agriculture refers to both producing crops and raising livestock. 
 
	
	
3 
environmental protection (Hajer 1995; Lee, Ferraro, and Barrett 2001). The relationship between 
tropical deforestation and agro-industrial expansion cuts to the heart of the environment and 
development question. Is deforestation necessary for the national development of tropical 
countries? Or is it possible to decouple agricultural productivity from forest clearing so that forest 
conservation and economic growth can coexist? The answers to these questions have profound 
implications for our understanding of the political economy of natural resources and development 
and the limits of possibility of our capitalist world-ecology. These are precisely the questions this 
dissertation seeks to answer. 
My study begins with a puzzling divergence. Brazil and Indonesia are the two primary 
hotspots of tropical deforestation. Together they contain 36 percent of remaining humid tropical 
forest, and they are responsible for roughly 60 percent of all humid tropical forest clearing (Hansen 
et al. 2008; Hansen et al. 2013). From the 1970s through the early 2000s, deforestation in these 
two countries followed a similar pattern. From the 1960s into the 1980s, deforestation was driven 
primarily by smallholder colonization in Brazil and by state-supported migration programs and 
logging operations in Indonesia. From the 1980s onwards, the main drivers of deforestation shifted 
in both countries towards industrial logging and agribusiness, especially ranching and field 
agriculture in Brazil and oil palm and tree fiber plantations in Indonesia (Rudel 2007; Rudel, 
DeFries, et al. 2009).  
In 2004, however, something changed. Primary forest cover loss in the Brazilian Amazon 
declined over 80 percent after 2004, while deforestation in Indonesia accelerated, to the point 
where in 2012, Indonesia exceeded Brazil as the country with the highest annual rate of primary 
tropical forest loss (Figure 1.1). Since that time, Indonesia has maintained elevated deforestation 
 
	
	
4 
rates, while deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has remained more than 70 percent below its 
2004 peak.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Primary Deforestation in Indonesia and the Brazilian Amazon. Data from Margono et 
al. (2014) and INPE (2017). 
While there are many different drivers of tropical deforestation, including climate and 
macroeconomic conditions, there is universal agreement among researchers, politicians, and 
farmers and ranchers that reductions in Amazonian deforestation have been driven substantially 
by new governance measures. These governance measures have included industry moratoria on 
purchasing soy and cattle from deforested areas, commodity sustainability roundtables, expansion 
of protected areas, and enhanced deforestation monitoring, and they have succeeded in reducing 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon even as agricultural production in the region increased. Yet 
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5 
similar governance measures in Indonesia, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and a 
moratorium on new industrial concessions in primary forest areas, have failed to reduce 
deforestation. 
I set out to explain this divergence: why have forest conservation policies failed to slow 
deforestation in Indonesia, how have policies reduced deforestation in Brazil, and what does 
Brazil’s success say about the possibility of reconciling environmental protection with agro-
industrial development? 
‘Development,’ Conflicts, and Institutions 
 The science of human-environment interactions, or ‘socio-ecological systems,’ is complex 
and inherently interdisciplinary. With regard to the role of policy in shaping socio-ecological 
change, there are three bodies of literature that offer different intuitions to explain divergent 
deforestation trajectories in Indonesia and Brazil. 
The first is the literature on the political economy of natural resources and development, 
within which there is a large body of work linked to socio-environmental modernization theories. 
‘Modernization’ as a theory of socio-economic development achieved prominence in the post-
World War II period of rapid urbanization, industrialization, technological innovation, and anti-
Communist sentiment. Modernization theories posit a teleological socio-economic evolution 
towards industrial consumer capitalism, exemplified by Rostow’s (1960) ‘stages of growth.’ In 
relation to the environment, the modernization narrative has been complemented by 
“modernization-based environmental social theories” (Perz 2007) such as the environmental 
Kuznets curve hypothesis, forest transition theory, and ecological modernization theory. These 
socio-environmental modernization theories all maintain that environmental destruction (such as 
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deforestation) worsens at earlier stages of socio-economic development and then improves at 
higher levels of development. 
The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis holds that there exists an inverted U-
shaped relationship between income and environmental degradation, analogous to the inverted U 
relationship between inequality and income levels posited by Simon Kuznets (1955). For Kuznets, 
the inequalities generated by earlier stages of capitalist development should resolve at higher levels 
of development into more egalitarian, rich societies. In the environmental version of the Kuznets 
curve, a country will experience increasing environmental degradation in the early stages of 
development until a certain turning point is reached, beyond which increased income is associated 
with improving environmental conditions 
Numerous studies in the 1990s presented evidence for the existence of an EKC,2 often 
based on cross-national statistical regressions. Critics charged that these studies employed 
inappropriate and simplistic econometric methods, and when proper techniques were used, the 
EKC disappeared (Stern 2004). Much of the EKC literature dealt with emissions of pollutants such 
as sulfur dioxide, but a number of studies also offer evidence of an EKC for deforestation 
(Bhattarai and Hammig 2001; Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw, and Jenkins 2002; Marquart-Pyatt 
2004; Culas 2007). The idea of an environmental Kuznets curve for deforestation is closely linked 
to the idea of a forest transition curve.  
Forest transition theory is based on the observation that in a number of places historical 
declines in forest area have been followed by gradual reforestation (Mather 1992; Mather and 
Needle 1998; Rudel et al. 2005; Kauppi et al. 2006). As with the EKC literature, many forest 
																																																						
2 The World Bank’s 1992 World Development Report (World Bank 1992) played a key role in popularizing the 
EKC hypothesis. For reviews of the 1990s EKC literature, see Stern, Common, and Barbier (1996) and Stern (2004). 
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transition analyses focus at the national level (Mather, Fairbairn, and Needle 1999; Kauppi et al. 
2006; Meyfroidt, Rudel, and Lambin 2010). The theory suggests that reversals in deforestation 
may occur as a result of processes of economic development or in reaction to forest scarcity (Rudel 
et al. 2005; Angelsen 2010). An early explanation for forest transitions held that as agriculture in 
an area matured, it became concentrated on higher-quality land, leaving poorer land areas open for 
reforestation (Mather and Needle 1998). This explanation has been elaborated to suggest that as 
an economy develops and better-paying non-farm jobs become available, agricultural labor costs 
rise, leading to the abandonment of less-productive fields – a process that Rudel et al. (2005) label 
the ‘economic development path’ to the forest transition.3 A second explanation for the forest 
transition is the ‘forest scarcity path,’ where declines in forest cover raise the price of forest 
products and services to the point where landowners begin to reforest their land (Rudel et al. 2005). 
Both of these paths ascribe forest transitions to a simple economic rationality: agricultural rents 
may decline, forest rents may increase, and over time and concurrent with economic development, 
the relative rent to forest conversion is altered in favor of reforestation. 
Forest transition theory and the EKC hypothesis complement the broader perspective of 
ecological modernization theory, which maintains that capitalist economies reform as they 
modernize in order to address environmental problems (Spaargaren and Mol 1992; Mol 1996; 
Murphy 2000).4 The mechanisms through which ‘modernization’ or increasing income might lead 
to improving environmental quality are disputed. Some scholars favor technological and structural 
																																																						
3 Other factors such as technological change might equally lead to agricultural intensification and land sparing for 
reforestation (Rudel, Schneider, et al. 2009); increasing off-farm employment is the mechanism endogenous to 
industrial development. 
4 There is a distinction between ecological modernization theory, which is the body of scientific research that argues 
that ecological modernization is an empirical regularity and seeks to study it (cf. Murphy 2000), and ecological 
modernization discourse, which advocates ecological modernization as possible, desirable, and perhaps inevitable 
(Hajer 1995). Unless specifically referencing ecological modernization theory, I primarily use the term ‘ecological 
modernization’ to refer to the broader discourse, which receives further treatment in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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explanations, such as the economic development and forest scarcity paths of forest transition 
theory, and others highlight political and institutional factors such as the effects of improved 
property rights and governance quality (Panayotou 1997; Mol 2000; Ehrhardt-Martinez, 
Crenshaw, and Jenkins 2002).  
In the broadest terms, the socio-environmental modernization perspective suggests that 
divergent patterns of deforestation between Brazil and Indonesia should be explained by 
‘development,’ locating the countries at different points on a modernization curve. 
A second body of literature comes from the field of political ecology. Political ecology is 
a diverse field that seeks to understand socio-ecological relations through an integration of ecology 
with political economy (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Watts and Peet 2004). Especially apt is 
Martínez-Alier’s characterization of political ecology as the study of “ecological distribution 
conflicts” (Martínez-Alier 2002). Political ecology scholarship, such as the work of Susanna Hecht 
and Marianne Schmink in the Amazon (Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Schmink and Wood 1992) and 
Tania Li and Nancy Peluso in Indonesia (Li 2002; Li 2014; Peluso 1992a; Peluso, Afiff, and 
Rachman 2008), examines how patterns of resource use and access structure and are structured by 
processes of political-economic contestation. Hecht, for example, locates Brazilian deforestation 
reductions in “[n]ew institutional framings, ideologies, political decentralization, globalizations 
and an expanded arena for new social movements and civil society” (Hecht 2011, 4), arguing that 
“[c]hanging deforestation patterns, the product and the point of policy and institutional 
innovations[,] were informed by deep interdisciplinarities [of a diversity of environmentalisms], 
rather than [being] an ancillary ‘by product’ of modernization” (Hecht 2011, 14). As Peluso points 
out, political ecology is an approach rather than a specific theoretical frame (Peluso 1992b). The 
political ecology approach, then, would focus on how the conditions and contestation of resource 
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use and access may differ in Brazil and Indonesia to influence the outcomes of conflicts around 
deforestation. 
Third, there is a large literature on global environmental governance, including especially 
scholarship on multi-level governance of complex resource systems, which follows the pioneering 
work of Elinor Ostrom. There is also a voluminous technical literature on reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (or REDD) as a climate change mitigation and sustainable 
development strategy. 
Theories about common-pool resource (CPR) governance were initially developed through the 
study of small-scale commons (Ostrom 1990) where resource users and their interactions are easier 
to identify and model. Governance of complex and multi-level CPR systems presents novel 
challenges (Ostrom et al. 1999). Tropical forest landscapes are an example of such a system, where 
heterogeneous actors have different understandings of resources and the determinants of land use 
decisions develop at different levels from local to global. Dietz et al. (2003) have synthesized 
institutional design requirements for multi-level commons governance, as well as general 
governance principles that help meet these requirements. Institutional design requirements are: 
providing information, dealing with conflict, inducing rule compliance, providing infrastructure, 
and encouraging adaptation and change. In addition to fairly universal governance principles that 
help meet these requirements, such as defining boundaries and applying sanctions, Dietz and 
colleagues identify three principles that are especially relevant to large-scale commons 
governance: analytic deliberation (involving interested parties in informed discussion of rules); 
nesting (allocating authority at multiple levels); and institutional variety. 
The more technical literature seeking to evaluate and improve REDD initiatives often applies 
institutionalist commons governance principles, notably in work produced through the Center for 
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International Forestry Research’s (CIFOR) Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (Luttrell et al. 
2011; Duchelle et al. 2014; Ravikumar, Larson, et al. 2015). These studies highlight the importance 
of factors such as regulatory enforcement, tenure rights, accountability and safeguards, and 
information sharing in constructing effective policy frameworks for reducing deforestation. 
Fundamentally, this multi-level governance literature emphasizes institutions; thus it would 
seek to explain divergent deforestation trajectories as a function of institutional design principles 
that somehow Brazil has fulfilled and Indonesia has not. 
These three approaches – socio-environmental modernization theories, political ecology, and 
multi-level commons governance – emphasize respectively the importance of development, 
conflicts, and institutions in determining environmental outcomes, and I carried the intuitions of 
each of these approaches with me as I embarked on my fieldwork in Brazil and Indonesia. 
Research and Findings 
Over the course of two years, from September 2013 to August 2015, I traveled from the 
cattle ranches of the Brazilian Amazon and the oil palm plantations of Indonesian Borneo to 
government ministries in Brasília and Jakarta and conservation group offices in Washington, DC. 
I witnessed firsthand the transformations sweeping the tropics, as forests give way to pastures and 
plantations and governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seek to govern the 
frontier. In countless hours in canoes and pickup trucks, over pots of rice and cups of sweet coffee, 
I talked with the migrant farmers, indigenous villagers, ranchers, bureaucrats, executives, and 
activists whose struggles are inscribed on the land in charred trunks and forest reserves. 
I structured my research as a comparative and ethnographic study focused on the programs 
of The Nature Conservancy (TNC), one of the largest international environmental NGOs and a 
key actor in forest governance in both Brazil and Indonesia. I conducted six municipal-level case 
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studies of TNC projects, four in Brazil and two in Indonesia, as well as an organizational 
ethnography of TNC’s tropical forest conservation programs. At the municipal, state, and national 
levels, and at TNC’s headquarters in the USA, I conducted 181 semi-structured interviews in 
Portuguese, Indonesian, and English with government officials; international and domestic NGO 
staff; and representatives of industry, farmer, and community associations. I carried out participant 
observation at meetings and events, and collected data from news stories, policy documents, and 
public databases. Through an affiliation with CIFOR, I received access to longitudinal surveys of 
socio-economic and environmental conditions for approximately 130 households per municipality 
in two of my Brazil sites and both of my Indonesia sites. 
I found that modernization, political ecology, and multi-level governance approaches each 
help to account for certain aspects of differential policy effectiveness and deforestation trends 
between Brazil and Indonesia, but overall these approaches fail to adequately locate environmental 
change within systemic processes of transformation in the global political economy. Socio-
environmental modernization theories provide the most systemic perspective, describing forest 
transitions as an empirical regularity internal to capitalist socio-economic development. I argue 
that the divergence in deforestation between Brazil and Indonesia is indeed best explained through 
an analysis of the political economy of natural resources and development, but modernization 
perspectives misread the dynamics of capitalist development, which are better understood through 
an ecological political economy grounded in a geographical analysis of extraction and production. 
Forest governance strategies in Brazil and Indonesia, I discovered, are strongly influenced 
by the ‘land sparing hypothesis,’ which holds that increasing agricultural productivity can spare 
land for nature. The land sparing hypothesis is closely linked to modernization perspectives, and 
has been prominent in academic and policy discourse since the 1980s, due to its promise of 
 
	
	
12 
reconciling agricultural development with environmental conservation. In Indonesia, as in many 
other frontier regions, land sparing efforts have been stymied by a complex of government and 
corporate actors that extracts resources for private gain. In Brazil, however, I found that a complex 
of government, corporate, and non-governmental actors has succeeded in reducing deforestation 
through a land sparing model that links forest conservation to agricultural intensification, state-
building, and socio-economic development. Land sparing in Brazil favors agro-industry over small 
farmers, however, and is mostly canceled out by displacement of deforestation to extractive zones 
like Indonesia. I therefore argue that the land sparing model is a fallacy: it supports industrial 
expansion and state-building but displaces social and environmental degradation, producing 
negative global outcomes. This conclusion contradicts socio-environmental modernization 
theories, which claim that environmental conditions improve at advanced stages of socio-
economic development. 
Theoretical Framework 
The framework for my analysis is rooted in geographical political economy and 
development sociology. Geographical political economy has developed a critical theorization of 
the spatial dynamics of capitalism, combining Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974]) insights into the social 
production of space with a materialist analysis of the uneven spatialities of capitalist production 
and expansion. Two dimensions are key to the geography of capitalism: the internal spatial 
organization of capitalism, and the dynamics of capitalist expansion. First, with regard to the 
internal spatial organization of the system, capitalism is typified by the division between town and 
country or urban and rural (R. Williams 1973; Moore 2000), or in Brenner and Schmid’s (2014) 
updated conceptualization, the concentration and extension of ‘planetary urbanization.’ This 
division emerges and sustains itself at the expense of a ‘metabolic rift.’ 
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The theorization of the metabolic rift originates with Marx and his analysis of the crisis of 
soil fertility in 19th-century capitalist agriculture, which has been resurrected in contemporary 
scholarship by the environmental sociologist John Bellamy Foster. Marx’s analysis drew heavily 
on the work of the German agricultural chemist Justus von Liebig, who explained how capitalism 
and capitalist agriculture disrupt the soil nutrient cycle by stripping nutrients from rural areas in 
the form of agricultural produce and concentrating nutrients in the cities, where they become 
organic waste (Foster 1999). This metabolic rift thus depletes the sources of soil fertility in rural 
areas at the same time as it overloads sinks for waste disposal in the urban areas, and it creates a 
necessity for artificial fertilization in agriculture. As Marx wrote in Volume 1 of Capital: 
“Capitalist production collects the population together in great centres, and causes 
the urban population to achieve an ever-growing preponderance. This has two 
results. On the one hand it concentrates the historical motive force of society; on 
the other hand, it disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e. 
it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the 
form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural 
condition for the lasting fertility of the soil. …But by destroying the circumstances 
surrounding that metabolism … it compels its systematic restoration as a regulative 
law of social production, and in a form adequate to the full development of the 
human race. …All progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only 
of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility 
of the soil for a given time is a progress toward ruining the more long-lasting 
sources of that fertility. …Capitalist production, therefore, only develops the 
techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of production by 
simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the 
worker.” (Quoted in Foster 1999, 379) 
  
The metabolic rift in this theorization emerges in the divide between country and city and the 
removal of humans from the land, but it is then globalized through the center-periphery relations 
of the capitalist world system (Foster 1999; Moore 2000). Schneider and McMichael (2010) 
critique Marx’s formulation of the metabolic rift as it relates to the practices and material flows of 
agricultural production, but most contemporary scholarship deploys the concept of metabolic rift 
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in a broader sense to describe the socio-ecological dynamics of uneven capitalist development (N. 
Smith 1984). 
 The metabolic rift in this sense describes the flow of embodied energy (resources or ‘use 
value’) within the capitalist system (Foster and Holleman 2014). In this conception, I take the 
metabolic rift to describe the geographical separation of extraction and production. World systems 
analysis distinguishes between a capitalist core characterized by strong state structures and high 
value-added production, among other factors typically associated with high levels of capitalist 
‘development,’ and a periphery characterized by weak state structures and low value-added, 
export-oriented production (Wallerstein 1979). Stephen Bunker (1985) strengthens the ecological 
basis of the core-periphery distinction by demonstrating how the energy-concentrating, 
complexifying structures of core economies are dependent on the energy-dissipating, simplifying 
structures of peripheral economies. The distinction between periphery and core, Bunker argues, is 
a distinction between ‘extraction,’ which destroys value in energy and material in the periphery, 
and ‘production,’ which absorbs energy and materials through transformation and consumption to 
concentrate value in the core. Core-periphery (production-extraction) dialectics are reproduced at 
multiple levels of the capitalist system, instantiating the metabolic rift as a fractal feature of 
capitalism (cf. Appadurai 1996). 
 With regard to the internal spatial organization of capitalism, this theorization of extraction 
and production reveals a multi-level geography of productive cores that enrich themselves at the 
expense of extractive peripheries. With regard to the dynamics of capitalist expansion, the 
metabolic rift constitutes “a powerfully globalizing spatial logic” (Moore 2000, 136). The 
development of productive centers is directly linked to extraction in peripheries. As core-periphery 
relations develop at the regional level within the world system, the externalization of extraction 
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and environmental degradation to expanding peripheries may result in environmental 
improvements in core regions (Tucker 2000; Jorgenson 2006; Walker 2012). This uneven global 
geography of capitalist development thus creates the illusion of ecological modernization 
(Mansfield, Munroe, and McSweeney 2010). Environmental conservation or restoration in core 
regions is dependent on the displacement of degradation to peripheries, and as regional 
environmental indicators improve in developed areas, global environmental indicators decline. 
 Still missing from this account of capitalist geography, however, is an analysis of the socio-
political dynamics of capitalist growth and transformation. How are extraction and production 
stabilized and regulated? How is capitalist development directed and governed? My answers to 
these questions derive from scholarship on the sociology of development and governance. I 
combine several strands of literature to produce a framework of regimes, complexes, and coalitions 
for analyzing the sociology of capitalist development, where regimes describe a stabilized 
political-economic order and complexes and coalitions describe projects of political-economic 
transformation. First, I expand on the work of Paul Gellert (2010) to argue that extractive and 
productive economies are associated with extractive or productivist political-economic regimes.5 
These regimes combine the economic mode of production with the institutional structures and 
socio-political relations that help structure and stabilize economic processes. Extraction may be 
associated with cronyism or clientelism, policies favoring natural resource exports, and a state 
bureaucracy that relies more on rents than on public revenues. Productivism may be associated 
with developmentalist policies favoring articulated industrial production, a professional and 
technocratic bureaucracy, and strong legal frameworks protecting property rights. These regimes 
																																																						
5 I use the term productivist principally to avoid ambiguities associated with the multiple meanings of ‘production.’ 
For a full discussion of terminology, see Chapter 3. 
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coalesce at multiple socially-constructed levels within the capitalist world system. For example, a 
country may have a productivist regime at the national level that encompasses extractive regimes 
in some provinces, which in turn comprise a mix of municipal productivist and extractive regimes. 
The nesting of regimes is the socio-political institutional face of the nesting of core-periphery 
relations. 
 Political-economic regimes describe the socio-political instantiation of a mode of 
production. Complexes describe the socio-political assemblages associated with projects of 
political-economic transformation anchored in particular fractions of capital at any level of the 
world system. A complex is an assemblage of actors, institutions, practices, and discourses that 
seeks to structure accumulation in a particular way (Li 2007a). Like a regime, a complex is both 
material and ideational, linking a particular fraction of capital with the epistemic and governmental 
formations that help support and direct that fraction. At the level of the global economy, for 
example, a ‘neoliberal complex’ has coalesced around a core of transnational corporate and 
financial capital. Animated by the ideology of the Washington Consensus, the neoliberal complex 
has advanced a project of privatization, marketization, and deregulation through the actions and 
interactions of governments, international financial institutions, multinational corporations, and 
others. Myriad complexes populate the world system, related to particular industrial sectors, 
commodities, and transformative projects, each associated with different fractions of capital, e.g., 
the fossil fuels complex, the sustainable development complex, and the military-industrial 
complex. Complexes may overlap or be nested (such as the wind energy complex within the 
renewable energy complex) and actors may participate in multiple complexes – the complex, like 
any fraction of capital, is not self-contained, but rather identifies an assemblage within a larger 
network (ultimately, the global political economy). 
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 A complex describes relationships among actors with complementary interests and 
discourses anchored in a fraction of capital. Complexes do not act as a unit, however. A complex’s 
program advances in different places and moments through political-economic ‘coalitions.’ 
Coalitions are assemblages that emerge when members of a complex ally with each other (and 
possibly other actors) to advance particular projects supporting their common agenda; they are the 
bridge between a complex and the implementation of policy. These coalitions are instances of 
“developmental coalitions” (P. Evans 1995) or “growth coalitions” (Rudel 2009), i.e., social 
groupings dedicated to promoting particular processes of socio-economic and environmental 
transformation. The fossil fuel complex, for example, may act through a fossil fuel coalition 
seeking to promote tar sands development in Canada, or a coalition seeking to obstruct carbon 
emissions regulation in Washington, DC. 
 The distinction between extraction and production as the foundation of the metabolic rift 
in the capitalist world economy, and the identification of regimes, complexes, and coalitions as 
capitalist sociological formations, provide a framework for the analysis of political-economic 
transformations. In this dissertation, I deploy this framework to analyze changes in forest 
governance and land use in Brazil and Indonesia. 
The Argument 
 I find that forest conservation policies in both Indonesia and Brazil are strongly influenced 
by the land sparing hypothesis. The Nature Conservancy and other environmentalist actors and 
initiatives in both countries promote land use intensification as a strategy for decoupling economic 
development from deforestation. Since the late 1990s, TNC has been at the forefront of shifts in 
international conservation policy and practice towards an ‘eco-pragmatist,’ ecosystem services 
approach that eschews biodiversity-focused conservation for a focus on ‘working landscapes’ 
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(Kareiva, Marvier, and Lalasz 2012). In moving from preservationism to sustainable 
developmentalism, TNC and transnational environmental NGOs (TENGOs) have become closely 
networked with intergovernmental organizations, governments, and multi-national corporations 
across multiple levels and scales in a sustainable development complex. Within the sustainable 
development complex, an assemblage of researchers, NGOs, development organizations, 
agribusiness actors, and government policymakers coalesced in the 2000s into a global ‘land 
sparing complex.’ TNC has been central to the establishment of the land sparing complex in Brazil 
and Indonesia. 
During the 1990s and 2000s, as TNC shifted from a focus on protected areas to ‘sustainable 
production,’ land sparing emerged as a core element of the organization’s tropical forest 
conservation strategy. TNC became one of the first environmental NGOs to work with soy 
agribusiness in the Amazon, and the organization helped pioneer governance measures to support 
compliance with the Brazilian Forest Code, which requires the preservation of a proportion of 
native vegetation on private lands. TNC’s programs in Brazil intersected with government 
environmental regulation and corporate supply chain governance as the organization became part 
of land sparing coalitions that deployed new governance frameworks to achieve dramatic 
reductions in Amazonian deforestation after 2004. TNC has launched programs directly supporting 
agricultural intensification, especially for cattle ranching, in both Brazil and Mexico, as the land 
sparing hypothesis has come to infuse not just tropical forest programs, but also TNC’s entire 
‘Global Lands’ strategy. In Indonesia, the global land sparing complex has gained less purchase at 
the national level, but TNC’s conservation programs maintain a land sparing premise. TNC works 
with villages to intensify agriculture to limit deforestation and has undertaken studies comparing 
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extensive timber production through selective logging with intensive production on timber 
plantations. 
 TNC and other actors within the global land sparing complex have attempted to implement 
policies linking forest conservation and land use intensification in Indonesia, Brazil, and elsewhere 
in the tropics. In Indonesia, as in much of the tropics, forest conservation policies have been largely 
ineffective in constraining deforestation since the 1970s. Protected areas have been ‘paper parks,’ 
and new land sparing and other green growth initiatives have failed to check accelerating 
deforestation during the 2000s. I argue that conservation policies have been ineffective in 
restraining deforestation in Indonesia and many other tropical regions because these regions fall 
under extractive political-economic regimes. 
Indonesia is ruled by an extractive regime at the national level that facilitates unsustainable 
logging and plantation and mining expansion and stymies the efforts of a land sparing complex of 
primarily international actors to promote land use intensification and reduce deforestation. Tree 
plantation agriculture and plantation forestry are the primary drivers of Indonesian forest 
conversion. Although plantations are a relatively intensive mode of production, low quality inputs, 
poor land use planning, and a timber subsidy from the clearing of plantation land mean that much 
of the Indonesian plantation economy operates in an ecologically extractive mode, while local 
populations are marginalized or adversely incorporated (Hickey and Toit 2007; John McCarthy 
2010). The plantation economy is an extractive peripheral formation that contributes to long-term 
socio-ecological degradation as opposed to productivist socio-ecological development. 
Environmentalist actors advocate a productivist transformation of the plantation economy through 
a land sparing lens, promoting land use intensification (principally through the siting of plantation 
expansion on ‘degraded lands’) as well as increasing productivity of smallholder and plantation 
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agriculture. In counterpoint, the present wave of extractive plantation expansion, like the previous 
wave of extractive industrial logging, is supported by an extractive political-economic regime 
characterized by close relationships between companies, politicians, and the Indonesian military; 
concentration of authority over forestlands in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry; 
widespread corruption; and weak enforcement of environmental regulations. 
The national-level extractive regime in Indonesia is reinforced by extractive regimes at the 
provincial and district levels in my case study districts of East Kutai and Berau in East Kalimantan 
Province of eastern Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan). East Kalimantan is the primary target 
province of TNC-Indonesia’s Terrestrial Program, and these case studies were selected as similar 
districts with contrasting histories of TNC engagement. Despite declaring itself a ‘green province’ 
and receiving substantial support from bilateral programs such as the German Government’s 
Forests and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME) and a debt-for-nature swap from the US 
Government, as well as from TENGOs including TNC and WWF, the East Kalimantan provincial 
government has continued to support an extractive economy by abetting the growth of mining 
activity, primarily open pit coal extraction, and the rapid expansion of oil palm and tree fiber 
plantations. 
East Kutai district, in the northern part of the province, presents a picture of almost 
complete landscape conversion under an extractive regime, having undergone large-scale 
deforestation for tree plantations and coal mining, as well as encroachment and deforestation in 
Kutai National Park. TNC is active in East Kutai through a high-profile orangutan conservation 
project in cooperation with a local indigenous group, and more recently through forays into larger-
scale planning aimed at coordinating conservation set-asides in industrial concessions. 
‘Development’ in East Kutai has come at a cost of severe environmental degradation, yet TNC’s 
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orangutan project with the Wehea Dayak indigenous people is widely cited as a success story by 
TNC and the East Kutai government. This paradox demonstrates what I term the ‘Pyrrhic’ logic 
of conservation in the face of extraction and the positions of ‘indigeneity’ and ‘forest’ as residual 
categories in the extractive landscape, albeit with their own possibilities for commoditization. 
Berau District, East Kutai’s neighbor to the north, contains some of the largest remaining 
areas of lowland forest in Kalimantan and is the site of a major TNC REDD project. Nonetheless, 
the land sparing coalition in Berau has failed to catalyze a productivist transformation, and a 
district-level extractive regime continues to predominate. While TNC is devoting some efforts to 
oil palm sustainability, no coalition has managed to integrate district government and corporate 
actors to effectively limit plantation and mining expansion. Unable to oppose the extractive 
economy, environmentalist actors have developed a land sparing coalition focused on the control 
of villagers’ swidden agriculture as a strategy for limiting deforestation and promoting economic 
development. Industrial clearing dwarfs forest conversion in swidden systems and undermines the 
conservation gains of swidden-limiting forest governance, however, maintaining the dominance 
of extractive processes. 
These Indonesian cases demonstrate the operation of an extractive regime across multiple 
levels. Political-economic relations and institutions in Indonesia are organized to support 
extraction, and this extractive regime mediates the possibilities for forest governance and regional 
development. Efforts by international actors such as The Nature Conservancy and bilateral 
cooperation agencies are stymied by extractive structures. Even where local allies support a land 
sparing agenda, such as parts of the provincial government in East Kalimantan and the district 
government and local NGOs in Berau, these lower level productivist impulses and their goals of 
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land sparing and ecological modernization are limited and undermined by the national extractive 
regime. 
Figures 1.2-3: 1.2) Map of Indonesia showing East Kutai and Berau districts in East Kalimantan; 
1.3) Map of Brazil showing municipalities of Nova Ubiratã and Cotriguaçu in Mato Grosso and 
São Félix and Novo Progresso in Pará.  
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 In Brazil, the Amazon region has historically also been characterized by an extractive 
economy driven by ‘boom-and-bust’ resource exploitation that fails to generate longer-term 
productive circuits of accumulation. Cattle ranching in the Amazon, the land use occupying the 
majority of deforested land (Sy et al. 2015), has operated in an extractive mode reinforced by 
speculation. The productive value of the herd is often secondary to the ability to profit from future 
land sales and government subsidies. Where the exchange value of land far exceeds its productive 
value, land managers have few incentives to invest in sustainable practices (Hecht 1985). Ranchers 
consolidate large properties, frequently through coercive or illegal ‘land grabbing,’ extract the 
fertility of deforested land through unmanaged or excessive grazing, and then as pastures become 
degraded they move on to grab and clear new areas (Rodrigues et al. 2009). Since the mid-1980s, 
cattle ranching has also become widespread among smallholders (Smeraldi and May 2008), 
intensifying cycles of land degradation and frontier expansion. Insecure land tenure, especially for 
smallholders, has been a further factor promoting deforestation (to establish ownership through 
‘productive use’) and inhibiting agricultural intensification (by hindering credit access and 
discouraging capital investments) (Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 1999; W. Jepson 2006b). This 
Amazonian extractive economy has enriched loggers, ranchers, and speculators at a cost of 
deforestation, land degradation, and dispossession, without supporting regional socio-economic 
development.  
While the Amazon remained largely an extractive periphery until the 21st century, the 
Brazilian state since World War II has been controlled by a developmentalist regime promoting 
productivist modernization. During the 2000s, opposition to the Amazonian extractive economy 
from local populations, environmentalists, and productivist elements of the Brazilian state and 
transnational capital converged to assemble a land sparing complex aimed at shifting the political-
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economic regime of the Amazon region from extraction to productivism. 
The Brazilian land sparing complex deployed environmental regulation in a project of 
economic development and state-building in a way that inverted previous strategies of state 
territorialization and environmental conservation. Under the land sparing complex, territorial 
constriction became a strategy for stimulating agricultural intensification and preventing 
agricultural land expansion. The creation of protected areas to act as ‘green barriers’ to agricultural 
expansion (Soares-Filho et al. 2010) and enforcement of the Brazilian Forest Code, which requires 
that rural properties maintain a proportion of their area under natural vegetation, anchored the land 
sparing complex with territorial constriction, while support for sustainable production and tenure 
regularization were advanced in part to facilitate land sparing intensification. In the ideal 
productivist model, dynamic interactions between constriction and intensification will transform 
the political-economic regime in the Amazon region: protected area creation and Forest Code 
enforcement contribute to state-building through territorialization and produce territorial 
constriction; territorial constriction guarantees forest conservation while inducing agricultural 
intensification, which is also supported by tenure regularization and agricultural policy; 
agricultural intensification catalyzes socio-economic development; and development and state-
building are mutually reinforcing. This model is geared towards the consolidation of agro-
industrial production, and inequitable environmental enforcement contributes to smallholder 
dispossession. While this land sparing project has succeeded in dramatically reducing 
deforestation within the Amazon region, the transition to productivism has been unevenly and 
incompletely realized, and deforestation reductions have been accompanied in some areas by 
economic stagnation. Extractive interests have pushed back against the land sparing agenda, with 
a revision of the Forest Code in 2012 and efforts to weaken protected areas. The deforestation 
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trend in Brazil reversed in 2012 and annual deforestation rates have inched upwards, while the 
Temer administration that took power after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff threatens to 
reverse the Amazon’s land use transition by unleashing a new wave of extraction. 
The Nature Conservancy’s programs in Brazil at the time of research were organized into 
two eco-regional programs, one more active in Mato Grosso State and one more active in Pará 
State. My organizational ethnography and case studies incorporated both these programs, 
providing a subnational comparison of forest governance across the two most rapidly deforesting 
states in the Amazon. For each eco-regional program, I conducted two municipal-level case 
studies, selecting the municipality where TNC staff reported their projects most successful and the 
municipality where they reported greatest difficulties. 
Mato Grosso is governed by a productivist political-economic regime dominated by soy 
interests, while some extractive frontiers of ranching, logging, and mining persist in the state’s 
northwest. TNC activities in Mato Grosso traverse the boundary between expanding industrial soy 
agriculture and frontier logging and ranching areas. The large-scale forest clearing that previously 
characterized the Mato Grosso frontier has been greatly reduced by a focus on compliance with 
environmental regulations concurrent with soy expansion into pastureland and ranching 
intensification, transforming the state from an extractive to a productivist economy. During the 
1990s and early 2000s, Mato Grosso was the state with the highest annual deforestation in the 
Amazon, but after 2006, it was overtaken by Pará, where a more heterogeneous frontier has 
presented greater difficulties for forest governance and the transition from extraction to production. 
In Mato Grosso, I compare the municipalities of Nova Ubiratã and Cotriguaçu. Nova 
Ubiratã is the municipality most integrated into a productivist, agro-industrial economy out of the 
four Brazilian cases. Favored by its location along the BR-163 agricultural corridor, Nova Ubiratã 
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has experienced rapid growth in soy production, which has helped drive ranching intensification. 
TNC was successful in a project promoting municipal compliance with environmental regulations, 
supported by a modernizing, technocratic mayor. Today, Nova Ubiratã is a post-frontier 
municipality with little forest area that could legally be open to conversion, approximating the 
productivist, ecologically-modernized landscape envisaged by land sparing advocates. 
Cotriguaçu is the opposite of Nova Ubiratã in that the municipality has stagnated as a zone 
of extraction. A REDD project in Cotriguaçu initially planned with TNC was subsequently led by 
a local NGO, and TNC’s follow-up activities in the municipality have been plagued by difficulties. 
Timber extraction in the municipality is seen to be on the decline, and ranching is not very 
profitable due to isolation and poor terrain. TNC worked with a consortium to lay the groundwork 
for a REDD project in Cotriguaçu beginning around 2008, but then decided to focus its efforts on 
São Félix do Xingu in Pará as the more dynamic and geographically critical frontier zone, ceding 
leadership of the Cotriguaçu project to ICV, a Mato Grosso NGO. Assembled through the REDD 
project, a relatively strong land sparing coalition in Cotriguaçu has supported Forest Code 
enforcement and ranching intensification. The municipality remains an area firmly in the 
periphery, however, where commercial activity is primarily extractive logging and ranching, and 
despite productivist policies at the federal, state, and municipal levels, there are few material 
prospects for more productivist economic activity. 
The Mato Grosso municipalities, differentiated primarily by the geography of the soy 
frontier, represent the more extreme cases of a productivist economy (Nova Ubiratã) and an 
extractive economy (Cotriguaçu) of the four Amazonian cases, while the Pará municipalities 
represent active frontier zones that have been the most dynamic spaces for the application of a land 
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sparing forest governance agenda aimed at the political-economic transformation of the extractive 
frontier. 
Between 1988 and 2013, Pará was responsible for 33 percent of total deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon, and since 2006 it has been the state with the highest annual deforestation rate. 
The state is characterized by extractive frontiers dominated by forest conversion to cattle pasture, 
while logging and mining interests remain important to the economy and state politics. 
Nonetheless, the state government has largely supported a land sparing agenda and productivist 
transition, through measures such as development of a rural environmental registry and creation 
of a statewide ‘Green Municipalities Program.’ I compare the municipalities of São Félix do Xingu 
(São Félix), site of a major TNC REDD program, and Novo Progresso, where a TNC project was 
largely unsuccessful and the organization subsequently left the municipality. 
 In São Félix, protected area creation closed the deforestation frontier, and command and 
control actions have strongly reduced predatory extractive activities. Constriction strengthened 
state territorialization and stimulated the integration of the municipal government and ranchers’ 
syndicate into a municipal land sparing coalition. Land sparing policies have not yet translated into 
widespread agricultural intensification and socio-economic development, however, leaving the 
municipality economically paralyzed as NGOs and government seek ways to overcome barriers to 
intensification. Meanwhile, the imposition of punitive measures without corresponding positive 
incentives disproportionately impacts smallholders, contributing to the exit of family farmers from 
the rural zone and the consolidation of large-scale ranching operations. 
 In Novo Progresso, the creation of protected areas was heavily contested. Command and 
control actions from the federal government largely failed to curtail land grabbing in the Jamanxim 
National Forest (FLONA), despite substantial reductions in deforestation at the municipal level. 
 
	
	
30 
Resistance to the FLONA stems from its creation in an area of active occupation and strong 
expansionary pressures, while the strictly protected areas in São Félix were created in zones still 
relatively remote and sparsely occupied. In addition to the difficulties of the federal government 
in implementing the FLONA, NGOs have been unable to gain traction, stymied by the municipal 
extractive regime. While TNC attempted to establish a presence in support of Forest Code 
compliance, it faced strong resistance and left the municipality without attaining its project goals. 
In a context of only partial constriction, few positive incentives from agricultural policy or tenure 
regularization, and municipal politics abetting extractive expansion, ranching intensification has 
been weak, while initial pasture-to-cropland conversions have been linked to the approach of the 
soy frontier. Recent events have continued to undermine constriction and facilitate agricultural 
expansion. In December 2016, in a victory for extractive coalitions, the Temer government 
announced a 43 percent reduction of FLONA Jamanxim, decreasing the strictly-protected area in 
Novo Progresso by 30 percent and legalizing extensive landgrabs. 
The differential effectiveness of land sparing coalitions in the two municipalities in Pará, 
resulting in effective constriction and stagnation in São Félix and ineffective constriction and 
extractive expansion in Novo Progresso, is explained primarily by differential investment in 
governance by external actors, coupled with frontier geography and the indirect effects of pasture-
to-cropland intensification. 
The Brazilian case studies illuminate conditions for the implementation of the Amazonian 
land sparing agenda. Territorial constriction is necessary but not sufficient for land sparing 
intensification. The effectiveness of constriction depends on how it is imposed and existing 
pressures in an area. Without constriction, deforestation may continue even as intensification 
occurs. With constriction, intensification should allow for increasing agricultural production over 
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a constant area, but intensification is not the inevitable outcome of land scarcity. Intensification 
through individual investment is occurring on some large properties, but more widespread 
intensification requires either arrival of the row-crop frontier or additional investments by land 
sparing coalitions. A key question for the future is thus whether the land sparing complex can 
effectively catalyze ranching intensification through constriction and positive incentives absent 
land pressure from industrial row-cropping. 
The Brazilian Amazon provides an empirical example of a regional transformation from 
an extractive to a productivist political-economic regime. In the Amazon, we see how policy, 
promulgated through higher-order political economic regimes and complexes, can steer 
development trajectories, and how peripheral regions can be ‘modernized.’ The success of the 
Brazilian land sparing complex, and the Amazonian productivist transformation, are nonetheless 
partial and incomplete, having advanced further in Mato Grosso than in Pará, and further in Nova 
Ubiratã and São Félix than in Cotriguaçu and Novo Progresso. As productivist centers grow in the 
socio-economic poles of the urban Amazon (Browder and Godfrey 1997; Garcia, Soares-Filho, 
and Sawyer 2007), extractive zones remain in areas that are remote or where land sparing coalitions 
are weak, due primarily to factors of physical and economic geography. All regional economies 
are an uneven mix of extraction and production, contrary to modernization perspectives that tend 
to view nations or regions as homogenous units. Political-economic regimes do operate at defined 
levels, however, and in the case of the Amazonian political-economic regime, the establishment 
of productivist politics and institutions is still incipient. The prospect of an extractive resurgence 
under the Temer administration may further counter the land sparing project and the productivist 
vision of articulated socio-economic development. 
 
	
	
32 
 Political-economic regimes, like the productivist regime in Brazil and the extractive regime 
in Indonesia, mediate the effectiveness of land sparing policy and determine regional development 
trajectories. Regimes are mutable. Efforts by the Brazilian land sparing complex to shift the 
Amazonian economy from extraction to production have resulted in an over 70 percent reduction 
in deforestation rates since 2004. Productivist modernization is not a global solution to tropical 
deforestation, however. Production and extraction are integrally interdependent. Deforestation 
reductions and the productivist transition in the Amazon have displaced extraction elsewhere, 
driving accelerating agricultural expansion and ecological destruction in the coupled frontiers of 
the Brazilian Cerrado tropical savanna region, the Paraguayan Chaco woodlands, and the 
rainforests of the extra-Brazilian Amazon. Displacement also operates more indirectly through the 
world system, accelerating deforestation in other zones of tropical extraction such as Indonesia. 
As deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has declined, global tropical deforestation has 
accelerated by over 2100 km2 per year (Hansen et al. 2013). Land sparing, I argue, is a fallacy. It 
highlights local improvements while ignoring global degradation. Land sparing and other socio-
environmental modernization agendas persist because they support industrial development and 
state-building, but they have negative global social and ecological impacts. 
Implications 
 This study demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of some of the existing literatures 
on the politics of socio-ecological change. With regard to the political ecology approach, I find 
that focusing on contestation around ecological distribution conflicts provides valuable insights at 
the local and regional levels, but more systemic analysis requires a robust theoretical framework, 
which political ecology does not contain. The distinctiveness of political ecology lies in its focus 
on the actions of resource users and their linkages to broader processes (Blaikie and Brookfield 
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1987; Peluso 1992b; Watts and Peet 2004). This is not to say that political ecology is caught in a 
‘local trap’ (Brown and Purcell 2005) so much as that political ecology is rooted in land managers 
and the labor process, and at broader scales, where some scholars have advocated a ‘global political 
ecology’ (Peet, Robbins, and Watts 2011), it blurs into macro-level critical political economy, 
where more explicit theoretical frames, such as ecological Marxism and world systems, are 
available to orient systemic analysis. 
 With regard to the literatures on multi-level governance and socio-ecological 
modernization, I find that institutions play a key role in the development process and that 
‘development’ is key to trajectories of environmental change. Tropical forest policy has reduced 
deforestation in Brazil but not in Indonesia due to the construction of particular governance 
institutions within a project of productivist developmental transformation. The decoupling of 
industrial agricultural growth from deforestation works only regionally, however, displacing 
extractive and expansionary processes to other regions. Socio-ecological modernization is thus a 
partial narrative that commits a fallacy of composition, mistakenly believing that local 
improvements indicate the pathway to global sustainability. 
 This study builds an alternative theoretical framework from geographical political 
economy and development sociology to show that capitalist development operates through a 
dialectic of extraction and production. This dialectic is stabilized and governed by political-
economic regimes, while projects of political-economic transformation are advanced by 
complexes and coalitions linked to different fractions of capital. I use this framework to explain 
why forest conservation efforts in Indonesia have been largely unsuccessful, and to demonstrate 
how and why a complex of powerful actors has come together to reduce deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon, though at a cost of smallholder dispossession and frontier displacement. These 
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findings advance our understanding of the political ecology and political economy of tropical land 
use change and development, while contributing to our empirical and theoretical understandings 
of the sociology and geography of the global political economy. My finding that Amazonian 
deforestation reductions deliver minimal global benefits contradicts efforts to situate Brazil as a 
global model for conservation. Rather, contrary to the land sparing hypothesis, this research 
implies that forest conservation and agro-industrial development are fundamentally irreconcilable. 
More broadly, contrary to socio-environmental modernization theories, capitalist development 
cannot be sustainable, because it depends fundamentally on expanding ecological extraction. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized into three parts. Part I continues in Chapter 2 with a 
discussion of key empirical concepts, research design, and methods. I define forest and 
deforestation, discuss how deforestation is measured, and review research on historical 
deforestation trends. I then discuss different approaches to studying socio-ecological relations and 
global political-economic phenomena. I explain my research focus on Brazil and Indonesia and 
my decision to focus on the programs of a transnational environmental actor, The Nature 
Conservancy. I explicate the research design, which combines organizational ethnography with 
nested municipal case studies, and I describe my methods, which included over two years of 
transnational fieldwork. In Chapter 3, I explain the history of the land sparing hypothesis and its 
relation to modernization perspectives in conservation biology. I then present my alternative 
theoretical framework centered on the relation between extraction and production and the political 
organization of the capitalist world system. 
 Part II comprises the empirical chapters of the dissertation. Chapter 4 focuses on The 
Nature Conservancy. I trace the rise of land sparing as the core of TNC’s forest conservation and 
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sustainable development strategy, drawing on interviews with TNC staff and my organizational 
ethnography of TNC’s tropical forest conservation programs. This history provides a background 
for understanding TNC programs in Brazil and Indonesia and the epistemic underpinnings of the 
land sparing complex. Chapter 5 describes forest governance and land use change in two districts 
of East Kalimantan, Indonesia, where land sparing and other forest conservation efforts have been 
hindered by Indonesia’s extractive political-economic regime. Chapter 6 then explains how a land 
sparing complex of government, NGO, and corporate actors coalesced in Brazil to drive 
deforestation reductions in the Amazon as part of a strategy of economic development and state-
building through environmental governance, with the ultimate goal of shifting the regional 
economy from a mode of extraction to a productivist mode of articulated, broad-based 
development. I illustrate variation in forest governance and its socio-economic and ecological 
effects across four different municipalities in two different states within the eastern Amazonian 
‘arc of deforestation,’ demonstrating the partial and incomplete realization of the Amazon’s 
productivist transformation. Chapter 7 examines displacement, showing that regional reductions 
in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon have been offset by the development of new frontiers in 
the Brazilian Cerrado and neighboring countries including Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru. 
 Part III consists of Chapter 8, which concludes the dissertation. Extraction and production 
are integrally linked across scales; thus I maintain that ‘land sparing’ is a fallacy that highlights 
local improvements while ignoring global degradation. Land sparing and other socio-
environmental modernization agendas persist because they support industrial development and 
state-building, but they have negative global social and ecological impacts. Alternatives abound, 
but in order to realize them we must first abandon the myth of ecological modernization. 
  
 
	
	
36 
CHAPTER 2 
WHAT IS DEFORESTATION AND HOW CAN WE STUDY IT? 
BACKGROUND, FRAMEWORKS, AND METHODS 
In this chapter, I provide background on forests, the drivers of forest cover change, and 
historical deforestation trends in Brazil and Indonesia. I then discuss different conceptual 
frameworks and methodologies for the study of global environmental governance, and I describe 
my research design and methods for studying tropical forest governance in a comparative and 
transnational perspective. 
What Is a Forest, Why Is It Important, and How Is It Measured? 
‘Forest’ in the modern usage refers to “an area covered by trees” (Lund 2002, 21). The 
etymology of forest is usually traced to the Latin foris, meaning ‘outside,’ and denoted an area 
‘beyond.’ Forestis silva were “the outside woods,” which generally comprised royal hunting 
grounds (Harrison 1992, 69). For the contemporary meaning, Lund (2002) finds that most 
definitions of forest refer to either an administrative unit, a type of land cover, or a type of land 
use. As environmental policies target deforestation at national and global levels, including under 
a UN-sanctioned international REDD mechanism, forest definitions play an increasingly important 
role in structuring the transformation of tropical landscapes. 
Putz and Redford emphasize that “There is a clear need for widely accepted definitions of 
forest, deforestation, forest degradation, and forest restoration that are politically expedient but 
culturally sensitive, ecologically reasonable, and technologically feasible. The danger of overly 
simple definitions is that they can obscure substantial losses in what most people value as forest” 
(2010, 12). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for example, which since 1946 has 
been one of the primary international bodies monitoring forests, defines forest as “Land spanning 
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more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than 5 meters and a canopy cover of more than 10 percent, 
or trees able to reach these thresholds in situ. It does not include land that is predominantly under 
agricultural or urban land use,” and excludes agricultural tree plantations (FAO 2010, 6). Putz and 
Redford note that the FAO’s distinction between natural forests and plantations is “often 
overlooked” and was not reflected in the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, such that “under the guidelines of the Kyoto Protocol, old growth natural forests 
could be defaunated, clear-cut, or replaced by monoclonal stands of genetically modified exotic 
tree species grown for oil or fiber on 5–10 year rotations with no change in ‘forest’ cover” (2010, 
12). While recognizing that forest inherently “will remain something of a social construct,” Putz 
and Redford propose a classification system focused on ecosystem structure and composition that 
is based on “old growth forest” as a reference state, in which specificities may vary according to 
forest type, but which is characterized by old trees and associated structural characteristics and has 
not been substantially modified in composition (through silviculture) or in structure (through 
degradation processes such as uncontrolled harvesting, pollution, species invasion, or fire). 
Putz and Redford’s classification effort reflects a concern for the multiple values or 
‘ecosystem services’ provided by forests. Deforestation is the second-largest source of 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions after fossil fuel combustion (van der Werf et al. 2009), 
and humid tropical forests are among the most carbon-dense forest types (Saatchi et al. 2011), 
making tropical deforestation a major driver of global climate change (Harris et al. 2012). Humid 
tropical forests are also the most biodiverse terrestrial ecosystems (Forseth 2012) and provide 
important hydrological services at regional and continental scales, including water purification and 
regulation of rainfall and river flow critical for economic activities such as agriculture and 
hydropower generation (Sheil and Murdiyarso 2009; Arraut et al. 2012; Makarieva et al. 2014; 
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Stickler et al. 2013). Forests have important cultural and aesthetic values, and the UN estimates 
that 300 million people live in forests, while over 1.6 billion people depend on forests for their 
livelihoods (United Nations 2011). Tropical deforestation is thus central to global trends of climate 
change, biodiversity loss, and the transformation of rural societies and regional economies. 
Definitions of forest in Brazil and Indonesia capture only some of the myriad values 
associated with forest ecosystems. The Amazon Basin in South America contains the largest 
contiguous area of humid tropical forest in the world. Several political and geographic designations 
structure forest policy in the Brazilian Amazon. Since the 1950s, the Brazilian Federal Government 
has engaged in development planning that specially targets the country’s northern and western 
interior. The ‘Legal Amazon’ region was designated by Law 1806 on 06 January 1953 and took 
its present form with Brazil’s 1988 Constitution to include the states of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, 
Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins, and the state of Maranhão to the west of 44° 
West longitude. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) defines biomes in 
Brazil as “a formation of flora and fauna constituted by a regionally contiguous and identifiable 
grouping of vegetation types, characterized by similar geoclimatic conditions and a common 
history of change, which produces a distinct assemblage of biological diversity,” and it 
distinguishes the Amazon Biome on the basis of its “climatic unity, forest structure, and 
geographical location” (IBGE 2004). At 4,196,943 km2, the Amazon Biome covers 49 percent of 
the Brazilian territory and is located entirely within the Legal Amazon region. 
Forest clearing in the Amazon Biome is monitored by the Brazilian National Institute for 
Space Research (INPE), whose data form the basis for the Brazilian Government’s policies for 
combatting deforestation. Since 1988, INPE’s PRODES program has used Landsat satellite 
imagery to annually report deforestation of areas over 6.25 ha in the Amazon. INPE defines 
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deforestation as the clear-cutting of primary forest, meaning that forest degradation that stops short 
of full conversion to an alternative land cover is not reported. Furthermore, once an area has been 
clear-cut, it is considered permanently deforested, so secondary forest regrowth is not considered 
in deforestation calculations. Detection of deforestation via satellite can also be impeded by cloud 
cover. Deforestation under cloud cover may go unobserved for one or several years, and while 
INPE makes estimates of unobserved deforestation, cloud cover affects the uncertainty of yearly 
estimates (Câmara, Valeriano, and Soares 2006), especially at smaller scales where the percentage 
of cloud cover may be substantial. Brazil has been highly successful at reducing Amazonian 
deforestation according to these definitions. At the same time, the government’s definition of 
Amazonian deforestation and its focus on combatting deforestation in the Amazon lead to a 
number of occlusions and collateral effects. Land conversion may be displaced from the Amazon 
to other biomes, such as the Cerrado savanna region, which have less restrictive governance, while 
within the Amazon, actors may avoid large-scale clear-cuts in favor of degradation, small-scale 
clearing, or recutting of secondary forest areas (WWF 2011; Davidson et al. 2012; Rosa, Souza, 
and Ewers 2012; Godar et al. 2014; Oliveira and Hecht 2016). 
In Indonesia, ‘forest’ has been first and foremost an administrative definition. Beginning 
in the colonial period, and continuing after Indonesian independence in 1945, the demarcation and 
management of “political forests,” or “lands states declare as forests,” has been a fundamental 
component of state-building and economic development (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001). The 
Basic Forestry Law of 1967, promulgated by Suharto’s ‘New Order’ government, designated 74 
percent of Indonesia’s surface area as ‘forest estate’ (kawasan hutan), which fell under the control 
of the central government’s Ministry of Forestry. Within the forest estate, areas are classified 
according to permitted land uses, which under the Consensus Forest Land Use Plan (Tata Guna 
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Hutan Kesepakatan, TGHK), created in the early 1980s, comprise nature reserve or conservation 
areas, protection forests, limited production forests, normal production forests, and conversion 
forests. Conservation and reserve forests are geared to the protection of biodiversity and ecosystem 
function, protection forests are intended to protect soil and hydrological functions, limited 
production forests are open to low-intensity selective logging, normal production forests are open 
to more intensive logging, and conversion forests may be fully logged and converted to agricultural 
or other land uses, at which point they are excised from the forest estate and reclassified as ‘other 
use areas’ (Areal Penggunaan Lain, APL). These classifications are ostensibly based on 
topographic and climatic characteristics, including slope, soil type, and rainfall intensity, but they 
were decided without regard for local land uses or existing land cover (Peluso 1995), and it is not 
uncommon for land within the forest estate to be highly degraded or occupied by settlements or 
agricultural land uses. 
 Large-scale mapping of land cover in Indonesia began in the late 1980s with the 
government’s RePPProt project (Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration), 
which used Landsat imagery and aerial photography to support regional planning, especially for 
internal migration programs linked to agricultural plantation development (Peluso 1995). The 
Indonesian Government did not undertake regular, comprehensive, remote sensing-based forest 
cover monitoring as was done in Brazil, however, and so reliable land cover data were available 
only piecemeal and at irregular intervals (e.g., Fuller, Jessup, and Salim 2004) until the late 2000s. 
In 2009, enabled by advances in satellite imagery availability and processing capacity and inspired 
by new programs for near-real time deforestation monitoring in Brazil, a team led by David 
Wheeler at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC launched Forest Monitoring 
for Action (FORMA), a remote sensing-based system using MODIS imagery that tracked tropical 
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deforestation initially at one-month intervals with a resolution of 1 km2 (Hammer, Kraft, and 
Wheeler 2009; Kraft 2014). FORMA permitted more fine-grained spatial and temporal analysis of 
tropical deforestation, including in Indonesia, from 2006 onwards (Wheeler, Kraft, and Hammer 
2011; Wheeler et al. 2011). At the same time, a team led by Matthew Hansen of the University of 
Maryland was developing global forest change maps using higher-resolution Landsat imagery 
(Hansen et al. 2008; Hansen, Stehman, and Potapov 2010). In 2009, Hansen et al. released an 
analysis of Indonesian deforestation for two periods, from 1990-2000 and 2000-2005, which 
showed much higher average annual clearing in the 1990s, but a “near-monotonic increase” in 
clearing from 2000 to 2005 (Hansen et al. 2009). The extremely high rates of forest loss in the 
1990s, however, were substantially driven by massive forest loss due to fires during the 1997-1998 
El Niño (Siegert and Hoffmann 2000; Fuller, Jessup, and Salim 2004). 
 In 2013, Hansen et al. revealed their high-resolution global forest change maps, which 
tracked forest loss and gain from 2000 to 2012 at a spatial resolution of 30 meters. The Hansen 
study considered trees as vegetation higher than 5 meters, and considered forest loss as stand-
replacement disturbance, reporting loss figures on an annual basis for different densities of canopy 
cover. The Hansen maps track forest cover without regard to land use, so forest loss may represent 
harvesting in a tree plantation, for example. Nonetheless, the Hansen data represented a milestone 
by providing internally-consistent, spatially explicit quantifications of forest loss and gain, as well 
as annual estimates allowing for analysis of forest loss trends (Hansen et al. 2013). In particular, 
Hansen et al. highlighted “converging rates of forest disturbance” in Indonesia and Brazil, 
estimating that forest loss in Brazil slowed by an average of 1318 km2 per year in 2000-2012, 
while forest loss in Indonesia accelerated by 1021 km2 per year (Hansen et al. 2013, 850). 
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 FORMA and the Hansen data were brought together in Global Forest Watch (GFW), an 
online forest monitoring and alert system launched in 2014 by a partnership fronted by the World 
Resources Institute. With regard to deforestation statistics, GFW has translated the advances of the 
Hansen dataset into an interactive platform, providing globally consistent, spatially explicit annual 
forest loss estimates from 2000 onwards.6 While Brazil continues to monitor Amazonian 
deforestation with its own definitions under government programs, GFW currently provides the 
only publicly-available, regularly-updated, remote sensing-based annual quantification of  
national-level deforestation in Indonesia. GFW data have the added benefit of global consistency, 
meaning GFW forest loss figures for Indonesia are directly comparable to GFW figures for Brazil. 
A substantial amount of tree clearing in Indonesia occurs within plantations, however, so GFW 
forest loss data may not immediately indicate the conversion of natural forests. Margono et al. 
(2014) address this issue by layering the Hansen data with a map of primary forests in Indonesia, 
which they define as “mature forests of 5 ha or more in extent that retain their natural composition 
and structure and have not been completely cleared in recent history (at least 30 years in age)” 
(Supplement, 2). They provide annual estimates of primary deforestation in Indonesia in 2000-
2012, showing that primary forest cover loss increased by an average of 476 km2 per year during 
this period, and by 2012, primary deforestation in Indonesia exceeded deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon (Figure 1.1). GFW also provides estimates of the amount of forest loss 
occurring outside of plantations in Brazil and Indonesia in 2013 and 2014. These data indicate that 
in 2013-2014, loss of forests with over 30 percent canopy density outside of plantations in 
Indonesia averaged 7330 km2 per year, while PRODES figures for Amazonian deforestation in 
2013-2014 averaged 5452 km2 per year. 
																																																						
6 Global Forest Watch currently provides annual tree cover loss estimates through 2015. 
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 The different definitions of forest in Indonesia as an administrative area and land use, and 
the lack of an ongoing and transparent government monitoring program for forest cover, have had 
myriad repercussions for forest policy and land use change. To give one example related to the 
control of deforestation, in 2010 the Government of Norway pledged up to $1 billion to support 
REDD in Indonesia. One of the conditions of the Norway agreement was an Indonesian 
moratorium on new concessions “for conversion of peat and natural forest” (Government of 
Norway/Government of Indonesia 2010, 3). Accordingly, in 2011, the Government of Indonesia 
announced a two-year moratorium on the issuance of new licenses in “primary natural forest” and 
peatlands (Government of Indonesia 2011a). The qualification of the moratorium by the 
Government of Indonesia to specifically ‘primary’ forests narrowed its potential scope, as 
Murdiyarso et al. (2011) note that a broader definition of ‘natural forests’ would have more than 
doubled the amount of forest area covered by the moratorium. Furthermore, ‘primary natural 
forest’ was not previously a forest category included in Indonesia’s official forest classification 
system, which refers to allowable land uses as opposed to existing forest cover. Murdiyarso et al. 
report that the Ministry of Forestry interpreted ‘primary natural forest’ to mean areas where no 
forest use licenses had ever been issued. The moratorium was accompanied by an Indicative 
Moratorium Map, and launched a process of continual revisions to reflect actual land cover, 
concession status, and forest zoning, for which no harmonized official map has previously existed 
(P. Wells, Franklin, and Paoli 2011; Koh et al. 2011). Observers have hoped that this process will 
enhance data quality and transparency and support more targeted and accountable forest 
governance (Murdiyarso et al. 2011; Austin, Sheppard, and Stolle 2012). 
My concern in this dissertation is with the broad range of ecological and social values 
related to forests. Most tropical forest conservation policy is directed at reducing primary forest 
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clearing and preserving ‘old growth’ forest. Accordingly, these policies and their effects are the 
principal focus of my research, but I endeavor throughout to situate these policies within broader 
dynamics of land use and land cover change across complex landscapes of agricultural and forest 
land uses and ecological succession. 
What Drives Deforestation? 
Since the Neolithic Revolution, agriculture has been the primary driver of anthropogenic 
deforestation (M. Williams 2006), and most tropical forest land cleared in modern times has been 
converted to agriculture (Ramankutty and Foley 1999; Gibbs et al. 2010; Sy et al. 2015). 
Agricultural expansion interacts with wood extraction and infrastructure extension as proximate 
causes of deforestation, which are determined by numerous underlying drivers including 
demographic, economic, technological, political-institutional, cultural, and environmental factors 
(Geist and Lambin 2002). Wheeler et al. (2011), for example, model Indonesian forest clearing 
with reference to prices and demands for palm oil and wood products, the exchange rate, the real 
interest rate, land-use zoning, forest protection status, the estimated opportunity cost of forest land, 
local governance quality, the poverty rate, population density, communications infrastructure, 
transport cost, local rainfall, and terrain slope. 
Although international markets play a key role in structuring regional land economies 
(Wheeler et al. 2011; Lambin et al. 2001), policies and institutions also play a critical role at 
multiple levels in determining the economic geographies of infrastructure, forestry, and 
agriculture. Brazil, in particular, demonstrates how governance changes can strongly affect 
deforestation rates, as strong policies led to declines in deforestation in the late 2000s, despite 
increasing agricultural profitability (Assunção, Gandour, and Rocha 2012; Macedo et al. 2012). 
Deforestation is better understood, therefore, not as a simple economic question, but as a question 
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of political economy, or better still, political ecology. From this perspective, the geographies of 
capitalist production emerge through dialectical political and ecological relations. I elaborate on 
this perspective in my discussion of conceptual frameworks for socio-ecological research, but first 
I address the historical deforestation patterns and specific dynamics of agricultural frontier 
expansion in the Amazon and Kalimantan. 
Historical Deforestation Patterns in Brazil and Indonesia 
Remote-sensing based calculations of annual deforestation rates have only been available 
since the late 1980s in Brazil and the 2000s in Indonesia, but studies using Landsat imagery are 
able to produce historical baselines of forest cover stretching back to the mid-1970s (INPE 1989; 
Skole and Tucker 1993; Gaveau et al. 2014). (The first Landsat satellite was launched in 1972.) 
We can thus produce a hazy picture of historical deforestation rates stretching back to the early 
years of large-scale clearing in the Brazilian Amazon and Indonesian Borneo, which comes into 
sharper annual focus in 1988 in Brazil and in 2000 in Indonesia. The following figures compile 
data from remote-sensing based studies of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, Indonesia, and 
Kalimantan. 
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Figures 2.1-3: Historical deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, Indonesia, and Indonesian 
Borneo, 2.1) Legal Amazon historical deforestation; 2.2) Indonesia historical deforestation; 2.3) 
Kalimantan historical deforestation. 
These figures highlight several important points. First, they confirm that deforestation in 
the Amazon has since 2004 dropped to historically low levels, while deforestation in Indonesia, 
and in Kalimantan in particular, has accelerated during the 2000s to reach historically high levels. 
It should be noted that Indonesian deforestation figures from Margono et al. (2014) and Gaveau et 
al. (2016) that appear to constitute a lower estimate refer only to primary forest loss, whereas 
Global Forest Watch figures reflect all forest clearing on an annual basis, and Hansen et al. (2009), 
Miettinen et al. (2011), and Gaveau et al. (2014) reflect all forest loss across multi-year periods, 
which I have divided to give annual loss estimates. (Multi-year estimates from Gaveau et al. (2016) 
have also been divided for annual estimates.) 
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Second, Indonesian deforestation data for the 1990s are distorted by massive forest loss in 
1997-1998 related to El Niño droughts and fires, which far exceeded the background rate of 
anthropogenic clearing (Fuller, Jessup, and Salim 2004; Hansen et al. 2009). The 1995 spike in 
Amazonian clearing was also caused by fires linked to El Niño conditions (Lindsey 2004). 
Macroeconomic conditions and political cycles contribute to fluctuations as well. Fearnside (2005) 
attributes the 1987-1991 decline in Amazonian deforestation to Brazil’s economic recession, and 
Rodrigues-Filho et al. (2015) claim that the 1995 and 2004 spikes were partly driven by 
institutional instability associated with Brazilian presidential elections. Hansen et al. (2009) 
associate lower Indonesian deforestation rates in the early 2000s with reduced oil palm expansion 
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and overthrow of the Suharto government. At the 
same time, the 1997-1998 fires had left ample deforested land open for plantation expansion, 
temporarily reducing pressures for new deforestation. 
Variation in aggregate deforestation rates is a function of interwoven climatic, economic, 
and political factors. El Niño fires in Kalimantan and the Amazon, for example, are not purely 
‘natural’ disasters. In the Amazon, El Niño years in the early 1990s may have left the forest more 
susceptible to fire, such that a spike in government-sponsored small farmer migration in 1995 led 
to widespread accidental burning beyond the usual levels of small farmer deforestation. In 
Kalimantan, unsustainable logging practices left forests severely degraded and more susceptible 
to drought and fire, which dramatically intensified the conflagrations of the 1997-1998 El Niño 
(Dauvergne 1998; Gellert 1998). Large-scale deforestation dynamics cannot be explained by 
discrete, independent variables; rather, they emerge out of complex socio-ecological systems. In 
both the Amazon and Kalimantan from the 1970s to the early 2000s, these systems were extractive 
political-economic regimes that drove high levels of deforestation, not in a linear fashion, but 
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rather through cyclical spikes and crashes within a secular trend of frontier expansion. After 2004, 
that extractive dynamic in Brazil began to shift, as the Brazilian land sparing complex sought to 
transform the Amazonian economy from a mode of extraction to a mode of production. This 
transformation is reflected in the decline in Amazonian deforestation rates to levels far below the 
historical extractive baseline. 
Agricultural Development, Deforestation, and Land Sparing 
In both Brazil and Indonesia, the majority of deforested land is converted to agriculture. In 
the Brazilian Amazon, deforested land is converted primarily to cattle pasture. The Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation’s (Embrapa) TerraClass project found that 62 percent of 
Amazonian land deforested up to 2008 was under pasture (Embrapa 2011), while Margulis (2004) 
estimates that pastures may occupy up to 88 percent of deforested area in the Amazon, a figure 
consistent with Sy et al.’s (2015) national-level finding that in 1990-2005, 82 percent of deforested 
land in Brazil was converted to pasture. The expansion of the ranching frontier in Brazil is driven 
in part by the expansion of the industrial field agriculture frontier, particularly soy cultivation 
(Arima et al. 2011; Richards, Walker, and Arima 2014; Richards 2015). Most deforested land is 
not converted directly to soy; rather, soy cultivation expands in former pasture areas, and the effect 
of soy production on regional land markets and the displacement of cattle ranching push the 
ranching frontier deeper into the Amazon. 
In Kalimantan, industrial logging usually precedes forest conversion for oil palm or tree 
fiber plantations, while roughly a third of deforestation is due to other agricultural activities, 
including clearing by smallholders. Abood et al. (2015) find that 66 percent of forest loss in 
Kalimantan in 2000-2010 occurred in industrial concessions for tree fiber, oil palm, logging, and 
mining, with 23 percent of forest loss in oil palm plantations. This percentage for oil palm is 
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consistent with Carlson et al. (2012), who report that in 2007-2008, 27 percent of deforestation in 
their West Kalimantan study region was for oil palm. 
Under the extractive regimes that have operated since the 1970s, industrial agricultural 
production in both the Amazon and Kalimantan has been closely linked to deforestation. This 
relationship continues in Kalimantan, where in 1990-2010, 90 percent of lands converted to oil 
palm were forested (Carlson, Curran, Asner, et al. 2012). Oil palm yields on large plantations in 
Indonesia have increased only marginally since the mid-1990s. Figure 2.4 shows that the increase 
in palm oil production in Indonesia since 2000 has been closely correlated with the expansion of 
plantation area, and both are positively correlated with Indonesia’s increasing deforestation rate. 
 
Figure 2.4: Oil palm area, palm oil production, and deforestation in Indonesia. Increases in 
production are driven by expansion as opposed to yield increases, and expansion drives 
increasing deforestation. Palm oil production on large plantations in metric tons is from BPS 
(2017b), oil palm area on large plantations in hectares is from BPS (2017a), forest loss at >30 
percent canopy density in square kilometers is from Global Forest Watch (Hansen et al. 2013), 
all values have been standardized for comparison. 
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In the Amazon, rising soy and cattle production were correlated with increasing 
deforestation until 2004, when new governance measures coincided with a dive in commodity 
prices, and deforestation and soy production both declined. After 2006, however, commodity 
prices recovered and soy and cattle production increased, while deforestation continued to decline. 
Macedo et al. (2012) describe a ‘decoupling’ of soy production from deforestation in Mato Grosso 
State after 2006 as yield increases comprised a greater proportion of production growth, cropland 
expansion became concentrated almost entirely on previously cleared land, and pasture expansion 
declined significantly. This dynamic of declining deforestation and rising agricultural production 
occurred at a regional scale. Figure 2.5 shows the standardized relationships between deforestation, 
soy production, and the size of the cattle herd in Pará State in 1990-2015, where as in Mato Grosso, 
soy and cattle production increased after 2007 while deforestation declined. 
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Figure 2.5: Soy, cattle, and deforestation in Pará. Soy production in metric tons is from IBGE 
(2016d), cattle herd in number of head is from IBGE (2016c), deforestation in square kilometers 
is from INPE (2017), all values standardized for comparison. 
 Increasing agricultural production concurrent with decreasing deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon has been considered an example of land sparing (Macedo et al. 2012; Arvor et 
al. 2012; Brando et al. 2013; Nepstad et al. 2013; Oliveira and Hecht 2016), which posits that 
agricultural intensification can spare land for environmental conservation. Land sparing has 
become the lens through which the Brazilian land use transition is explained (Lapola et al. 2013), 
as well as the policy prescription that government, NGO, and academic actors take as the lesson 
of the Brazilian experience. While it is clear that Amazonian deforestation has declined, 
agricultural production has increased, and ranching and cropland intensification has occurred in 
some areas, it is unclear that cattle production has decoupled from deforestation at the regional 
level. The rate of cattle herd expansion in the Amazon slowed after 2004, and the Legal Amazon 
added fewer cattle per hectare deforested in 2005-2014 than in 1995-2004 (IBGE 2016c; INPE 
2017). Large-scale deforestation continues for the establishment of extensive ranching operations, 
but the primary driver of these operations in many cases is not cattle production, but rather land 
speculation (Hecht 1985; Hecht 1993; Bowman et al. 2012). The relationship between agricultural 
intensification and deforestation is more complex than the ‘land sparing’ narrative reveals, and I 
explore the construction of the narrative and the messy realities in which it is applied in subsequent 
chapters.  
 It is crucial to recognize, furthermore, that agricultural development, deforestation, and 
forest governance in Brazil and Indonesia are globalized phenomena. Brazil is the world’s largest 
soy exporter, sending roughly half of its soybean harvest abroad, and the country is responsible 
for nearly a fifth of global beef exports. Indonesia is the world’s largest palm oil exporter, and 
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exports roughly 70 percent of its production (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2017). The agro-
forest frontier in these countries develops through ‘telecouplings’ with distant markets (Liu et al. 
2013); for example, the liberalization of Chinese soybean imports spurred export-oriented soy 
production in the Brazilian Amazon (Oliveira and Schneider 2016), while EU targets on the use of 
biofuels for renewable energy have helped drive increasing demand for Indonesian palm oil (Pye 
2010; Neslen 2016). These globalizing processes are mediated by powerful transnational 
corporate, intergovernmental, and NGO actors. Four multinational companies – Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus – have controlled over 50 percent of Brazilian 
soybean crushing capacity since the early 2000s (Oliveira and Schneider 2016). Cargill and ADM 
are also major traders of Indonesian palm oil, which is often grown by plantation conglomerates 
such as Singapore-based Golden Agri-Resources and sold to consumer goods manufacturers such 
as Unilever, which purchases as much as 5 percent of Indonesia’s palm oil production (Greenpeace 
2008). Bilateral cooperation organizations such as USAID and Norway’s International Climate 
and Forest Initiative, transnational environmental NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy and 
WWF, and intergovernmental conventions and organizations such as the UNFCCC and the World 
Bank all seek to influence and govern tropical agricultural production and environmental 
conservation. An explanation of agricultural development and forest governance in Brazil and 
Indonesia, and an evaluation of land sparing claims, must therefore take account of global 
processes. The following sections consider conceptual frameworks and methodologies for the 
study of tropical deforestation and global environmental governance. 
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Conceptual Frameworks and Methods for Global Environmental Governance Research 
 The Great Acceleration in human activity and environmental change since 1950 heralds a 
new era in the history of humanity, the biosphere, and the planet (Steffen et al. 2015). Socio-
ecological processes are interconnected through flows of increasing volume and velocity across 
great areas and distances. Global environmental politics determine how these processes and flows 
are directed and governed, and how benefits and burdens are distributed. The socio-ecological 
revolution of the Great Acceleration implies a revolution in global environmental politics. Scholars 
have responded to these revolutions with new concepts and methods for studying power and 
change in a ‘globalized’ world. I review some methodological approaches to the study of global 
environmental politics and then discuss incorporated comparison and ethnography of transnational 
organizations as research methodologies capable of overcoming some of the challenges of ‘global’ 
research and illuminating multilevel and telecoupled socio-ecological phenomena. 
Global Environmental Governance 
 ‘Globalization’ describes transformations in the geographical organization of life on Earth 
that accompany the Great Acceleration in human activity. Globalization occurs through the 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization of socio-ecological relations, as territorial structures 
such as the nation-state are simultaneously transcended and reconstructed (Brenner 1999). Within 
this dynamic, we have come to possess an idea of ‘the global’ in our natural and social worlds (cf. 
Tsing 2000b). In the realm of the natural and earth sciences, we build global biodiversity maps 
and climate models, helping us comprehend phenomena from species invasions to El Niño. In the 
social, economic, and political realms, the increasing volume and speed of flows of information, 
symbols, capital, commodities, and people is articulated through constructs of global society, the 
global economy, and global governance (Kearney 1995). 
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 ‘Governance’ encompasses the reconfiguration of political authority that coincides with 
the reterritorializations of globalization. Governance is both the sum of governmental 
arrangements or structures of rule within a socio-political system, and more specifically, an 
expression of the shift in the exercise of authority from the state (‘government’) to a heterogeneous 
array of political actors, including international organizations, NGOs, and corporations 
(‘governance’) (Paterson, Humphreys, and Pettiford 2003; Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2003; Himley 
2008). Governance takes a multitude of forms. In the environmental field, governance measures 
include commodities roundtables and eco-certifications; ‘zero deforestation’ pledges, moratoria, 
and other voluntary agreements; and voluntary carbon markets (Cashore 2002; Jordan, Wurzel, 
and Zito 2003; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Brannstrom et al. 2012). 
Governance structures may be voluntarist, constituted through multi-stakeholder 
cooperation or public-private partnerships (James McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Castree 2010b), 
yet they often remain closely articulated with government authority (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; 
Sawyer 2004). In practice, the boundaries of the ‘state’ are mutable. As Mitchell notes, the 
state/society distinction is “a line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms 
through which a social and political order is maintained” (1991, 78). The move from government 
to governance may allow actors to circumvent unwieldy bureaucracies and political struggles, and 
by the same token it may allow them to circumvent some forms of public accountability (Cashore 
2002; P. Jepson 2005). The prevailing neoliberal order is characterized by variegated forms of 
‘hybrid governance’ and ‘co-governance’ that blur the lines of ‘state’ rule by diffusing authority 
across government and parastatal agencies, corporations, NGOs, and organized ‘civil society’ 
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; D’Alisa and Kallis 2016). 
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Globalization and governance are two faces of the systemic socio-ecological 
transformation towards global capitalism that is the motor of the Great Acceleration. Capitalism, 
as Jason Moore argues, is an ecological regime: a historically stabilized set of market and 
institutional mechanisms that ensure the extraction and consumption of surpluses of energy, food, 
raw materials, and labor (Moore 2010b, 392). The capitalist ecological regime expands through 
cyclical phases of crisis and revolution that reconfigure socio-ecological circuits of accumulation 
(Moore 2000). Globalization and governance are elements in the appropriation of socio-ecological 
surplus at a planetary scale under the contemporary regime of global capitalism (Robinson 2004), 
where accumulation is unbound from national territories and biogeophysical thresholds. 
‘Global environmental governance’ thus refers in the broadest sense to this systemic 
reordering of political-economic and ecological relations, and also more specifically to the political 
project of governing the socially-constructed ‘global environment’ (Tsing 2000b) through 
institutional mechanisms such as the Rio Conventions, the United Nations Environment 
Programme, and international conservation initiatives. 
Frameworks and Methods for Studying Global Environmental Governance 
 A world of heightened interconnections, flows, and telecouplings7 poses new challenges 
for scientific research. It collapses both disciplinary boundaries and territorial units of analysis. 
Scholars have responded by experimenting with new conceptual frameworks and methodologies. 
These frameworks can be divided into two broad categories: institutionalist approaches and 
systems approaches. Institutionalist approaches are more oriented toward the political project of 
																																																						
7 Telecouplings are “socioeconomic and environmental interactions between coupled human and natural systems 
over distances” (Liu et al. 2013). The concept is intended to link environmental teleconnection and human 
globalization in a unified socio-ecological framework. 
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governing the environment, while systems approaches explore the general reordering of political-
economic and ecological relations. 
Institutionalist Approaches 
 Institutionalist approaches are associated with a narrower definition of ‘global 
environmental governance’ rooted in political science and especially international relations 
scholarship related to international environmental politics. O’Neill et al., for example, define the 
study of global environmental governance as “a problem-driven field with roots in political science 
and international relations (IR) theory relevant for improving global governance of the 
environment” (2013, 442). Lemos and Agrawal similarly view environmental governance through 
an institutional lens as a “set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations,” though they 
are attentive to the political-economic relationships that institutions embody (2006, 298). Within 
this institutionalist perspective, an important subfield comprises research on ‘multilevel 
governance,’ which draws on frameworks developed for the study of European Union politics 
(Bache and Flinders 2004) as well as work by Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators on governance 
of complex common-pool resource systems (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Brondizio, Ostrom, 
and Young 2009). The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) has been prominent in 
developing multilevel governance analyses of forest management, especially within its Global 
Comparative Study on REDD+8 (Mwangi and Wardell 2012; Saito-Jensen 2015; Ravikumar, 
Larson, et al. 2015). The common thrust of institutionalist approaches is the search for institutional 
design ‘solutions’ to environmental governance ‘problems’ that engage government and non-state 
actors across multiple levels and scales. The literature thus has a tendency to ‘render technical’ (Li 
																																																						
8 REDD+ adds sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks to efforts to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). 
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2007b) questions of governance in order to offer policy prescriptions, slipping at times into what 
Stubbs describes as a ‘realist modernism’ (2005, 66; see also Saito-Jensen 2015) fixated on 
‘problem-solving’ at the expense of ‘problematizing.’ 
 Methodologies deployed by scholars working in an institutionalist framework are generally 
geared toward the positivist definition of key variables and identification of causal effects and 
causal mechanisms (O’Neill et al. 2013; Saito-Jensen 2015). While many social science methods 
can contribute to either empiricist or interpretative research, some such as case studies and 
statistical analysis lend themselves more readily to positivist, variable-based research, while others 
such as ethnography and participatory mapping lend themselves to interpretative or relational 
analyses. O’Neill et al. (2013) highlight four characteristics of global environmental governance 
that pose challenges for ‘problem-driven’ research, namely high levels of complexity and 
uncertainty in socio-ecological systems, vertical linkages across multiple governance levels, 
horizontal linkages and overlaps of issue areas and governance regimes, and the fluid and 
evolutionary character of problem sets and institutional initiatives. Institutionalist scholars deploy 
a variety of research designs and qualitative and quantitative methods to address these challenges, 
including comparative case studies, ‘fuzzy set’ analysis, collaborative event ethnography, 
participatory action research, construction of global statistical databases, network analysis, and 
model- and scenario-building. Researchers frequently employ multiple methods in an attempt to 
‘triangulate’ in order to gain greater analytical leverage over a particular problem or question 
(O’Neill et al. 2013). 
 A prime example of institutionalist global environmental governance research 
methodology is offered by CIFOR’s research program on “Multilevel Governance and Carbon 
Management at the Landscape Scale” (Ravikumar, Kijazi, et al. 2015), part of the organization’s 
 
	
	
59 
Global Comparative Study on REDD+. The Multilevel Governance research program “examines 
how institutions of different levels and sectors relate [to] each other in decision-making processes 
around land use, carbon management and benefit-sharing arrangements” (CIFOR 2014) in order 
to “propose principles and options to improve the design of multilevel institutions, processes and 
tools in the implementation of REDD+ and other land use policies,” in the words of a CIFOR 
scientist (pers. comm. 25 July 2013). The program adopted a multilevel comparative case study 
design. The case selection included five different countries, at least two regions or provinces in 
each country, and multiple cases within each province or region that contrasted sites with 
increasing deforestation with sites with initiatives to reduce deforestation, whether or not through 
REDD+. This nested design yielded 54 case study sites where researchers intended to combine the 
collection of quantitative data on carbon stocks and emissions with key informant interviews on 
governance and land use, ethnographies of land change practices and decision making, surveys on 
benefit sharing, and carbon and land use modeling and scenario building (CIFOR 2014; 
Ravikumar, Kijazi, et al. 2015). In practice, the research activities focused most heavily on key 
informant interviews and participatory scenario building (Ravikumar, Kijazi, et al. 2015; Myers et 
al. 2016; Ravikumar et al. 2017). In a methodological innovation, interviews included an 
‘articulation’ section eliciting information about perspectives and actors that played a key role in 
determining the informant’s land use decision making, as a tool for mapping the multilevel 
governance assemblage and identifying additional interviewees (Ravikumar, Kijazi, et al. 2015, 
11).  
 Products of CIFOR’s Multilevel Governance program to date include overviews of the 
legal and institutional frameworks of REDD in the study countries (e.g., Myers et al. 2016) and 
comparative analyses of design issues such as the challenges of jurisdictional versus project-based 
 
	
	
60 
initiatives or the relative role of carbon finance in land use change (e.g., Ravikumar, Larson, et al. 
2015). These studies often include substantial analyses of the role of power and economic interest 
in structuring multilevel interactions and determining land change outcomes, but through their 
very attentiveness to underlying political and economic forces they reveal the limitations of their 
institutionalist framework. Myers et al., for example, in their analysis of multilevel governance 
and REDD+ in Indonesia, acknowledge that “[s]olutions… are unlikely to be effective without 
addressing the underlying drivers of deforestation in Indonesia, which are tied to broad economic 
goals” (2016, ix), yet their recommendations are still focused on improving communication, 
participation, and accountability of governance initiatives rather than addressing underlying 
drivers. Paradoxically, they are offering solutions that they recognize are unlikely to be effective. 
As this example illustrates, institutionalist research takes as its object of inquiry a particular 
institutional assemblage (e.g., REDD), and that assemblage also tends to define the boundary of 
the inquiry. Thus, even an institutionalist research approach that is highly “contextual, culturally 
located, historically grounded, and politically sensitive” (Saito-Jensen 2015, 19) inevitably reflects 
back on questions of institutional design and ‘good governance’ as a normative goal, without being 
able to effectively critique the socio-political, economic, and ecological relations with which 
governance intertwines. In its more extreme ramifications, this limitation of the institutionalist 
literature can lead to research that naturalizes institutional structures, elides power differentials, 
and technifies and depoliticizes socio-ecological conflicts. 
Systems Approaches 
 Systems approaches, by contrast, are less narrowly focused on contributing to the political 
project of governing the environment, though they may still offer policy prescriptions. These 
approaches begin, however, with an effort to understand the broader dynamics of political-
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economic and ecological relations. Researchers use a variety of frameworks to study socio-
ecological systems (Binder et al. 2013). Work in the Ostrom institutionalist tradition is now often 
styled as ‘social-ecological systems’ analysis (Ostrom 2009), although this framework remains 
fundamentally concerned with the design of governance institutions, reimagined as “adaptive 
governance in complex systems” (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1908).  
The panarchy framework is a holistic systems approach rooted in ecological theory 
(Holling 1973; Gunderson and Holling 2002). ‘Panarchy’ describes a socio-ecological system as 
a set of adaptive cycles nested at multiple spatio-temporal levels, from the rapid changes in a 
garden plot to the long-term transformation of a landscape. The concept of system resilience (i.e., 
the ability of a system to recover or reorganize in response to disturbances) is critical to an 
understanding of adaptive cycles. With respect to governance, this concept has been taken up by a 
‘resilience’ literature that integrates social and institutional dynamics in analyses of system 
thresholds and regenerative capacity (Folke 2006; P. Olsson, Galaz, and Boonstra 2014). The 
resilience literature clashes with much of contemporary social science thinking, however, as its 
framework of self-organizing systems is deeply functionalist and overshadows agency, conflict, 
and power. When taken up by political actors, resilience theory tends to converge with 
institutionalism in an alignment with neoliberal principles of self-organization and functionalist 
coordination that naturalizes and depoliticizes social and institutional relations (L. Olsson et al. 
2015). 
The resilience and institutionalist approaches have been integrated in recent years into the 
emerging field of ‘sustainability science.’ Sustainability science serves as an umbrella for ‘use-
inspired,’ ‘problem-driven’ research on coupled human-environment systems that has an 
overarching normative commitment to ‘sustainable development’ (W. C. Clark 2007; Kates 2011). 
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Sustainability science integrates a variety of social-ecological systems approaches, and generally 
combines research in the natural sciences with policy and management perspectives (Bettencourt 
and Kaur 2011). Despite its integrated socio-ecological approach, sustainability science research 
has often been limited to local or regional scales. Liu et al. (2013) argue that globalization, which 
they define as “socioeconomic interactions between human systems over distances,” and 
teleconnections, defined as “environmental interactions between natural systems over distances,” 
require a new research framework for sustainability studies. They advocate a ‘telecoupling’ 
framework for the study of “socioeconomic and environmental interactions between coupled 
human and natural systems over distances.” Using the example of the soybean trade between Brazil 
and China, they provide a number of analytical tools for examining the causes, effects, flows, and 
spillovers of the soy trade telecoupling, and they argue that governance approaches must be 
attentive to telecouplings or operate at the scale of the telecoupled system in order to avoid negative 
feedbacks and spillovers. Conducting research with a telecoupling framework calls for a network 
perspective emphasizing multi-site connections and integrated systems, and Liu et al. advocate 
cross-system collaborations among researchers and the pursuit of methodologies such as network 
analysis, telecoupled agent-based modeling, and systems modeling. 
 An alternative to the sustainability science systems approach is offered by world systems 
analysis, which opposes functionalism and depoliticizing normalization with a critical political-
economic perspective. Scholars working in environmental history, geographical political 
economy, and environmental sociology have drawn on thinkers such as Marx, Polanyi, Braudel, 
and Wallerstein to develop approaches to studying socio-ecological change that think dialectically 
about power, conflict, and biophysical processes (Martínez-Alier 1987; O’Connor 1988; 
Friedmann and McMichael 1989; Hornborg 1998; Foster 1999; Moore 2000; Foster and Holleman 
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2014). One field of scholarship employing a dialectical systems perspective comprises historical 
research under headings such as environmental history and historical sociology, which relies 
heavily on historical methods such as archival research. A second field of scholarship tackles more 
contemporary phenomena, including questions of globalization and environmental governance in 
the time of the Great Acceleration.9 Here there is a particularly rich subfield of ‘political ecology’ 
that links questions of natural resource use and access to processes of political-economic 
contestation (Watts and Peet 2004). 
Political ecology traditionally roots itself at the ‘local’ level (Brown and Purcell 2005), 
seeking to understand the environmental and political-economic factors that structure the decision 
making of resource users (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). In terms of research methodology, 
political ecology classically proceeds by “examining first the resource-related actions of local 
people and then linking them both to their webs of local social relations and to the broader political-
economic setting” (Peluso 1992b, 51). This approach is similar to the method of ‘progressive 
contextualization’ developed in human ecology by Vayda, which involves “focusing on significant 
human activities or people-environment interactions and then explaining these interactions by 
placing them within progressively wider and denser contexts” (1983, 265). In political ecology, 
there is a more individualist focus on how actors are embedded in social relations that structure 
their resource use and access, and there is an assumption that the actions of local resource users 
can only be understood through their relations to larger social structures and political-economic 
processes (Peluso 1992b). This perspective led to a method of ‘chains of explanation,’ which move 
from a consideration of resource managers in direct relation to the environment, to the relations of 
																																																						
9 These distinctions are heuristic, and in reality historical scholarship and more contemporary research blur together. 
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resource managers with each other and other social groups, to the relations of resource managers 
and their society with the state and the world economy (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, 27). 
Researchers working in the political ecology tradition often draw on multiple kinds of data 
to develop their contextualized explanations of resource use and access. Rocheleau (1995), for 
example, in her study of a social forestry program in the Dominican Republic, deployed a suite of 
methods including focus groups, key informant interviews, oral histories, labor calendars, 
participatory mapping, and a standardized, randomly-sampled questionnaire survey, and 
concluded that empiricist and interpretative approaches combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods could be brought together in a productive synthesis to reveal gendered social structures 
and patterns of resource management. Doolittle (2010) similarly recounts her strategy of 
combining archival research, oral histories, participant observation, household economic journals, 
and participatory mapping to study native property rights and resource management in Malaysian 
Borneo. 
As globalization has become more pervasive, both materially and conceptually, the ‘chains 
of explanation’ approach has been criticized as encouraging overly simplistic linear or hierarchical 
thinking (Doolittle 2010), and the focus on the ‘local’ as a level of analysis has been criticized as 
reifying scale to catch political ecology in a ‘local trap’ (Brown and Purcell 2005). Seeking new 
analytical tools for exploring complexity and connection, political ecology scholars have moved 
from ‘chains of explanation’ to an exploration of networks or ‘webs of relation’ (Rocheleau and 
Roth 2007), and to explicit theorizations of scale and the articulations of local resource use with 
the capitalist world system in a move toward ‘global political ecology’ (Peet, Robbins, and Watts 
2011). At the global level, political ecology blurs with human-environment geography and 
geographical political economy, with which it shares foundations in ecological Marxist analysis 
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and dialectical systems thinking, though political ecology scholarship continues to be 
distinguished by a commitment to fieldwork and examination of the agency and decision-making 
of specific actors, even in ‘global’ analyses. 
Global environmental governance has become a central problematique across these 
interlinked subfields, due to their shared preoccupation with what Himley (2008) describes as “the 
nexus of nature and neoliberalism.” From the dialectical, systemic perspectives of geography and 
political ecology, research on global environmental governance seeks to “analyze how processes 
of neoliberal globalization have entailed – indeed, have been predicated on – a radical 
reconfiguration of the organizational and institutional arrangements through which society-
environment relations are governed… [stressing] the interests served by these reconfigurations as 
well as how governance arrangements are contested and struggled over by differentially 
empowered social and political actors” (Himley 2008, 434). This formulation stands in stark 
contrast to institutionalist approaches that attempt to ‘improve’ governance without analyzing 
neoliberal globalization, or sustainability science approaches that attempt to govern globalization 
without critiquing it. 
In addition to the already diverse methodological toolbox of political ecology, two 
methodological innovations stand out as strategies for conducting global research, including global 
environmental governance research, from a dialectical perspective. The first is the method of 
‘incorporated’ or ‘relational’ comparison, which builds on sociological critiques of positivist 
comparative methods by the likes of Tilly and Wallerstein. As McMichael (1990) argues, “global 
conceptions of social change violate formal comparative requirements” of case independence and 
uniformity (385), so the goal of comparative historical inquiry should be “not to develop invariant 
hypotheses via comparison of more or less uniform ‘cases,’ but to give substance to a historical 
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process (a whole) through comparison of its parts” (386). He defines ‘incorporated comparison’ 
as a strategy that “progressively constructs a whole as a methodological procedure by giving 
context to historical phenomena. In effect, the ‘whole’ emerges via comparative analysis of ‘parts’ 
as moments in a self-forming whole” (386, original emphasis). Incorporated comparison has been 
further developed by Hart (2006) under the rubric of ‘relational comparison.’ Following 
Lefebvre’s (1991) work on the social production of space, Hart maintains that “place is most 
usefully understood as nodal points of connection in wider networks of socially produced space” 
(994), this conception “moves us beyond ‘case studies’ to make broader claims – it enables, in 
other words, a non-positivist understanding of generality. In this conception, particularities or 
specificities arise through interrelations between objects, events, places, and identities; and it is 
through clarifying how these relations are produced and changed in practice that close study of a 
particular part can generate broader claims and understandings” (996, original emphasis). 
Incorporated or relational comparison, in other words, enables inquiry into interconnected 
phenomena that emerge in dialectical relation with generalized, systemic processes, and so 
constitutes a comparative method for dialectical systems approaches to global research. 
A second methodological innovation for dialectical global studies is ‘global ethnography.’ 
Ethnography seeks to understand the culture of a particular group – to see the world through the 
eyes of others – and traditionally relies on participant observation as a foundational method. 
Ethnographic methods have a key role to play in environmental governance research. As Himley 
(2008) argues, “through critical ethnographic methods, geographers will gain a fuller and more 
nuanced understanding of how actual resource/environment decisions are being made, by whom, 
for whose benefits, and within the contexts of what power asymmetries” (446–447). A small but 
increasing number of ethnographies of environmental governance have made important 
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contributions to scholarly understanding of topics including environmental governmentality, 
environmental regulation and governance assemblages,  conservation science and practice, and the 
role of environmental governance in capital accumulation and class formation (Rival 2003; 
Agrawal 2005; West 2006; Li 2007b). 
Global ethnography offers a methodology for the ethnographic study of globalized 
environmental governance phenomena. Championed by Michael Burawoy and his collaborators, 
global ethnography develops the approach of ‘multi-sited ethnography’ (Marcus 1995) to 
investigate the “production of globalization” (Burawoy 2001, 150). The ‘site’ or ‘field’ of global 
ethnography is the ‘place-making projects’ of globalization that define new kinds of places and 
social relations. For Gille and Riain (2002), “[b]y locating themselves firmly within the time and 
space of social actors ‘living the global,’ ethnographers can reveal the socioscapes that people 
collectively construct of global processes” (271). In this approach, “place becomes a launching 
pad outward into networks, backward into history and ultimately into the politics of place itself” 
(287). Anna Tsing’s book Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (2005) demonstrates 
the utility of global ethnography for research on global environmental governance. Tsing explores 
the networks and processes through which forest conservation and landscape change occur in the 
rainforests of Indonesian Borneo, producing insights into how the globalizing aspirations of 
capitalism, science, and politics are “charged and enacted in the sticky materiality of practical 
encounters” (1) around forest destruction and environmental advocacy. 
Global ethnography poses a number of challenges for the practitioner, however. Defining 
the contours and limits of the ‘field’ out of a complex, multi-sited network stands as a critical 
analytic, strategic, and practical concern. Ethnographic practice also shifts: as “the methodological 
imperative of being there is replaced by that of chasing things around” (Gille and Riain 2002, 286), 
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global ethnographers may spend less time “just hanging around” (Fenno 1978) conducting 
participant observation and rely more heavily on methods such as interviews, network mapping, 
and documentary and archival research. As Tsing writes, “My knowledge is variously 
ethnographic, journalistic, and archival, and it is formed in discrete patches. …The only ways I 
can think of to study [global connections] are patchwork and haphazard. The result of such research 
may not be a classical ethnography, but it can be deeply ethnographic in the sense of drawing from 
the learning experiences of the ethnographer” (2005, x–xi). 
Table 2.1: Frameworks and Methods for Global Environmental Governance Research 
Conceptual Frameworks Methodological Innovations 
Institutionalism Nested Comparison, Triangulation, Articulation, Fuzzy Sets 
Systems 
Sustainability Telecouplings 
Dialectics Incorporated Comparison, Global Ethnography 
 
Empire from the Inside: Organizational Ethnography for Global Research 
 
Organizational ethnography of transnational organizations is capable of addressing some 
of the challenges of global ethnographic research while taking researchers inside the major 
organizations participating in the construction of global environmental governance. While much 
of the classic scholarship in international relations and international environmental politics took 
the state as the unit of analysis, the shift from government to governance under neoliberal 
globalization has enhanced the importance of intergovernmental, non-state and parastatal actors in 
international politics and led to an increasing scholarly interest in the governance functions of 
groups such as international advocacy networks, multinational corporations, and NGOs (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 2004; Heins 2008). The key actors in globalization and global governance 
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are organizations, from state and international bureaucracies to corporations to NGOs, and so 
organizational ethnography has become an important approach contributing to the endeavor of 
global ethnography. 
The method of organizational ethnography, i.e., “ethnography in and of organizations” 
(Eberle and Maeder 2011, 53), is usually traced back to the Hawthorne Studies of the 1920s and 
1930s, which took place at the Western Electric Hawthorne Plant in Illinois. These studies 
launched an anthropological focus on industrial organizations that gave rise to the field of 
organizational behavior (H. B. Schwartzman 1993; Bate 1997). After World War II, organizational 
ethnographers in sociology and anthropology turned their attention to public bureaucracies, and 
the 1960s inspired an interest in social movement organization. From the 1970s onwards, 
organizational ethnography proliferated as part of a growing field of the ‘anthropology of work’ 
(H. B. Schwartzman 1993), which describes the cultures and lived experiences of work in capitalist 
society.10 At the same time as organizational ethnography offers a window inwards on the cultures 
of organizations, it can also be used to reflect outwards on the social processes in which 
organizations participate. Michael Burawoy’s (1979) Manufacturing Consent provides a classic 
example of this strategy, as Burawoy uses his experiences on the shop floor in a Chicago factory 
to illuminate broad transformations in the capitalist labor process. 
Organizational ethnography thus can serve to explore the constitution of political-
economic processes through the experiences, understandings, relations, and interactions of 
individuals within and across the membrane of an organization. In this capacity, organizational 
ethnography becomes especially useful to the endeavor of global ethnography.11 Given the 
																																																						
10 For further discussions of organizational ethnography in this tradition, see Neyland (2008) and Ybema et al. 
(2009). 
11 Ethnographic approaches that share certain key elements of the organizational ethnographic perspective include 
‘institutional ethnography,’ which builds on the work of Dorothy Smith to explore institutionalized interactions, 
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proliferation and importance of organizations participating in the construction of globalization and 
global governance, organizational ethnography offers simple solutions to some of the basic 
challenges of global ethnography, such as defining the ‘field’ and gaining access at multiple levels 
and sites. In an ethnography of a transnational organization, the field is the organization itself or 
some combination of its components, and when access is gained at one site or level of the 
organization, it facilitates access across the organizational network, allowing the researcher to 
travel along existing pathways of transnational connection. 
Researchers have begun to produce ethnographies of global organizations that take 
advantage of these strengths. In the field of global environmental governance, in addition to 
collaborative event ethnographies of meetings of groups such as the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (L. Campbell and Brosius 2010) and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (L. Campbell et al. 2014), notable organizational ethnographies include works 
by Michael Goldman (2005) and Catherine Corson (2016). Goldman’s ethnography of The World 
Bank took him from “the belly of the so-called beast” in Washington, DC to “remote research 
institutes, run-down government agencies, international conferences, and mountain dam sites” 
(2005, xiii) to reveal how the Bank has integrated a mandate of environmental sustainability into 
a global project of “green neoliberalism” (5). Corson (2016) uses her experience working for the 
United States Government and especially the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
to show how assemblages of public, private, and nonprofit actors came together to direct US 
																																																						
both within and beyond formal organizations (D. Smith 2002), and ‘collaborative event ethnography,’ in which a 
group of researchers works together to create an ethnography of a complex event, such as an international 
environmental conference (L. Campbell and Brosius 2010; L. Campbell et al. 2014; Corson, Campbell, and 
MacDonald 2014). 
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environmental foreign aid to Madagascar in order to expand protected areas, while nonetheless 
failing to combat the social drivers of environmental degradation.12 
Environmental NGOs 
Environmental NGOs occupy a critical position in global environmental governance 
networks. From the 1980s onwards, a small group of environmental NGOs expanded and 
internationalized to become transnational organizations. These transnational environmental NGOs 
(TENGOs), which include The Nature Conservancy, WWF, Conservation International, and 
Greenpeace, among others, have come to exercise substantial power over the nature and direction 
of environmental policy from international negotiations to local projects. These groups generally 
have thousands of employees worldwide, hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue, and 
activities in dozens of countries across the Global North and Global South. 
In an early volume on international environmental NGOs, Princen and Finger (1994) argue 
that TENGOs are particularly effective and influential in their ability to make ‘translational 
linkages,’ one dimension of which involves connecting the local and the global in ways that 
transcend state structures and create new conditions to which states must react. A second 
dimension of TENGOs’ translational linkages “connects the biophysical to the political” (Princen, 
Finger, and Manno 1994, 220–21). Environmental challenges transcend the territorial domain and 
political-economic optic of the state, and so NGOs work to create the terms of engagement between 
government and ecology through a focus on specific processes, actors, and framings. As actors 
that connect the local with the global, and the biophysical with the political, TENGOs are ideal 
subjects for researchers studying socio-ecological systems from a global perspective, with the 
																																																						
12 Also worth highlighting is Steve Rhee’s (2006) unpublished dissertation comprising an ethnography of the Center 
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and international-aid related forestry institutions in Indonesia. 
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potential to offer insights beyond those available through the study of supranational or parastatal 
bureaucracies such as The World Bank and USAID. 
In a 1997 review essay on the ‘associational revolution’ of mushrooming NGO activity, 
William Fisher lamented, “There are relatively few detailed studies of what is happening in 
particular places or within specific organizations, few analyses of the impact of NGO practices on 
relations of power among individuals, communities, and the state, and little attention to the 
discourse within which NGOs are presented as the solution to problems” (Fisher 1997, 441). The 
intervening years have seen a growing literature on the role of NGOs in international politics (e.g., 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Heins 2008; Murdie 2014), as well as a number of studies of NGOs 
working on environmental issues (Chartier and Deléage 1998; Chapin 2004; Bryant 2005; West 
2006; Rootes 2006; Li 2007b; Bryant 2009; Holmes 2010; Macekura 2016). Research has included 
ethnographic work on NGOs, including some organizational ethnographies (e.g., Markowitz 2001; 
Hilhorst 2003; Igoe and Kelsall 2005; E. Mertz and Timmer 2010 special issue), yet there is a lack 
of focused attention on the major international environmental NGOs as a distinct category of actor 
in global environmental politics. Organizational ethnography can play a key role in addressing this 
gap and illuminating the motivations, perceptions, ideologies, and practices of TENGOs. 
To date there has been virtually no ethnographic research inside the transnational 
environmental NGOs. The two important exceptions are the (mostly unpublished) studies of Sally 
Jeanrenaud (1998) and Sarah Milne (2009). Jeanrenaud drew on her experience as a consultant for 
WWF and IUCN to produce a critical study of WWF’s shift to ‘people-oriented conservation.’ 
While not explicitly an organizational ethnography, Jeanrenaud’s work is directly concerned with 
WWF’s policy narratives, values, and organizational structures. Her dissertation, completed in 
1998, included “a review of 35 years of field and policy documents, an analysis of over 2000 
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conservation projects undertaken since 1961, an evaluation of 150 contemporary forest 
conservation projects, seven field case studies and a wide range of interviews” (Jeanrenaud 2002, 
viii), and concluded that the shift to people-oriented conservation had not constituted a meaningful 
paradigm change in WWF policy and practice. Her findings have been published only in a highly 
abridged form (Jeanrenaud 2002). 
Sarah Milne followed three years as a Community Program Manager with Conservation 
International (CI) in Cambodia with eleven months of ethnographic fieldwork on a CI direct 
payments project for biodiversity conservation in Cambodia’s Cardamom Mountains. Her 
experience as a CI staff member gave her extraordinary access, and she was able to observe “the 
project’s inception and design at the global level; its processes of implementation across scales 
and through national institutions; and its social effects at the local level” (Milne 2009, 83). Milne’s 
thesis provides a global ethnography of the development of payments-for-ecosystem services in 
transnational conservation practice and illuminates the encounter of the policy narratives and 
organizational structures of CI with the ‘local realities’ of Cambodian communities. At the local 
level, she concludes that the socio-economic impacts of the project are inequitable and complex, 
and community engagement in the project was mostly instrumental, obscuring social justice 
concerns in favor of the demands of payment contracts. At the international level, she finds that 
TENGOs may have difficulty controlling project outcomes due to disconnects between theoretical 
policy models and practical political and cultural constraints and differences. Most of Milne’s 
ethnographic work has yet to be published, though she is currently preparing a monograph based 
on her dissertation (Sarah Milne, pers. comm. 2015). 
Jeanrenaud and Milne’s research demonstrates the importance and potential of 
organizational ethnographic perspectives that illuminate the inner workings of transnational 
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environmental NGOs. At the same time, these examples highlight the dearth of published literature 
in this field and some of the particular challenges of this kind of research. 
My research on tropical forest governance adopts a dialectical systems approach that draws 
heavily on political ecology and geographical political economy, using methods of both 
incorporated comparison and global ethnography of a transnational environmental NGO. The 
following sections detail the methodology of this study. 
Methodology of this Study 
 As I began to develop my research on deforestation and forest governance in Brazil and 
Indonesia in the early 2010s, I sought a research design that could both distill the complex socio-
ecological transformations happening at the forest frontier and illuminate the interconnections 
between distant places. I intended to carry out municipal-level case studies to capture varying 
subnational deforestation dynamics, and I was aware that as a component of its forest conservation 
programs in Brazil and Indonesia, The Nature Conservancy was running two flagship municipal-
level REDD projects: one in São Félix do Xingu (São Félix) in the Brazilian State of Pará, where 
TNC started work in 2009, and one in the District of Berau in East Kalimantan, where they helped 
launch the Berau Forest Carbon Program, also in 2009. During a preparatory visit to Pará in 2012, 
I met with one of the managers of TNC’s Amazon Conservation Program, which gave me a 
valuable first contact with the organization and background information on TNC’s activities in the 
region. My initial attempts at comparative case selection based on variables such as municipal 
deforestation rates and agricultural production resulted in sets of cases that felt decontextualized 
and disarticulated. This variable-based case selection lacked a logic capable of connecting 
municipal cases to each other and to regional and global processes. In 2013, I decided to focus my 
research design on The Nature Conservancy. As a key actor in forest governance processes in both 
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the Brazilian Amazon and Indonesian Borneo, TNC offered a way of tying together and 
understanding diverse landscapes and global forest governance processes through the experience 
of a common actor. 
I developed a combined methodology of organizational ethnography and incorporated 
comparison. I allowed the structure of TNC’s forest conservation programs in Brazil and Indonesia 
to guide my comparative case selection. Since TNC forest activities were organized under two 
eco-regional programs in the Brazilian Amazon and one forest program in Indonesia, I chose 
municipality case studies to reflect the experiences of each of these programs, and I used my 
ethnographic research with each program to guide the selection of municipality cases. 
Organizational ethnography thus defined the contours of my comparison and helped to 
‘incorporate’ my municipal case studies in the broader historical processes operating in the 
evolution of TNC’s tropical forest programs. At the same time, the municipal case studies 
contributed to my organizational ethnography, since they included interviews and participant 
observation with local actors who would share with me the stories of their interactions with and 
perceptions of TNC. 
Incorporated Comparison 
This project asks why, despite similar histories and drivers of land use change, Brazil and 
Indonesia have since 2004 experienced divergent rates of deforestation. This question is rooted in 
a ‘most similar systems’ comparison (Przeworski and Teune 1970), and the goal of the comparison 
is to better understand the relationship between governance and tropical land use change. 
Deforestation and forest governance in Brazil and Indonesia have not emerged independently of 
each other, however. They are interconnected through global commodity chains, global 
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governance processes, and the global climate system. The proper comparative approach is 
therefore one of incorporated comparison. 
I utilize a nested comparative case study design not dissimilar to CIFOR’s Multilevel 
Governance case study design. My goal is to explore the contrasting experiences of forest 
governance between Brazil and Indonesia, as well as to understand the diversity of forest 
governance dynamics within each country. Reflecting the interconnected character of forest 
governance and land use change between the two countries, I selected my cases to follow the 
diverse experiences of a common actor. This actor was The Nature Conservancy, which is active 
in forest conservation efforts at multiple levels from villages on the forest frontiers of Borneo and 
the Amazon to international environmental negotiations. 
In Indonesia, TNC’s forest conservation work is focused principally on East Kalimantan 
Province in eastern Borneo. In Brazil, TNC activities in the Amazon were carried out by two 
distinct eco-regional programs, the Amazon Conservation Program, which was most active in Pará 
State, and the Atlantic Forest and Central Savannas Program, which had primary responsibility for 
activities in Mato Grosso State. Across these three programs, TNC activities were frequently 
targeted to the secondary jurisdictional level, which comprises municípios (municipalities) in 
Brazil and kabupaten (districts) in Indonesia. I refer to these jurisdictions as being at the municipal 
level and discuss them collectively as ‘municipalities.’ I used interviews with TNC staff at the 
level of each eco-regional program to determine the municipality where they felt their activities 
had been most successful and the municipality where they felt they had experienced their greatest 
difficulties.13 I selected these municipalities as contrasting, paired cases (Tarrow 2010), arriving 
																																																						
13 In East Kalimantan, only two districts have received significant on-the-ground conservation projects from TNC, 
so these two districts were selected by default as paired case studies.  
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at a nested design of six municipal case studies in three different states or provinces across two 
different countries, which comprised a diverse case selection (Gerring 2008) capturing a wide 
range of variation in TNC’s forest conservation activities and experiences. 
Table 2.2: Forest cover and loss in study areas. 
	 Land	Area	(km2)	 Forest	Cover	in	2000	(km2)	
Forest	Loss,	
2001-2015	
(km2)	
Forest	Loss	/	
Forest	Cover	(%)	
INDONESIAa	 1,904,569	 1,609,749	 206,626	 12.8	
East	Kalimantanb	 204,534	 186,215	 24,889	 13.4	
Berau	 21,952	 21,743	 3,765	 17.3	
East	Kutai	 35,747	 30,613	 7,423	 24.2	
BRAZILIAN	
AMAZONc	 5,068,048	 3,426,656	 193,409	 5.6	
Mato	Grosso	 903,198	 371,199	 62,840	 16.9	
Nova	Ubiratã	 12,707	 7,455	 1,942	 26.0	
Cotriguaçu	 9,421	 8,679	 1,518	 17.5	
Pará	 1,247,955	 946,240	 70,639	 7.5	
São	Félix	do	Xingu	 84,213	 72,482	 10,848	 15.0	
Novo	Progresso	 38,162	 32,850	 4,103	 12.5	
a	Forest	 cover	 and	 forest	 loss	 figures	 in	 Indonesia	 at	 >30	 percent	 canopy	density	 are	 from	Global	 Forest	Watch	
(Hansen	et	al.	2013).	b	North	Kalimantan	province	was	excised	from	East	Kalimantan	province	in	2012.	Figures	refer	
to	the	pre-2012	provincial	area,	i.e.,	present	East	and	North	Kalimantan	provinces.	c	Brazilian	Amazon	area,	forest	
cover,	and	deforestation	figures	are	derived	from	INPE’s	PRODES	program	(INPE	2017)	and	refer	to	primary	forest.	
Mato	Grosso	and	Nova	Ubiratã	figures	do	not	include	Cerrado	vegetation.	State	and	municipal	areas	are	the	official	
figures	reported	by	IBGE	(2017a).	
 
Figure 2.6: Nested case selection for incorporated comparison of tropical forest governance. 
Circles represent the global, national, state or provincial, and municipal levels. Borders at each 
level below the global are porous. In Brazil, the most successful municipality for each TNC eco-
regional program is colored green, the most challenging municipality is colored orange. 
Municipalities hosting jurisdictional-level REDD projects are denoted by a textured background 
pattern. 
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Figure 2.7: Annual forest loss in square kilometers in case study municipalities, 2001-2015. Forest 
loss figures for East Kutai and Berau are calculated by Global Forest Watch at >30 percent 
canopy density (Hansen et al. 2013). Forest loss figures for Nova Ubiratã, Cotriguaçu, São Félix, 
and Novo Progresso are primary Amazon deforestation reported by INPE’s PRODES program 
(INPE 2017). 
As an incorporated comparison, the goal of these nested case studies was to “give substance 
to a historical process” (McMichael 1990, 386) of forest governance and land use change through 
a comparison of its parts. Structuring case selection around the activities of The Nature 
Conservancy served to make explicit the interconnections between distant places. An incorporated 
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comparative approach affects not just case selection, but also the questions that are investigated 
and the analysis that occurs. I sought to understand the mutual constitution of municipal 
deforestation dynamics with global forest governance processes. In my interviews, I would ask 
informants about their vertical connections with actors and processes at other levels, as well as 
their horizontal connections to other places. These comparative case studies were carried out in 
combination with organizational ethnography. 
Organizational Ethnography 
Through my organizational ethnography of TNC’s tropical forest conservation programs, 
I sought to “think culturally” (Bate 1997, 1153) about the development of tropical forest 
governance through the individual ideas, experiences, and relations of TNC staff as members of a 
transnational organizational network, and through the socially-constructed discourses, structures, 
and practices of the organization. What are the motivations of TNC staff members? How do they 
understand problems? How do they make decisions and choose conservation strategies? And how 
do they evaluate success and failure? Taking TNC as an example of a transnational environmental 
NGO, I was particularly interested in how TNC links the local with the global in the production of 
tropical forest governance, and how TNC sees itself, especially in relation to other actors such as 
governments, local people, corporations, and other NGOs. My ethnography of TNC’s tropical 
forest programs thus looked both outward, for an understanding of the production of tropical forest 
governance, and inward, for an understanding of the culture of TNC as a transnational 
environmental NGO. This dissertation focuses on the production of tropical forest governance, 
while my research on the internal culture of TNC is the focus of a companion project and plays a 
more peripheral role in this manuscript. 
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There are particular benefits to be gained from conducting transnational research within a 
transnational organization. A common strategy for global ethnography is to trace the linkages 
between a ‘local’ site and the ‘global’ level. Examples of this strategy include Corson’s (2016) 
work linking environmental governance in Madagascar with the US Congress and USAID 
headquarters in Washington, DC, and Milne’s (2009) study linking conservation interventions in 
Cambodia with decision-making at Conservation International headquarters in the United States. 
This approach is analogous to a ‘chain of explanation’ that links the local with the global in a two-
dimensional portrait of ‘international’ phenomena. While valuable insights are gained from this 
approach, a more ‘global’ picture is possible if the researcher ‘takes transnationality seriously’ and 
follows “webs of relation” (Rocheleau 2008) across multiple local and global sites in order to 
produce three-dimensional portraits of transnationality (Figure 2.8). Here a focus on a 
transnational organization lends a structure to help define the transnational ‘field.’ By studying 
TNC’s tropical forest programs in both Brazil and Indonesia, and conducting interviews and 
participant observation at multiple levels from frontier villages to international environmental 
negotiations, I was able to develop a three-dimensional understanding of TNC as a transnational 
organization and forest governance as a transnational phenomenon, beyond the subnational and 
cross-national dimensions of my comparative case studies. 
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Figure 2.8: Global Research Design. Graphic representation of an international, two-dimensional 
chain of explanation versus a transnational, three-dimensional web of relation. Arrows indicate 
only the most direct vertical and horizontal relations. 
 
Methods and Data 
 I conducted over two years of fieldwork in 2013-2015. My research in Brazil took place 
from September 2013 to August 2014. My Indonesia fieldwork ran from November 2014 to July 
2015. In Brazil, I was affiliated with the Center for Sustainable Development (CDS) at the 
University of Brasília. In Indonesia, I was affiliated with the Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR), an international research center within the CGIAR network, which is 
headquartered in Bogor, Indonesia. I speak fluent Portuguese and advanced Bahasa Indonesia, and 
I conducted interviews and collected materials in both languages, as well as in English. All 
translations used in the dissertation are my own. 
For the organizational ethnography, I conducted participant observation with the three 
TNC eco-regional programs in Mato Grosso and Pará States in Brazil and East Kalimantan 
Province in Indonesia. I spent time in TNC regional offices in the state and provincial capitals, as 
well as in municipal offices while I carried out my municipal case studies. In locations where TNC 
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had physical offices, I was given desk space from which I could work and observe office activity. 
I traveled with TNC staff to project sites, accompanied them to meetings and events, and conducted 
interviews at every level from field staff to regional program directors to staff in the national 
headquarters in Brasília and Jakarta. 
In July and August 2015, I interviewed members of TNC’s executive team and World 
Office staff, including during a week of meetings in August at TNC’s Arlington, Virginia 
headquarters. I also observed TNC’s participation in major international events, including a 
November 2014 “Learning Exchange” in Jakarta that brought together TNC staff from the World 
Office with staff from Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, and Belize, and the 
December 2015 Paris Climate Conference, which was attended by staff from the World Office, 
Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico, among others. I shared meals with TNC staff, sang karaoke with 
TNC staff, and slept on floors in remote villages with TNC staff. I also interviewed numerous 
former TNC staff members who participated in earlier stages of the organization’s forest 
conservation efforts. Overall, I conducted in-depth interviews with 58 current and former TNC 
staff members. I also collected documentary materials ranging from TNC publications and 
promotional materials to project evaluations to internal memos to memoirs of former TNC staffers. 
The key divisions of TNC that I engaged with in my research are represented in the organogram 
in Figure 2.9. 
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In addition to my research into TNC’s tropical forest programs, my research for the nested 
case studies involved interviews with government, private sector, and civil society actors; 
participant observation of local, regional, and national forest governance activities and events; and 
the analysis of documentary materials and socio-environmental survey data at the municipal, state 
or provincial, and national levels. Beyond my interviews with TNC staff, I conducted 123 semi-
structured interviews with government officials; international and domestic NGO staff; and 
representatives of industry, farmer, and community associations. I also collected news stories, 
policy documents, and scientific studies related to my field sites. 
While my research in Brazil was conducted independently, my work in Indonesia took 
place under the auspices of CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on REDD+, within the module 
devoted to research on subnational REDD+ initiatives. As part of this study, CIFOR researchers 
have collected longitudinal data at the household, village, and project levels of over 20 REDD 
initiatives in six different countries (Sunderlin et al. 2016). The study uses a ‘before-after/control-
intervention’ (BACI) design to collect identical data both before and after the implementation of 
project interventions and in both intervention sites (those within the project boundary) and control 
sites (locations similar to the intervention site but not impacted by the REDD intervention). The 
study aims to assess changes in human welfare, deforestation, and other relevant outcomes of 
REDD interventions, as well as evaluating the processes through which REDD projects are 
implemented. The household survey component includes at least 120 households in each project 
site, surveyed at roughly four year intervals beginning around 2010. Berau and Kutai Timur in 
Indonesia are included in the study as intervention and control sites, respectively, and São Félix 
and Cotriguaçu in Brazil are included in the study as intervention sites. Through my affiliation 
with CIFOR, I received access to the data from these four sites. In this dissertation, I draw on these 
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data exclusively for the case study analysis of Berau, but I intend to utilize them more fully in 
future work. In Chapter 3, I proceed with a discussion of my theoretical framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LAND SPARING, MODERNIZATION, AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the ‘land sparing hypothesis’ and its linkages with 
other socio-environmental modernization theories. I relate these modernization perspectives to the 
rise of ‘new conservation science’ and eco-modernism in environmentalist discourse. I then 
develop a theoretical framework for analyzing forest governance and land use change from a 
systemic perspective, drawing primarily on ecological Marxist political economy and development 
sociology. I discuss the relationship between extraction and production in the global capitalist 
economy and I advance the concept of extractive and productivist political-economic regimes. 
Lastly, I propose a sociological hierarchy of regimes, complexes, and coalitions as a tool for 
analyzing political-economic transformations, in this case, changes in forest governance and land 
use. 
We Have Always Been Modernizing 
 The land sparing hypothesis permeates scientific debates in conservation biology, land 
change science, and the many cognate fields where academics struggle with the wicked problems 
of ‘feeding the world’ and ‘saving the planet.’ Not confined to the academy, land sparing has been 
taken up by environmentalists and corporate executives, government officials and pundits, farmers 
and philanthropists. As an idea, it has a history; as a discourse, it has a politics. I begin, though, 
with a definition. 
The land sparing hypothesis holds that: 
a) agricultural intensification increases production per unit of land, such that 
b) a given demand can be met by cultivating a smaller area; therefore, 
c) land that would otherwise have been used for agriculture is spared for other uses. 
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Agricultural expansion is the largest driver of anthropogenic land cover change (Ramankutty and 
Foley 1999; M. Williams 2006), and most agricultural expansion in the tropics has come at the 
expense of forests (Gibbs et al. 2010). Advocates therefore argue that agricultural intensification 
can spare land for ‘nature,’ and in the tropics, land sparing can avoid the conversion of standing 
forests or free up land for reforestation. 
 The land sparing hypothesis has deep roots in the environment and development debates 
of the mid-20th century. In the pre-World War II period in the US, some New Deal programs such 
as the Soil Conservation Service and the Tennessee Valley Authority had encouraged farmers to 
retire poor soil and seek increased yields in smaller acreages in the interest of local environmental 
benefits (Timothy Johnson, pers.comm.). Following WWII, however, industrial agriculture both 
intensified and expanded, driven by advances in fertilizer production, mechanization, plant 
breeding, and the development of agri-food supply chains geared towards meat and processed food 
production (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). Capital-intensive, high-productivity agriculture 
was part of a modernist vision of development, linked to ideals of urbanization, industrialization, 
high technology, and control of nature (Scott 1998), as well as to the geopolitics of the Cold War 
period. Modernization theory flourished in the 1950s and 1960s as an ideology of linear, 
teleological social evolution towards industrial consumer capitalism, epitomized by Rostow’s 
(1960) ‘stages of growth.’ The Green Revolution, which transformed agriculture in the Global 
South in the 1960s and 1970s, globalized agribusiness capital and the high-input, high-intensity 
mode of industrial agricultural production as the foundation for ‘modernization’ and 
‘development’ of the Third World. 
By the 1960s, however, the environmental consequences of global growth were also 
becoming increasingly apparent. The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 decried 
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the deleterious environmental impacts of pesticide use in industrial agriculture and was a clarion 
call for the nascent Northern environmental movement. The UN Conference on the Human 
Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, highlighted divisions between North and South over 
environmental issues, where concern for the environment was seen by developing countries as a 
luxury of the rich. In the shadow of the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report, released that 
same year, the prevailing view was that pursuit of economic development and environmental 
protection posed irreconcilable tradeoffs. 
During the 1970s, environmentalists began to question the tradeoffs perspective, and 
increasingly it was understood that environmental protection required attention to human 
wellbeing, while development would be undermined by environmental degradation. This 
perspective was reinforced over the course of the 1980s by increasing contacts between Northern 
and Southern environmental activists. With the 1980 publication of the World Conservation 
Strategy by IUCN, UNEP, and WWF, and subsequently with the release of the famous Brundtland 
Report in 1987, ‘sustainable development’ emerged as a new paradigm seeking synergies between 
environmental protection and economic development (Hajer 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lee, 
Ferraro, and Barrett 2001). 
As synergistic thinking came to predominate, the idea that agricultural intensification 
might bring global environmental benefits began to take shape. In a Malthusian vein, the 
recognition of planetary limits meant that agricultural intensification was necessary to feed a 
growing population, in an extension of the Boserupian argument that agricultural intensification 
was driven by land scarcity under population pressure (Boserup 1965). In a more optimistic vein, 
increasing agricultural productivity was not just the foundation of socio-economic modernization, 
but also a critical component of ecological modernization. If environmental concern and 
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improving environmental quality was a luxury of developed countries, then as all countries 
modernized to achieve high levels of development, environmental quality could improve across 
the board. 
The environmental benefits of agricultural intensification were imagined in several ways. 
Most generally, increasing agricultural productivity was associated with increasing incomes, 
which should then be associated with improving environmental quality (Lee, Ferraro, and Barrett 
2001). This logic follows the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, which posits an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental degradation and GDP per capita, where 
degradation accelerates in the early stages of economic development, and then decreases after a 
certain level of development is surpassed. More specifically, it was argued that agricultural 
intensification delivered environmental benefits through land sparing. Land sparing arguments for 
agricultural intensification were made by Norman Borlaug, Nobel laureate and ‘father’ of the 
Green Revolution, already in the 1980s (Waggoner 1995; Borlaug 2002), and the 1990s saw a 
proliferation of calculations, models, and policy papers advocating land sparing intensification as 
a ‘win-win’ for environment and development (Sanchez, Palm, and Smyth 1990; Serrão and 
Toledo 1990; Goklany and Sprague 1992; Waggoner 1995; Barbier and Burgess 1997; Goklany 
1999; Lee, Ferraro, and Barrett 2001). Land sparing arguments were linked as well to the 
development of forest transition theory, which began to emerge in the early 1990s on the basis of 
the observation that in some parts of the industrialized world historical declines in forest cover had 
been reversed and forests were recovering. The forests of New England often served as a 
paradigmatic example, and forest transition theory held that over time, and under the pressure of 
labor shortages caused by migration to urban centers, farmers shifted to more intensified 
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production on the most fertile available lands, allowing less suitable land to return to forest (Mather 
1992; MacCleery 1993; Grainger 1995; Mather and Needle 1998). 
Land sparing made agricultural modernization environmentally-friendly, and it made 
environmental conservation development-friendly. Conservationists began to embrace agricultural 
intensification as an environmental strategy in the 1980s and 1990s. Intensification to alleviate 
local deforestation pressures figured in numerous integrated conservation and development 
projects (ICDPs) that dominated the conservation landscape during this period (Lee, Ferraro, and 
Barrett 2001), and CGIAR’s ‘Alternatives to Slash-and-Burn’ (ASB) global research program was 
founded in 1994 to promote more intensive agricultural practices in tropical forest margins. 
Criticisms of the environmental impacts of industrial agriculture and the Green Revolution were 
also common during this period (Kloppenburg 2004; Friedmann 1993; Altieri 1995; Pingali, 
Hossain, and Gerpacio 1997), and empirical evaluations of the land sparing hypothesis returned 
decidedly mixed findings. Numerous studies pointed to the operation of rebound effects or the 
‘Jevons paradox,’ where increased productivity might lead to lower commodity prices and 
increased demand, driving rising land values and profitability and resulting in additional 
agricultural expansion (Kaimowitz and Angelsen 1998; Lee, Ferraro, and Barrett 2001). 
Mixed evidence did little to dampen enthusiasm for the land sparing hypothesis, however. 
The same can be said of EKCs and forest transition theory, which developed alongside the land 
sparing hypothesis and ecological modernization theory during the 1990s as a web of 
“modernization-based environmental social theories” (Perz 2007). Classical modernization theory 
was largely abandoned in the social sciences after the 1960s, beset by a variety of critical 
perspectives including dependency theory, world systems analysis, and poststructuralism, though 
linear, evolutionary perspectives on capitalist development certainly did not disappear from the 
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popular imagination. Moreover, despite the supposed death of modernization theory four decades 
ago, socio-environmental modernization theories have been a constant presence in academic and 
policy debates since the 1980s, justifying the conciliation of environment and development under 
ecological modernization discourse (Hajer 1995). 
Academic attention to the land sparing hypothesis burgeoned in the mid-2000s. A group of 
conservation biologists at Cambridge University attempted to formally model and empirically 
assess the environmental and economic tradeoffs between land sparing (high-intensity, low-
biodiversity) agriculture and land sharing (low-intensity, high-biodiversity) agriculture, 
concluding tentatively in favor of land sparing as a preferred approach for conservation and 
development (Green et al. 2005; Balmford, Green, and Scharlemann 2005). The ensuing land 
sparing versus land sharing debate has generated dozens of scientific studies over the course of the 
past decade (Grau, Gasparri, and Aide 2008; Edwards et al. 2010; Perfecto and Vandermeer 2010; 
Fischer, Batáry, and Bawa 2011; Phalan, Balmford, et al. 2011; Phalan, Onial, et al. 2011; 
Tscharntke et al. 2012; Fischer et al. 2014; Edwards et al. 2015; Griscom and Goodman 2015; for 
a review see Kremen 2015). This debate has also prompted a more rigorous examination of the 
land sparing hypothesis itself. In smallholder systems where local markets dominate, some studies 
have found that agricultural intensification may lead to land sparing and even forest regrowth 
(Locatelli, Boissau, and Weber 2004; Shively and Pagiola 2004). At the global level, Stevenson et 
al. (2013) estimate that yield gains from germplasm improvement in staple crops spared 18 to 27 
million ha from being brought into agricultural production in 1965-2004, an effect “orders of 
magnitude lower” than predicted by simplistic calculations such as Borlaug’s (Stevenson et al. 
2013, 8365). They also caution that intensification at the forest margin for the production of goods 
with elastic global demand is likely to increase pressure on forests and in the absence of strong 
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conservation policies may lead to increasing deforestation. Indeed, Rudel et al. (2009) find that in 
1970-2005, rising yields have rarely been accompanied by declines in cultivated areas either 
nationally or globally, and national-level land sparing effects have often been accompanied by 
displacement through increasing grain imports. In many cases, as staple yields increase and 
cropland devoted to staples declines, non-staple crop production expands, canceling out the land 
sparing effect of intensification (Ewers et al. 2009). 
In the Brazilian Amazon, two forms of agricultural intensification predominate. One is 
intensification of cattle ranching through practices such as improved pasture management (non-
innovative intensification), while the other is intensification via a transition in techno-managerial 
system from ranching to industrial field agriculture (innovative intensification) (cf. Laney 2002). 
Other forms of intensification exist also, for instance through diversification of smallholder 
production with cacao agroforestry, which has been promoted by TNC in São Félix do Xingu. 
Ranching intensification and pasture-to-cropland conversions are the most important forms of 
agricultural intensification for the Amazonian land use transition, however. Barretto et al. (2013) 
show that before 2006, ranching intensification and crop yield increases in frontier areas coincided 
with agricultural expansion in the Brazilian Amazon, contradicting the land sparing hypothesis. 
They also find that in southern and southeastern Brazil, crop and pasture intensification under 
conditions of land scarcity did result in land sparing. Land scarcity, or territorial constriction that 
produces land scarcity, thus appears as a key variable interacting with agricultural intensification 
to determine land cover change, and many land sparing advocates acknowledge the importance of 
complementary environmental policies for achieving conservation benefits from land sparing 
(Phalan, Balmford, et al. 2011; Balmford, Green, and Phalan 2012). 
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In Indonesia, meanwhile, agro-industrial intensification at the forest margin involves 
increasing yields in oil palm production through improved crop varieties and fertilizer application, 
as well as land use intensification that seeks to direct plantation expansion toward ‘degraded lands’ 
(R. Stone 2007; Daemeter Consulting 2013; Sigit 2015). In smallholder systems, governance 
efforts have also sought to reduce clearing for swidden agriculture by promoting production of 
permanent tree crops such as rubber and cacao, and in forestry, TNC scientists have discussed the 
tradeoffs between natural forest logging and tree plantations in a ‘sharing versus sparing’ 
framework, though they have rejected the facile translation of agricultural intensification debates 
to the forestry sector (Griscom and Goodman 2015). For oil palm, which is the primary agricultural 
land use driving forest conversion in Indonesia (Abood et al. 2015; Griscom et al. 2016), yield 
gains over the past two decades have been minor and over 90 percent of Indonesian production 
growth has come from land expansion (Villoria et al. 2013). Villoria et al. (2013) have modeled 
the potential land sparing impacts of oil palm intensification, and argue that yield growth in 
Indonesia and Malaysia might slightly increase regional deforestation, but with land sparing effects 
at the global level. 
In both Brazil and Indonesia, questions of governance and scale are critical to assessing the 
environmental impacts of agricultural intensification. Where intensification does spare land from 
agricultural production, it will only spare land for nature if governance effectively restricts 
conversion of natural habitats (Phalan, Balmford, et al. 2011; Balmford, Green, and Phalan 2012; 
Ceddia et al. 2014). With strong environmental governance and agricultural intensification, it may 
be possible to ‘decouple’ agricultural production from deforestation at local or regional scales. 
Scale is critical, however, as land sparing in one region may be canceled out by ‘leakage’ of land 
cover change beyond regional boundaries, or displacement of land conversion to other parts of the 
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globe (Meyfroidt and Lambin 2009; Oliveira and Hecht 2016). In Brazil, for instance, Walker 
(2012) argues that land scarcity and productivist development leading to land sparing in the 
southern and southeastern Atlantic Forest region simultaneously drove increased deforestation in 
the Amazon. 
These scalar problems are not unique to land sparing; rather, they are a common weakness 
of modernization theories. With regard to deforestation, cross-country EKC and forest transition 
studies may misread the geography of land cover change, falling into the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 
1994), while telecouplings producing indirect land use change and displacement (Meyfroidt and 
Lambin 2009; Meyfroidt, Rudel, and Lambin 2010; Liu et al. 2013; Liu 2014; Arima et al. 2011; 
Richards 2015) render analyses below the global level susceptible to what Berlik et al. call  “the 
illusion of preservation” (2002, 1557). For this same reason, one of the major critical tendencies 
undermining modernization theory after the 1960s came from systemic perspectives such as 
dependency and world systems analyses. 
New Conservation Science, Eco-Pragmatism, and Eco-Modernism 
Alongside these seemingly circular debates around modernization-based socio-
environmental theories (Perz 2007), ecological modernization discourse has come to occupy an 
ever more hegemonic position in global environmental and development policy (Hajer 1995). 
While the development apparatus has to some degree adapted to or absorbed environmental 
concerns (Goldman 2005), my focus here is on shifts in environmentalist discourse and practice 
that have led to the centering of land sparing as a forest conservation strategy. 
‘Big conservation,’ as practiced by the major international environmental NGOs, has 
undergone a dramatic transformation since the 1990s from a ‘biocentric’ focus on protected areas 
and species conservation to an ‘anthropocentric’ focus on ecosystem services and sustainable 
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production or ‘green growth’ (Chapin 2004; Kareiva, Marvier, and Lalasz 2012; Hunter, Redford, 
and Lindenmayer 2014; Doak et al. 2014). There are at least three primary drivers propelling this 
transformation. First, since the environment and development debates of the 1970s, conservation 
organizations have come under sustained critique for ‘fortress conservation’ (Brockington 2002) 
that focuses on environmental protection to the exclusion of local peoples’ interests and livelihoods 
(Wilshusen et al. 2002; Chapin 2004; Dove 2006), and for related Edenic, romanticized ideals of 
pristine and uninhabited ‘wilderness’ (Denevan 1992; Cronon 1996; Kareiva, Marvier, and Lalasz 
2012). These critiques have prompted innovations such as integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs) and the sustainable development concept, and constitute one 
justification for contemporary anthropocentric arguments that orient environmental protection to 
human benefit (Kareiva, Marvier, and Lalasz 2012). 
Second, the globalization of environmental crisis has at once produced a perception of 
humanity as both existentially threatened and also globally responsible under the emerging 
discourse of the ‘Anthropocene’ (Lowenthal 1990; Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007; Johnson 
et al. 2014). Global environmental crises including mass extinction, climate change, ocean 
acidification, and the hole in the ozone layer pose severe threats to human societies and are 
understood to demand globally-coordinated efforts across large spatial scales. These crises 
necessitate action far beyond protected area designation or preservation of endangered species; 
rather, they require responses that address the underlying socio-economic drivers of environmental 
degradation (Hance 2016). These drivers emerge from similarly globalized structures, including 
transnational corporations, global commodities markets, and international institutions. In the frame 
of the Anthropocene, conservation that is not anthropocentric is anachronistic. 
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Third, the rise of neoliberalism since the 1980s, with its strong focus on marketization and 
economic valuation, has included a plethora of new modalities of environmental management and 
the widespread restructuring of environmental governance (James McCarthy and Prudham 2004; 
Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Castree 2010b; Castree 2010c; Castree 
2010a; Castree 2011; Arsel and Büscher 2012; Castree and Henderson 2014). In particular, the 
development of the ‘ecosystem services’ perspective for apprehending and managing the 
environment has implied the abstraction of nature into a form capable of bearing social value that 
can be negotiated through market exchange (Robertson 2012), via modalities such as payments-
for-ecosystem services (PES), biodiversity offsets, and emissions cap-and-trade systems. With the 
neoliberal impulse to create exchange values throughout human socio-ecological systems, in other 
words, man has become the measure of nature. 
These three drivers – the critique of fortress conservation, the advent of the Anthropocene, 
and the rise of neoliberalism – have catalyzed the emergence of a perspective called ‘new 
conservation science’ (NCS) and the articulation of ideologies of ‘eco-pragmatism’ or ‘eco-
modernism.’ Peter Kareiva, during his tenure as Chief Scientist of TNC, was a highly visible 
proponent of NCS and eco-pragmatist viewpoints, which reinforced TNC’s already heavily 
market-oriented and pragmatic conservation approach (TNC 2016b). The NCS label has come into 
common use only since 2012 (Kareiva and Marvier 2012; Soulé 2013; Doak et al. 2014) to describe 
a generally anthropocentric approach to conservation aimed at “de-emphasizing the goal of 
protecting nature for its own sake in favor of protecting the environment for its benefits to humans” 
(Doak et al. 2014, 77). In Kareiva's view, the goal of conservation should not be the preservation 
of “islands of ‘pristine nature’ in a sea of profound human transformations,” but rather “to enhance 
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those natural systems that benefit the widest number of people” through the design of sustainable 
“working landscapes” (Kareiva, Marvier, and Lalasz 2012). 
NCS and Kareiva's eco-pragmatism are closely related both conceptually and 
institutionally (through the support of The Breakthrough Institute) to eco-modernism, which has 
received much attention after the 2015 publication by a group of scientists and science 
communicators of “An Ecomodernist Manifesto” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015). Eco-modernism is 
an explicit iteration of ecological modernization discourse, permeated by narratives of 
anthropocentric sustainable development, ecosystem services, and the Anthropocene. In their 
manifesto, the eco-modernists write, “The modernization processes that have increasingly 
liberated humanity from nature are, of course, double-edged,” (17) since they have generated 
“serious, long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate 
change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification” (10). Nonetheless, they maintain 
that “knowledge and technology, applied with wisdom, might allow for a good, or even great, 
Anthropocene” (6). The eco-modernist prescription for a ‘good Anthropocene’ relies heavily on 
land sparing. The manifesto asserts: 
“Intensifying many human activities — particularly farming, energy extraction, 
forestry, and settlement — so that they use less land and interfere less with the 
natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental 
impacts. These socioeconomic and technological processes are central to economic 
modernization and environmental protection. Together they allow people to 
mitigate climate change, to spare nature, and to alleviate global poverty.” (7) 
 
The idea of land sparing intensification as the mechanism for reconciling environmental protection 
with economic development thus remains foundational to contemporary ecological modernization 
thinking and is heavily influential to the praxis of ‘new conservation,’ as exemplified by 
transnational environmental NGOs like TNC, WWF, and CI. 
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NCS, eco-pragmatism, and eco-modernism have been the objects of numerous critiques, 
in responses to Kareiva in the Breakthrough Journal (Robbins 2012; Suckling 2012; Hayward and 
Martinez 2012), responses to the eco-modernists including in a special section of Environmental 
Humanities (vol. 7, 2015), and elsewhere (Doak et al. 2014; Collard, Dempsey, and Sundberg 
2015). Again, it seems as if the empirical weaknesses of modernization arguments have little effect 
on their popularity. As Doak et al. demonstrate, the prescriptions of NCS rest primarily on 
assumptions and values, not analysis and facts (2014, 80). NCS argues that conservation should 
be done for the sake of human well-being, and then equates well-being with business interests and 
economic prosperity (Doak et al. 2014, 79). In Chapter 4, I describe how land sparing became a 
central element of TNC’s tropical forest conservation strategies, as land sparing ideas and 
programs evolved in articulation with the deepening of new conservation science at TNC. 
My analysis of TNC’s tropical forest programs and the broader trajectories of forest 
governance and land use change in Brazil and Indonesia develops a systemic critique of 
modernization perspectives. I explain why a land sparing agenda has largely been stymied in 
Indonesia, how land sparing has been effectively implemented in the Brazilian Amazon, and how 
Brazil’s success provides a mostly illusory environmental benefit due to land use change 
displacement. My theoretical framework for analyzing comparative and transnational dynamics of 
tropical forest governance and land use change is grounded in ecological Marxist political 
economy and development sociology. 
Extraction, Production, and Socio-Political Organization in the Capitalist World Ecology 
 Marxian analyses highlight the expansionary dynamics of capitalism. Competition and 
declining rates of profit in a capitalist system create a growth imperative that can be met through 
gains in productivity or through primitive accumulation, which Harvey (2004) terms 
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‘accumulation by dispossession.’ While productivity gains derive from improved production 
efficiencies, which may include technological innovations and capital investments, primitive 
accumulation describes the enclosures involved in the creation of new markets as well as the 
continuing appropriations of ‘free gifts of nature’ (in the terminology of the classical economists) 
or uncompensated labor (De Angelis 2001; De Angelis 2004; Glassman 2006; Araghi 2009). Marx 
famously observed that capitalist production rests on “simultaneously undermining the original 
sources of all wealth – the soil and the workers” (Capital Vol. I in Moore 2000, 127). In addition 
to the degradation of labor, the first great contradiction of capitalism, ecological Marxists have 
emphasized the degradation of the environment as a second fundamental contradiction of 
capitalism (O’Connor 1988; Foster 1992), rooted especially in the ‘metabolic rift’ of capitalist 
production between the countryside (periphery) and the city (core) (Foster 1999; Moore 2000). 
In the classic formulation of the metabolic rift, crops grown in the countryside are 
consumed in the cities, leading to the concentration of nutrients in cities and the degradation of 
soil fertility in the country. The metabolic rift is a fractal feature of capitalism (cf. Appadurai 
1996), operating at the local level between hinterlands and urban centers, at the regional level 
between agricultural and industrial zones, and at the global level between the natural resource-
based economies of the Global South and the industrial economies of the Global North (Foster 
1999).  As a process of uneven development and environmental degradation, the metabolic rift is 
also a fundamental dynamic in the expansion and deepening of capitalist relations as waves of 
resource exhaustion drive new enclosures in expanding frontiers of primitive accumulation 
(Harvey 2001). Moore therefore argues that the metabolic rift is “a fundamental ecogeographical 
feature of capitalism as a world-system that contained a powerfully globalizing spatial logic” 
(2000, 136). 
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From the world system perspective, the expansionary dynamics of capital play out through 
the globalizing reproduction of center-periphery formations. As Foster and Holleman (2014) 
explain, the global metabolic rift of capitalism derives to a substantial degree from relations of 
unequal ecological exchange. The general phenomenon of unequal exchange in capitalist trade 
relations is rooted in the competitive equalization of rates of profit that allows wage differentials 
between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ regions or countries (those with higher versus lower 
levels of fixed capital investment, or as Hornborg (2001) would have it, higher versus lower 
‘technomass’) to exceed productivity differentials, such that the low-wage countries exchange 
more value for less. This economic mechanism combines with the monopolistic behavior of 
dominant core actors, which skews the terms of trade against underdeveloped countries, 
compounding unequal exchange relations and concentrating value in the core at the expense of the 
periphery. These inequalities of global trade relations were at the heart of dependency theories that 
emerged in the 1960s in opposition to modernization perspectives (Frank 1966; Frank 1967; 
Cardoso and Faletto 1979). 
The ecological dimension of unequal exchange is based on the free appropriation of 
‘nature’s gifts,’ which are then inserted into unequal trade relations, resulting in the unequal 
exchange of embodied energy (‘natural’ or ‘use’ values), including embodied labor (Hornborg 
1998; B. Clark and Foster 2009; Foster and Holleman 2014). A useful illustration of the effects of 
unequal ecological exchange comes from ecological footprint analysis, which demonstrates that a 
country’s ecological footprint may be inversely related to its environmental degradation, as 
developed (industrialized) economies displace environmental loads to developing (natural 
resource-based) economies (Tucker 2000; Jorgenson 2006; Hornborg 2012). 
 
	
	
102 
The border zones of capitalist expansion, where processes of primitive accumulation 
appropriate ecological value and enclose new capitalist space, are frequently configured as 
‘frontiers’ of natural resource extraction and land conversion (Moore 2010a; Barbier 2011; Peluso 
and Lund 2011; Barbier 2012). These frontiers typically extract and exhaust raw materials or soil 
fertility, producing ‘boom and bust’ development patterns (Rodrigues et al. 2009). In the broadest 
sense, capitalist development is a dialectic of primitive accumulation and productivity, and in the 
capitalist geography of unequal exchange and uneven development (N. Smith 1984), this dialectic 
is manifested through the coevolution of what Bunker (1985) terms extractive and productive 
economies. 
Extraction and Production 
Stephen G. Bunker’s (1985) Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal 
Exchange, and the Failure of the Modern State was a landmark study for thinking about unequal 
exchange based on an incisive analysis of the economic history of the Amazon. Bunker’s 
theorization of Amazonian (under)development and capitalist dynamics is a foundation for my 
analysis of Brazilian and Indonesian land use change. 
 In what he describes as a synthesis of externally focused theories of imperialism, 
dependency, and world systems with internally focused theories of modernization and modes of 
production, Bunker shows how the energy-concentrating, increasingly complex structures of 
productive economies are dependent on the energy-dissipating, simplifying structures of 
extraction. For Bunker, 
“the complex social organizational, demographic, and infrastructural forms that 
emerge as technological change and accumulation accelerate the flow of energy 
through the articulated productive systems ultimately depend on processes that 
progressively decelerate the economy, disrupt the ecosystem, and simplify social 
organization in extractive regions.” (1985, 30–31) 
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Bunker anchors his argument in the Brazilian Amazon, where he describes how successive export 
economies have extracted resources such as minerals, timber, or (in the case of cattle pasture) soil 
fertility, to support the productive economies of urban centers, southern Brazil, and the Global 
North. 
 I adopt Bunker’s understanding of the relation between extractive and productive 
economies, and I seek to expand his theoretical apparatus with a particular attention to the political 
arrangements that help to stabilize and reproduce structures of extraction and production.14 
Bunker’s analysis pays considerable attention to the state, which he describes as emerging in 
productive centers and seeking to impose control and regulation on extractive peripheries. The 
‘modern state’ is a specific form of organization, an energy-concentrating and energy-directing 
bureaucratic structure of socio-economic control: 
“The modern state, however, emerged out of energy-intensive industrial production 
systems. In its promotion of social welfare, in its attempts to maintain order, and in 
its regulation of economic activities, the modern state’s complexity and size have 
corresponded to the high degree of economic differentiation, specialization, and 
complexity of the articulated industrial economy. As it has grown, its increased size 
and complexity have directly absorbed higher levels of human and nonhuman 
energy…. Such forms of regulation are enormously costly… They can only be 
maintained and can only function, therefore, in energy-intensive systems where 
high proportions of nonhuman energy in production liberate human energy for other 
purposes.” (51-52) 
 
The state seeks to govern the periphery as the site of extraction on which the productive center 
depends, but due to their intensive energy requirements, “The bureaucratic agencies of the modern 
																																																						
14 This distinction between extraction and production is related to but different from the problem of the 
“subsumption of nature” and the distinction between extraction and cultivation developed by Boyd et al. (2001; see 
also Carton, Jönsson, and Bustos 2017). The subsumption of nature framework focuses more narrowly on the 
materialities of nature and its integration into industrial processes, whereas the distinction between extractive and 
productive economies comes at the level of socio-economic and political organization. For example, iron mining 
(which for Boyd et al. is extraction) can occur in a productivist complex integrated with steelmaking and automobile 
manufacture, while oil palm plantations (which for Boyd et al. are cultivation) can be extractive and disarticulated 
from local socio-economic development. 
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state can only occur in extractive peripheries as an imposed, exogenous force and are therefore 
compelled to act without the corresponding civil organization which its own rationality and 
operating procedures require” (29). This imposition may generate a number of pathologies, such 
as oligarchization, rent seizing, and regulatory capture (52-53; cf. Ross 2001). 
 Bunker’s argument reifies a particular form of political organization under the rubric of the 
‘modern state.’ While I agree that there are certain characteristics of the state as a form of political 
organization that are fundamental to the government of complex societies (Scott 1998), I argue 
that the political organization of extractive zones, when stabilized over an extended period of time, 
should be considered not as a diminished or pathologized expression of the ideal-typical modern 
state (cf. Levitsky and Collier 1997), but rather as a coherent political-economic structure. The 
‘pathologies’ of extractive politics are rather stabilized, functional aspects of what I term an 
‘extractive regime’ (following Gellert 2010). Bunker also recognizes that extraction and 
production engender distinct configurations of land tenure and resource access (27), and 
productive and extractive systems comprise “very different ecological, demographic, and social 
structural evolutionary processes” (46), yet by insisting on the economic and ecological integration 
of extraction and production, he tends to insist also on the political integration of these formations. 
 Relatedly, Bunker’s analysis tends to privilege particular territorial levels in his description 
of extractive and productive economies. Namely, the Amazon Basin as an extractive zone, the 
Brazilian Southeast, Europe, and the US as productive centers. This perspective elides the fractal 
character of extraction-production relations15 and the political formations that support them across 
local, municipal, regional, national, and international levels. It also reinforces an equilibrium 
picture of cores and peripheries common to world systems analysis and dependency theory, where 
																																																						
15 Consider by way of contrast Browder and Godfrey’s (1997) work on the urbanization of the Amazon. 
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being peripheral or dependent is an indefinite equilibrium condition perpetuated by seemingly 
insurmountable structures of political, economic, and ecological inequity. I maintain that a greater 
attention to the political configuration of extractive regimes and to the interactions of extractive 
and productivist political-economic formations across multiple levels can open up a richer 
understanding of the process and contingency of political-economic and environmental change. 
When and how might an area move from being an extractive periphery to a productive core?16 
How do transitions between extraction and production at different levels interact and spread 
through systems? And to what degree, contra Bunker, are political structures able to catalyze these 
transformations? 
A focus on the state, furthermore, helps to illuminate the importance of territory and 
processes of ‘territorialization’ through which states facilitate and structure capitalist extraction 
and production. The construction of ‘territory’ is a principal means for securing state control of 
populations and resources. Elden (2010) defines territory as a political technology that has both 
economic and strategic dimensions. Territorialization, in Vandergeest and Peluso’s (1995) 
formulation, describes the state’s actions to structure the spatial organization of people and their 
relations to natural resources. Building on these concepts, I use ‘territorialization’ to describe the 
construction of political spaces of economic and strategic control. Territorialization is a process of 
state-building that articulates with other forms of socio-economic control in the construction of 
extractive and productivist regimes. 
Extractive and Productivist Regimes 
																																																						
16 Zeitlin’s (1984) The Civil Wars in Chile seeks to answer this question for Chile in the second half of the 19th 
century. 
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 I argue that extractive and productive economies are supported by distinct types of political 
arrangements, such that we can differentiate extractive and productivist political-economic 
regimes. A regime is, fundamentally, a mode of rule. In the case of political-economic systems, a 
regime refers to the configuration of a socio-political order articulated with a mode of production. 
To use Araghi’s phrasing, I am describing regimes as ‘the political face of value relations’ (2003, 
51). I delineate an extractive regime corresponding to an extractive economy, and a productivist 
regime corresponding to a productive economy.17 This concept of a political-economic regime 
bears similarity to the regime concept in regulation theory, which identifies macro-social regimes 
of social regulation corresponding to different historical forms of accumulation (typically Fordism 
and post-Fordism) (Aglietta 1979). My usage refers to political-economic regimes not at the global 
level of industrial regulation theory, or its adaptation to ‘world food regimes’ described by 
Friedmann and McMichael (1989) and critiqued by Goodman and Watts (1994). Rather, I am 
describing extractive and productivist regimes that are component parts of the capitalist world 
economy.  
 Extractive and productivist political-economic regimes are thus more specific than the 
‘capitalist political-economy,’ for they describe the character of subsystems within the capitalist 
world system as either extractive or productivist. These regimes are also more general than a 
description of particular labor relations or production processes and sectors, where we might 
																																																						
17 The multiple uses of terms such as ‘extraction’ and ‘production’ pose a challenge for choosing an appropriate 
terminology for these regimes. I describe an ‘extractive’ regime following the usage of the term for ‘extractive 
industries,’ and more specifically Gellert’s (2010) existing description of an ‘extractive regime.’ I do not use the 
term ‘extractivism’ or an ‘extractivist’ regime because extractivism, especially in Amazonian scholarship, may refer 
to livelihoods centered on harvesting of non-timber forest products such as rubber, although there is also scholarly 
discussion of extractivism with regard to natural resource extraction (Gudynas 2009; Baletti 2014). On the other 
hand, where ‘mode of production’ is used to distinguish an extractive economy from a productive economy, the 
terms ‘production’ and ‘productive’ appear ambiguous, so I refer to a ‘productivist’ regime corresponding to a 
particular, intensive mode of production. This usage hearkens to discussions of ‘productivism’ as an intensifying, 
modernizing ‘regime’ in agriculture (Wilson 2001), as well as a more general discursive and material configuration 
of capitalist development and modernization (Baudrillard 1975; Moore 2015). 
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identify a ‘plantation economy,’ a ‘petro-economy,’ or a ‘tech economy’ and its attendant political 
formations. This level of specificity is analogous to the level at which regimes are often discussed 
in comparative politics, where ‘regime’ describes the organization of rule within a particular state 
or polity, such as a ‘democratic regime’ versus an ‘authoritarian regime’ (Levitsky and Collier 
1997). It is a concept more specific than the state, but more general than the government 
administration holding power at any particular moment. The difference is that the regime concept 
in comparative politics is usually concerned narrowly with political institutional structures at the 
level of the nation-state and does not address the economic question of the forms of accumulation 
linked to a particular organization of rule. Further description is required in this terminology to 
link the political regime to an economic form, for example ‘bureaucratic authoritarian 
developmentalism’ in Brazil or ‘neopatrimonial extractivism’18 in Indonesia. In the language of 
comparative politics, then, the Brazilian State since World War II may be said to have passed from 
a democratic regime to a bureaucratic authoritarian regime back to a democratic regime, but across 
these transitions the political regime remained committed to modernizing, industrializing 
development, and so I characterize the Brazilian national political-economic regime throughout 
the post-WWII period as a productivist regime. 
 A few points must be clarified. First, where comparative politics’ discussion of regimes 
tends to fall into a ‘territorial trap’ that limits analysis to the national level (Agnew 1994), I suggest, 
following Appadurai (1996), that political-economic regimes are fractal features of the capitalist 
world system, just as the extraction-production dialectic is reproduced across scales. Thus, while 
relative to the systemic core of the Global North, Brazil represents a zone of extraction, Brazil also 
has a national core of productivist industry, centered especially in the South and Southeast. For 
																																																						
18 Exctractivism here refers to extractive industry. 
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the Brazilian core, the Amazon is a zone of extraction, yet even within the Amazon there are 
productive urban centers that extract from the hinterlands. At each socially produced spatial level, 
there is a political-economic regime that articulates a socio-political regulatory structure with a 
mode of accumulation. From this point of view, we can see clearly how the political character of 
the regime plays a crucial role in determining patterns of accumulation. At any political level, a 
regime may govern both extractive and productive processes. Because extraction and production 
are integrally interdependent and fractal, no regime is absolutely extractive or absolutely 
productivist; the question is rather one of degree. Nonetheless, it becomes deeply consequential 
whether the political organization at a particular level is configured in such a way as to promote 
primarily extraction or production. This political configuration is not entirely autonomous or 
arbitrary, but rather rooted in the political-economic history of that place. At the same time, the 
political regime is not entirely determined by economic structures, and it can play a determinant 
role in how the economy evolves under its control. 
 For example, I argue that Brazil at the national level is characterized by a productivist 
political-economic regime that seeks industrialization and broad-based, articulated national 
development through bureaucratic rule. Historically, the Amazon has been characterized by an 
extractive regime, where clientelist, latifundista political-economic formations have mined timber, 
minerals, and soils without contributing to more complex economic integration or general well-
being. Bunker describes the pathologies of the Brazilian state attempting to extend modern 
bureaucratic government to the Amazonian extractive zone. While the perversion of modernizing 
projects certainly occurred, such as the boondoggle of the military’s development projects under 
the Superintendency for Development of the Amazon (SUDAM) (Hecht and Cockburn 1989; 
Schmink and Wood 1992), I would focus instead on the tenure relations, patronage structures, and 
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personalistic politics that stabilized and supported an extractive economy in the Amazon region, 
which constituted a political-economic regime in their own right. Extractive interests had political 
representation at the national level, just as productivist interests sought to steer development in the 
Amazon, but these were minority tendencies in the overall structure of their regimes. I argue in 
this study that since the mid-2000s, the national productivist regime in Brazil has sought to shift 
the regional economy of the Amazon from a mode of extraction to a mode of production. National 
productivist pressures have been resisted by some regional elites, threatened by the transformation 
of the Amazonian extractive regime. At the same time, and in some cases anticipating federal 
policy, some municipalities in the Amazon have sought to effect a transformation from extraction 
to production at the municipal level. One example is the municipality of Paragominas, where with 
the collapse of a timber boom elites sought to shift the economy to manufacture of value-added 
wood products and industrial soy cultivation (Thaler, Viana, and Toni, n.d.). Their efforts were 
subsequently supported by the productivist thrust of federal policy. If, by contrast, the national 
political-economic regime had been extractive, as in Indonesia, municipal elites would have had 
much more difficulty effecting a municipal productivist transition, as they would have been 
encompassed by formal and informal institutional structures aimed at siphoning wealth for 
personal and external enrichment rather than reinvesting in local articulated development. An 
extractive regime at a higher level may impede a productivist transition at a lower level, while an 
extractive regime at a lower level may derail or refract higher-level productivist forces. In short, 
development processes on the ground materialize through nested political-economic regimes 
across multiple levels, and higher-level regimes are not necessarily determinant of lower levels, 
but they are conditioning, and lower-level regimes may resist or distort higher level projects. 
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 A brief word on neo-extractivism is also warranted. Some scholars might argue that the 
21st-century leftist neoliberal political-economic regime in Brazil (and many other parts of Latin 
America) is not a productivist regime, but rather a ‘neo-extractivist’ regime (Gudynas 2009; Baletti 
2014) based on a natural resource export economy. I make two observations. First, that extraction 
certainly continues to exist within the Brazilian national economy, as it does at all scales of the 
capitalist system. The fact that natural resource extraction is occurring in some zones does not 
imply that the character of the national political-economic regime is necessarily extractive. The 
important question is how the value from extraction circulates at the national level. In Brazil, 
extractive revenues have been reinvested in social programs and infrastructure, which is in keeping 
with a productivist politics. Of course, as Brazilian political scandals have revealed, billions of 
dollars from the national oil company have been siphoned off for personal enrichment, in keeping 
with an extractive politics. Regimes are ever hybrid. To the degree that the national political 
economy has remained geared toward value-added production and broad-based socio-economic 
growth, however, I consider the national regime productivist. 
Second, some scholars have characterized the expansion of agro-industry in the Amazon 
as a form of agricultural extraction (Oliveira 2013; Baletti 2014). I maintain that there is a 
fundamental difference between the capital-intensive, high-productivity agro-industrial soy 
production and cattle ranching that is emerging in the Amazon region and the low-input, low-
productivity, slash-and-burn ranching that it is replacing. While the latter was classically 
extractive, the new agro-industrial mode of production and the political arrangements that 
accompany it are productivist and indicative of an incipient regional transition from extraction to 
production, as I argue in Chapter 6. It should be clear that I am not arguing that the new Amazonian 
productivism is a ‘good’ thing, or that it does not entail the inequities and degradations that critics 
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have described. My point is rather to describe and theorize the processes of change in the local and 
regional political economies of tropical agro-forest landscapes under contemporary global 
capitalism. In the Amazon, as everywhere else, the increasing development (wealth, complexity) 
of the productivist agro-industrial economy is dependent on the underdevelopment 
(impoverishment, degradation) of extractive economies across multiple scales. 
 In Chapters 5 and 6 on Indonesia and Brazil, I detail the empirical manifestations of 
extractive and productivist regimes in those countries. Here, I elaborate briefly on the general 
characteristics of extractive and productivist regimes. 
Extractive Regimes 
 The extractive regime is the typical political-economic formation of the periphery. 
European colonialism outside the settler colonies, for example, operated quintessentially as an 
extractive regime. The institutions constructed and maintained by the colonial state, such as 
slavery, large land grants, and trade monopolies, were calculated to enrich a narrow domestic elite 
and the foreign metropole, at the expense of environmental and social degradation in the colony. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) review a number of studies of colonial extraction, noting 
that in the early 20th century the French extracted 50 percent of the GDP of Dahomey, Britain took 
in over 17 pounds in taxes from the southern African copperbelt for every pound returned to 
Northern Rhodesia in development grants, and tax rates on Africans in the Belgian Congo 
approached 60 percent of their income. They emphasize that the institutions supporting this 
extraction persisted long after independence. The Mobutu government in Zaire is famous for its 
depredations, as is Suharto’s New Order government in Indonesia for its natural resource plunder. 
Africanists speak of ‘neopatrimonial regimes’ as systems of personalistic rule, but these regimes 
have an explicitly economic component as well, comprising patronage networks, personal 
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enrichment, and the blurring of public and private interests (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994), 
making them another iteration of an extractive political-economic regime. The distinction between 
extractive and productivist regimes bears similarities also to the distinction between predatory and 
developmental states (P. Evans 1995), but that distinction is generally limited to national-level 
analysis, ignores the integral interdependence of extraction (predation) and production 
(development), and fails to situate predatory and developmental regimes within a world system 
where national level political formations are co-produced with extractive and productivist regimes 
across multiple levels (Gellert 2010). 
 Unsustainable natural resource exploitation is a hallmark of extractive economies, and is 
enabled and maintained by particular political formations. Looking specifically at Southeast Asia, 
Michael Ross (2001) describes the ‘institutional breakdown’ he sees emerging from tropical timber 
booms. He details the interactions of rent-seeking by private actors and government officials and 
rent-seizing by bureaucrats who seek to control and allocate rents from the windfall profits of the 
tropical timber trade. Ross focuses on the dismantling of regulatory institutions during an 
extractive boom, concluding that “state institutions can become endogenous to the pursuit of rents” 
(202), yet in the case of Indonesia, as Ross recognizes, there were few regulatory institutions to be 
dismantled to begin with. While Ross’ analysis is limited to a single commodity boom, under the 
extractive regime in Indonesia, as elsewhere, institutions are integrally ‘endogenous to the pursuit 
of rents,’ by the New Order government, by the Dutch colonial government, by the Dutch East 
India Company, and their associates. The nationalist post-independence government of Sukarno 
was consumed by political struggles and ultimately did little to alter the fundamentally extractive 
character of Indonesia’s political-economic regime. 
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 Paul Gellert’s (2010) definition of an extractive regime, based on the case of Indonesia, 
comes closest to my use of the concept. Gellert builds on world systems analysis and Bunker’s 
work on extractive and productive economies to define an extractive regime as a historically 
produced, concrete economic and political order based on natural resource extraction. He notes 
that extractive regimes can access and use natural resources through structures of domination 
without constructing complex, Weberian bureaucracies, and that the spatiality of the regime will 
be specific to the resources in question. Gellert argues that the extractive regime concept can help 
move beyond the predeterminations of some strands of world systems and dependency thinking to 
attend to the ways peripheral states may reshape accumulation processes. 
  My definition of extractive regimes differs from Gellert’s in two important ways. First, 
Gellert defines an extractive regime only in relation to the extraction of natural resource-based 
commodities. Although he recognizes that the exploitation of peripheral labor is also fundamental 
to capitalist development (35), Gellert limits his discussion to natural resources in order to attend 
to the particular materialities and institutional characteristics of natural resource extraction. My 
concern, however, is with the broader extraction versus production dialectic and its associated 
political economic forms, which encompass extraction from peripheral social and ecological 
systems and accumulation in productive centers. I therefore link extractive labor structures and 
natural resource extraction under my extractive regime concept. 
 Second, Gellert defines an extractive regime as a limited historical form that emerges in a 
particular world-historical moment of post-WWII developmentalism and globalization. I 
generalize the extractive regime as an ideal type of political-economic organization in the capitalist 
world system. I am interested in production/extraction, core/periphery dynamics in the longue 
durée of historical capitalism, and from this perspective there is a continuity, for example, between 
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the political structures of colonial and post-colonial extraction, and between the Suharto-era 
extractive regime in Indonesia and post-Suharto extractive neoliberalism, as Gellert also 
recognizes (50), or between colonial and post-colonial natural resource extraction in the Brazilian 
Amazon. 
 Finally, Gellert recognizes that extraction occurs at different scales throughout the world 
system, and suggests the possibility of extending his extractive regime concept to the ‘internal 
peripheries’ of core countries (30 fn. 2), but in his exposition he focuses almost exclusively on the 
national-level political-economic regime. My concern is more explicitly with the multi-level 
character of extractive and productivist regimes and the interactions across levels between, for 
example, a productivist national regime in Brazil and an extractive regional or municipal regime 
in the Brazilian Amazon, or attempts to alter the extractive character of a district-level regime in 
Indonesia while confronted by pressures from extractive provincial and national regimes. 
 A note on speculation is also important. Speculation, or “the purchase (or sale) of goods 
with a view to re-sale (re-purchase) at a later date, where the motive behind such action is the 
expectation of a change in the relevant prices relatively to the ruling price and not a gain accruing 
through their use, or any kind of transformation effected in them or their transfer between different 
markets” (Kaldor 1939, 1), is a dynamic common to both extractive and productive economies of 
capitalism. Speculation may alter productivist systems, for example by feeding real estate bubbles 
or stock market bubbles (Kindleberger 1978; Schwartz 2009), and extractive systems, for example 
by feeding land grabs, gold rushes, or other commodity booms (Hecht 1985; Hecht 1993; Tsing 
2000a). Speculation may become especially prominent during periods of high financialization of 
the economic system (Arrighi 1994), leading to surprising convergences of high finance with 
frontier extraction, as Anna Tsing (2000a) describes in the case of the Bre-X gold find in 
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Indonesian Borneo, and as can be seen with the involvement of financier Daniel Dantas in cattle 
ranching in Southern Pará (Manechini 2008) and the imbroglio of a Rothschild investment in coal 
mining in East Kalimantan (Kahn and Mellor 2013). These speculative dynamics are significant 
to the operation of different extractive and productivist regimes, and I describe the role of 
speculation in the political economies of the Amazon and Eastern Borneo. Nonetheless, I view 
these dynamics as secondary to the fundamental material extraction and production processes of 
the different economies,19 and I maintain that the critical distinction for the question of land sparing 
forest governance is between extractive and productivist regimes. 
 I have devoted more space to delineating the extractive regime because of my concern to 
show that it is a distinct political-economic formation and not simply a diminished or externally-
imposed structure of a general, homogenous ‘modern state.’ The following section completes the 
discussion of extraction and production with a brief description of productivist regimes. 
Productivist Regimes 
 The productivist regime is the typical political-economic formation of core zones of the 
world economy. Productivist core economies are characterized by high rates of fixed capital 
investment or ‘technomass’ and infrastructural density, strong inter-sectoral linkages, and 
economies of scale (Hirschman 1977; Bunker 1985). This mode of production is supported by a 
characteristic set of political institutions centered on the complex bureaucratic formations of the 
modern state, which regulates production in the core and seeks to guarantee extraction in the 
peripheries through its relations with extractive regimes. There is an extensive literature on the 
																																																						
19 Jason Moore argues differently that contemporary financialization is of a different quality from the previous five 
centuries of historical capitalism, surpassing the exhausted historical marriage of ‘productivity and plunder’ 
(production and extraction) through the instantiation of general financialized extraction throughout the world system 
(Moore 2012, 4–5). Be that as it may, I find the divergent trajectories of Indonesian and Brazilian land use change 
best explained by a continued focus on extraction and production, as opposed to their subsumption under 
generalized financialization. 
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‘varieties of capitalism’ that discusses institutional variation among advanced industrial economies 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). More important here are the general institutions of productivist regimes 
that these economies share. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) highlight constraints on 
government expropriation, an independent judiciary, property rights enforcement, and institutional 
support for access to education and protection of civil liberties (1370 fn. 3), which are the 
foundational institutions of a liberal political-economic order and broad-based socio-economic 
development in modern capitalist societies (North 1981). Students of developmentalism, focused 
more narrowly on the “late-late industrializers” (Kohli 2004, 8) of the Global South, have also 
emphasized the importance of effective bureaucracies and alliances between the state and capital 
to promote industrial development (P. Evans 1995; Kohli 2004). As in the case of predatory or 
neopatrimonial states, these descriptions of developmental states are generally limited to the 
national level and do not situate political-economic structures within the broader world system 
(Gellert 2010); nonetheless, they provide a further illustration of the interaction of political and 
economic structures in productivist capitalist development. 
In the following sections, I propose concepts for analyzing the interactions between extractive 
and productivist regimes across multiple levels through attention to the political-economic 
assemblages that support particular kinds of transformation. 
Complexes and Coalitions 
Complexes 
 I have discussed extractive and productivist regimes as analytical frames encompassing the 
socio-political and economic ordering of geographically-defined subsystems of the capitalist world 
system. Political-economic regimes scale across socially-produced spatial levels that articulate 
with materially-grounded modes of production and accumulation. At a fundamental level, the 
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capitalist system is an endless dialectic of extraction and production. At different levels of the 
system and in different historical periods, however, there emerge assemblages of actors, 
institutions, practices, and discourses that seek to advance particular political-economic projects, 
i.e., to structure accumulation in a particular way (Li 2007a). I call these assemblages complexes. 
Like a regime, a complex is both material and ideational. A complex is linked to a particular 
fraction of capital, however large or small, and includes the epistemic and governmental 
formations that help support and direct that fraction. At the broadest level, we can speak of macro-
level political-economic phenomena such as Fordism and neoliberalism in terms of complexes. 
There is a neoliberal complex animated by the ideology of the Washington Consensus and 
advancing a project of privatization, marketization, and deregulation through the actions and 
interactions of governments, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, private corporations, and others. At a less general level, we can 
speak of the military-industrial complex in the United States as an assemblage of the US Armed 
Forces, defense contractors, politicians, and others united by a project for militarized political 
power and economic growth. 
 In this frame, I argue that ecological modernization discourse has been coupled with the 
emergence of a global ‘green growth complex.’ As I described at the beginning of the chapter, 
ecological modernization discourse has supported a conciliation of environmentalist NGOs, 
corporations, and government actors to pursue improved environmental conditions through 
economic development. UNEP’s launch in 2008 of its Green Economy Initiative was a landmark 
in the consolidation of this complex. “Mobilizing and re-focusing the global economy towards 
investments in clean technologies and ‘natural’ infrastructure such as forests and soils is the best 
bet for real growth, combating climate change and triggering an employment boom in the 21st 
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century,” UNEP (2008) affirmed. The ‘green growth’ frame was quickly expanded into a holistic 
economic perspective: UNEP’s Green Economy Report in 2011 included chapters on agriculture, 
fisheries, water, forests, renewable energy, manufacturing, waste, buildings, transport, tourism, 
cities, policy ‘enabling conditions,’ and finance (UNEP 2011). The green growth complex at the 
international level integrates intergovernmental organizations such as UNEP and the Global Green 
Growth Institute (established in 2012), multi-lateral development banks, bilateral development 
agencies, transnational corporations, sustainability researchers, and transnational environmentalist 
and development NGOs. The complex is reproduced across levels in the world system. Sugarcane 
ethanol producers in Brazil are a part of the green growth complex, as are RSPO-certified palm oil 
producers in Indonesia, along with national government agencies and domestic NGOs. The green 
growth project takes different forms according to the socio-political and material characteristics of 
different subsystems, and it will not necessarily be manifested in all places at all times. 
Within the green growth complex, there are a variety of subsidiary complexes related to 
particular industrial sectors, particular commodities, and particular transformative projects, each 
associated with different fractions of capital. Thus there is a solar energy complex, a sustainable 
soy complex (Baletti 2014; Elgert 2012), and a REDD complex. Complexes may overlap and 
actors may participate in multiple complexes – the complex, like any fraction of capital, is not self-
contained, but rather identifies a cluster (an assemblage) within a much larger network (the world 
system). I define the land sparing complex as an assemblage of actors, institutions, practices, and 
discourses seeking to advance land sparing as a political-economic project. The land sparing 
complex is centered on a fraction of agro-industrial capital, and it falls within the broader green 
growth complex. TNC plays a key role in the land sparing complex at multiple levels, as it does in 
the green growth complex more generally.  
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Coalitions 
A complex describes an assemblage, a set of relationships. Complexes do not act as units, 
however. Rather, complexes advance their projects in different places and moments through the 
constitution of political-economic coalitions. Coalitions emerge when members of a complex ally 
with each other (and possibly with other actors) in order to advance particular projects or goals 
that support their common agenda. These coalitions are the bridge between a complex and the 
implementation of policy. Thus, the land sparing complex acts through land sparing coalitions. 
These coalitions are characterized as ‘developmental coalitions’ or ‘growth coalitions’ in the 
sociological and development studies literature, i.e., social groupings dedicated to promoting 
particular processes of socio-economic and environmental transformation (P. Evans 1995; Rudel 
2009). Different coalitions may coincide or clash with each other in a particular space or across 
multiple levels, and these interactions comprise the tectonics between different fractions of capital 
and their associated complexes. 
In the case of land sparing, in any particular place and time, a subset of actors within the 
land sparing complex may be active in promoting agricultural intensification and forest 
conservation as a land sparing coalition. In the chapters that follow, I describe land sparing 
coalitions operating at different levels from frontier municipalities to national capitals. In Chapter 
4, I discuss the development of green growth and land sparing ideas at TNC and the changing 
relations and practices of the organization as it has participated in assembling the global green 
growth and land sparing complexes. In Chapter 5, I describe the land sparing complex in Indonesia 
and the particular challenges it has faced, as I examine attempts to mobilize land sparing coalitions 
at the national, provincial, and district levels. In Chapter 6, I describe the land sparing complex in 
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Brazil and the formation and activity of land sparing coalitions at the national, state, and municipal 
levels. 
 
 In summary, I have put forward an analytical framework based on extractive and 
productivist regimes as political-economic formations comprising economic structures of 
production and accumulation and socio-political structures that stabilize, regulate, and reproduce 
those economic structures. Extractive regimes exhibit institutional structures directed towards 
enabling socio-ecological extraction for the benefit of a narrow elite and external economies at a 
cost of internal socio-ecological degradation. Productivist regimes exhibit institutional structures 
aimed at concentrating resources to support complex and broad-based structures of articulated 
production and accumulation. These regimes coalesce at multiple socially-constructed spatial 
levels within the capitalist world system. At different levels of the system and in different historical 
periods, complexes emerge as assemblages of actors, institutions, practices, and discourses 
anchored in particular fractions of capital and seeking to advance particular political-economic 
projects. One such complex is the green growth complex; another is the land sparing complex that 
is a component of it. Complexes act through coalitions, where members of a complex ally with 
each other and sometimes other actors in order to advance their agenda at a particular level and in 
a particular moment, in contestation or cooperation with other actors and coalitions. Land sparing 
coalitions emerge in different configurations and with different effects and durations in Amazonian 
municipalities, Indonesian districts, and at other levels up to the global. This framework allows us 
to analyze the interactions between extractive and productivist regimes across multiple levels 
through attention to the complexes and coalitions that support particular kinds of transformation 
at particular conjunctures. 
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My first purpose in the following chapters is to use this analytical framework to help 
explain trajectories of forest governance and land use change in Brazil and Indonesia. My second 
purpose is to situate these divergent trajectories in a systemic perspective to evaluate more general 
questions related to the nature of the relationship between extraction and production, the 
effectiveness of land sparing, and the systemic possibility of ecological modernization. 
Part II contains the empirical chapters of the dissertation. Chapter 4 provides a genealogy 
of the land sparing idea within a key environmental actor (TNC), while Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate 
the operation of extractive and productivist regimes, the land sparing complex, and land sparing 
coalitions across different tropical forest landscapes in Eastern Borneo and the Amazon. Chapter 
7 focuses on the dialectical relation between extraction and production by tracing the linkages 
between productivist development in the Brazilian Amazon and accelerating deforestation on 
coupled South American frontiers. 
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PART II 
CHAPTER 4 
LAND SPARING, ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION, AND FOREST CONSERVATION 
AT THE NATURE CONSERVANCY 
 
“The world runs on capitalism; that drives everything. 
How do you make conservation compatible with that?” 
- TNC employee, Arlington, VA, 11 August 2015 
“At The Nature Conservancy, we believe that production systems must intensify. 
Intensification must be at the center of conservation thinking about agriculture.” 
- TNC Global Lands Report (2015, 28) 
 
 
Founded in the United States in 1951 as an environmental nonprofit group, The Nature 
Conservancy emerged out of the Ecologists Union, a splinter faction of the Ecological Society of 
America, and was modeled in part on the nature conservancy programs of the British Government. 
TNC’s signature strategy was to purchase land for conservation, beginning with the purchase of 
60 acres of river gorge near New York City in 1955. The organization grew steadily during the 
blossoming of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s, eventually operating in all 50 
states and launching programs in Latin America. TNC then grew rapidly in the 1980s, nearly 
quadrupling its annual revenue from $58 million to $222 million and expanding its staff by an 
order of magnitude from 77 employees to 933 (Ottaway and Stephens 2003). During the 1990s, 
TNC underwent a further metamorphosis as corporate donations and bilateral and multilateral 
funding began to make up an ever larger part of the organization’s budget. Corporate donations 
grew from $1.8 million in 1993 to $225 million in 2002, at which time total annual revenue reached 
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nearly $1 billion (Ottaway and Stephens 2003). By the 2010s, the organization had over $6 billion 
in assets, 3,800 staff members, and activities in over 30 countries. 
In the late 1980s, TNC began working on forest conservation in Brazil, followed several 
years later by the beginning of forest conservation activities in Indonesia. Early international 
efforts maintained the wilderness-oriented, ‘fortress conservation’ approach TNC had taken in the 
U.S., focusing initially on improving forest conservation in protected areas through the ‘Parks in 
Peril’ program in Brazil and a program at Lore Lindu National Park in Indonesia. In 1997, TNC 
partnered with American Electric to launch a project around Noel Kempff National Park in Bolivia 
that became the world’s first independently-verified REDD project, preceding intergovernmental 
discussions on REDD at the UNFCCC by a decade. Subsequently, TNC was instrumental in the 
establishment of the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility in 2007, and it launched 
REDD pilot projects in Brazil and Indonesia in 2009. By 2015, TNC’s international Forests and 
Climate program had been rolled into a new Global Lands program, and the organization was 
promoting agricultural intensification as a strategy for forest conservation, including through 
projects for ‘sustainable cacao’ and ‘sustainable beef’ in the Amazon and ‘sustainable oil palm’ in 
Borneo. Why did an organization focused on biodiversity conservation start devoting resources to 
increasing agricultural productivity? How did land sparing become the central policy idea of 
TNC’s tropical forest programs? 
This chapter traces the emergence of land sparing as the core of TNC’s tropical forest 
conservation strategy. The land sparing hypothesis is intimately linked with a broader discourse of 
ecological modernization, thus I situate the history of land sparing at TNC within a more general 
exploration of the consolidation of ecological modernization perspectives in the organization. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a history of ideas and a history of practice that links the 
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discursive and material dimensions of socio-ecological change in tropical forest landscapes. This 
account can then serve as a background for understanding the ideas and strategies of tropical forest 
policy-making in Indonesia and Brazil described in the subsequent chapters. Tropical forest 
governance emerges through shifts in ideas about conservation in articulation with shifts in 
ecological and political-economic relations. A history of The Nature Conservancy’s tropical forest 
programs illuminates the recursive interactions between ideas and experience out of which a forest 
governance architecture has emerged. 
It is especially apt to explore these developments through the lens of an environmental 
NGO. As Princen et al. (1994) argue, international environmental NGOs make ‘translational 
linkages’ that connect the local with the global and the biophysical with the political. In the 
characterization of the multi-level governance literature, TNC operates as a ‘boundary’ or 
‘bridging’ organization that “play[s] an intermediary function between different arenas, levels, 
[and] scales and facilitate[s] co-production of knowledge” (Mwangi and Wardell 2012, 87). Shifts 
in discourse and practice at TNC thus not only encapsulate broader transitions in environmental 
politics, but also have been instrumental to the production of the global green governance complex. 
Empirical material in this chapter is drawn primarily from my organizational ethnography of 
TNC’s tropical forest programs. 
Land, Nature, and The Nature Conservancy 
 What exactly is the ‘nature’ that TNC seeks to conserve? David Morine, who was in charge 
of land acquisition for TNC from 1972 to 1987, recalls that TNC’s early goal was to ‘save land,’ 
which they did by raising money and ‘doing deals’ to purchase property or conservation easements. 
“Land Conservation Through Private Action” was TNC’s motto in 1972 (Morine 2012). ‘Land’ 
and the ‘nature’ upon it were conceived largely in the romantic terms of Muir and Thoreau that 
 
	
	
125 
Martínez-Alier terms a ‘cult of the wilderness’ (2002; see also Cronon 1996), evoking a pristine 
and primeval ‘nature’ unsullied by humans. As TNC developed its first long-range plan in the early 
1970s, Robert Jenkins, TNC’s chief scientist, argued that TNC should not just buy land, but should 
focus on preserving biotic diversity, and this goal was written into the organization’s 1974 plan 
(Morine 2012). Preservation of biodiversity gave a systematic, scientific basis to TNC’s 
conservation efforts. Subsequently, the centrality of biodiversity conservation gave way to a more 
anthropocentric focus on ecosystem services. Tropical rainforests have been one of TNC’s 
conservation priorities since the early years of the organization’s international expansion in the 
1990s, a focus that has been maintained even as the discursive framing of tropical forest 
conservation has changed. An emphasis on the rich biodiversity of tropical forests (TNC 2008a) 
is now supplemented by assertions of the importance of tropical rainforests for climate change 
mitigation (TNC 2015), but these scientific arguments are inevitably layered on top of the Edenic, 
wilderness narratives that have colored tropical forest conservation since colonial times (Grove 
1995). Whatever the ‘nature’ may be that The Nature Conservancy seeks to conserve, tropical 
forests are an important part of it, and have been and remain a priority of TNC’s global 
conservation efforts. 
Eco-Modernism, REDD, and Land Sparing 
 Maarten Hajer pioneered the study of policy discourse in environmental politics with his 
1995 book, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy 
Process. Hajer argues that discourses produce knowledge about an issue and help to define and 
limit a field of action, but different actors participate in discourses from different standpoints, and 
discourses may contain multiple different story lines and contradictions. In the case of land sparing 
and TNC, three fields of policy discourse and policy making are of prime importance: the 
 
	
	
126 
encompassing field of ecological modernization (or ‘eco-modernism’), and under the umbrella of 
ecological modernization, the discourses of REDD and land sparing. 
 By way of overview, this chapter locates the roots of land sparing at TNC in the 
development during the 1970s of synergistic thinking about the relationship between the 
environment and capitalist development that gave rise to ecological modernization discourse and 
the concepts of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘green growth.’ REDD and land sparing are both 
examples of purported pathways for simultaneously improving environmental quality and 
promoting economic growth (i.e., green growth). Ecological modernization anticipates and 
incorporates environmental risks into economic development, thus it requires planning and 
‘design.’ The creation of metrics and planning tools for sustainable development is touted as 
‘science-based,’ effectively re-situating science within a regulatory project. In conservation praxis, 
green growth requires taking into account both ‘natural’ and ‘working’ lands, and regional and 
global socio-environmental problems undermine enclosed nature preserves or REDD projects, so 
TNC has sought to gain scale in its conservation activities, adopting a focus on ‘working 
landscapes’ and jurisdictional REDD. While a working landscape could in principle be land 
sharing or land sparing, relying on more or less concentrated and intensified production, the 
capitalist modernization narrative (and TNC’s government and corporate partners) favors 
productivism and intensification, and so TNC has pragmatically adopted land sparing as its 
landscape-level strategy for achieving forest conservation and economic development. As 
discourses tend to marginalize and erase their alternatives and their unintended consequences, land 
sparing has come to appear in TNC discourse as the only viable way of reducing tropical 
deforestation, and ecological modernization discourse has come to paint the reduction of 
environmental degradation with economic development as an inevitability, while both discourses 
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gloss over concerns about equity and the displacement of degradation. 
Origins of Ecological Modernization 
 Hajer (1995) describes the origins and consolidation of ecological modernization discourse 
in the 1970s and 1980s. He defines ecological modernization as “the discourse that recognizes the 
structural character of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes that 
existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalize the care for the environment” 
(25). Ecological modernization holds that environmental management is a positive-sum game. 
Environmental degradation is economically inefficient. While early environmental policies of the 
1960s and 1970s were generally ex post, remedial measures, ecological modernization held that 
policy should be anticipatory, so that environmental costs could be factored into the economic and 
institutional model ex ante. Hajer identifies three principal characteristics of ecological 
modernization discourse: 1) environmental degradation is rendered calculable and monetizable; 2) 
economic growth and the resolution of environmental problems are seen as compatible; and 3) 
positive-sum outcomes from environmental protection require collective action, therefore 
environmental protection is understood as a problem of management (26). 
 The emergence of the Western environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was characterized by apocalyptic alarm at what was suddenly understood as global ecological 
crisis (e.g., Meadows et al. 1972). During the 1970s, energies of the radical environmental 
movement focused in particular on opposing nuclear power, while the ingredients of ecological 
modernization were incubated in international organizations such as the OECD, IUCN, and UNEP. 
Synergistic thinking in these international organizations emerged partly in response to the rift of 
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment between Northern demands for 
environmental protection and Southern demands for development. In the 1980s, Hajer recounts, 
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“ecological modernization conquered the discursive space of environmental politics” (263). While 
much intellectual work took place in positioning ecological modernization as a coherent policy 
discourse, Hajer indicates several elements of the 1980s conjuncture that favored ecological 
modernization’s ascendance. These elements include the economic recession of the late 1970s, 
which reinforced the priority of economics over environmental concerns; the professionalization 
of the environmental movement, which shifted environmental NGOs toward more strategic and 
less confrontational action; and the emergence of new emblematic environmental issues such as 
acid rain and ozone depletion, which relative to nuclear power were less clearly aligned with 
radical counter-cultural critique and more amenable to pragmatic, management ‘solutions’ (94-
95). 
 Hajer’s account must also be situated within the broader processes of political-economic 
neoliberalization that gained strength during the 1980s. For instance, the professionalization and 
integration of environmental NGOs in participatory environmental policy making; the rise of 
regulatory science; strengthening relationships between corporations, NGOs, and government; and 
the monetization and commodification of the environment were all deeply integrated with 
generalized processes of deregulation, marketization, and decentralized governance that 
characterize neoliberal political economy (James McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Castree 2010b). 
These macro-level political economic transformations of neoliberalization, and the more specific 
processes associated with the emergence of ecological modernization discourse, are exemplified 
in the organizational history of The Nature Conservancy. 
Ecological Modernization at The Nature Conservancy: Landscapes, New Conservation 
Science, and Green Growth 
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 Two principles form the core of TNC’s conservation ideology: conservation at TNC is 
‘science-based,’ and it is ‘pragmatic.’ Pragmatism in TNC parlance generally refers to the search 
for practical solutions to problems, meaning that TNC’s actions are not so much science-driven as 
they are driven by what the organization perceives as the prevailing structure of opportunities and 
constraints, while TNC’s goals and pragmatic actions are defined and justified in scientific terms. 
Pragmatism as a guiding principle for the organization is as old as TNC itself. In Morine’s 
recounting of TNC’s origin story, TNC as an offshoot of the Ecological Society of America was a 
purely scientific organization: 
 “Academics would gather a few times a year to read and discuss papers relating to 
the natural world. The bulk of these papers were given to documenting areas that 
were being lost. When the discussion turned to a very attractive piece of the Mianus 
River Gorge that was about to be developed, someone noted that TNC had $4,000 
in the kitty and rather than just sitting around discussing the loss of natural areas, 
why not do something about it?” (Morine 2012, 13) 
 
Mianus River Gorge became TNC’s first land purchase, launching ‘land conservation through 
private action.’ This approach signaled TNC’s pragmatism as a search for solutions to problems 
or the achievement of goals within what is understood to be a structure of opportunities and 
constraints outside of the actor’s control. For TNC, capitalist markets are a structure outside of its 
control, and pragmatic action means seeking conservation – of land, biodiversity, or ecosystem 
services – within and through those markets. As Timothy Luke observes in an incisive analysis, 
“Because of what has happened to Nature, how capital operates, and where 
resources for change must be solicited, TNC does what it can. It pragmatically, or 
perhaps uncritically, accepts these realities as background conditions, and then tries 
to do something positive within the constraints imposed by these limitations. Yet, 
as a result, the tenets and tenor of the Conservancy’s operations as an 
‘environmentalist organization’ are those of almost complete compliance, and not 
those of radical resistance to this system of political economy” (Luke 1997, 57) 
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At its core, pragmatism is a commitment to action above ideology. As one TNC executive affirmed 
to me in an interview, “TNC is not afraid to do stuff. …We aren’t advisors, we’re doers” (TNC46 
150807).20 Pragmatism allows TNC to take action to solve problems, and reciprocally TNC’s 
experiences on the ground inform its search for pragmatic ‘solutions’ in the policy world. This 
pragmatic loop is central to how TNC operates. 
 In TNC’s early incarnation as a US-focused organization trying to save land through real 
estate deals, pragmatism meant working within and through land markets. Still, these pragmatic 
land acquisitions were motivated by a wilderness ideal of ‘saving’ land from development. In 
Morine’s view, “There is no such thing as ‘limited development.’ You can’t have it both ways. 
You’re either saving land or you’re developing it. There’s no middle ground” (2012, 77). From 
the 1980s onwards, changes in TNC’s conservation science, conservation strategy, and 
organizational structure transformed the organization from a US-focused wilderness land trust to 
a transnational NGO at the forefront of ecological modernization policy. Three interrelated 
transitions helped drive this transformation: the scaling up of conservation interventions to a 
‘landscape approach,’ the development of ‘New Conservation Science,’ and the embrace of the 
idea of ‘green growth.’ 
Scaling up: Eco-Regions and a Landscape Approach 
 As TNC developed its first long-range plan in the early 1970s, Robert Jenkins, the 
organization’s chief scientist, argued that TNC should not just buy land, but should focus on 
preserving biotic diversity, and this goal was enshrined in TNC’s 1974 plan (Morine 2012). TNC 
began to target its land purchases to protecting biodiversity, but as one long-time staffer recalled, 
																																																						
20 Interview references are given using a unique identifying code for each interviewee, comprising a combination of 
letters and numbers, followed by the date on which the interview took place, written in yymmdd format. 
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“environmentalists would try to save 300 acres for a rare orchid, and we would get nowhere. The 
‘buy and hold preserves’ model wasn’t getting us where we needed to go. We were protecting 
1000 acres a day, but you almost couldn’t see it, and our scientists were telling us, ‘The climate is 
changing and isolated reserves won’t be viable’” (TNC44 150715). TNC sought ways to ‘gain 
scale’ in its conservation activities, developing a number of new conservation tactics. This move 
to larger scales was supported by an expanded scientific and planning apparatus, the brainchild of 
TNC President John Sawhill, that TNC branded ‘Conservation by Design.’ 
 Conservation by Design, which debuted in 1995, launched the eco-regional planning 
paradigm at TNC. TNC’s objective would be to develop a representative conservation ‘portfolio’ 
across the different eco-regions where the organization worked, with the goal of effectively 
conserving 10 percent of every major habitat type by 2015. TNC’s mission at this time was “to 
preserve the plants, animals and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth 
by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive” (TNC 2006). TNC scientists spearheaded 
eco-regional analyses at the global level and regional levels. In Latin America, where eco-regional 
mapping and prioritization were taken very seriously, scientists identified ‘crisis’ and 
‘opportunity’ eco-regions and conducted threat mapping, leading to new strategic focuses, such as 
the development of a TNC program in Patagonia (TNC49 150811). Implicit in the shift to an eco-
regional focus was a reconceptualization of the relation between environmental protection and 
social issues. In Sawhill’s words, “It’s not good enough anymore to fence nature away from 
people.” As one journalist put it, instead of seeking to preserve “living museums of primeval 
America,” TNC would seek “to protect entire evolving ecosystems – including the humans who 
lived and worked in them” (Weisman 1993). 
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In the late 1990s, as TNC began to seek larger-scale conservation impacts under its 
Conservation by Design framework, the organization orchestrated several innovative deals that 
helped to consolidate TNC’s strategy of conservation in working landscapes and reinforced ideas 
in the organization about potential synergies between environmental protection and economic 
production. In 1998, TNC’s Maine chapter took advantage of the sell-off of large tracts of 
timberland by paper companies in northern Maine to launch an unprecedented fundraising 
campaign in support of a $35 million bid to buy out 200,000 acres of land on the St. John River 
from International Paper. This deal not only raised TNC’s fundraising horizon, showing that “for 
the right project, people were willing to step forward” with large donations (TNC44 150715), it 
also helped consolidate a ‘multiple use’ approach to conservation. Because of the timber supply 
contracts on the property, and because of the debts incurred in order to make the purchase, TNC 
continued logging in portions of the St. John property. This form of use met with little opposition, 
however, since TNC’s purchase was protecting the land from other forms of development. With 
the St. John purchase, “You now have environmentalists who are not just preservationists,” in the 
words of one TNC employee (TNC44 150715).21 In a second innovative deal in Maine’s North 
Woods, TNC bought out a $50 million loan from John Hancock Life Insurance Company to Great 
Northern Paper. TNC used the buyout to forgive $14 million of the loan in exchange for 40,000 
acres of the paper company’s land near a state park, and they lowered the interest rate on the loan 
in exchange for conservation easements on another approximately 200,000 acres. As one TNC 
staffer describes this move, “TNC had gone from a retail buyer to a wholesale buyer to a financier 
of a paper company in an effort to save forest and jobs” (TNC44 150715). 
																																																						
21 These multiple use arrangements have occasionally attracted strong criticism, as in the case of oil production in a 
Texas refuge for the endangered Attwater’s prairie chicken (Gillis 2014). 
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Eco-Pragmatism and New Conservation Science 
The scaling up of TNC’s conservation strategy to the eco-regional level and the 
incorporation of socio-economic considerations into TNC programs were articulated with a new 
shift in conservation science at the organization. While from the 1970s to the 1990s, TNC moved 
from an opportunistic approach to land acquisition to a systematic strategy for biodiversity 
conservation based on eco-regional assessments, from the 1990s to the 2000s the organization 
increasingly adopted a more anthropocentric discourse of ‘eco-pragmatism’ anchored by 
‘ecosystem services’ concepts within a framework of ‘New Conservation Science.’ The ecosystem 
services framework conceptualizes ecological processes in terms of their value to human society, 
enabling their classification, valuation, and commodification (Robertson 2012). Ecosystem 
services concepts gained strength during the 1990s through the construction of market-based 
environmental governance mechanisms such as emissions trading schemes (e.g., the Kyoto 
Protocol), wetlands banking, and payments-for-ecosystem services (PES) programs, including a 
national PES program in Costa Rica and REDD projects like TNC’s Noel Kempff experiment in 
Bolivia. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, launched by the United Nations in 2001, marked 
the consolidation of the ecosystem services framework in global environmental discourse. 
The emergence of the ecosystem services framework was a key dimension of the 
neoliberalization of environmental policy, and it coincided with increasing pressures on 
environmental NGOs from local communities and indigenous rights activists to reconcile 
conservation with people and their livelihoods (Brockington 2002; Chapin 2004). These 
tendencies fused at TNC into a discourse of ‘eco-pragmatism.’ Eco-pragmatism is an ideological 
perspective on conservation practice that grounds itself epistemically in New Conservation 
Science. The shift to eco-pragmatism and New Conservation Science at TNC was led by Peter 
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Kareiva, TNC’s chief scientist from 2002 to 2015, and solidified under Mark Tercek, TNC’s 
President since 2008 and a former Goldman Sachs investment banker, who promoted Kareiva to a 
spot on TNC’s Executive Team (Max 2014). 
Kareiva has often proclaimed himself “not a biodiversity guy” (TNC49 150811). In 2012, 
he and two colleagues published the essay “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” which captures 
the essence of Kareiva’s eco-pragmatist ideology. The essay condemns biodiversity-focused 
conservation, advocating instead a focus on ‘working landscapes.’ “Instead of scolding 
capitalism,” wrote Kareiva et al., “conservationists should partner with corporations in a science-
based effort to integrate the value of nature’s benefits into their operations and cultures. Instead of 
pursuing the protection of biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake, a new conservation should seek to 
enhance those natural systems that benefit the widest number of people” (Kareiva, Marvier, and 
Lalasz 2012). Kareiva’s essay provoked a backlash from a number of eminent conservation 
scientists, and the conflict generated high tension within TNC. As one TNC scientist recalls, the 
hallway talk at TNC science meetings was pointed: “What are we doing? Are we conserving 
biodiversity, or delivering water to the city of Bogotá?” (TNC49 150811). The controversy led to 
discontent among some donors and the departures of some TNC staff, but the shift to ecosystem 
services and a more anthropocentric conservation ideology was consolidated. A former TNC 
scientist sees that “TNC has moved aggressively to a human-centered view of the natural world. 
They attempt to straddle it, but they are now more about the human use of nature” (TNC45 
150727). 
Kareiva’s anthropocentric, ecosystem services perspective is couched as eco-pragmatism, 
situating it as a continuation of the pragmatic approach to conservation that is at the core of TNC’s 
organizational identity. In TNC’s early incarnation as a US-focused organization trying to save 
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land through real estate deals, pragmatism meant working within and through land markets. In the 
move toward ecosystem services and anthropocentric conservation, eco-pragmatism means the 
acceptance of corporate industrial capitalism and attempts to work within and through the 
structures and processes of corporate globalization. Global capitalist development is inevitable: 
“Just as the United States was dammed, logged, and crisscrossed by roads,” Kareiva et al. (2012) 
proclaim, “it is likely that much of the Amazon will be as well.” Kareiva and others claim that eco-
pragmatism is scientifically justified by the failures of traditional conservation, the unreality of 
conservationist ideals of pristine wilderness, and the hitherto underappreciated resilience of 
ecological systems. In counterpoint, they promote a New Conservation Science that sees nature as 
a “a bundle of ecosystem services” and seeks to “help humanity to domesticate nature more 
wisely” (Kareiva et al. 2007; Kareiva and Marvier 2012). As Doak et al. (2014) have cogently 
demonstrated, this reorientation of New Conservation Science has limited support in biological or 
social science, and is justified primarily according to a belief system that prioritizes the needs and 
wants of humans over any rights or values of nature. 
Regardless of its scientific basis, the move to eco-pragmatism and New Conservation 
Science at TNC, with its concomitant focus on working landscapes and economic development, 
enhanced TNC’s ability to build corporate partnerships and attract funding from governments, 
corporations, and foundations, which lent further support to TNC’s efforts to gain scale. Finally, 
in a third dimension of TNC’s transformation, a focus on the human use of nature at the landscape 
scale has been tied to the emergence of a belief in ‘green growth’ and the compatibility of 
environmental protection and economic development. In other words, TNC has become a central 
participant in ecological modernization discourse. 
Green Growth and Ecological Modernization 
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From the 1970s wilderness perspective expressed by Morine – “You can’t have it both 
ways. You’re either saving land or you’re developing it,” (2012, 77) – TNC moved during the 
1990s and 2000s toward the view, asserted by current TNC President Mark Tercek, that “economic 
growth and environmental stewardship are not mutually exclusive, and that in fact, saving nature 
is the smartest commercial investment any business or government can make” (Tercek 2017). TNC 
has a long history of creative use of markets and other financial and regulatory mechanisms in the 
pursuit of conservation. Even in the 1970s, articles about TNC “began to point out how it was run 
by lawyers and MBAs, how it wheeled and dealed, how it focused on the ‘bottom line’” (Morine 
2012, 43). TNC’s original mantra was ‘bucks and acres,’ and it used a range of acquisitions, 
bequests, easements, and other transactions to preserve vast areas of land. In the late 1990s, deals 
such as those in the Maine North Woods pioneered new market approaches to conservation in 
working landscapes. From the business background of TNC employees, organizational 
relationships with corporations and wealthy donors, and a pragmatic use of business approaches 
to conservation, it was no great leap for TNC staff to begin to argue that environmental protection 
and economic development could go hand in hand. 
While always distinguished among conservation groups by its business acumen, TNC 
under Tercek, the former investment banker, has further burnished its “corporate sheen” (TNC49 
150811) and become a vocal proponent of “the business case for nature” (Tercek and Adams 2013, 
165). In 2006, TNC founded the Natural Capital Project in collaboration with Stanford University, 
WWF, and the University of Minnesota, in order to map and value ecosystem services to provide 
a ‘scientific’ basis for sustainable development decision making. Since around 2010, TNC’s 
Conservation by Design framework has been complemented by ‘Development by Design,’ under 
which TNC purports to use landscape-level planning to minimize and offset the impacts of energy, 
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mining, and infrastructure development (Kiesecker et al. 2010; TNC 2017a). ‘Green growth’ has 
become the new mantra of the organization. “We can create a new paradigm,” writes Justin Adams, 
a former BP executive who is now TNC’s Global Managing Director for Lands, in his preface to 
TNC’s 2015 Global Lands report. The report lays out “a new agenda for green growth” where a 
doubling of global economic output can “deliver net gains for nature and people” (TNC 2015).  
Corporate partnerships are thus not merely convenient or pragmatic, they are indispensable 
to TNC’s mission. “We do not view working with corporations as merely a necessary evil;” 
Kareiva and Marvier write, “in fact, corporations can be a positive force in conservation” (2012, 
967). “TNC’s strategy of achieving big conservation results is to work with the entities creating 
the threats to change their practices,” a long-time TNC staff member explained to me, “It is not to 
vilify or shame. We work with Dow, we work with Monsanto, we work with BP. The world runs 
on capitalism; that drives everything. How do you make conservation compatible with that?” 
(TNC49 150811). Mirroring the broader ecological modernization discourse, TNC’s answer is that 
with proper calculation and management, capitalist growth can be green growth: there is a “techno-
institutional fix” for the ecological crisis (Hajer 1995, 32). 
The adoptions of ecological modernization perspectives, New Conservation Science, and 
a landscape approach at TNC are closely related to broader shifts in the political economy of the 
environment and environmental policy discourse. TNC’s internationalization and increasing 
participation in corporate and government partnerships, and its change in focus from wilderness 
preservation to landscape-scale sustainable development, exemplify the changes that have taken 
place at other large conservation organizations such as WWF and Conservation International 
(Chartier and Deléage 1998; Jeanrenaud 1998; Chapin 2004). These organizations have 
transformed into a group of transnational environmental NGOs (TENGOs) that are closely 
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networked with intergovernmental organizations, governments, and multi-national corporations 
across multiple levels and scales in a green growth complex anchored in ecological modernization 
discourse and promoting neoliberal environmental governance strategies. 
Up to this point, this chapter has discussed higher-level discursive and strategic 
transformations at TNC. As I have argued, however, TNC works through a pragmatic loop where 
ideology and implementation develop recursively. The emergence of land sparing as the core of 
TNC’s tropical forest conservation strategy illustrates this loop, through which environmental 
discourse is co-produced with material socio-ecological change. 
Land Sparing and REDD in Tropical Forest Conservation at TNC 
 In Chapter 3, I described the emergence of the land sparing hypothesis through the 
arguments of figures such as Norman Borlaug and as a part of the broader movement towards 
synergistic thinking about the relationship between environmental protection and economic 
development following the 1972 Stockholm Conference. TNC staff have participated in the 
consolidation of ecological modernization discourse, and they have come to frame their work in 
forest landscapes in terms of socio-environmental modernization theories such as forest transition 
theory and the land sparing hypothesis (Hovani 2014; TNC 2015). The adoption of land sparing 
strategies has not been solely a top-down process, however. TNC projects, while based on specific 
planning and project concepts, such as eco-regional assessments and REDD, often proceed 
pragmatically and opportunistically in implementation, and the experience of implementation on 
the ground reshapes TNC’s high-level strategic thinking and discourse. One staff member 
described this approach as “focused opportunism” (TNC49 150811). “Pragmatism [in policy] 
comes from knowing what is workable” on the ground, a member of TNC’s international climate 
policy team told me (TNC52 150812). 
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 TNC’s experimentation in the late 1990s and 2000s with agricultural policy and REDD 
pilot projects was shaped by the consolidation of ecological modernization discourse at that time, 
at the same time as these project experiences re-shaped global discourse. In brief, when REDD 
emerged as a concept in the 1990s, it was closely linked to neoliberal ideas about environmental 
markets. REDD projects were expected to produce quantifiable carbon emissions reductions 
through forest conservation, and those reductions would be commodified as carbon credits sold in 
markets to compensate the emissions reductions (Sills et al. 2014). TNC, along with numerous 
other ENGOs and for-profit companies, rushed to launch REDD pilot projects in the late 2000s, 
and it quickly became apparent that REDD would not play out as neatly in practice as in theory. 
REDD on the ground faced numerous difficulties, including unclear forest tenure, inadequate 
monitoring frameworks, concerns about leakage, and the lack of a binding international climate 
agreement to direct funds to REDD (Sunderlin et al. 2014; Sills et al. 2014; Fishbein and Lee 
2015). In coping with these challenges, a number of REDD initiatives, including those directed by 
TNC, have shifted towards jurisdictional approaches and have reduced or abandoned their 
expectations of income from carbon credits in favor of broader strategies of ‘low emissions 
development’ (Sunderlin et al. 2014; Fishbein and Lee 2015). 
As the prospect of a carbon market windfall for forest conservation has faded, land sparing 
has risen as a strategy for forest conservation and economic development within existing 
institutional frameworks. Chapters 5 and 6 detail the emergence of land sparing complexes in 
Indonesia and Brazil and their effects on environmental governance and land use change. In the 
following sections, I trace the development of land sparing discourse across TNC’s tropical forest 
programs in Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico and link these programs to the consolidation of land 
sparing as the cornerstone of TNC’s Global Lands strategy. While TNC’s tropical forest 
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conservation programs include numerous activities that are not directly related to land sparing, my 
intent is to follow the history of land sparing policy discourse within and across these programs, 
and I argue that in recent years, with the strengthening of TNC’s Global Lands Team, the land 
sparing hypothesis has become the core concept anchoring TNC’s tropical forest conservation 
strategy. I first discuss TNC’s field programs and then move upwards to TNC’s Worldwide Office, 
from which field programs were directed and where lessons from the field were distilled to reshape 
global strategies. 
TNC in Brazil: ‘Responsible’ Agro-Industrial Production and a Jurisdictional Approach 
 TNC’s US strategy focused on private land ownership and acquisition, but as the 
organization began to work abroad in the 1980s and 1990s, land acquisition was largely unfeasible, 
and TNC shifted its strategy to focus on working with partner organizations and strengthening 
regulatory approaches to conservation (TNC44 150715). By the end of the 1990s, TNC was 
established in Brazil through its work on protected areas management, but TNC staff felt that 
Brazilian protected areas had become more consolidated, and they wanted to move on to thinking 
about development pressures, according to a veteran of the Brazil program (TNC43 150713). Soy 
and beef were clear drivers of large-scale deforestation, so TNC began to seek partnerships with 
those sectors. Beef was a complicated supply chain with a lower proportion of international 
exposure, whereas the soy sector was highly concentrated in multinational commodities companies 
with a substantial reliance on exports to European markets. TNC gained traction more easily with 
the soy industry and began working with Cargill in 2004. At this time, it was still controversial for 
a conservation organization to engage with agribusiness, and TNC came under heavy criticism 
from other ENGOs (TNC43 150713). 
 In 2003, Cargill had opened a soy port on the Amazon River in Santarém, Pará, which 
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primarily exported soy grown in Mato Grosso, but also drove the expansion of soy farming in the 
area around Santarém. TNC began working with Cargill to set up a monitoring system to ensure 
that its local soy purchases were not driving deforestation, an effort that became TNC’s 
‘Responsible Soy’ project (TNC 2017b). The Brazilian Forest Code requires landowners to 
maintain a portion of their properties as a ‘legal reserve’ of natural vegetation, as well as to 
maintain ‘permanent protection areas’ along waterways and on steep slopes and hilltops. Cargill 
initially sought to exclude from its supply chain only soy that had been produced on land deforested 
illegally in violation of the Forest Code. In 2006, however, Greenpeace launched a campaign 
targeting Cargill for driving deforestation through its soy purchases. In response, Cargill 
assembled the other major soy traders in collaboration with environmental NGOs to agree to a Soy 
Moratorium against the purchase or trade of soy produced in areas of the Amazon Biome 
deforested after 24 July 2006. TNC’s existing monitoring efforts with Cargill provided a template 
for implementing the Soy Moratorium. 
 By the time the Soy Moratorium came into effect, TNC had already begun applying its 
‘responsible soy’ approach in the São Lourenço river basin in southern Mato Grosso State. The 
basin-level approach meant that only a small proportion of any given municipality might be 
registered, and so the project failed to generate much interest on the part of municipal governments 
and did not meet with great success (TNC19 140502). Aware of TNC’s compliance work, the 
mayor of the municipality of Lucas do Rio Verde in central Mato Grosso, himself the owner of the 
important regional agricultural trading company Fiagril, approached TNC about developing a 
municipal-level property registration and compliance project, which was launched in 2006 under 
the banner of ‘Legal Lucas’ (Lucas do Rio Verde Legal). Working at the municipal level and with 
a supportive municipal government, TNC had greater success in enrolling producers in its 
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environmental compliance project and was able to refine its argument that environmental 
compliance could benefit farmers and improve agricultural production (Ferreira 2010; Rausch 
2013). Working at the jurisdictional level was also technically superior to either the property-by-
property approach of the Mato Grosso state registration program or the basin-level approach TNC 
had adopted in the São Lourenço region. Those latter approaches allow for the possibility of 
overlaps in property boundaries as registrations are frequently entered on the basis of incomplete 
or inaccurate documentation. A continuous jurisdictional map allowed for TNC to identify 
overlaps from the outset and call on property owners to resolve them (TNC15 140414). 
 Legal Lucas thus demonstrated for TNC’s Amazon Program the benefits of a municipal-
level jurisdictional project design versus a design based on ecological boundaries such as a water 
catchment.22 Municipal-level approaches to combating Amazonian deforestation were reinforced 
in 2008, when the federal government launched a ‘List of Priority Municipalities for Actions to 
Prevent and Control Deforestation in the Amazon’ that targeted municipalities with high rates of 
deforestation for especially rigorous monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. At 
this point TNC had established itself as an organization that could work with agribusiness and 
producers to help them ‘green’ their production in the face of environmental pressures. TNC 
continued to run municipal-level projects supporting environmental compliance in the Amazon, 
targeting especially those municipalities included in the federal government’s priority list. TNC’s 
work with the soy industry and priority municipalities was intimately connected with the rise of a 
land sparing complex in the Brazilian Amazon, a process that I describe in Chapter 6. In the 
aftermath of the 2007 Bali Climate Conference, where REDD was included as part of the UNFCCC 
																																																						
22 This shift from an ecological scale to a politico-administrative scale subsequently occurred at a higher level, as 
TNC’s eco-regional programs in Brazil were combined into a national program in 2015. 
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negotiations, TNC sought to launch a REDD pilot project in the Brazilian Amazon, and TNC’s 
REDD interventions in Brazil solidified the organization’s land sparing discourse. 
REDD in the Amazon 
 When TNC first experimented with REDD through its Noel Kempff project in Bolivia in 
1997, the organization had adopted a ‘project-level’ approach. True to its predilection for land 
acquisition, TNC purchased four logging concessions adjacent to the Noel Kempff Mercado 
National Park in the Bolivian Amazon, doubling the size of the park’s protected area. While TNC 
accounted for leakage that might occur through displacement of logging to other areas and sought 
to offer economic alternatives to local communities in community forestry and park monitoring, 
the focus of Noel Kempff was on creating a clearly defined protected area, not on managing a 
working landscape (Hoekstra 2009; Tercek 2009).23 When TNC returned to REDD in 2008 in 
Brazil, the organization had a landscape approach and a record of working with government and 
agribusiness for ‘responsible’ agricultural production. REDD in the late 2000s was no longer a 
narrow, technical, market mechanism, but a ‘multi-stakeholder’ framework that increasingly 
included non-forest land uses. The jurisdictional approach to REDD was further reinforced by 
TNC’s experience in helping set up the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) 
in 2006-2007, through which funds were designated to support subnational REDD pilot programs 
(TNC42 150709). 
During 2008, TNC conducted a feasibility study in Brazil to identify one or several 
municipalities for REDD pilot projects in order to develop REDD governance structures and 
provide the basis for state and national REDD programs (TNC 2008b; TNC54 150814). That 
																																																						
23 TNC’s Guaraqueçaba Project in Brazil’s Atlantic Forest, which began in 2000, took a similar ‘buy and hold 
preserves’ approach to REDD (TNC 2009; Schapiro 2009). 
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feasibility study identified Northwest Mato Grosso and the São Félix do Xingu region of Pará as 
attractive places for establishing REDD pilots. In both regions, in addition to various components 
for establishing project baselines, monitoring deforestation, and supporting management of 
indigenous territories, the feasibility study envisaged, “Work with cattle ranchers, governments, 
and beef industry to increase the level of compliance of [sic] the Brazilian Forest Code by 
improving monitoring and enforcement to prevent further degradation and deforestation, and by 
developing and disseminating production systems that are more sustainable and profitable.” The 
strategy for REDD in São Félix additionally proposed to “create an incentive program to engage 
cattle ranchers on best management practices and intensive cattle ranching” (TNC 2008b). 
Ranching intensification was thus an important part of TNC’s landscape approach to REDD in the 
Amazon, and drew on connections TNC had been developing with the cattle industry since the 
early 2000s (TNC12 140409, TNC43 150713). 
Activities in Northwest Mato Grosso eventually came to focus on the municipality of 
Cotriguaçu, and TNC left leadership of the REDD initiative in the region to the Brazilian NGO 
Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV), which has run the Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde (Cotriguaçu Always 
Green) project in the municipality. TNC trained its focus on São Félix, where it began work in 
2009, with activities concentrated on supporting environmental compliance and building 
institutional frameworks for REDD. In 2013, with the support of a $2.2 million grant from the 
Moore Foundation, TNC launched a sustainable ranching project in São Félix in partnership with 
Walmart, the international retailer, and Marfrig, a Brazilian meat processor that sells to Walmart. 
In addition to supporting ranchers to comply with the Forest Code, the project includes “initiatives 
to increase ranching productivity through pasture management, in order to guarantee that local 
ranchers can expand their production without deforesting new areas” (TNC-Brazil 2016). Also in 
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2013, TNC launched a sustainable cacao project in São Félix with support from Cargill, which 
seeks to aid smallholders to achieve Forest Code compliance by restoring degraded lands with 
cacao agroforestry, “combining income improvements with environmental compliance,” in the 
words of TNC’s project manager (TNC-Brazil 2013). 
TNC’s ‘second-generation’ REDD efforts in the Brazilian Amazon were begun in 
anticipation of the establishment of a global forest carbon market. As the more radical expectations 
for forest carbon credits as a driver of ecological modernization faded from the horizon of 
probability, land sparing became a dominant story line within REDD. One of TNC’s Amazon 
Program staff recounts: 
“Initially our activities in São Félix were a REDD Pilot Project, but now there have 
been conceptual changes. The expectation of compensatory carbon credits is not 
going to bring many resources, and Brazil at the federal level does not support 
credits for REDD. …Our São Félix activities are now ‘Sustainable Development’ 
or ‘Green Development’… focusing on a logic of sustainable production. We work 
now more with supply chains than with carbon credits.” (TNC 02 131111) 
Over the course of the 2000s and 2010s, in sum, TNC in Brazil came to emphasize environmental 
compliance (which was structured within a land sparing framework) and increasing productivity 
through agricultural intensification as the core strategies of ‘responsible’ or ‘sustainable’ 
production that would render agricultural development compatible with forest conservation. 
The adoption of land sparing discourse and strategies in TNC’s Amazon program 
intersected with the rise of land sparing discourse at the regional and national levels in Brazil. In 
what Oliveira and Hecht (2016) have described as the ‘Amazon Swerve,’ reductions in 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon concurrent with increasing agricultural production during 
the late 2000s were taken as evidence that agricultural production had ‘decoupled’ from 
deforestation (Macedo et al. 2012), and so agricultural development could be reconciled with forest 
conservation. As I describe in Chapter 6, the land sparing hypothesis undergirded most 
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environmental governance in the Amazon after the promulgation of the federal government’s plan 
for deforestation prevention and control (PPCDAm) in 2004. TNC both created discourses of 
responsible production, sustainable landscapes, and land sparing through its programs, and drew 
reinforcement for its land sparing discourse and programs from the other actors and processes in 
the region. 
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon declined over 80 percent between 2004 and 2012, 
as did deforestation in São Félix. Land sparing in the Amazon appeared to be a success, and TNC’s 
São Félix model and Brazil’s Amazon model were touted as examples for other tropical forest 
landscapes (Boucher et al. 2014; TNC 2015). The consolidation and apparent success of land 
sparing in Brazil influenced TNC’s other major tropical forest conservation programs in Indonesia 
and (later) in Mexico, helping to elevate land sparing within the already eco-pragmatist orientation 
of these programs. 
REDD in Indonesia 
 TNC began working in Indonesia in the early 1990s, and its Indonesia Terrestrial Program 
(devoted to forest conservation) was concentrated beginning in 1992 on the protection of Lore 
Lindu National Park in Sulawesi. Around 2000, the organization began to shift toward Kalimantan, 
and the East Kalimantan Program was established in 2001, initially with a focus on orangutan 
conservation and support for sustainable logging (Bennett 2004). Orangutan conservation efforts 
led to the designation of new protected areas in Berau and Kutai Timur districts, and TNC’s work 
on sustainable logging led to collaborative forest management agreements between logging 
companies and local communities and a move toward Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
sustainability certification in some Kalimantan logging concessions. 
Following the Bali Climate Conference in 2007, TNC sought to launch a REDD pilot 
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project in Indonesia simultaneously with its REDD initiative in the Amazon. Taking a 
jurisdictional approach, as in Brazil, TNC began to develop a forest carbon project in Berau 
District, where the Terrestrial Program had already been active for several years. TNC’s work on 
the Berau Forest Carbon Program (BFCP) was initially devoted primarily to the technical aspects 
of REDD design and the development of management institutions for the program. As a senior 
manager of TNC’s REDD efforts recalled, “Berau was our first serious effort. …It was more 
advanced in design for a while [relative to Brazil]. …The concept, design, and visibility were good, 
but it was hard to move forward. …Brazil started later, but the opportunity around CAR [for 
environmental compliance] was a big lever to drive change” (TNC50 150813). 
Application of land sparing concepts and a direct engagement with agricultural production 
came relatively late to BFCP. REDD is inherently an ecological modernization concept, since it 
posits a techno-institutional fix to the environmental problems of deforestation and climate change. 
Modernization perspectives such as forest transition theory shaped TNC’s conception of REDD 
projects, including in Berau. A 2010 TNC “REDD+ Implementation Framework” draft stated 
matter-of-factly that “Countries (and states/provinces) are at different points on the forest 
transition curve… and will need different incentives,” and included a schematic forest transition 
graph plotting forest cover against “Time / Development Status” (TNC 2010), thus embracing a 
linear modernization narrative. A 2014 presentation of the Berau Forest Carbon Program replicated 
that graph, this time locating different Indonesian provinces at different points on the forest 
transition curve, and identifying a “REDD Opportunity Zone” of relatively high forest cover and 
low “time/development” (Hovani 2014) (Figures 4.1-2). 
Green growth discourse was also prominent in East Kalimantan at the time of the Berau 
program’s inception. The province joined the Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force to 
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support REDD development in 2009. In 2010, East Kalimantan declared itself a ‘green province’ 
and launched an Environmentally Sustainable Development Strategy on the premise that “it is 
possible for East Kalimantan to cut greenhouse gas emissions and still develop” (DNPI Indonesia 
2010a). That provincial strategy included sector strategies for palm oil, forestry, agriculture, coal, 
and oil and gas. Both the palm oil and agriculture sector strategies advocated spatial planning to 
direct agricultural expansion to degraded lands, and intensification, because “higher yields will 
help to reduce pressure on forest areas” (DNPI 2011, 81). 
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Figures 4.1-2: 4.1) Forest transition curve graph from 2010 TNC REDD+ Implementation 
Framework discussion draft (TNC 2010). Four letter abbreviations describe different country 
circumstances: HFLD = high forest cover/low deforestation, HFMD = high forest cover/medium 
deforestation, HFHD = high forest cover/high deforestation, MFMD = medium forest 
cover/medium deforestation, LFLD = low forest cover/low deforestation; 4.2) forest transition 
curve graph from 2014 TNC Overview of the Berau Forest Carbon Program presentation showing 
locations of Indonesian provinces and Berau District on a conceptual curve and identifying a 
REDD Opportunity Zone (Hovani 2014). 
Despite the central role of oil palm plantations and other agricultural expansion to 
deforestation in Berau, TNC had minimal engagement with these sectors. Land sparing eventually 
entered TNC’s work in Berau through the organization’s engagement with community agriculture. 
TNC began working with ‘model villages’ in Berau in 2012 as part of its REDD strategy, and in 
2013 the organization signed conditional payments agreements with two villages that required the 
villages to limit their forest clearing for shifting agriculture in exchange for support for alternative 
livelihoods including rubber production (Thaler and Anandi 2017). The logic of this intervention 
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is that with rubber groves as a more productive, permanent land use, farmers can increase their 
incomes while deforesting less land. In 2013, TNC also began managing a US debt-for-nature 
swap that designated funding to Berau for ‘green economic development,’ which was specified to 
include “supporting intensification of production, [and] increasing use of degraded land for 
economic activities” (TFCA, n.d., 23), and which TNC directed toward replication of its village 
REDD strategy. In 2015, TNC began to engage the oil palm sector in Berau more directly through 
the launch of a ‘Sustainable Palm Oil’ program funded by the German Government, under which 
TNC hopes to contribute to landscape-level land use planning to reduce deforestation from oil 
palm expansion by directing new plantations toward degraded lands and away from high 
conservation value forest (BLI/P3SEKPI 2016; TNC42 150709). 
The distinct land use dynamics in Indonesia and the history of TNC’s Terrestrial Program 
led to a more delayed and less prominent adoption of land sparing discourse in TNC’s forest 
conservation activities in that country. While TNC did support ‘sustainable commodity’ programs 
in Indonesia, these programs focused initially on the logging industry, which was a more 
significant driver of forest degradation in Indonesia than in Brazil. As Curran et al. (2004) note, 
because of the high density of dipterocarp forests in Kalimantan, “intensively logged forests 
typically have ≥80 percent of the canopy basal area removed or destroyed,” and from the 1980s-
1990s, the volume of timber exports from Borneo “exceeded all tropical wood exports from 
tropical Africa and Latin America combined” (1001-1002). Logging was thus a logical priority for 
TNC’s programs, and timber harvesting in natural forests, while amenable to certain ecological 
modernization approaches such as eco-certification, does not fit easily within a land sparing 
framework (Griscom and Goodman 2015). Land sparing discourse eventually did shape TNC’s 
village REDD interventions aimed at limiting shifting cultivation and the design of its sustainable 
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oil palm program for landscape-scale land use planning, but the consolidation of land sparing in 
TNC’s tropical forest conservation strategy has been driven more by the organization’s high-level 
shift to eco-pragmatism, program experiences in Brazil, and the rapid translation of Brazilian land 
sparing approaches to TNC’s REDD program in Mexico. 
REDD in Mexico 
 TNC’s reinvestment in REDD in 2008 targeted Brazil and Indonesia as two countries with 
existing TNC forest conservation programs, large areas of tropical humid forest, and high 
deforestation rates. The launch of a REDD program in Mexico was an opportunistic decision for 
TNC. In the words of a senior staff member, “USAID put out a call for a $50 million program in 
Mexico, and we decided to go up for it” (TNC50 150813). The Mexico REDD+ Alliance (M-
REDD+) was formally launched in 2012. Rane Cortez, who directed TNC’s international climate 
policy efforts on REDD, had been seconded to Brazil in 2010-2011 to assist in setting up the São 
Félix REDD project, and now became the director of M-REDD+. In Mexico, TNC has 
experimented with REDD at new jurisdictional levels, working across three contiguous states in 
the Yucatán Peninsula, and within the states adopting an ‘inter-municipal approach’ that combines 
several of Mexico’s relatively small municipalities into a group for the purpose of program 
interventions (TNC56 151205). 
Cattle ranching is one of the dominant rural land uses in the Yucatán, and the approach 
adopted in M-REDD+ echoes the Brazilian land sparing model. TNC has carried out ‘sustainable 
intensification zoning’ and directed financing toward ranching intensification. In a panel during a 
side event to the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015, Carlos Rafael Muñoz, Secretary of 
Ecology and Environment of Quintana Roo State, one of the M-REDD+ participants, was explicit: 
“Intensification is the priority we want the government to support;” he asserted, “we want to 
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overcome poverty by making production more efficient.” When asked by a participant whether 
reducing meat consumption could be an option for alleviating deforestation pressure, Muñoz was 
dismissive: “Eating meat is a part of our culture,” he admonished. “We’re not going to reduce the 
amount of meat we consume; we’re going to make production more efficient, to occupy less space 
and produce more.” This land sparing vision is equally clear in program literature, which states 
that “the Alliance works with the Mexican government, organized civil society, and local 
communities to reduce deforestation and forest degradation through the promotion of sustainable 
farming, ranching and forestry practices. With these practices, we hope to mitigate climate change 
and help communities increase their incomes through more efficient use of their land and their 
forests” (Mexico REDD+ Alliance, n.d.). 
Drawing on TNC’s REDD experiences in Brazil and Indonesia, and particularly the land 
use planning and ranching intensification strategies that TNC had developed in Brazil, M-REDD+ 
comprises a clear articulation and application of land sparing as a mechanism for forest 
conservation. In this regard, M-REDD+ both responds to and reinforces the increasing clarity and 
consolidation of land sparing discourse at TNC at the global level.  
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Figure 4.3: The Nature Conservancy worldwide. Clockwise from upper left: Worldwide Office 
(headquarters) in Arlington, Virginia, USA; district office in Tanjung Redeb, Berau, Indonesia; 
house used by TNC staff in Long Duhung village, Berau, Indonesia; Amazon Program head office 
in Belém, Pará, Brazil. 
 
Land Sparing and TNC’s Global Teams 
During the 1990s and 2000s, TNC’s Amazon Program in Brazil and Terrestrial Program 
in Indonesia developed with a fairly high level of autonomy from TNC headquarters. Program 
directors for the most part were American or other Anglophone men with backgrounds in 
environmental conservation, while field staff were generally hired locally. TNC’s global planning 
tools, such as eco-regional assessments, were applied across the international programs, but 
projects were generally developed at the technical level within the programs themselves, with 
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headquarters taking a lead in marketing and fundraising (TNC41 150711). In 2008, Mark Tercek 
left his job as managing director of the Environmental Markets Group at Goldman Sachs 
investment bank to become president of TNC. Months later, the global financial crisis struck, and 
TNC found itself overextended in its international programs. In an effort to give a more strategic 
overlay to the organization, TNC formed ‘global teams’ at the Worldwide Office to respond to 
what the organization had identified as ‘global challenges’ (TNC 2017c). The global teams for 
Lands, Water, Oceans, and Cities are today headed by ‘global managing directors’ who are 
members of TNC’s Executive Team. Global Lands “historically was what TNC had been working 
on everywhere,” as a senior manager told me (TNC44 150730). The Lands team identified four 
key themes and hired small teams to work on them. Those themes were Smart Infrastructure, 
Indigenous Peoples, Sustainable Agriculture, and Forests and Climate. The goal was for these 
teams to work with the field programs to provide expertise and advice, to represent the theme to 
donors, and to become knowledge centers for the organization (TNC44 150730). 
The creation of the Forests and Climate Team occurred at the same time as TNC was 
investing in a new generation of REDD projects following the Bali Climate Conference. Greg 
Fishbein, a Wharton MBA and former management consultant who was the head of TNC’s 
Business Consulting Group, was selected to lead the team. The Forests and Climate Team’s role 
was to provide strategic direction to TNC’s REDD programs in Brazil and Indonesia, to promote 
and fundraise for TNC’s REDD efforts, and to function as a center of expertise on REDD issues. 
In the words of one of the team members: 
“The Forests and Climate global team’s contribution to the field is a strategic vision 
of how to do the work. The field programs were previously more project based and 
small scale, working in parks and the like. When REDD emerges, we’re in a 
position at the global level to see this is where the future is going. This is what 
people want to see, what funders want to fund. …The global team went out to help 
build programs. We bring a strategic vision and expertise on how to design 
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programs, providing technical support for carbon accounting, science, and 
community issues like how to engage communities and measure benefits. And we 
bring expertise on finance. Most money for the jurisdictional REDD projects comes 
from Forests and Climate fundraising in collaboration with country teams. 
…Seconding people from the global team has been valuable in bringing skills to 
the local team and creating strong connections.” (TNC50 150813) 
 
The Forests and Climate Team under Fishbein was a hub of ecological modernization thinking 
driving TNC’s tropical forest conservation efforts. A common refrain among Forests and Climate 
and Global Lands staff is the importance of creating a “compelling value proposition” for a “forest-
friendly development model” (Fishbein and Lee 2015, 3; also TNC 2015, 16). 
Complementing the hub-and-spokes relations of the field programs with the Forests and 
Climate Team, TNC has organized roughly annual REDD Exchanges – conferences that bring 
together TNC staff working on REDD from across the organization. I attended the fourth of TNC’s 
REDD Exchanges, which took place in Jakarta in November 2014. The two-day “Jurisdictional 
Approaches to Green Development Learning Exchange,” which was followed by a two-day field 
trip to Berau for TNC employees, was attended by staff from the Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia 
programs, and primarily US-based members of the Forests and Climate Team, International 
Climate Policy Team, Development by Design Team, and Global Lands directorate, as well as two 
of TNC’s carbon scientists. Also invited were a number of TNC partners from research institutes, 
NGOs, funding agencies, and the Indonesian Government. These events serve as moments of 
exchange of ideas and calibration of discourse across TNC’s tropical forest programs and 
partnerships. Land sparing at this event was common sense: a necessary and effective strategy for 
green development. In his opening address to the gathering, Greg Fishbein, director of the Forests 
and Climate Team, began by showing two images “that remind me why we work on this issue of 
saving the world’s forests.” The first was the ‘blue marble’ photograph of the Earth from space, 
and the second was a satellite image of São Félix do Xingu. The growing demand for food, fiber, 
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and energy will add stress to the planet, Fishbein asserted; “It can be discouraging, but there are 
clear solutions: increase productivity, log more efficiently, and use degraded lands.” Brazil, and 
São Félix, were the example to be followed: “What can we learn from success in Brazil, and how 
can we make palm oil more efficient?” Fishbein asked the audience. In a plenary session the next 
day on “Jurisdictional Approaches to Sustainable Commodity Production,” participants agreed 
that Brazil’s land sparing approach of intensification and frontier governance offered a model for 
countries like Indonesia to reduce deforestation. “Indonesia is in exactly the same place Brazil was 
in the early 2000s,” asserted Frances Seymour, former Director-General of CIFOR and now a 
fellow at the Center for Global Development and advisor to the Packard Foundation, “it has a new 
president, the highest deforestation in the world, and new monitoring capabilities.” By implication, 
Indonesia could replicate Brazil’s ‘success’ and “transform the development paradigm” (Fishbein 
and Lee 2015, 4) to productivist, ‘low emissions development.’ 
Finally, the Sustainable Agriculture component of TNC’s Global Lands Team is also 
deeply connected to the Amazonian land sparing strategy. In 2010, David Cleary, the former 
director of TNC’s Amazon Program, who was instrumental to TNC’s work with agribusiness in 
Brazil, became TNC’s global Director for Agriculture, from where he has helped to place 
‘sustainable intensification’ at the core of TNC’s sustainable agriculture concept. In addition to 
transferring land sparing approaches, from Brazil to Indonesia and Mexico, for example, TNC is 
seeking to scale up its land sparing models, for instance by adopting a supply chain approach to 
transform TNC’s experience with ranching intensification in Brazil and Mexico into a ‘Latin 
America cattle strategy’ (TNC50 150813). 
Global Lands 
 Since 2014, TNC’s Global Lands Team has become more integrated and holistic under the 
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direction of Justin Adams, the managing director for Lands and a former BP executive. The Forests 
and Climate Team no longer exists. Climate issues have been ‘mainstreamed’ across programs, 
and while there is still a Forests unit within the Global Lands Team, ‘working landscapes’ has 
become the unifying concept for the program (TNC43 150713). Greg Fishbein is now in charge 
of ‘Landscapes Finance,’ while another former Forests and Climate Team member has become the 
lead for ‘Integrated Landscapes Strategies.’ “Forest is still the big kahuna” within Global Lands, 
one of the team members assured me (TNC50 150813), and intensification is still at the core of 
TNC’s strategy for reconciling production and conservation in working landscapes. 
In 2015, the Global Lands Team published Lands can do more: An integrated approach to 
conservation and development (TNC 2015), which a team member described as a “first attempt to 
put something into writing” expressing the new Global Lands perspective at TNC (TNC58 
151205). Lands can do more is an apotheosis of eco-pragmatism, and clearly demonstrates the 
centrality of land sparing to current forest conservation at TNC. Much can be said about this 
document and what it reveals about TNC’s policy discourse and policy making. The title, “Lands 
can do more,” indicates a productivist attitude toward land, while the subtitle unabashedly evokes 
‘integrated conservation and development project’ (ICDP) approaches that were popular before 
the advent of REDD and have been criticized for failing to meet conservation or development 
objectives (Sunderlin et al. 2014). Nonetheless, conservation and development is precisely what 
TNC’s eco-modernist vision promises. The picture on the front and back covers of the report, 
meanwhile, is of a cowboy herding cattle in the Brazilian Amazon, reinforcing the centrality of 
TNC’s Amazon experience to its global lands strategy. The report takes as a truism “the need to 
double production of food, fiber and fuel by mid-century” (6), sets up a dichotomy between 
“natural land” and “working land” (8), and then claims that “Encouraging more productive 
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activities on these [working] lands is the only way we can meet growing demand for food, fiber 
and fuel while also taking pressure off habitat conversion” (14). Land sparing through agricultural 
intensification and forest protection is TNC’s solution (29), and the tropical forest programs in 
Pará and East Kalimantan are profiled as models, alongside other TNC programs in North 
America, Mongolia, and Kenya. “We can be a model,” a São Félix rancher is quoted as saying, 
“not just for Brazil, but for the world” (42). A productivist, eco-modernist strategy of land sparing 
through agricultural intensification and forest protection has thus become not only the core of 
TNC’s forest conservation programs, but a pillar of the “innovative approaches to protection and 
production” that TNC promotes as “the heart of a new agenda for green growth” (14). 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has followed the rise of ecological modernization and land sparing discourse 
at TNC in order to provide a history of ideas and history of practice that links discursive change 
with the political-economic and ecological transformations of tropical forest landscapes that are 
described in depth in Chapters 5 and 6. Between the 1970s and 2000s, TNC transformed from an 
organization focused on land acquisitions and protected areas approaches to biodiversity 
conservation in the United States to a transnational organization espousing global green growth in 
working landscapes. In TNC’s work on tropical forest conservation, the Amazon Program in Brazil 
pioneered work on ‘responsible’ agro-industrial production and subnational jurisdictional project 
models. When TNC invested in second-generation REDD projects in Brazil and Indonesia 
beginning in 2008, the Amazon Program gained recognition for major deforestation reductions in 
São Félix do Xingu. TNC helped engineer these reductions as a member of a land sparing coalition 
in the municipality, participating in Brazil’s Amazonian land sparing model of territorial 
constriction through protected areas creation and Forest Code enforcement combined with 
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agricultural intensification on private lands. The prospect of a global market for forest carbon 
credits faded in the 2010s, land sparing policies in Brazil had produced deforestation reductions 
that provided TNC with a model of success, and partnering with industrial agribusiness allowed 
TNC to attract new funds and operate at larger spatial scales, so TNC pragmatically embraced land 
sparing as the core of its tropical forest conservation strategy. TNC’s tropical forest programs 
include components not directly associated with land sparing, such as support for indigenous 
peoples to manage their territories, but the central political-economic premises of TNC’s strategy 
are that socio-economic development is necessary; therefore production of food, fuel and fiber 
must increase; and the only way that development and increasing production are compatible with 
environmental protection is through land use planning, agricultural intensification, and 
environmental governance. 
 Contemporary discourse and practice at TNC highlight several key tendencies in ecological 
modernization discourse and the neoliberalization of environmental governance. First, ecological 
modernization holds that synergy is possible between capitalist development and environmental 
protection, in the form of ‘sustainable development’ or ‘green growth,’ but these synergies require 
planning and design. Ecological crisis is thus transformed into a technical problem, for which TNC 
develops metrics and planning tools that are touted as ‘science-based,’ thus positioning science as 
a regulatory project. These metrics and planning tools are all premised on the ‘pragmatic’ 
inevitability of certain forms of development. New Conservation Science thus emerges as an 
ideological and regulatory project supporting capitalist (green) development. In praxis, green 
growth requires taking into account both ‘natural’ and ‘working’ lands, so it necessitates a 
‘landscape approach.’ Project-based interventions such as REDD at Noel Kempff encounter 
problems of leakage and ownership, so interventions move to a jurisdictional scale. There is an 
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implication in TNC’s approach that traditional conservation did not achieve satisfactory results 
because it was not working at large enough scales, but when scale is finally achieved, environment 
and development will harmonize. A similar logic sees accelerating deforestation in Indonesia 
concurrent with declining deforestation in Brazil as an indication that Brazil offers a model that 
should be replicated in Indonesia. These ecological modernization and land sparing logics see 
displacement of degradation as a technical and temporary problem, not as a fundamental dynamic 
of capitalist development. 
 The ‘solution’ offered by land sparing is both scientifically and logically dubious, yet it is 
made to appear as the only and inevitable course of action. I have addressed scientific problems 
with land sparing in Chapter 3, where I argued that land sparing ignores the integral dependence 
of productivism on extraction. Land sparing discourse at TNC is also logically contradictory: eco-
pragmatism condemns a focus on protected areas or ideas of ‘pristine’ nature, yet simultaneously 
advocates intensification as a way to spare more land for ‘nature.’ Discourses are often 
contradictory, however; the coherence of land sparing lies in its support for intensification and 
productivism within a narrative of capitalist modernization. TNC applies this narrative at multiple 
spatial levels from villages in Berau to municipalities in Brazil to regions in Mexico to the globe. 
Discourses define and limit legitimate and credible policy and action. Land sparing and ecological 
modernization come to appear as necessary and inevitable processes to the degree that land sparing 
and ecological modernization discourse become hegemonic, delegitimating and rendering 
invisible critiques and alternatives. Multiple concepts and story lines support and legitimate 
discourse hegemony, as for example forest transition theory and the conflation of ‘time’ and 
‘development’ have become naturalized facts underlying the conservation thinking of TNC staff. 
Teleology is a bulwark of hegemony, and it hides the contested and contingent processes through 
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which land sparing, and ecological modernization more broadly, have come to dominate discourse 
and policy making as components of an ascendant ‘green neoliberalism’ (Goldman 2005; Hajer 
1995). 
 Simplistic modernization narratives are belied by TNC’s own program experiences, 
however. Deforestation reductions in the Brazilian Amazon were achieved through the actions of 
land sparing coalitions of government, corporate, and NGO actors that have sought to engineer a 
shift in the regional political economic regime from extraction to productivism. Through the 
actions of these land sparing coalitions, farmers and ranchers have been pressured to shift from 
extensification to intensification. TNC provides the techno-institutional tools to make this shift. 
Where development has an environmental problem, TNC offers a solution, but TNC does not set 
out to create problems for development. Under an extractive regime such as in Indonesia, this 
“non-confrontational, pragmatic” (TNC 2016b) approach gains little traction, because the actors 
driving extractive deforestation are empowered by the prevailing political-economic regime and 
do not feel sufficient pressure to change their practices. Berau has been a focus of TNC’s Indonesia 
Terrestrial Program since the mid-2000s, and TNC has invested heavily in Berau as a REDD pilot 
project, but despite over 10 years of TNC engagement, and some patchwork achievements, 
deforestation in Berau has not declined. A TNC staff member notes that the Berau REDD program 
was for a time more advanced in design than the Amazon program, and TNC was successful in its 
fundraising for Berau, “but Indonesia is a frickin’ difficult place to work. The concept, design, and 
visibility were good, but it was hard to move forward.” In Brazil, meanwhile, Forest Code 
compliance was “a big lever to drive change,” and deforestation has declined dramatically (TNC50 
150813).   
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 TNC’s differential success in Indonesia and Brazil is, I argue, not really TNC’s ‘fault.’ 
Problematizing is a prerequisite to ‘rendering technical’ (Li 2007b) and producing pragmatic 
solutions. In Brazil, the government has joined with environmental NGOs to limit Amazonian 
deforestation and major corporations have proved sensitive to government and activist pressures, 
creating an opening for TNC to work with agricultural producers and corporations to comply with 
government regulations and deforestation moratoria. Indonesia, by contrast, remains in the thrall 
of an extractive regime that exploits natural resources with little regard for local development or 
environmental consequences.  Domestic environmental activism is repressed, and the government 
is complicit with corporations in deflecting pressures from international activists. Absent the 
problematization of the major drivers of deforestation, TNC is left spinning its wheels. TNC’s 
failure to reduce deforestation in East Kalimantan reflects the conditions of possibility for 
ecological modernization to occur. While an extractive regime prevails, the Indonesian 
government and plantation and mining companies have a greater interest in extractive 
deforestation than in productivist investment, and TNC’s work will have little effect on regional 
deforestation. In the next Chapter, I describe forest governance and land use change in East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia. Deforestation in Indonesia illustrates the baseline dynamics of extraction 
typical of tropical forest frontiers. I show how land sparing and forest conservation efforts in 
Indonesia have been hindered by the operation of an extractive political-economic regime. I then 
proceed in Chapter 6 to describe how a land sparing complex in Brazil has reduced Amazonian 
deforestation as part of an effort to engineer a shift from extraction to productivism. Chapter 7 
completes the argument by demonstrating that productivism requires extraction, land sparing is a 
fallacy, and ecological modernization at the global level is not possible.  
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CHAPTER 5 
INDONESIA: EXTRACTION 
“Indonesia’s rates of deforestation, dewilding of forests and seas, and also its recent 
spate of fires, clearly show that nothing is under control, and that, in fact, everything 
in conservation is utterly out of control. … [T]he protected areas, conservation 
laws, and those that are supposed to enforce them are largely ineffective. … We 
don’t need more laws, new laws, or changed laws, if the old ones never worked 
because no one bothered, or felt entitled or empowered to enforce them. We need 
a new system … Why are laws ignored. Is it corruption within the government? 
Financial interests within or outside the government that overrule the laws? A total 
disinterest among government and public in environmental conservation? Or all of 
them?” 
- Erik Meijaard, former Senior Scientist and Terrestrial Program 
Director of TNC-Indonesia, Coordinator of the Borneo Futures 
Initiative, Jakarta Globe, 10 November 2015 
 
 In Indonesia, as in much of the tropics, forest conservation policies have been largely 
ineffective in constraining deforestation since the 1970s. Protected areas have been ‘paper parks,’ 
and new land sparing and other green growth initiatives have failed to check accelerating 
deforestation during the 2000s. I argue that conservation policies have been ineffective in 
restraining deforestation in Indonesia and many other tropical regions because these regions fall 
under extractive political-economic regimes.  
 Indonesia is ruled by an extractive regime that stabilizes a peripheral, extractive economy 
that removes value from the country in the form of natural resources and embodied labor, to 
support accumulation in productivist centers abroad. This national-level extractive regime 
facilitates unsustainable logging and plantation and mining expansion and stymies the efforts of a 
land sparing complex of international actors and their domestic allies to promote land use 
intensification and reduce deforestation. Logging and fires contribute to forest degradation, while 
industrial oil palm, wood fiber plantations, and other agricultural activities including small-scale 
agriculture, expand over both degraded and intact forest area (Abood et al. 2015; Griscom et al. 
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2016; Gaveau et al. 2016). Environmentalist groups campaigned against timber extraction in 
Borneo during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the Malaysian state of Sarawak, and the 
development of FSC certification at this time within a ‘sustainable timber’ complex was a key 
moment in the emergence of ecological modernization discourse in the tropics (Brosius 1999). As 
oil palm expansion in Kalimantan accelerated during the 1990s and 2000s, environmental NGOs 
began to focus increasingly on the relationship between deforestation and agricultural production.  
 Plantation monocultures in Kalimantan are often characterized by low quality inputs and 
poor land use planning, and they expand predominantly through conversion of forests or peatlands 
(Carlson, Curran, Asner, et al. 2012) to avoid tenure conflicts and profit from timber sales. Local 
populations are usually marginalized or adversely incorporated (Hickey and Toit 2007; John 
McCarthy 2010; Li 2015). Ecological modernization discourse has dominated environmentalist 
policy making efforts targeting plantations, leading to governance initiatives such as the multi-
stakeholder Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), formally established in 2004, and 
numerous REDD programs following the UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Bali, Indonesia in 
2007. Two principal strategies have emerged for reducing deforestation from oil palm expansion. 
The first strategy is to shift the siting and development of plantations so that forest areas are spared 
from conversion. This strategy has led to provisions in RSPO guidelines against conversion of 
primary or high conservation value forest, and efforts to engineer ‘land swaps’ or otherwise direct 
oil palm expansion away from forested areas and towards ‘degraded lands’ (Gingold et al. 2012; 
Rosenbarger et al. 2013). The second strategy is to intensify or improve the efficiency of oil palm 
production in order to raise productivity and close ‘yield gaps’ (van Noordwijk, Khasanah, and 
Dewi 2017; Soliman et al. 2016; Woittiez et al. 2017). The latter strategy of increasing productivity 
employs an archetypical logic of land sparing via agricultural intensification, but the former 
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strategy of improved land use planning is also a strategy for land sparing via land use 
intensification. The premise of land use planning and optimization is that maximizing the 
productive use of deforested lands will allow for increasing production without deforestation, a 
corollary of the decoupling logic of land sparing via agricultural intensification. In both cases, 
industrial agriculture and environmental protection are held to be compatible, so long as economic 
production is effectively controlled and managed. 
 These land sparing projects have so far failed to transform the extractive economy and the 
regime that supports it. Political-economic regimes are sticky institutional formations, and the 
Indonesian regime is especially expansive and enduring. The extractive regime in Indonesia has 
its roots in the Dutch colonial period, and has persisted through the Suharto dictatorship and post-
Suharto democratization. The national regime is reproduced at the provincial and district levels in 
my case study areas of East Kutai and Berau Districts in East Kalimantan Province of eastern 
Indonesian Borneo. East Kalimantan would appear to be a best case for forest conservation in 
Indonesia. It has substantial remaining forest cover; a long history of involvement with 
environmentalist NGOs (including TNC-Indonesia’s Terrestrial Program), research groups, and 
bilateral cooperation programs; and a government that has committed itself to green growth. 
Although a coalition of actors promotes green growth and land sparing policies in the province, 
plantations and mining have continued to expand, and deforestation has increased substantially 
over the past decade. 
 TNC launched its program in East Kalimantan in 2001 with a focus on Berau, due to the 
district’s extensive lowland forest areas and orangutan population, and the “relative lack of ethnic 
strife” in the province (Bennett et al. 2004, 2). In 2002-2003, TNC implemented the cornerstone 
of its ‘Conservation by Design’ process by conducting an eco-regional assessment for East 
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Kalimantan. On the basis of this assessment, the East Kalimantan Program identified four priority 
sites for conservation, primarily in Berau and neighboring East Kutai District, and a number of 
‘leverage sites’ where TNC would encourage conservation by local government and partners with 
limited direct involvement (Bennett et al. 2004). TNC has subsequently been involved in 
conservation efforts in East Kutai and Berau for over a decade, but its programs in the two districts 
have taken very different directions. Furthermore, while East Kutai and Berau share certain 
ecological characteristics, including intact upland forest areas along their western borders and the 
limestone karst landscape of the Sangkulirang peninsula, East Kutai is closer to the provincial 
development hubs of Bontang, Samarinda (the capital), and Balikpapan, and suffered more 
substantial damage from Indonesia’s severe El Niño fire events during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Siegert and Hoffmann 2000; Dennis and Colfer 2006). 
 East Kutai today presents a picture of almost complete landscape conversion under an 
extractive regime. Coal mining and oil palm and wood fiber plantations have replaced forests on 
a massive scale, and even Kutai National Park has been logged, burned, encroached upon, and 
reduced. There is virtually no coalition for land sparing in the district, and an overwhelming 
impetus for extractive expansion. TNC’s most notorious activity in East Kutai is the protection of 
an area of orangutan habitat in cooperation with a local indigenous group known as the Wehea 
Dayak, in the northwestern area of Muara Wahau-Kongbeng. Despite the severe environmental 
degradation of the East Kutai landscape, TNC’s project with the Wehea Dayak is widely cited as 
a success story by TNC and the East Kutai government, and Muara Wahau-Kongbeng is, 
somewhat paradoxically, both a center of oil palm expansion and a center of environmental 
conservation initiatives. This juxtaposition demonstrates how ‘forest’ and ‘indigeneity’ are 
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reconstructed as residual categories in the extractive landscape (cf. Li 2000), albeit with their own 
possibilities for commodification. 
 Berau District, East Kutai’s neighbor to the north, contains some of the largest remaining 
areas of lowland forest in Kalimantan and is the site of a major TNC REDD project. Nonetheless, 
the land sparing coalition in Berau is weak, and deforestation has accelerated in spite of multiple 
conservation programs. While TNC has begun to devote some efforts to oil palm sustainability, 
primarily within a frame of land sparing via land use intensification, no coalition has managed to 
integrate district government and corporate actors to effectively limit plantation and mining 
expansion in Berau. Unable to oppose the extractive economy, environmentalist actors have 
developed a land sparing coalition focused on the control of swidden agriculture (i.e., shifting 
cultivation with fire) as a strategy for limiting deforestation and promoting economic development. 
Industrial clearing dwarfs forest conversion in swidden systems and undermines the conservation 
gains of swidden-limiting forest governance, however. The failure to reduce deforestation in this 
best-case district in a best-case province demonstrates the power of political-economic regimes in 
determining patterns of land change and economic development, and the conditioning effect of 
higher level regimes on lower level transformative projects. 
This chapter proceeds by describing the development of Indonesia’s extractive regime 
under Dutch colonialism and the Suharto dictatorship and post-Suharto period. I introduce the 
political economy and environmental politics of East Kalimantan province, and then develop my 
case studies of East Kutai and Berau Districts. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis 
of East Kutai and Berau and reflections on the structure and political ecological implications of 
Indonesia’s extractive regime. 
The Extractive Regime in Indonesia: From Colony to Reformasi 
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 The Dutch East India Company was created in 1602 to control the spice trade in the 
Indonesian archipelago. The Dutch expanded their economic and territorial control in the region 
during the 17th and 18th centuries (albeit with numerous conflicts and setbacks), until the Company 
was dissolved in 1800 and the Dutch crown took control of its territories. After the Java War of 
1825-1830, Dutch rule over the island of Java was consolidated, and the Dutch intensified their 
extraction from the colony through the imposition of the infamous ‘Cultivation System’ 
(Cultuurstelsel), which required villages to set aside a fifth of their land for the production of cash 
crops such as coffee, sugar, and indigo. The Cultivation System exploited domestic labor and 
undermined subsistence production while delivering enormous profits to the Dutch and local elites 
(Ricklefs 2008). With the Agrarian Law of 1870, the Dutch moved to a model of exploitation 
through private plantations. The ‘Domain Declaration’ (Domeinverklaring) that accompanied the 
law appropriated all land not under clear ownership to the colonial state and served as a pretext for 
the expropriation of forests and fallow lands for plantation companies (Stoler 1995). Plantation 
development was concentrated in Java and Sumatra, while in Borneo the Dutch sought to secure 
control over coal mining and oil extraction (Lindblad 1988; Singer 2009), but were more limited 
in their control over interior forest areas (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001). While the profitability of 
the Dutch East Indies to the Netherlands rose and fell, especially with fluctuations in global 
commodity markets and military expenditures, the fundamental logic of the Dutch colonial 
government of Indonesia was the extraction of profit for the metropolitan state and capital 
(Ricklefs 2008; Mansvelt 2012). 
As Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have argued in general terms, the extractive 
institutions of the colonial state created a political economic order that in many cases persisted 
after independence. They quote Crawford Young (1994) to assert that post-colonial states “were 
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successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and 
its more hidden normative theories of governance” (Young 1994, 283 quoted in Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 1376). While institutionalist approaches often pathologize (and 
dehistoricize) patterns of natural resource degradation in the post-colonial states of the Global 
South as the effect of ‘weak governance,’ William Ascher notes that ‘lack of capacity’ may not be 
unintentional: resource degradation in these countries is often driven systematically by institutions 
and political projects geared toward “financing controversial development programs; providing 
economic benefits for particular groups, areas, or individuals; or capturing natural resource rents 
(or other sources of revenue) for the central treasury” (Ascher 2000, 12). 
Following the interlude of a more nationalist economic policy under President Sukarno 
after Indonesian independence in 1945, the extractive regime in Indonesia was fully reasserted 
with the ascendance of General Suharto and his displacement of Sukarno as president in 1967. 
Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime mirrored the colonial state in its endemic corruption and cronyism, 
support for large-scale agricultural plantations at the expense of smallholders, and appropriation 
of land and resources through the dispossession of local populations. The political economy of 
New Order Indonesia was structured around the extraction of multiple resource commodities to 
fuel regional circuits of capitalist accumulation centered on Japan and global circuits centered on 
the Euro-American core (Dauvergne 1997; Gellert 2010). 
The tropical timber trade was one of the pillars of the Suharto regime, particularly after 
Suharto bankrupted Pertamina, the state-owned oil company, in the 1970s by using it as a source 
of off-budget funding for development projects (Ascher 2000). The 1967 Basic Forestry Law, 
enacted shortly after Suharto’s rise to power, had arrogated to the central government’s Forestry 
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Department24 control of the national ‘forest estate’ (kawasan hutan), covering over two-thirds of 
Indonesian territory, in a direct reprisal of the colonial Agrarian Law of 1870 (Rhee 2006). At the 
same time, the logging industry was opened to foreign investment. Rapid expansion of industrial-
scale logging took place in Kalimantan from the 1970s onward. 
The general pattern of timber extraction involved, first, the allocation of logging 
concessions to Suharto’s military allies and business cronies and their foreign partners (Ross 
2001). As Barr recounts, “Partnerships with the largest [foreign] investors were almost always 
forged by military interests, politico-bureaucratic powerholders, or private entrepreneurs with 
close ties to elite officials. In particular, military-owned holding companies, cooperative 
enterprises, foundations, and pension funds, representing the particular interests of both individual 
officers and whole commands, frequently acted as ‘silent partners’ for foreign logging companies” 
(1998, 6). The deep involvement of the military in Indonesia’s timber sector helped insure loyalty 
to the regime (through personal enrichment), facilitated the repression of any local dissent to 
logging operations, and guaranteed impunity for violations of harvest limits and other regulations 
(Barber and Talbott 2003). An emblematic example of the alliances between foreign capital and 
domestic elites for the extraction of Indonesian timber was the partnership between Georgia 
Pacific, an American timber multinational, and Bob Hasan, Suharto’s long-time business partner. 
Hasan and Georgia Pacific were awarded a 350,000 ha concession in present day East Kutai, from 
which Georgia Pacific exported over 2.2 million m3 of raw logs during its first decade of operation, 
with gross earnings valued at over $460 million in 2017 dollars (Barr 1998, 7). 
																																																						
24 The Directorate General of Forestry was made a Ministry in 1964, downgraded to a Directorate in 1967, and 
restored to ministerial status in 1983. In late 2014, the Ministry of Forestry merged with the Ministry of 
Environment to form the new Ministry of Environment and Forestry. 
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Second, in the early 1980s Indonesia banned the export of raw logs, and Bob Hasan helped 
lead an expansion of the country’s wood processing sector that transformed Indonesia into the 
world’s largest hardwood plywood exporter (Barr 1998). Plywood, sawn wood, and pulp and paper 
mills proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s without effective supervision or the guarantee of 
sustainable timber supplies, leading to overcapacity in the wood processing sector and a timber 
supply deficit that by 2005-2006 had reached 40 million m3 annually (Obidzinski, Andrianto, and 
Wijaya 2007). Third, this timber supply deficit and the generalized corrupt and extractive character 
of the timber sector have driven what Obidzinski et al. characterize as “massive over-harvesting” 
and the “spiralling deterioration of Indonesia’s forest resources” (2007, 532). Fourth, for a coup 
de grâce, in 1989 the Suharto government created a Reforestation Fund (Dana Reboisasi) 
ostensibly intended to support reforestation and rehabilitation of degraded lands. The Reforestation 
Fund was supplied by a volume-based levy on timber concessionaires and was the largest single 
source of government revenues from the commercial forestry sector. The Ministry of Forestry used 
the fund to support the development of industrial tree plantations, predominantly on forested land 
and by companies with close ties to political elites that engaged in fraudulent practices to maximize 
their rents from the fund and from the exploitation of forest areas. The fund was also used by the 
regime to finance unrelated, off-budget development projects, such as a $190 million transfer to 
the state aircraft company and a $109 million allocation to Bob Hasan’s PT Kiani Kertas to finance 
construction of the company’s pulp mill in Berau. A 1999 audit by Ernst & Young documented 
losses of $5.2 billion from the Reforestation Fund in the five years from 1993-1998 due to 
mismanagement, fraud, and improper diversions of funds (Barr et al. 2010). 
The fall of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998 in the gyre of the Asian Financial Crisis ushered 
in the period of ‘Reform’ (Reformasi) in Indonesia, but the essentially extractive character of the 
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political economic regime has persisted in the post-Suharto period (Hadiz and Robison 2005). In 
the forestry sector, the Ministry of Forestry has continued to exercise virtually unchecked control 
over the lands of the forest estate, although decentralization measures prompted a surge in smaller-
scale concessions issued by district governments, which exacerbated illegal logging and forest 
clearing and were quickly reined in by the central government (Obidzinski and Barr 2003; Barr et 
al. 2006). Illegal log production, generally from exceeding harvest limits or cutting outside of 
forest concessions, was often double or triple official production in the early 2000s (Obidzinski, 
Andrianto, and Wijaya 2007), and while expansion of tree plantations may have supplanted some 
illegal production, estimates in 2010 and 2013 suggest that 40-60 percent of Indonesian timber is 
still cut illegally (Hoare and Wellesley 2014). An analysis by Smajgl et al. (2008) for East 
Kalimantan found that industrial logging did not reduce poverty in the province, rather “a 
reduction of annual allowable cut of existing HPH [industrial] concessions are more likely to 
reduce poverty as logging allows a minority of the population to benefit while a majority faces 
lower income due to negative externalities from logging” (17, my emphasis). Social and ecological 
degradation have been corollaries of extraction in Indonesia from the Dutch colonial period to the 
present. 
While I have focused here on describing the functioning of the extractive regime in relation 
to the timber sector, the acceleration in deforestation in the post-Suharto period has also been 
driven substantially by the conversion of forests to industrial oil palm plantations. The oil palm 
sector in Indonesia has developed through similar circuits of corruption, cronyism, illegality, and 
environmental degradation linked to accumulation by domestic elites and foreign capital 
(Greenpeace 2007; Obidzinski et al. 2012; Setiawan et al. 2016; Purnomo et al. 2017), as have the 
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other major natural resource and agricultural export sectors of the Indonesian economy, such as 
oil and gas, mining, and fisheries (Gellert 2010). 
Forest Conservation under the Extractive Regime 
 Deforestation under the extractive regime in Indonesia has not proceeded in the complete 
absence of opposition or some impulse for forest conservation. The creation of forest reserve areas 
was used by the Dutch, as by other colonial regimes (Grove 1995), as part of a strategy for 
constructing control and management of territory, populations, and resources (Peluso 1992a; 
Peluso and Vandergeest 2001). While the Dutch issued an ordinance in 1924 enabling the 
establishment of forest reserves in the Outer Islands, including Borneo, there was little demarcation 
of reserve forests in eastern Borneo prior to World War II (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001). Under 
Sukarno’s rule after independence, the forestry service began to expand its presence in Borneo 
with a mission to classify and administer forest areas in support of national development. These 
activities continued after the creation of the forest estate by the Suharto regime in 1967, 
culminating in the early 1980s in the Consensus Forest Land Use Plan (Tata Guna Hutan 
Kesepakatan, TGHK), which classified areas of the forest estate according to their permitted land 
uses. Forest classifications comprise nature reserve or conservation areas, protection forests, 
limited production forests, normal production forests, and conversion forests. Conservation and 
reserve forests are geared to the protection of biodiversity and ecosystem function, protection 
forests are intended to protect soil and hydrological functions, limited production forests are open 
to low-intensity selective logging, normal production forests are open to more intensive logging, 
and conversion forests may be fully logged and converted to agricultural or other land uses. These 
classifications are ostensibly based on topographic and climatic characteristics, including slope, 
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soil type, and rainfall intensity. These forestry exercises were intended to guarantee the scientific 
management of Indonesia’s forests in the national interest. As Vandergeest and Peluso write: 
“In Kalimantan, professional forestry found expression in highly elaborate land use 
exercises that were carried out by various land management agencies. At the local 
level, however, foresters were not necessarily able to translate this into autonomous 
control over forest resources. Foresters had little direct or actual control over the 
military branches with timber concessions and civil administrators who had 
interests other than implementing sustainable logging or conservation plans. Some 
foresters collaborated in corruption, a much easier alternative than enforcing legal 
controls. Foresters, civil service officials and members of the military who 
protected the companies’ operations were commonly known to be corrupt. 
Indonesian foresters frequently referred to their institution as ‘the golden ministry’, 
and with good reason…. 
 
“Overall, the example of Kalimantan demonstrates the irony of professional 
forestry. On the one hand, the land use planning and other development exercises 
were intended to render landscapes and subjects visible, legible and ‘sustainable’. 
On the other hand, the actual practices of foresters (and others) were often illegal 
and intended to produce illegibility and obfuscation.” (Vandergeest and Peluso 
2006, 52–53) 
 
In practice, the impulse for scientific management of Indonesia’s forests has been overwhelmed 
by extractive interests that have refashioned institutions such as the forestry service to their benefit. 
 National parks in Indonesia were first established in 1980 as part of a global wave of 
national park creation (W. Adams and Hutton 2007; Gaveau, Linkie, et al. 2009). Even this 
sacrosanct category of international conservation proved largely incapable of protecting 
Indonesian forests, however. While David Gaveau and his collaborators have found reductions in 
deforestation in protected areas in Sumatra relative to the surrounding landscape, they also report 
large-scale logging and deforestation within protected area boundaries (Gaveau, Epting, et al. 
2009; Gaveau, Linkie, et al. 2009). In Kalimantan, 56 percent of protected lowland forests, an area 
of 29,000 km2, were deforested from 1985-2001, with the expansion of oil palm plantations and 
decline of timber stock in logging concessions helping to drive industrial logging operations into 
national parks and conservation and protection forests (Curran et al. 2004). In an econometric 
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analysis of determinants of deforestation in Indonesia for 2005-2010, Wheeler et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that deforestation in the country was significantly determined by economic factors 
(palm oil and wood products prices and demands, the exchange rate, and the real interest rate), 
whereas they found no significant impact of protected area status on deforestation. At Lore Lindu 
National Park in Sulawesi, the focus of The Nature Conservancy’s Terrestrial Program during the 
first decade of its work in Indonesia, Tania Li describes endemic illegal logging in the park and 
the encroachment on the park in 2001 by 1030 households that settled and cleared park land for 
agriculture (Li 2003). In short, the national park model promoted in the 1980s and 1990s in 
Indonesia by international environmentalist actors such as UNDP, IUCN, the Asian Development 
Bank, and NGOs such as TNC had virtually no effect on the national deforestation rate and largely 
failed to avoid deforestation even within designated protected areas. 
 Destructive logging and forest conversion have severe impacts on the livelihoods of local 
peoples, and in some instances communities and civil society organizations have mobilized to 
oppose dispossession and extractive expansion. Communities living within Indonesia’s forest 
estate have few formal legal rights to their land. Rural political mobilization had strengthened 
under Sukarno, especially with communist efforts to organize plantation workers, but after Suharto 
came to power amidst the killings of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists, rural society 
was heavily repressed and depoliticized. Peluso et al. (2008) affirm that “Until the 1980s, the New 
Order state successfully maintained such overwhelming power and control that rural protest was 
almost unknown” (382). Attempts to articulate an ‘indigenous’ identity and politics in Indonesia 
connected to the international indigenous peoples’ movement were likewise dismissed by the 
political establishment (Li 2000). The 1980s and 1990s saw nascent mobilization around 
environmental justice and indigenous people’s discourses, which recast issues of land rights and 
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dispossession that had been a focus for the peasant movement. With the fall of Suharto, civil 
society in Indonesia gained greater space to organize, and agrarian reform, social forestry, and 
access for local communities to state forest lands all became topics of public debate (Peluso, Afiff, 
and Rachman 2008). 
Domestic environmental NGOs, indigenous peoples’ associations, agrarian movements, 
and international environmental organizations have formed shifting alliances during the Reformasi 
period. A general cleavage highlighted by the small farmer encroachment in Lore Lindu is between 
agrarian and environmental justice groups seeking to redress past dispossessions by supporting 
small farmers’ access to forest lands, and international environmental NGOs and indigenous 
peoples’ associations seeking to avoid new dispossessions by protecting forest land from extractive 
expansion (Li 2003). A notable victory for the indigenous rights movement was a 2013 
Constitutional Court decision supporting traditional communities’ customary rights to their forest 
lands, though the government bureaucracy has been reluctant to implement the decision, and little 
has so far changed on the ground (“Forestry Ministry Reluctant to Relinquish Control over 
Forests” 2014; Rogers 2016). Ad hoc actions by communities and their allies at times check 
industrial expansion, as in Berau where villagers were able to halt activities in a logging concession 
until TNC brokered a ‘collaborative forest management’ agreement between them and the logging 
company, and where local communities with support from TNC succeeded in canceling an oil 
palm concession. The ability of communities to maintain forest-dependent livelihoods and resist 
industrial expansion may be undermined, however, by the landscape-scale expansion of industrial 
plantations and mining, a conundrum I discuss further in the case study of Berau. 
Lastly, the Reformasi period in Indonesia has coincided with a consolidation of ecological 
modernization in global environmentalist policy discourse. The ‘sustainable commodities’ model 
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pioneered by FSC in the 1990s was taken up by WWF to convene the multi-stakeholder 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in the early 2000s. REDD initiatives in Indonesia 
were boosted when the country hosted the UNFCCC 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) in 
Bali in 2007. The Director-General of the Forest Research and Development Agency (FORDA) of 
the Ministry of Forestry was supportive of REDD policy and had helped establish the Indonesia 
Forest Climate Alliance in 2006, which received funding from Australia, Germany, and the UK 
under the coordination of the World Bank to bring together government officials from Forestry 
and other ministries, researchers from institutions such as CIFOR, and representatives of 
environmental NGOs including TNC and WWF to develop a basis for REDD policy in Indonesia 
(TNC27 141219). Following the Bali Conference, Indonesia joined the UN-REDD Programme 
and signed a Letter of Intent with the Government of Norway in which Norway pledged up to $1 
billion to support Indonesian REDD efforts. Under the agreement with Norway, Indonesia 
committed to develop a national REDD strategy, establish an agency for REDD implementation, 
and impose a two-year moratorium on new concessions for the conversion of peatlands and natural 
forest (Government of Norway/Government of Indonesia 2010). 
REDD and RSPO share the ecological modernization premise that capitalist development 
can be made compatible with environmental protection. While the RSPO understands 
sustainability to include the decoupling of oil palm production from deforestation, at least of 
primary forest areas, most REDD discourse in Indonesia has been premised on the idea that carbon 
credits would finance forest protection, and national REDD strategy, focused on the forest estate 
under control of the Ministry of Forestry, has for the most part dissociated the question of reducing 
deforestation from the question of plantation expansion (e.g., Masripatin 2010). As Casson et al. 
observe, “Within Indonesia, climate change policy is rarely consistent with other sectoral policies. 
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For example, policies that promote the expansion of palm oil (both for food and biofuel production) 
into new areas often conflict with climate change policies designed to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and degradation” (2015, ix). A more holistic ‘green growth’ perspective has been 
taken up in some pockets of the government bureaucracy, particularly in relation to national and 
provincial greenhouse gas reduction plans, which are coordinated by the Ministry of National 
Development Planning (BAPPENAS) and pertain to multiple sectors, including agriculture and 
forestry. These plans express support for land sparing policies to limit deforestation from 
smallholder agriculture and direct plantations away from forested areas and toward degraded lands 
(DNPI Indonesia 2010b; DNPI 2011; Government of Indonesia 2011b), but green growth policy 
making is obstructed and overshadowed at the national level by extractive coalitions. Anderson et 
al. (2016) describe ‘anti-reform coalitions’ including private sector companies and government 
actors that have opposed the moratorium on primary forest and peatland concessions, scuttled a 
zero-deforestation pledge by major palm oil companies, and supported the 2011 Master Plan for 
the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development (MP3EI), which proposes 
massive investments in infrastructure, natural resource sectors, and agro-industry while initially 
omitting any consideration of greenhouse gas reduction goals. 
While the national-level extractive regime remains largely unshaken, REDD and green 
growth advocates have sought gains at the subnational level with pilot programs and demonstration 
activities. East Kalimantan Province, the focus of TNC-Indonesia’s Terrestrial Program, has been 
at the forefront of these subnational forest governance and green economy efforts. 
East Kalimantan: The Green Province 
 East Kalimantan is in many respects a ‘best case’ province in Indonesia for pioneering a 
transformation from extraction to a productivist, ‘green’ economy. Under Dutch colonialism, 
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Sumatra was an intensively exploited internal periphery, but large-scale logging began in 
Kalimantan only in the 1970s, and oil palm plantations expanded first in West Kalimantan 
beginning in the 1980s and in Central Kalimantan from the 1990s onwards. Industrial land use in 
East Kalimantan continued to be dominated by forestry, while the oil and gas industries in the 
province grew during the 1980s, followed by the expansion of coal mining in the 1990s. Industrial 
logging operations began to decline towards the end of the 1990s, and the number of permits for 
tree fiber and oil palm plantations grew from the mid-1990s into the 2000s, as did plantation area, 
although in many cases plantation concessions were used as a front for timber exploitation and 
never planted (Obidzinski and Andrianto 2005).  
 By the 2000s, as TNC began to develop its East Kalimantan Program and REDD gained 
prominence in forest governance discourse, East Kalimantan contained the largest remaining areas 
of lowland rainforest in Kalimantan.25 To the forest transition thinking of eco-modernist 
researchers, NGO staff, and government officials, rising rates of forest conversion for mining, oil 
palm, and tree plantations denoted East Kalimantan as a frontier area squarely within the ‘REDD 
Opportunity Zone’ for a low carbon development transformation (Figures 5.1-3). The province 
had substantial experience with international forest research and conservation programs. In 1989, 
French researchers began a long-term study on forest regeneration known as the STREK project, 
which was conducted in partnership with FORDA and the state logging company PT Inhutani I in 
Inhutani’s Labanan concession in Berau. This project subsequently became part of the Berau 
Forest Management Project (BFMP), a $12 million EU-funded project from 1996-2002 that 
																																																						
25 In October 2012, the four northernmost districts of East Kalimantan split to become the new province of North 
Kalimantan (Kalimantan Utara). These four districts are for the most part heavily forested, and the creation of North 
Kalimantan has substantially reduced the total area of primary forest in East Kalimantan. Nonetheless, large areas of 
primary forest remain in the north (Berau) and interior of present-day East Kalimantan. For the purpose of 
consistency and unless otherwise noted, statistics given for East Kalimantan pertain to the whole of present-day East 
Kalimantan and North Kalimantan provinces. 
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conducted research on forest management and developed a proposal for a Clean Development 
Mechanism carbon forestry project in Berau (Oosterman 2000). CIFOR, created in 1993 with its 
headquarters in Bogor, Indonesia, outside of Jakarta, also developed a close relationship with East 
Kalimantan, where from 1996 onwards the organization had privileged access to a 300,000 ha 
research forest adjacent to Kayan Mentarang National Park in present-day Malinau District (Rhee 
2006). Beginning in 1994, the German Government and its cooperation arm GTZ supported the 
Integrated Forest Fire Management Project, which ran for a decade in partnership with the 
provincial forestry authorities. When TNC carried out its eco-regional assessment, shortly after 
the launch of its East Kalimantan Program in the early 2000s, it found that “almost all of the 
available geologic, vegetative and cultural information for Kalimantan has been gathered only for 
this province due to its rich natural resources and a host of local and international companies 
seeking to exploit them” (TNC-Indonesia 2004, I:7). 
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Figures 5.1-3: 5.1) Forest transition curve for Indonesian islands from a CIFOR report published 
prior to COP13 in Bali on the implications of deforestation research for REDD policy (Kanninen et 
al. 2007, 11); 5.2) Forest transition curve for Indonesian islands from a 2015 presentation on 
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REDD in Indonesia by an official from the Forestry Research and Development Agency (FORDA) 
of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Wibowo 2015); 5.3) forest transition curve from 2014 
TNC Overview of the Berau Forest Carbon Program presentation showing locations of Indonesian 
provinces and Berau District on a conceptual curve and identifying a REDD Opportunity Zone 
(Hovani 2014). Note that the forest transition is assumed to operate regardless of scale: these 
graphs include districts, provinces, and islands, and much forest transition literature uses a 
national level of analysis (e.g., Kauppi et al. 2006). 
 East Kalimantan’s political economy has developed squarely within Indonesia’s national 
extractive regime. In addition to its reliance on oil and gas exploitation and coal mining, the 
province has been a site of rampant illegal logging. In Berau and East Kutai districts, Obidzinski 
and Andrianto (2005) describe a multitude of illegalities in the forestry sector including cutting 
outside of designated areas, land clearing for dubious plantation schemes, unlicensed logging 
operations, under-reporting of timber harvests, and tax evasion, all feeding economic rent 
extraction by individuals, government institutions, and companies. They estimate annual 
budgetary losses due to illegal forestry in each district at over $11 million in 2003. As a provincial 
official put it succinctly, “The wood is gone, and we got nothing from it” in terms of development 
(BAPPEDA01 150324). Suwarna Abdul Fatah, a retired army Major General, was Governor of 
East Kalimantan from 1998 until 2006, when he was removed from power due to a corruption 
inquiry. He was ultimately convicted of improperly issuing permits for 1 million ha of oil palm 
plantations in Berau, which were logged but never planted, causing losses to the state of nearly 
$40 million (CIFOR 2010). 
 Governor Suwarna’s next elected successor was Awang Faroek Ishak, the former bupati 
(district head) of East Kutai, who ascended to the governorship in 2008. A number of current 
provincial level officials and NGO actors had previously worked with Awang when he was bupati 
in East Kutai, creating continuities between the history of forest governance in East Kutai and 
present provincial-level perspectives. In East Kutai, Awang as bupati and Riza Indra Riadi, head 
of the district Environment Agency, had worked with TNC staff to set up the Wehea Protected 
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Forest area. As governor, Awang made Riza head of the provincial Environment Agency, while 
some of the same TNC staff members involved in the Wehea project today direct TNC’s East 
Kalimantan Program. Awang came to the governorship at the same time as a wave of REDD 
activity following the 2007 Bali Climate Conference. A provincial REDD Working Group was 
already in existence, supported in part by TNC, and TNC and others encouraged Awang to enlist 
East Kalimantan in the Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force, which had been founded in 
2008 by US states (California, Illinois, and Wisconsin), Brazilian states (including Mato Grosso 
and Pará), and Indonesian provinces (Aceh and Papua) to support the development of REDD. 
In 2009, Awang traveled to California, where he met Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
and participated in the Governors’ Global Climate Summit. In the account on Awang’s personal 
website, “At the the meeting that last week of September 2009 in Los Angeles (LA), these two 
men, each important in his respective region, exchanged souvenirs. Awang Faroek Ishak gave 
[Arnold] a red ruby ring from Kalimantan, while Aarnold [sic] gave Awang Faroek Ishak a position 
as the eleventh permanent member of the Governor Climate and Forest (GCF) [Task Force]” 
(“Derap Langkah Kurangi Pemanasan Global - Anggota Tetap GCF vs Permata Merah Delima” 
2015). This meeting with Schwarzenegger motivated Awang to move forward with a green agenda 
(TNC35 150321).26 In 2010, he convened the district heads and mayors of the province to launch 
the Green East Kalimantan Declaration, which asserted a commitment to environmentally 
																																																						
26 Awang’s esteem for Schwarzenegger has proved enduring. East Kalimantan is serving as Chair of GCF in 2017, 
and Awang has made it known that he intends to invite Schwarzenegger to the GCF Annual Meeting in Balikpapan, 
although Schwarzenegger is no longer governor of California: “‘Arnold Schwarzenegger has promised me that he 
will come if GCF is held in East Kalimantan in order to enliven the event,’ Awang Faroek said in Samarinda on 
Sunday, Feb. 12. The east Kalimantan governor said Arnold Schwarzenegger will be invited since he was one of the 
co-founders of the GCF. ‘Arnold Schwarzenegger and I [among others] had co-founded the GCF,’ Awang Faroek 
said. According to Awang Faroek, Arnold Schwarzenegger’s presence will make East Kalimantan proud and would 
be an honor for The Terminator actor. ‘We will invite him as an individual not [as part of an] institution. I hope he 
will be willing [to come] and I still have his personal number. We expect Arnold to give a speech on environmental 
conservation, particularly to anticipate global warming,’ Awang Faroek explained” (Tempo 2017). 
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sustainable development, and included a clause “recognizing that global warming is happening 
that causes global climate change, one of the causes of which is deforestation and forest and land 
degradation, so it is important to prevent forest destruction and improve the quality of forest 
through restoration, reforestation, and forest and land rehabilitation” (“Deklarasi Kalimantan 
Timur Hijau” 2010). 
 “Kaltim Green” (“Green East Kalimantan”27) became one of the principal slogans of 
Awang’s administration. When I visited the East Kalimantan capital of Samarinda in 2015, the 
slogan was displayed prominently over the entry to the Governor’s Residence (Figure 5.4). 
																																																						
27 Kalimantan Timur, the Indonesian name for East Kalimantan, is frequently abbreviated to “Kaltim.” 
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Figure 5.4: East Kalimantan Governor’s Residence displaying slogans “Kaltim Green” and 
“Develop Kaltim for All,” 27 February 2015. 
 
Under Awang, the provincial government adopted a discourse of green development. According 
to a long-term advisor to the governor, after East Kalimantan’s timber boom and subsequent 
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reliance on oil and gas and mining, members of Awang’s administration realized that their 
economic model built on natural resource extraction had degraded the natural resource base and 
caused problems including natural disasters (e.g., floods, landslides), extreme income inequality 
across districts, poverty, and unemployment (KALTIM03 150307). “Permits [for logging, mining, 
and plantation concessions] were being given without good control,” one of the governor’s 
assistants told me, “Coal and forest exploitation have been too rapid, and areas were becoming 
degraded” (KALTIM04 150310). “We realized we were doing development wrong,” a provincial 
planning official told me. The answer, he affirmed, is that “before fossil fuels are exhausted, we 
need to increase our renewable sectors, especially agriculture. Agriculture has higher labor 
requirements and will reduce unemployment. …We want an economic transition from non-
renewable resources to renewable resources based on plantations, farming, and processing and 
manufacturing” (BAPPEDA01 150324). Green growth in East Kalimantan, it turns out, is rooted 
in large-scale plantation agriculture and agro-industrial development. 
 The agro-industrial model advocated by members of the green growth coalition in East 
Kalimantan seeks to move from simple resource extraction to a productivist model of resource 
transformation, integrating palm oil production with food processing and biofuel operations, for 
instance, and coal mining with petrochemical industries (BAPPEDA01 150324). Land sparing 
ideas are woven through the modernization discourse of actors in East Kalimantan’s green growth 
coalition. Awang supports expanding tree fiber plantations to avoid clearing of natural forest areas 
(Ghofar 2015; KALTIM03 150307; KALTIM04 150310) under a logic that suggests that high-
yield fiber plantations could help meet wood demand and reduce illegal logging. (TNC’s own 
scientists have argued, however, that the tradeoffs between logging of natural forests and 
monocultural fiber plantations are complex and not well captured by a simplistic logic of ‘forest 
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sparing’ (Griscom and Goodman 2015; Griscom et al. 2017).) Arguments for land sparing via 
agricultural intensification are occasionally heard at the provincial level. East Kalimantan’s 
Environmentally Sustainable Development Strategy, for example, calls for boosting yields of 
smallholder agriculture while limiting the use of fire (DNPI 2011, 121). Smallholder production 
receives far less attention than industrial sectors in provincial green growth discourse, however. 
The provincial strategy also includes “productivity gains to replace some expansion of [oil palm] 
concessions” (DNPI 2011, 79). A long-time Indonesian employee of GIZ, the German cooperation 
program, emphasized in our interview the potential for land sparing by developing efficiency and 
increasing yield in the oil palm sector, asserting that “Indonesia can double its palm oil production 
without converting forest” (GIZ02 150303). 
More prominent than arguments for land sparing via agricultural intensification in the 
provincial ecological modernization discourse are arguments for land sparing via land use 
intensification. Numerous government officials, local academics, and NGO actors promote land 
use intensification arguments for identifying degraded lands and siting plantation expansion in 
degraded areas. The Regional Climate Change Council (DDPI) in East Kalimantan, an ad hoc 
government policy forum, has undertaken a mapping of degraded or ‘critical’ lands in the province 
according to biological, chemical and physical criteria (KALTIM08 150513, KALTIM01 
150305). In a message to a provincial level seminar, Governor Awang stated that there are 7.9 
million ha of degraded land in the province,28 which would represent roughly two-thirds of the 
total provincial land area. A provincial discussion document on “optimizing land use management” 
states that “areas with high carbon values need to be identified and prioritized for conservation,” 
																																																						
28 Governor’s Message to “Seminar Implikasi Undang-Undang Nomor 23 tahun 2014 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah 
dalam Tata Kelola Sumberdaya Alam di Provinsi Kalimantan Timur,” 23 March 2015, Governor’s Office, 
Samarinda, East Kalimantan, from author field notes. 
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while simultaneously highlighting the need to “ease productive access to degraded land” and 
noting that “there is a large amount of degraded land in [the] forestry estate that are [sic] suitable 
for oil palm” (Daryanto 2011, 12–16). 
Borras and Franco have comprehensively critiqued the argument for large-scale 
agricultural expansion on ‘degraded’ lands in the Global South, arguing that lands classified as 
‘degraded’ are rarely empty or unused (despite being perceived as such by government and 
corporate planners), and advocating for plantation expansion on degraded lands reframes 
plantation expansion as an essentially positive development model that simply needs to be properly 
‘managed’ (2010, 511–13). The particular history of Indonesia, where the Dutch appropriated 
forest and fallow land as ‘wasteland’ under the Domain Declaration, reinforces this critique of the 
degraded lands discourse as a justification for agro-industrial expansion (cf. Montefrio and 
Dressler 2016). A letter to The Jakarta Post (2010) put it bluntly, “the term ‘degraded’ is 
synonymous with idle, marginal, unproductive, empty or wasted, and is derived from the similar 
colonial concept and model.” When coupled with arguments for forest conservation, the argument 
for agricultural expansion on degraded lands intertwines with land sparing arguments and 
modernization discourses promoting the intensification and optimization of land use. 
In practice, redirecting plantation expansion to degraded lands faces numerous difficulties. 
Land swaps to shift existing permits from forests to degraded lands are so administratively 
complex that most informants consider them unviable (TNC31 150205, DISHUT02 150310), so 
current discourse emphasizes siting new plantations in degraded areas. Plantation expansion on 
degraded lands as opposed to forests could have substantial environmental benefits, but degraded 
lands are not generally found in contiguous areas of sufficient size for plantations, there are high 
transaction and regulatory costs for securing concessions on degraded lands since they are often 
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subject to multiple and overlapping land claims, and there are fewer opportunities for rent 
extraction when opening plantations on degraded lands, since in many cases operators will use 
profits from timber sales from forest clearing to finance plantation establishment (if they intend to 
establish a plantation at all) (DNPI Indonesia 2010a; Daryanto 2011; BAPPEDA01 150324). The 
incentives of the extractive regime thus support plantation expansion through forest conversion. 
In 2013, Awang declared a moratorium on new logging, mining, and plantation 
concessions in the province, ostensibly to give time to inventory and evaluate existing concessions. 
Concession permits are issued at the district level, but then require a provincial recommendation 
for approval. The moratorium on new concessions should in principle lay the groundwork for a 
provincial land use transformation, but in practice it did little to slow the expansion of mining or 
plantations into forested areas. When the moratorium was issued, 2.4 million ha of the province 
had already been permitted for oil palm, while only 1 million ha had so far been planted (East 
Kalimantan Government 2013). As one of the governor’s staff observed, “permits have been pretty 
much fully issued over East Kalimantan’s territory, so now we have a moratorium” (KALTIM08 
150513). 
A green East Kalimantan may involve no new permits for deforestation, but vast areas may 
still be cleared under existing permits for oil palm plantations, in addition to whatever expansion 
occurs on ostensibly ‘degraded’ lands. The productivist project for ‘renewable’ agro-industry in 
the province also involves the construction of a major port facility and creation of a Special 
Economic Zone at Maloy in East Kutai, which was included in the national government’s MP3EI 
development plan. Maloy is promoted as a future hub for palm oil, biodiesel, and petrochemical 
industries, and its construction is intended to help spur development in a new part of the province, 
rather than reinforcing the existing hubs of Bontang, Samarinda, and Balikpapan (BAPPEDA01 
 
	
	
190 
150324). It is hard not to see a pork barrel, however, in the proposal for massive industrial 
development in the Governor’s home district. One informant alleges that Awang and his cronies 
have bought up the land around Maloy on speculation, and that Awang has also been involved in 
land speculation around Kutai National Park, where road projects linked to the Maloy corridor will 
pass (KALTIM05 140311). Even in a green province, politics in Indonesia is still a business. 
“Awang declared ‘Kaltim Green,’ but you can’t find it in the regulations,” an environmental lawyer 
told me, “it’s just a slogan” (UNMUL02 150324). “Kaltim has been an early adopter of ideas [such 
as REDD], but slow in implementation” mused an Indonesian who has worked for many years 
with the German cooperation program in the province, “Before COP13 in Bali we already had a 
REDD task force, but now on the ground [in 2015] not that much has changed. This phenomenon 
in itself is political” (GIZ05 150427). 
 
Figure 5.5: Annual forest loss in East Kalimantan (since 2012, East Kalimantan and North 
Kalimantan), 2001-2015, at >30 percent canopy density (Hansen et al. 2013); trend line R2 = 0.70. 
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Forest loss in East Kalimantan has accelerated significantly since 2001 (Figure 5.5). This 
acceleration has occurred despite East Kalimantan declaring itself a green province in 2010, 
imposing a moratorium on new concessions in 2013, and being a magnet for REDD programs. In 
addition to the province’s membership in GCF, Germany’s FORCLIME project and TNC’s Berau 
Forest Carbon Program were designated by the Ministry of Forestry in 2009 as two of four official 
REDD demonstration activities in Indonesia (Masripatin 2010). In the case studies that follow, I 
compare forest governance and land use change in East Kutai and Berau districts (Figure 5.6). 
Both districts were identified as priority areas for forest conservation by The Nature Conservancy’s 
East Kalimantan Program due to their remaining expanses of lowland and upland forest, large 
orangutan populations, and the distinctive karst landscape shared along their border on the 
Sangkulirang Peninsula (TNC-Indonesia 2004; P. Wells, Paoli, and Suryadi 2010). Berau became 
the best case district in the best case province for forest governance, as it became the site of TNC’s 
district-level REDD project, the Berau Forest Carbon Program. East Kutai was not targeted by 
TNC for a district-level program, but it is the site of a highly publicized collaboration between 
TNC and the Wehea Dayak indigenous group for the management of a protected forest area. At 
the same time, East Kutai has been a center of oil palm expansion in East Kalimantan, the district 
has been massively transformed by plantation agriculture and coal mining, and rapid deforestation 
continues. The comparison here is not based on the perceived ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of TNC’s 
programs, but rather it provides a contrast between a protected area conservation model in an 
extractive landscape in East Kutai and an attempt at ecological modernization through 
jurisdictional REDD in Berau. Ultimately, the political economy of Berau remains extractive, 
however, and deforestation in the district is accelerating. I begin with the case of East Kutai to 
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provide the extractive baseline, followed by the case of Berau to explore the efforts by TNC and 
its allies to engineer a land use transformation. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Nested case selection for incorporated comparison of tropical forest governance in 
Indonesia. Circles represent the national, provincial, and district levels. Borders at each level are 
porous. Berau district, which hosts a jurisdictional-level REDD project, is distinguished by a 
textured background pattern. 
East Kutai: Forest Guardians across the Commodity Frontier 
 The district of East Kutai was created in 1999 through the breakup of the much larger 
district of Kutai as part of the ‘blossoming’ (pemekaran) of district creation that occurred after the 
fall of Suharto. Awang Faroek Ishak, now governor of East Kalimantan, served as the first bupati 
(district head). The creation of new districts was often an occasion for the creation and capture of 
new rents (Aspinall 2013, 39), and was finally paused by a moratorium in 2009. In a certain sense, 
then, East Kutai District was destined for extraction from its birth, and in the nearly two decades 
since its creation, the district has been a center for the virtually unbridled expansion of coal mining 
and oil palm and tree fiber plantations. 
 Of course, the extractive regime in East Kutai existed well before 1999. Kutai District was 
a center for logging, oil and gas production, and coal mining throughout the 20th century (Magenda 
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1991). The 350,000 ha Georgia Pacific concession was located in present-day East Kutai and 
began operating in 1971, and Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC) was formed in 1982 as a joint venture of 
BP and Rio Tinto and in the early 1990s began operating the Sangatta coal mine, an open pit 
operation with some of the world’s largest thermal coal reserves, on the outskirts of the town of 
Sangatta, which is today the East Kutai district seat. 
 The climate of East Kutai, to the south of the Sangkulirang peninsula and its karst 
escarpments, is somewhat warmer and drier than Berau, and the district experienced earlier and 
more extensive logging and tree plantation development than its neighbor to the north. During the 
1982-1983 and 1997-1998 El Niño years, fires burned vast areas of East Kutai. As Dennis and 
Colfer observe, “In addition to the contributing El Niño drought conditions, evidence suggests that 
increased logging and large-scale agro-industrial developments in tropical rainforests, and an 
increase in modified forest in general, has led to an increased fire risk and incidence both in and 
around these forests, creating a positive feedback loop whereby fire-affected forest becomes more 
prone to repeat fire damage” (Dennis and Colfer 2006, 31). They find that in a 2000 km2 study 
area in East Kutai, 70 percent of forest that burned during the 1982-1983 El Niño had ceased to be 
forest in 2000. Similarly, Siegert and Hoffmann (2000) report that for their test area of 18,500 km2 
overlapping present-day East Kutai, 71 percent of the area burned during the 1997-1998 El Niño, 
with the most severe damage occurring in more heavily logged areas and tree plantations. 
 Logged and burned over areas of East Kutai became prime sites for the expansion of oil 
palm and tree fiber plantations (cf. Gaveau et al. 2016). With the creation of East Kutai as a new 
district in 1999, there were strong personal, institutional, and political incentives for officials to 
accelerate economic growth. As one district official recalls, “Around 2000, East Kutai was a new 
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district and there were many new permits, the largest number being for oil palm. As a new district, 
East Kutai wanted to grow quickly” (KUTIM03 150520). Another official expands: 
“Thirteen years ago, when the district was created, there was a need to speed 
development. There was the old model of HPH [industrial forest concession] 
management, but it wasn’t very good. …Permits [on the concessions] were ending, 
and what was left? Sixty percent of the district area that hadn’t been managed well. 
East Kutai needed to develop the economy and open new areas. The regulations 
permitted conversion, so the private sector came in to convert land. There wasn’t 
much land use planning from the government: it was the companies that indicated 
which places were most appropriate for expansion. Many areas were converted to 
oil palm.” (KUTIM05 150522) 
 
In the early 2000s, as production from industrial logging concessions in East Kutai declined, the 
provincial and district governments issued large numbers of land clearing permits (IPK). 
“Expansion of IPK logging over last few years is directly related to East Kutai’s plans to become 
the center of agro-business and agro-industry in East Kalimantan,” Obidzinski and Andrianto 
wrote in 2005, “To accomplish this, the district authorities plan to clear 1.3 million ha of land/forest 
for large-scale plantations, mainly oil palm. As a result, IPK licenses are continuing to be issued 
by district authorities (even though the central government regulations prohibit this) and the 
allocated forest areas to be cleared are large” (2005, 80). By 2015, the provincial statistics bureau 
reported that over 424,000 ha in East Kutai had been planted to oil palm (BPS Provinsi Kalimantan 
Timur 2017). 
 East Kutai today is largely a post-frontier district that exemplifies wholesale landscape 
transformation under an extractive regime. Through cycles of extractive logging, fires, and 
plantation development, as well as large-scale mining, vast areas of forest have been cleared to the 
point where there is little forest area left to conserve (Figures 5.8-11). Roughly 14 percent of East 
Kutai is currently designated as protected forest or park areas, predominantly in the far west of the 
district and in the Sangkulirang karsts, although portions of the protected forest estate have been 
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seriously degraded. After the 1997-1998 fires, forest cover loss was lower at the beginning of the 
2000s as industrial logging declined and plantations expanded in burned over areas, but since 2005 
deforestation has accelerated (Figure 5.7), as it has in the rest of Kalimantan (Gaveau et al. 2016), 
as oil palm and tree fiber plantations have continued to expand, especially in the northwestern sub-
districts of Muara Wahau and Kongbeng.29 
 
Figure 5.7: Annual forest loss in East Kutai, 2001-2015, at >30 percent canopy density (Hansen 
et al. 2013); trend line R2 = 0.73. 
																																																						
29 Kongbeng subdistrict (kecamatan) was excised from the subdistrict of Muara Wahau around 2004, but the Muara 
Wahau-Kongbeng area is still often referred to generically as Muara Wahau. 
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Figures 5.8-9: 5.8) Open pit coal mining by KPC at Sangatta, East Kutai, April 2015; 5.9) Recently 
cleared oil palm plantation in western East Kutai District, April 2015. 
 
 With the possibility of maintaining a large-scale intact forest landscape in the district 
foreclosed and extractive interests virtually hegemonic, there has been no coalition for land sparing 
in East Kutai. To the contrary, when Governor Awang imposed his moratorium on new forest, 
mining, and plantation concessions in East Kalimantan in 2013, the bupati of East Kutai protested, 
arguing that the moratorium on mining concessions would reduce the district revenue (Subkhan 
2013). In contrast to the transformative ambitions of regional land sparing efforts, the few forest 
conservation initiatives in East Kutai operate largely within a protected areas model. In the words 
of Obidzinski and Andrianto, “there is a sense in the district that not much can be done but write 
off the already damaged or degraded forest areas and focus on agro-development and conservation 
in the remaining remote forest areas” (2005, 81). The Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation 
(BOSF) operates an 86,000 ha ecosystem restoration concession that lies on the border between 
East Kutai and Kutai Kartanegara districts, which the organization uses for the release of rescued 
orangutans. The concession is issued by the Ministry of Forestry, and has had little interaction with 
the district government (KUTIM05 150522). It lies in a production forest area in the far west of 
East Kutai, and was still fairly well forested when taken over by BOSF. In the opinion of a former 
TNC scientist familiar with the project, reintroduction of rescued orangutans is “a welfare issue, 
but not a conservation tool” (TNC40 150529). 
The Sangkulirang karst landscape has long been a secondary focus of TNC’s East 
Kalimantan Program in both Berau and East Kutai districts. In 2004, for example, TNC sponsored 
a scientific expedition in the karst escarpments with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences that 
confirmed the karst forests as orangutan habitat and discovered, among other species, “probably 
the largest cave cockroach in the world and a very small blind crab” (Salas et al. 2005, 15). TNC 
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began to devote greater attention to management and policy for karst areas after 2009, with a 
particular interest in protecting the role of karst in the regional hydrology (porous karst limestone 
collects and filters water, and the Sangkulirang karst is the source of several important rivers) and 
as orangutan habitat (TNC33 150513). The karst escarpments are extremely rugged and 
inaccessible, so logging and hunting in these areas has for the most part been limited, but the karst 
limestone is an excellent material for cement production, and a number of lime and cement 
concessions operate or have been issued in the region, though generally over fairly small areas of 
a couple hundred hectares. One TNC employee confided to me that he feared that after logging 
and coal, cement could be the next wave of extraction, thus it was important to protect the karst 
now (TNC33 150319). TNC staff worked with the provincial government, in particular Riza Indra 
Riadi at the provincial Environment Agency, to secure a regulation from Governor Awang in 2012 
protecting over 360,000 ha of karst landscape between East Kutai and Berau districts. While karst 
policy has been coordinated at the provincial level as a transboundary issue between the two 
districts, the district Environment Agency in East Kutai has supported the process, and both East 
Kutai and Berau districts collaborated with TNC and provincial authorities to nominate the 
Sangkulirang-Mangkalihat Karst as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (although the submission was 
ultimately made for recognition as a cultural heritage site in light of the large amount of prehistoric 
rock art in the karst area). 
While the Sangkulirang karst is undoubtedly a unique and important ecosystem, that this 
unique and important ecosystem continues to exist in East Kutai as an object for environmental 
protection is a testament to its unsuitability for most other land uses. The karst was protected by 
default due to its inaccessibility for logging and it cannot be converted for agriculture, so declaring 
it protected gives the appearance of environmentalist action at very low cost to other interests. The 
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primary competing use for karst is for extraction of clay and lime and cement production, yet the 
Governor’s Regulation identifies limestone areas in East Kutai and Berau of virtually equal size 
to the protected karst zone (over 350,000 ha) that will remain open to exploitation. 
Beyond karst and the BOSF concession, the primary forest conservation initiatives in the 
district are the Wehea Protected Forest, established in the mid-2000s by TNC and the East Kutai 
government in cooperation with the Wehea Dayak indigenous group, and Kutai National Park, 
established in 1982 by the national government. 
Figures 5.10-11: 5.10) Map of East Kutai showing forest loss in 2001-2005; 5.11) Map of East 
Kutai showing forest loss in 2001-2014, demonstrating large-scale deforestation after 2005.	  
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A Tale of Two Parks 
 The contrast between Kutai National Park and Wehea Protected Forest (HL Wehea) starkly 
illustrates the realities and limits of forest protection under an extractive regime. Kutai National 
Park lies in a coastal, lowland area easily accessible for extraction (especially of timber, oil and 
gas, and coal) and attractive for settlement and conversion. As a result, the park has been heavily 
logged, burned over, and encroached, and Pertamina, the state oil company, operates an oil 
concession on park land. The severe degradation of Kutai National Park contrasts with the strong 
protection currently enjoyed by the Wehea Protected Forest. HL Wehea is located in the western 
uplands of East Kutai on the border with Berau. While the area was previously under a logging 
concession, its fairly steep slopes protected it from excessive timber extraction or agricultural 
conversion. While the national park is administered by the national government, management of 
Wehea is led by the Wehea Dayak indigenous group, which collaborated with TNC and the district 
government to secure the protected forest designation. I briefly describe the fate of Kutai National 
Park, and then examine in detail TNC’s program with the Wehea Dayak and district government 
in HL Wehea. I argue that the destruction of Kutai National Park and the protection of HL Wehea 
demonstrate the vestigial character of indigenous nature and culture in a landscape of unbridled 
extraction. 
A Park, some Oil Wells, and an Airport 
 Kutai National Park was originally established as a game reserve by the Dutch in 1936, 
and in 1982 it was designated by the national government as one of Indonesia’s first national parks. 
An area of 198,629 ha was gazetted to the park comprising a highly biodiverse lowland rainforest 
ecosystem that includes charismatic species such as hornbills, orangutan, and proboscis monkeys. 
Oil exploitation within the current park boundaries was initiated by the Dutch during the colonial 
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period, and some early migrants from Sulawesi settled in the park area in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Vayda and Sahur 1996). With the start of the logging boom in East Kalimantan in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, timber concessions operated within the park, while Pertamina, the national oil 
company, built drilling rigs, and the mining towns of Sangatta and Bontang grew on the park 
boundaries and were eventually connected by a road built across the park in 1991 (M. Moeliono 
and Purwanto 2008). The El Niño fires of 1982-1983 and 1997-1998 also heavily damaged the 
forests of the park: almost the entire area of the park burned in March and April 1998 (Siegert and 
Hoffmann 2000; Guhardja et al. 2000). 
 After the division of Kutai District in 1999, the new East Kutai government, led by Awang 
Faroek Ishak, sought to ‘enclave’ an area of the park near the Bontang-Sangatta road that had been 
heavily burned and encroached. The Ministry of Forestry did not fulfill the request at the time, and 
as Bontang and Sangatta grew during the 2000s and traffic along the road increased, thousands of 
migrants settled on park land. As Limberg et al. explain, “people regarded the area as offering 
economic opportunities, and the protected area as offering free land” (2009, 192). While most of 
the settlers were people of the Bugis ethnic group from Sulawesi, their successful encroachments 
on the park have sparked resentment among Dayak and Kutai groups who feel land is being given 
away to ‘outsiders,’ and who have responded with their own incursions (M. Moeliono and 
Purwanto 2008).30 Politicians in East Kutai, including Awang, have played upon the conflicts, 
allegedly encouraging encroachments and promising land titles to gain political support or to profit 
																																																						
30 In East Kalimantan, hunter-gatherer groups have historically been ethnic Punan. Indigenous upland agriculturalist 
groups in Borneo are generically known as ‘Dayak,’ though settled Punan may also refer to themselves as ‘Dayak 
Punan.’ I refer to all settled, upland, predominantly Christian or animist indigenous groups as ‘Dayak.’ These groups 
are distinct from the Muslim Kutai and other Malay populations that live primarily along the coasts (Colfer pers. 
comm.; Dounias et al. 2007). 
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from private land speculation (M. Moeliono and Purwanto 2008; UNMUL03 150309; KALTIM05 
140311). 
 From around 2007 onwards, ‘integrated teams’ of district officials, park management, and 
civil society have sought solutions to the land conflicts in the park. The East Kutai district 
government has long demanded an enclave of over 24,000 ha from the park, claiming that the park 
is constraining the development of the sub-districts of South Sangatta and Teluk Pandan, which it 
overlaps (Chered 2014). In recent years, the district government has also become increasingly 
fixated on the idea of constructing an airport at Sangkima, which lies within the park. The 
integrated team and forestry officials agreed to recommend an enclave of 17,000 ha in a revision 
to the provincial spatial plan, which must be approved by the National Congress (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR), but the final recommendation from the Ministry of Forestry to the 
Congress in 2013 was for an enclave of just 7816 ha, limited to already settled areas, including the 
area of the Sangkima airport. Governor Awang, standard-bearer of Kaltim Green, threw his weight 
behind the 17,000 ha reduction of the park, “I told the DPR working group [that visited the park], 
just look at the conditions on the ground, and the working group visited Teluk Pandan, South 
Sangatta, and Sangkima, which are in the park. They see that Pertamina is there. It’s not possible 
if they only make an enclave of 7800 ha. …If DPR approves (the 17,000 ha enclave), then the plan 
for the Bontang-Sangatta toll road also won’t be a problem. PLN [the electric company] can 
connect the area to the grid. But I’m sure, in accordance with the reality on the ground, DPR will 
definitely agree” (quoted in Hendar 2013). Only the more limited enclave of 7816 ha was 
approved, and the district and Ministry of Environment and Forestry have since 2014 been engaged 
in defining the exact boundaries of the enclaved area. 
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Although much of the discourse supporting the reduction of the national park has focused 
on the need to develop the southern sub-districts of East Kutai and to give tenure security and 
public services to the population living on park land, after agreement on the enclave was obtained, 
the East Kutai government has had no compunction in asserting its priorities. The site of the 
proposed airport at Sangkima is currently covered in oil palm planted by local people who had 
settled on park land. Ismunandar, the current bupati of East Kutai, says there will be no 
compensation for people who settled or are cultivating land that was formerly part of the national 
park: “‘That land was property of the national government, and after the creation of the enclave, it 
is now fully owned by the government of East Kutai, and not individual persons.’ …However, he 
continues, the East Kutai Government does not want to strong-arm people, so it will give 
compensation for the oil palm trees that are already planted. ‘The district government will be 
generous in giving compensation for people’s plantings. However, of course it will be done with 
a different calculus because the plantings were made on government land,’ he said. ‘For people 
who want to have rights to land, they have to follow the proper procedures’” (Warta Kutim 2017). 
For government officials, the destruction and reduction of Kutai National Park has been a question 
of their political fortunes and opportunities for extractive expansion and personal enrichment (rents 
will be extracted from the construction of an airport as surely as from any other industrial project 
in Indonesia, though the airport may also be desired for the personal convenience of the elites who 
will use it, or as part of broader goals for expanding coal mining in the park area). Migrant 
agriculturalists have been convenient pawns in elite maneuvers to reduce the park, but the welfare 
of the population is not the business of the extractive regime, and certainly cannot be allowed to 
stand in the way of a new airport. 
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Figure 5.12: Pertamina oil company billboard in Kutai National Park along the Bontang-Sangatta 
road in Sangkima: “Sangkima Eco-Tourism: Pertamina EP Sangatta Field is fully committed to 
the preservation of Kutai National Park,” April 2015. 
Protecting and Becoming Wehea: The Wehea Dayak and Their Forest 
 The Wehea Dayak people are heralded today as ‘forest guardians’ for their role in 
managing 38,000 ha of protected forest in the western uplands of East Kutai, an important 
orangutan habitat. Promotional images published by TNC depict a timeless, symbiotic connection 
between the Wehea people and the Wehea Forest. A special feature on Wehea on the TNC website 
is titled “Nature Provides Our Resources.” Over a photograph of Ledjie Taq, the customary leader 
of the Wehea Dayak, dressed in a traditional hat and a shirt with Dayak designs, the website 
proclaims: “For the Wehea community in the heart of Borneo, nature provides food, water, shelter, 
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medicine and ceremonial resources” (TNC 2017a). “If the forest is gone, we lose our identity and 
culture too,” declares Ledjie Taq on another TNC site titled “Watching Over Wehea” (TNC 2012). 
Here his photo appears alongside an ad for Suave, one of TNC’s ‘corporate supporters,’ which is 
a subsidiary brand of Unilever, probably the world’s largest corporate consumer of palm oil 
(Greenpeace 2008). 
 These images of the ecologically noble Wehea Dayak as primordial forest guardians elide 
a complex history. When I arrived in April 2015 in Nehas Liah Bing (Sliahbing), the largest of the 
six Wehea Dayak villages, I had read these TNC materials and spoken with numerous TNC staff 
members about the HL Wehea project. I expected to find myself in a traditional Dayak village 
located within a protected forest area. I was surprised to discover that Sliahbing is just a few 
kilometers outside the town of Muara Wahau-Kongbeng, the regional urban center, and that the 
village is completely surrounded by oil palm. The protected forest area is 90 km away, and the six 
Wehea Dayak villages, all in the area of Muara Wahau, lie in a landscape dominated by mines and 
oil palm plantations. There was a deep irony to that Suave ad. 
The Wehea Dayak themselves, I would learn, have only gained recognition as a unique 
ethnic group in the past decade, while during the late 20th century they were often identified as 
Bahau, part of a distantly-related Dayak family. How did this group of people become recognized 
as the Wehea Dayak, and how did they become protectors of a 38,000 ha forest area 90 km from 
their villages? 
Upland Borneo has been inhabited for centuries by indigenous groups of hunter-gatherers 
and swidden agriculturalists. In East Kalimantan, the nomadic hunter-gatherer groups have 
historically been Punan, while the more settled Dayak agriculturalist groups include the Kayan, 
Kenyah, and Modang, which trace their origins to the Apo Kayan highlands region on the present-
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day boundary between North Kalimantan and the Malaysian state of Sarawak. The Wehea Dayak 
are a small group of Kayanic Modang people that live in six villages in the East Kutai sub-district 
of Muara Wahau. They number around 6000 people, roughly 4000 of whom live in Sliahbing. 
The traditional livelihoods of the Wehea communities centered on shifting rice cultivation, 
complemented by extraction of forest products. From the late 1960s through the 1990s, their 
landscape was profoundly transformed by the arrival of industrial timber companies, migrant 
Dayak groups, and participants in the Indonesian Government’s Transmigration Program 
(primarily Javanese families). Oil palm plantations were first established in the region in the late 
1990s. In the early 2000s, the industrial logging concessions in East Kutai began to decline or 
lapse as timber companies faced a range of financial difficulties, social conflicts, and regulatory 
problems. As the major logging concessions declined, small-scale clearing permits were issued 
and illegal logging proliferated (Obidzinski and Andrianto 2005, 46). 
In the Shadow of Elephant Mountain 
The Nature Conservancy, recently active in East Kalimantan, had its eye on the Muara 
Wahau-Kongbeng region after TNC’s orangutan surveys and eco-regional assessment had 
identified the area as a priority for conservation. TNC initially sought to use money raised through 
its ‘Adopt-An-Acre’ program to buy out the 75,000 ha logging concession of the Gunung Gajah 
(Elephant Mountain) company, which was controlled by Bob Hasan, who in 2001 had been 
convicted of corruption and imprisoned. When news of TNC’s plans leaked, however, the price of 
the concession shot up (TNC40 150529), and TNC was left without enough money to buy the 
concession. A former TNC manager recalls, “I was sitting in Bob Hasan’s office, and Hasan’s 
deputy was going to fly to jail to convince Bob to make the sale, but then they turned around and 
sold the concession to the illegal logging baron of East Kalimantan” (TNC41 150611). Years later, 
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the company was sold again to a Japanese firm, and TNC supported Gunung Gajah to attain FSC 
certification, which was eventually awarded in 2015. In the early 2000s, however, after its failure 
to purchase Gunung Gajah, TNC adopted a different strategy in East Kutai. 
Building a Coalition for Wehea  
TNC devoted a staff member to working full-time on East Kutai, and this staff member 
approached PT Loka Dwihutani, which since 1995 had managed the 38,000 ha PT Gruti III 
concession adjacent to Gunung Gajah. While the initial intent was to work with the company on 
sustainable forest management, the staffer, whom I will call Sammy, learned that the company felt 
the area was not good for logging and wanted to return the concession to the Ministry of Forestry.31 
Both migrants and indigenous people were also involved in substantial illegal logging within the 
concession at this time. When shortly thereafter the concession was revoked by the Ministry of 
Forestry, Sammy set about trying to protect the area so that no new logging permit would be issued. 
At first he attempted to pursue a designation for the former concession as a ‘special purpose forest 
area’ (kawasan hutan tujuan khusus – KHTK), working in cooperation with the Forestry Faculty 
at Mulawarman University in Samarinda. TNC also made initial contacts with Miau Baru, a 
community of Kayan Dayak living near the edge of the concession. The Ministry of Forestry was 
skeptical of the proposal, however, and there was only moderate support from the university for 
the plan, in part because the university already had a designated research forest and the proposed 
KHTK was far from the campus in Samarinda (TNC33 150423).  
Sammy next began to pursue a protected forest (hutan lindung – HL) designation, which 
could be managed by the district. This effort required building a coalition within the East Kutai 
																																																						
31 This account of the early stages of the Wehea program is based on my interview with ‘Sammy,’ TNC38 150428, 
as well as field notes from my visit to Wehea in April 2015. 
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district government. The protected forest would have to be proposed formally by the district 
Forestry Agency (Dinas Kehutanan), but in the early 2000s the Forestry Agency in East Kutai was 
heavily involved in logging activities and uninterested in conservation. Instead, Sammy managed 
to gain the support of Riza Indra Riadi, then head of the district Environmental Agency, and 
together they persuaded the bupati, Awang Faroek Ishak, to propose the protected forest to the 
Ministry of Forestry in 2004. 
Around this time, a group of Dayak leaders from Muara Wahau showed up at a meeting in 
the district seat claiming that the forest was a part of their traditional territory and that they should 
be involved in the forest protection process. These leaders represented the Wehea Dayak. They 
were upset that TNC had approached the Miau Baru community, because the Miau had arrived 
only in the late 1960s, and the concession land was actually located within the customary territory 
of the Wehea (TNC33 150513). The Wehea had become marginalized in the region over the 
previous decades, and they were referred to generically and incorrectly as ‘Wahau’ or ‘Bahau.’ 
The leaders were looking for a way to strengthen their identity, using forest management as a 
linkage to the historic connection between Dayak livelihoods and the forest. Since TNC, the 
Wehea Dayak, and the district were all aiming to protect the forest area, they agreed to work 
together. The district would pursue the protected forest designation with the Ministry of Forestry, 
while the Dayak would manage the area through their customary institution (Lembaga Adat). 
In November 2004, the Wehea Dayak held a customary meeting with other communities 
from the region, which confirmed the customary claim of the Wehea to the forest area. The Wehea 
declared the forest area protected and expelled illegal logging groups from the concession. In 2005, 
they established a program of ‘forest guardians’ (Petkuq Methuey - PM) through which men from 
the community, many of whom previously worked for timber companies, mines, or plantations, 
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spend month-long periods in the forest to protect it from logging surveyors, illegal loggers, hunters, 
and other encroachments. The Lembaga Adat was not interested in extracting resources from the 
protected forest, but rather in using forest protection to strengthen Wehea identity.32 TNC provided 
financing and assistance for the Lembaga Adat and the district government to manage the forest 
area. Supporting the Lembaga Adat, TNC began to use the name ‘Wehea’ for the Dayak and the 
protected forest area and started to take an active role in promoting Wehea cultural identity. 
There are numerous accounts of local people deploying indigenous and environmentalist 
discourses to attain their political goals, and of environmentalist groups allying with indigenous 
people to further their conservation agenda (Hirtz 2003; Tsing 2003; Dove 2006). TNC in Wehea 
went a step further by directly and intentionally seeking to participate in and reinforce the 
reconstruction of the collective identity of the Wehea Dayak people. Both current and former TNC 
staff and the customary head of the Wehea community relate how TNC supported the resurgence 
of Wehea identity. By 2005, Sammy had hired a small team, including one staff member focusing 
on relations with the district government and one living primarily in Sliahbing focusing on 
community relations. The former TNC community liaison in Sliahbing recounts, “We were 
encouraging Wehea identity. We developed and marketed the Lom Plai [harvest ceremony]. For 
six months, I asked them, ‘What ethnicity are you?’” (trying to encourage people to respond 
‘Wehea’ instead of ‘Bahau’) (TNC59 150423). The customary head of the community recalls, 
“People didn’t used to identify as Wehea, but rather as Bahau. …We got media exposure when 
TNC brought in Kompas and Tempo [national media organizations], and we named the forest 
‘Wehea.’ TNC raised our awareness” (KUTIM06 150422).  
																																																						
32 There were other factions in the Wehea community, including groups that had been involved in illegal logging, 
that were not as supportive of the protected forest project. My focus here is on the relationship between TNC and the 
Lembaga Adat, while the internal politics of the community will be addressed in future work. 
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The Lom Plai ceremony mentioned by the community liaison is a rice harvest festival 
celebrated yearly in the Wehea villages. Before the cooperation with TNC, the Lom Plai was a 
smaller affair, and was rarely attended by outsiders. In 2006, as the customary head mentions, 
TNC invited media organizations to attend the Lom Plai to highlight the Wehea community, which 
was maintaining its traditions, including protecting the forest. The Lom Plai includes dances and 
prayers that had previously taken place in or around the village hall. TNC convinced the customary 
leader to move the dancing to the village soccer field to allow for a more public spectacle. For 
TNC, the promotion of Wehea cultural identity became a strategy for forest conservation. The 
stronger the cultural identity of the Dayak group, which is inflected with forest knowledge and 
livelihoods, the stronger the protection of the forest area would be. TNC also came to see this 
cultural dimension as an added benefit of its program. Before 2007, Sammy told me, TNC did not 
consider the community social value of its projects, but as Wehea was being developed, TNC 
began to consider social-cultural value (TNC38 150428). The Wehea helped TNC achieve its goal 
of conserving HL Wehea, with the added legitimacy of cooperation with a local indigenous group. 
On the other side, the Wehea Dayak have gained pride, recognition, and political and economic 
power through their cooperation with TNC and the district government and their management of 
HL Wehea. “Once the province, district, and community agreed to preserve the forest, the Wehea 
Dayak became a priority for the government also, and they get programs from the government,” 
Sammy explained (TNC38 150428). “Wehea people’s bargaining position with companies and the 
government has been improved;” another TNC staffer told me, “they are now seen as a community 
with strong adat (traditional customs)” (TNC33 150513). In 2013, the Ministry of Forestry finally 
conceded an official protected forest designation for HL Wehea, a testament to the strength of the 
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coalition between TNC, the district government, and the Lembaga Adat in support of the Wehea 
forest. 
Lom Plai 
 I attended the Lom Plai rice harvest festival in Sliahbing in April 2015 in the company of 
TNC staff members, and we stayed in the house of the customary head of the community. In the 
years since 2006, the Lom Plai has continued to attract Indonesian journalists and media 
organizations, as well as local NGO staff and representatives of industrial plantation companies, 
who come to pay their respects to the villagers, and local and some foreign tourists. The ‘outsiders 
with cameras,’ as I will call them, of whom I was one, are often very aggressive in pursuing their 
best angles and shots. These paparazzi strengthen the valence of the festival as an objectified 
performance, against the internal meanings of the Dayak ceremonies. One component of the 
festival is a mock river battle, where boys standing in canoes throw reeds at each other instead of 
spears. As I watched from the river bank with the rest of the village, outsiders with cameras buzzed 
through the battle in their own canoe, snapping photos. In the afternoon, a prayer ceremony and 
dance takes place with traditional costumes (Figure 5.13), the component of the festival that was 
moved to the soccer field to create a larger spectacle. The leader of the ceremony and participants 
are mobbed by photo-snappers (Figure 5.14). I watched from the edge of the crowd as a group of 
children, unable to see much of the ceremony, became captivated by a drone being used by one of 
the media organizations to film the proceedings. 
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Figures 5.13-14: 5.13) A close-up of costumed dancers participating in a Lom Plai ceremony, and 
5.14) the way the ceremony on the village soccer field actually appears; Nehas Liah Bing, East 
Kutai, April 2015. 
 
Forest Guardians across the Commodity Frontier 
 This experience of the Lom Plai in Sliahbing leads me to a reflection on the status of 
‘indigeneity’ and the status of ‘nature’ in landscapes undergoing radical transformations of 
capitalist globalization. The Lom Plai exemplifies a frontier of cultural commodification co-
produced with the frontier of industrial deforestation. Both the indigenous culture of the Wehea 
Dayak and the indigenous nature of the upland rainforest are vestigial formations within the 
wholesale conversion of culture and landscape that has occurred in this region. The Wehea Dayak 
maintain their somewhat commodified culture and TNC and the Dayak and the district maintain a 
somewhat more commodified patch of forest, but industrial mining and plantations and industrial 
consumer culture have overwhelmed the landscape and the ecology of Wehea forest and Wehea 
culture. 
As scholars of multiculturalism have argued (Mantena 2010) in parallel with scholars of 
the political economy of the environment (Robertson 2012), valorization happens concurrently 
with and enables the degradation of what is valued, in this case an indigenous cultural ecology. 
None of the actors in the Wehea coalition is challenging the overall development model or 
pretending to reduce deforestation at the level of the district or landscape. At the same time, most 
of the actors interested in protecting the forest are meeting their stated interests, although in a 
rather minimal way. There are a number of ways to read this contradiction between the ‘success’ 
of the Wehea forest and culture and the conversion of the surrounding landscape. On the one hand, 
we can take this contradiction as an example of ‘cynical reason,’ which has been theorized by 
Sloterdijk (1988) as ‘enlightened false consciousness.’ Cynical reason knows its own falsehood, 
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yet it “opportunistically deploys ideas and beliefs” under the lemma of ‘pragmatism’ (Ebert 1999). 
The cynical deployment of ideas and beliefs is instrumental to the reproduction of structures of 
extraction and exploitation antithetical to those beliefs. MacDonald uses this contradiction of 
cynical reason to critique neoliberal environmentalism, arguing that “environmental organizations 
– once the site of planning, mobilizing and implementing opposition and resistance to the 
environmentally destructive practices of corporate and industrial actors – have become part of a 
new project of accumulation grounded in enclosure, and the production and market exchange of 
new environmental commodities” (2013, 47). We could say that TNC cynically trumpets its 
success in conserving Wehea when the rest of the landscape is being destroyed, and that the 
customary leaders of the Wehea cynically appeal to their connection to nature in an identitarian 
strategy to advance their political goals. On the other hand, we can take this contradiction as an 
example of what I call ‘Pyrrhic reason.’ The power of the extractive regime in East Kutai is 
overwhelming, and it may well be that the only apparent alternative to these compromised victories 
is the complete annihilation of both Wehea culture and the Wehea forest. 
These two logics are not mutually exclusive. In a landscape dominated by extraction, 
cynical reason and Pyrrhic reason are likely two sides of the same coin, similar in consequences 
regardless of differences in intent. To the degree that TNC and some members of the Wehea 
community are complicit in the commodification of Wehea forest and culture, they are ipso facto 
complicit in the abstraction and mystification of the real socio-ecological relations through which 
HL Wehea and the Wehea community are constituted, and in their simultaneous valorization and 
degradation within circuits of capitalist accumulation. The contrast between the (cynical or 
Pyrrhic) conservation of Wehea and the degradation and reduction of Kutai National Park reveals 
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the limited possibilities of forest conservation under a strongly extractive political-economic 
regime. 
‘Living Museums’ in a Zone of Extinction 
 Why are there any parks in East Kutai? What is the purpose of fictitious or even real 
conservation of forest remnants in a world of mines and plantations? Beyond the objectives of 
forest conservation for the preservation of ecosystem services, protected areas may serve the 
interests of extractive political-economic actors in developing state capacity through 
territorialization (W. Adams and Hutton 2007) and enabling primitive accumulation through 
resource extraction and the labor of local populations (Kelly 2011; Corson 2011; Fairhead, Leach, 
and Scoones 2012). The designation of Kutai National Park as state land since the Dutch colonial 
period has helped guarantee the smooth extraction of oil and timber, and has allowed for the 
expropriation of settlers at the whim of the state, as in the case of the planned Sangkima airport. 
The designation of HL Wehea also contributed to state capacity at the district level, building up 
the resources of the district Environmental Agency that coordinates Wehea management. When 
Wehea was protected, some local people thought that TNC and the Wehea Dayak were surveying 
for coal in the forest area (TNC38 150428), assuming that their interest was in primitive 
accumulation. In Wehea, however, a coalition of conservationist actors pursued political-economic 
and institutional interests based not in extraction, but rather in what Brockington and Scholfield 
(2010) call the ‘conservationist mode of production,’ where accumulation operates through 
practices such as eco-tourism in HL Wehea, cultural tourism at the Sliahbing Lom Plai, and 
fundraising by TNC for its conservation programs. This conservationist mode of production still 
operates in Kutai National Park as well, through eco-tourism and the marketing of the park as part 
of East Kalimantan’s ‘green’ image. Lastly, protected areas may facilitate the capture of material 
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and symbolic resources by both extractive and conservationist actors through participation in the 
‘world society’ project of protected areas creation (Meyer et al. 1997; W. Adams and Hutton 2007), 
as has been the case in Indonesia through programs such as the UNDP/FAO National Parks 
Development Project, TNC’s program at Lore Lindu in Sulawesi, and TNC’s support for HL 
Wehea. 
 Protected areas creation in East Kutai has not operated within a land sparing framework, 
as it has in Brazil. Rather, the district is characterized by wholesale extraction in the lowlands and 
‘cynical’ or ‘Pyrrhic’ conservation in the uplands. As one informant observed, “On the one hand, 
the East Kutai government allows Kutai National Park to be destroyed, on the other hand they 
support Wehea and karst because there is nothing up there anyway” (KALTIM05 140311). 
Paradoxically, Muara Wahau-Kongbeng has become a center of forest conservation for East Kutai, 
home to HL Wehea, the BOSF orangutan concession, and the FSC-certified Gunung Gajah 
concession, at the same time as virtually all the remaining land in the sub-districts has been leased 
to five different oil palm companies. The Wehea Dayak maintain their culture and a patch of forest, 
but they must work in the mines and plantations that have overwhelmed their landscape and the 
ecology of their culture. In a glimmer of ecological modernization, TNC and the Wehea Dayak 
have built on their experience in managing HL Wehea to form an agreement in 2014 with a local 
oil palm plantation operated by PT Swakarsa, a subsidiary of the DSN Group. Under this 
agreement, the Dayak are paid to monitor roughly 3000 ha of forest fragments conserved within 
the oil palm concession under the company’s sustainability commitments. A group of Dayak 
tending forest fragments in a sea of oil palm while their families and neighbors work for the mines 
and plantation companies is a dim vestige of the forest and the way of life in the heart of Borneo 
that TNC claims to protect (TNC 2017a). 
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 Timothy Luke, in the late 1990s, critiqued The Nature Conservancy in the US as ‘the 
Nature Cemetery,’ arguing that TNC operates by “trading sanctuary and protection here (where it 
is commercially possible or aesthetically imperative) to forsake sanctuary and protection there 
(where it is commercially unviable or aesthetically dispensable). It extracts a title for partial 
permanence from a constant turnover of economic destruction anchored in total impermanence. 
Thus the Conservancy ironically fights a perpetually losing battle, protecting rare species from 
what makes them rare and building sanctuary from what devastates everything on the land 
elsewhere with the proceeds of its members’ successful capitalist despoliation” (1997, 64). This 
critique resonates beyond TNC to the broader political ecology of East Kutai, where the protection 
of HL Wehea (a remote and unproductive logging concession) has been traded for the exploitation 
of Kutai National Park (a rich and accessible lowland forest), and the ‘partial permanence’ of 
Dayak culture or the forests of the PT Swakarsa concession are secured only through the proceeds 
of the ‘economic destruction’ and ‘capitalist despoliation’ of a spectacularized Lom Plai and vast 
monocultures of oil palm. 
During the 1990s, The Nature Conservancy as an organization moved away from its focus 
on a protected areas model towards an ecological modernization approach seeking conservation in 
‘working landscapes.’ TNC’s program in Wehea harkens back to its earlier strategy of “sheltering 
living museums of primeval [nature and culture]” (Weisman 1993). While TNC and the prevailing 
institutions of global forest governance have transitioned from ‘cult of the wilderness’ protected 
areas creation to eco-modernist landscape management, East Kutai is not an anachronism, or a 
place that has yet to progress along the ‘time/development’ axis of the forest transition curve. 
Rather, extraction in East Kutai is integrally linked with productivist modernization in the core 
regions where the district’s resources are consumed: plywood in Japan, coal in South Korea, palm 
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oil in Europe. The case of East Kutai demonstrates the limits of conservation in the thrall of 
virtually untempered extraction, where forests survive only as living museums in a zone of 
extinction. 
 
Figure 5.15: Karst escarpment on the border between Berau and East Kutai districts, seen from 
an oil palm plantation near Merabu village in Berau, March 2015. Karst forests offer a refuge from 
logging and plantations thanks to their ruggedness, though the underlying limestone is an 
attractive raw material for cement production. 
 
Berau: Shifting Cultivation, Contentious Land Change, and Forest Governance 
 Berau, East Kutai’s neighbor to the north, is in many respects the most promising district 
in Indonesia for reducing large-scale deforestation through forest governance. Not only is it located 
in East Kalimantan, the self-declared ‘green province,’ but Berau is also the site of a district-level 
REDD program that is the flagship of TNC’s Indonesia Terrestrial Program and one of four 
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national REDD demonstration activities initially identified by the Ministry of Forestry (Masripatin 
2010). Roughly 85 percent of the district remains under natural forest cover (Griscom et al. 2016), 
including some of the largest remaining areas of intact lowland forest in Indonesian Borneo. Berau 
was largely spared the massive El Niño fires that swept across East Kutai, but forest clearing 
associated with mining and tree fiber plantations expanded in the district in the late 1980s and 
1990s and was accelerated by a boom of small-scale logging permits issued by the district at the 
beginning of the Reformasi period. Berau has also been a favored site for international forest 
conservation projects, which have operated in the district since the mid-1990s. TNC arrived in 
Berau at the beginning of the 2000s and focused initially on sustainable forestry projects and 
protected area designation. Oil palm plantations have expanded rapidly since 2005, while after 
2007 TNC’s focus in Berau shifted to the development of a district-level REDD program. Despite 
two decades of forest conservation programs in Berau and efforts with REDD to articulate a 
sustainable development policy framework, deforestation in the district has accelerated since 2001 
(Figure 5.16), and an extractive regime continues to dominate at the district, provincial, and 
national levels, stymieing the weak productivist coalition promoting land sparing and ‘green 
growth.’ 
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Figure 5.16: Annual forest loss in Berau, 2001-2015, at >30 percent canopy density (Hansen et 
al. 2013); trend line R2 = 0.43. 
 Berau was ruled by a sultanate from the 14th century to the early 18th century, at which 
point the monarchy was divided under influence of the Dutch into the Sultanate of Sambaliung 
and the Sultanate of Gunung Tabur, whose wooden palaces lie across the river from each other in 
what is today Tanjung Redeb, the district seat. Coal mining in Berau began during the 1800s under 
the sultanates, and continued under the Dutch during the first half of the 20th century (Obidzinski 
and Barr 2003). Mining lapsed after Indonesian independence, and the export economy of the 
district next turned to timber, with the allocation of the first large-scale logging permit in the 
district in 1969. 
Major actors in the timber sector included the government-owned PT Inhutani I, which 
currently controls over 300,000 ha in the district and during the 1990s controlled as much as 
530,000 ha. Companies linked to Bob Hasan included the Astra Group, which controlled 140,000 
ha through the concessions of PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya, and the Kalimanis Group, which 
controlled over 300,000 ha of logging concessions as well as nearly 200,000 ha permitted for tree 
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fiber plantations in support of the group’s Kiani Kertas pulp mill, which came on line in 1997 
(Obidzinski and Barr 2003; Casson, Muliastra, and Obidzinski 2015). The Kiani Kertas mill was 
an exemplary boondoggle of Suharto’s extractive regime. The mill received heavy subsidies from 
the Suharto government, including an allocation of $100 million from the Reforestation Fund, and 
there was widespread diversion of funds into private hands during mill construction. Tree fiber 
plantations to supply the mill also received support from the Reforestation Fund, but large areas 
were never planted and the concessions served instead as cover for timber extraction. The mill 
virtually never operated above half capacity and suffered frequent shutdowns (Obidzinski and Barr 
2003; Obidzinski and Andrianto 2005). After the fall of Suharto and Bob Hasan’s imprisonment, 
Kiani Kertas faced severe financial problems linked to the overall liabilities of the Kalimanis 
Group. The mill was sold in 2004 to a consortium led by military and government officials but 
remained paralyzed by legal and financial problems, and it is presently effectively shuttered. 
The economy of Berau is today driven first and foremost by coal. Industrial coal mining 
resumed under PT Berau Coal in 1983 and expanded significantly during the 1990s. In 2002, 
mining accounted for roughly a third of the gross regional domestic product (Obidzinski and Barr 
2003), and by 2014 it accounted for nearly two-thirds (BPS Kabupaten Berau 2017). A steady 
stream of coal barges ply the waterfront in Tanjung Redeb, and flying into the district airport, the 
plane approaches over a chain of open mining pits. Direct deforestation for mining is limited 
(Griscom et al. 2016), although indirect land use change linked to mining through mechanisms 
such as speculation and migration are difficult to quantify (cf. Scrivener 2013). The acceleration 
in deforestation in Berau since 2001 has been driven particularly by the expansion of oil palm 
plantations. Griscom et al. (2016) find that clearing for oil palm was responsible for 28 percent of 
Berau’s net forest carbon emissions in 2000-2010, which includes emissions from selective 
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logging (degradation) as well as full deforestation. Plantation expansion increased dramatically 
after 2005, and by 2015 the district had 115,000 ha planted in oil palm (BPS Provinsi Kalimantan 
Timur 2017). Officials in the district Plantations Agency (Dinas Perkebunan) in 2015 reported 
that roughly 300,000 ha had already been permitted for oil palm, and they viewed the provincial 
moratorium on new permits as temporary, noting that provincial development plans had asked 
Berau to allocate even more area to oil palm (author field notes, 21 April 2015; TNC34 150501). 
 Even as the industrial frontier of timber extraction and land conversion has expanded in 
Berau, the district has participated in a number of high-profile international forest conservation 
programs. The STREK forest regeneration study began in 1989 through a collaboration with 
French researchers in Inhutani’s Labanan concession. (Ironically, while STREK comprised one of 
the foremost long-term studies of tropical forest regeneration (Priyadi, Gunarso, and Kanninen 
2005), parts of the STREK plots were damaged in the Reformasi logging boom after 1998 
(Obidzinski and Andrianto 2005).) In 1996-2002, Berau was the site of the EU-funded Berau 
Forest Management Project (BFMP), which conducted forest management research and attempted 
to support a multi-stakeholder ‘model forest’ management body (Mantel 2001). BFMP even 
developed a concept for forest carbon trading under the nascent Clean Development Mechanism 
of the Kyoto Protocol (Oosterman 2000). While an Inhutani manager acknowledges that BFMP 
may have helped the company develop a ‘social management’ approach in its concessions, most 
actors working on forest conservation in Berau today see little impact from the project. “BFMP 
was a good project, there was lots of money, but it was lost,” recalls an informant who has worked 
on forestry in Berau for over two decades, “Whatever they set up, it’s not left in the field. There 
wasn’t really ownership with Inhutani and the district government” (GIZ03 150330). “The 
approach of BFMP was hiring European consultants and making studies, but there was not much 
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impact,” a former TNC staffer affirms, but he notes that TNC used BFMP’s reports when they set 
about designing the Berau Forest Carbon Project roughly five years later (TNC35 150321). 
 When TNC began to work in Berau in the early 2000s, it focused initially on sustainable 
forest management and protected areas creation. PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya (SLJ), part of Bob 
Hasan’s Astra Group, held the 100,000 ha SLJ IV concession in the upper Segah River watershed 
in western Berau, overlapping the territories of five indigenous Dayak villages. The communities 
became upset that the company had blocked a small river used by villagers, violated village grave 
sites, and cut down fruit and honey trees, and they felt they were not receiving substantive benefits 
from the logging operations (Lalasz 2009; Lobet 2010; BER16 150418). Tensions escalated to the 
point where villagers seized SLJ logging equipment and managed to halt logging in the concession 
for nearly three years, in 2000-2003. In 2002, SLJ approached TNC in Berau, seeking an ‘honest 
broker’ to help negotiate with the communities. Two years of negotiations produced an agreement 
between the company, the five communities, and the district government under which the company 
would respect sacred sites, provide scholarships and infrastructure, and pay increased volume-
based fees on timber extraction to the communities. SLJ was sold in 2003 to the Hasco Group, the 
agreement held, and logging resumed. TNC helped the communities form an association, known 
as BP Segah, which manages the relationship with SLJ under a model that TNC has dubbed 
‘collaborative forest management.’ Communities now largely support the company’s presence and 
assist in monitoring the concession, as they will not allow entry by illegal loggers who would 
effectively be stealing from the communities as well as from SLJ (BER16 150418; TNC37 
150421). SLJ is now pursuing FSC certification for the concession, although the concession 
currently measures just over 60,000 ha, since a third of its area has been excised for oil palm. 
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 After its success with BP Segah, TNC replicated the collaborative forest management 
approach in the Kelay watershed, the other major upland watershed in Berau. The Upper Kelay 
Village Forum today manages relations between Kelay Dayak communities and four different 
logging concessions overlapping village territories. Kelay is also the site of the Lesan River 
Protected Forest (HL Lesan), an area of roughly 11,000 ha overlapping four different villages. 
With support from TNC, the district Forestry Agency, and the communities, Lesan was designated 
by the bupati in 2004 as a protected forest area to conserve orangutan habitat and protect the 
regional hydrology (BER02 150317; BER09 150413). The protected forest designation was finally 
confirmed by the Ministry of Forestry in 2014. While HL Lesan was established at the same time 
as HL Wehea, and under a similar model of engaging communities and districts to establish 
protected areas locally, there were village boundary and land disputes between two of the Lesan 
villages, and TNC had greater difficulty coordinating community management. There was also a 
lack of budgetary support for the protected forest from the district (TNC33 150513). The forest 
eventually came to be managed within the Berau Forest Management Unit (KPH), established in 
2010 as part of a national effort to promote more decentralized and integrated forest management. 
Although HL Lesan covers a relatively modest area and has not benefited from the same level of 
community, NGO, and district commitment as HL Wehea, Lesan is nonetheless mentioned by 
numerous informants as an example of successful forest conservation in Berau. This emphasis on 
Lesan demonstrates again the symbolic, if perhaps cynical or Pyrrhic, conservation value of 
protected areas in an otherwise extractive landscape: Lesan is bordered on the east and south by 
oil palm plantations and on the west by the trans-Kalimantan highway. 
 When the 2007 Bali Climate Conference touched off a new wave of REDD programs, TNC 
decided to build on its presence in Berau to launch a REDD pilot program in the district. TNC 
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formed working groups with partners including the Ministry of Forestry, an Indonesian NGO, an 
environmental consultancy, and the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) to develop the technical 
aspects of the Berau Forest Carbon Program (BFCP). As a number of informants noted, the 
commitment of the district government to BFCP was never more than lukewarm. Makmur, the 
bupati of Berau from 2005-2015, was opposed to carbon trading because of the failure of a 
previous attempt to develop a Clean Development Mechanism forest project in Berau, but TNC 
promoted REDD to the bupati as a way of improving district forest governance (TNC35 150321) 
and eventually secured his assent, if not enthusiastic support. In the words of a former TNC staff 
member, “TNC went deep in Berau, but never had clear champions there” (TNC41 150611). The 
plan initially called for BFCP to be funded by a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) and overseen by 
a steering committee, with TNC participating as a donor and steering committee member. TNC 
was unable to attract donors for an MDTF, however, so “TNC now had a big design and no money 
and had to change the implementation concept” (TNC42 150709). Thus, around 2009, TNC 
decided to “put all its eggs in the Berau basket” (TNC29 141223) and go “all in on REDD and 
Berau” (TNC41 150611), reallocating resources to the district and attracting donors to support 
particular programs. Funding for BFCP has subsequently come from sources including the Anne 
Ray Charitable Trust (created by Cargill heiress Margaret A. Cargill), the Bank of America 
Foundation, the Grantham Foundation (Jeremy Grantham sits on the TNC Board of Directors), the 
Norwegian Government, the Boeing Foundation, and Xerox. 
 TNC proceeded to develop its program in Berau in five key areas, comprising a 
combination of site-based activities and work on ‘enabling conditions’ for REDD (TNC34 
150316). Activities related to enabling conditions have concentrated on building the jurisdictional 
REDD program, and include carbon accounting and support for the development of a ‘reference 
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emission level’ for the district, support for the district REDD working group and BFCP Steering 
Committee, and engagement with government policy and planning processes. The other four areas 
of the program focus on endangered species (particularly orangutan), protected areas, corporate 
engagement (especially with logging concessions), and community-based natural resource 
management. While work in these areas also includes activities related to enabling conditions, 
such as TNC’s research and experimentation with reduced-impact logging methods (Griscom, 
Ellis, and Putz 2014; Ellis et al. 2016), the bulk of activities have been site-based. TNC work on 
protected areas and orangutan conservation in Berau includes the HL Lesan project and initiatives 
related to the Sangkulirang karst. Engagement with logging concessions includes support for 
concessions pursuing FSC certification and for collaborative forest management with the Segah 
and Kelay communities. Finally, community-based natural resource management has involved 
intensive work with two model villages, on the basis of which TNC has developed a methodology 
for community engagement in REDD called SIGAP-REDD+33 (Hartanto, Yulianto, and Hidayat 
2014). 
 Alongside its own heavy investment in BFCP, TNC successfully encouraged Germany’s 
bilateral cooperation programs (GIZ and KfW) to select Berau as one of the target districts for 
their Forests and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME). FORCLIME, like TNC, aims to 
develop REDD readiness and demonstration activities, although its field activities operate only in 
western Berau, whereas TNC takes a “wall-to-wall REDD” jurisdictional approach (GIZ05 
150427). FORCLIME began work in Berau around 2010, supporting activities including capacity 
development for the Berau Forest Management Unit within the district Forestry Agency, 
																																																						
33 SIGAP-REDD+ is an acronym for Aksi Inspiratif Warga untuk Perubahan dalam REDD+, or Inspirational 
Popular Action for Change within REDD+. 
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sustainable logging practices and FSC certification in the SLJ IV concession, studies for 
identification of a district reference emission level, and alternative livelihood development with 
villages in the SLJ IV and Inhutani I Labanan timber concessions. A substantial portion of 
FORCLIME activities are run ‘on-budget’ directly through the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry, which a former employee notes makes FORCLIME administration slower than TNC 
activities, but improves coordination with the government (GIZ06 150427). 
FORCLIME began implementing demonstration activities in villages in 2013-2014, 
selecting villages so as not to overlap with TNC’s ongoing activities. Demonstration activities are 
intended to promote alternative livelihood practices that will allow communities to reduce clearing 
for shifting cultivation. FORCLIME’s strategy in the villages, like TNC’s, is to encourage village 
land use intensification by promoting agroforestry and more intensified rice production (GIZ03 
150330), though the initial approach has been to make “easy and quick investments to raise 
confidence” (GIZ06 150427) and the long-term strategy for village land use may be less clear 
(GIZ03 150330), leading one TNC employee to the characterization that “FORCLIME had no plan 
[for community development], they just ran around to villages handing out $25,000 here and there” 
(TNC42 150709). 
TNC’s community strategy, meanwhile, packaged as SIGAP-REDD+, was leveraged by 
the organization to secure funding for BFCP within a US Government Tropical Forest 
Conservation Act (TFCA) debt-for-nature swap. TFCA is run through the US Treasury and 
USAID, and initially focused on protected areas. Around 2009, however, Treasury personnel were 
interested in incorporating climate change issues into the program and contributing to REDD 
(TNC50 150813). TNC pitched its SIGAP approach and managed to forge an agreement with 
WWF to manage the TFCA program in Kalimantan, with TNC focused on implementation in 
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Berau and WWF focused on Kutai Barat in East Kalimantan and Kapuas Hulu in West Kalimantan, 
where it has ongoing programs. Through TFCA, TNC managed to secure $10 million for BFCP 
for 2013-2017, which it is using to fund local organizations to replicate SIGAP-REDD+ in villages 
across Berau. As of April 2015, twelve local organizations were receiving TFCA funding in Berau. 
SIGAP is based on the experiences of two model villages where TNC piloted community REDD 
strategies. A primary strategy for reducing village-level deforestation in these models has been the 
reduction in agricultural clearing through shifting cultivation (swidden) in favor of more intensive 
land use strategies, including limitation of swidden to previously cleared areas and the 
establishment of permanent rubber gardens. These models thus deploy a land sparing logic at the 
village level, linking swidden and agroforestry intensification to deforestation reductions. A 
similar village-level land sparing logic informs FORCLIME’s community demonstration activities 
and comprises one of the recommended strategies for local NGOs implementing TFCA projects 
(TFCA, n.d., 23). The following sections explore this village-level land sparing project and analyze 
why control of shifting cultivation has become one of the primary strategies for organizations 
working on forest governance in Berau. 
Figures 5.17-18: 5.17) Map of Berau showing forest loss in 2001-2005; 5.18) Map of Berau 
showing forest loss in 2001-2014, demonstrating large-scale deforestation after 2005. 
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Shifting Cultivation and Forest Conservation34 
Swidden, or shifting cultivation with fire (O. Mertz et al. 2009), has for centuries been a 
dominant component of the agricultural systems of upland Southeast Asia. For almost as long, 
swidden systems have been under pressure from external actors, including governments, 
companies, and conservation groups, who have sought to control or eliminate shifting cultivation 
(Scott 2009). The transformation of Southeast Asian swidden systems in recent decades has been 
especially intense, with widespread extinction or alteration of swidden practices due to a 
confluence of political, economic, and ecological factors, including government resettlement and 
land privatization policies, infrastructure expansion, environmental conservation initiatives, and 
the landscape-scale expansion of industrial agriculture (Padoch et al. 2007; Fox et al. 2009). I 
conducted field visits in March-April 2015 to the two upland Dayak villages where TNC pioneered 
its SIGAP approach in order to investigate the relation between forest governance programs and 
village land use change. I combined this fieldwork with both internal and publicly-available 
documents from TNC and government agencies, key-informant interviews, media reports, and data 
from household surveys carried out in 2012 and 2014 by CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on 
REDD+.35 
I find that at the household level, swidden clearing has become increasingly important as a 
strategy for villagers to assert control over land under conditions of tenure insecurity (cf. Peluso 
2005). Political-economic dynamics of territorialization and speculation shape swidden systems 
through a form of ‘contentious land change’ (Aldrich et al. 2012). At the village and district levels, 
																																																						
34 The following sections on swidden and forest governance in Berau draw on material that has appeared in 
publication in Thaler and Anandi (2017), “Shifting cultivation, contentious land change and forest governance: the 
politics of swidden in East Kalimantan.” 
35 I am indebted to Cut Augusta Mindry Anandi, who coordinated CIFOR data collection in Berau and who 
collaborated with me in my analysis of the villages. 
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I find that forest governance has coalesced around land sparing swidden control because 
compensated reductions in swidden can reconcile community livelihoods with industrial forestry 
and government development priorities. The concentration of village forest governance on 
swidden systems has had ambivalent effects, however, developing village land management and 
livelihood activities at a cost of temporary increases in swidden clearing and with minimal impact 
on larger-scale deforestation for industrial land uses such as oil palm and tree fiber plantations and 
coal mining. These findings lead me to conclude that forest governance efforts in Berau have thus 
far been ineffective in eliminating contentious land change or reducing district-level deforestation 
due to their incapacity to address extractive plantation and mining expansion as the dominant direct 
and indirect drivers of forest conversion. 
Swidden in East Kalimantan 
In Borneo, as in much of the rest of Southeast Asia, swidden systems are centered on upland 
rice production. In the classic model, a forested area of roughly 1 ha is selected for cultivation and 
trees and brush are felled and then burned to enhance soil fertility. The swidden plot (called ladang 
in Indonesian36) is cultivated in rice for one or several years, often intercropped with or succeeded 
by other useful species such as chili, cassava, or banana, and the plot is then fallowed for a period 
of usually not less than five years. Often, fruit trees and hardwoods are tended in the fallows. When 
sufficient time has passed to restore fertility and reduce the population of weeds and agricultural 
pests, the plot may again be cleared and returned to cultivation.37 Swidden plots and fallows are 
traditionally controlled by the household that originally cultivated them, or by descendants of the 
																																																						
36 The Indonesian word ‘ladang’ is widely used and understood, while terms for swidden plots in local dialects 
differ. 
37 A classic description of an upland rice swidden system is Conklin’s (1957) work on Hanunóo agriculture in the 
Philippines. Descriptions of swidden systems in eastern Indonesian Borneo include Inoue and Lahjie (1990), Jessup 
(1991), Colfer and Dudley (1993), and Colfer (2008). 
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original cultivators. This swidden model has historically been practiced by settled upland groups, 
who would engage in trade with hunter-gatherer Punan and with coastal populations. 
Particularly since the end of World War II, this swidden system has been circumscribed, 
disrupted, and otherwise transformed by a variety of political and economic forces. Central to this 
transformation has been the assertion of state control over most of the land in Kalimantan through 
the creation of the national forest estate, followed by commercial logging and ‘development’ 
schemes facilitated by the relocation and sedentarization of indigenous groups and state-sponsored 
transmigration of non-indigenous settlers (Li 1999; Peluso 2005; Colfer 2008). In response to state 
and market pressures and incentives and the encroachment of logging companies and migrants, 
most hunter-gatherer groups have become more sedentary, usually taking up shifting cultivation 
and other agriculturalist livelihood practices (Sitorus et al. 2004). Indigenous agriculturalist 
communities have responded to shifting political and economic incentives in a variety of ways, 
including through expanded production of cash crops such as rubber (Dove 1993) and pursuit of 
off-farm employment with timber companies. The rapid expansion of oil palm plantations across 
East Kalimantan in the last two decades has dramatically altered the upland landscape, and many 
Dayak now also cultivate oil palm or work as laborers on oil palm plantations. 
Model Villages in the Berau Forest Carbon Program 
The Dayak villages of Merabu and Long Duhung are located in the Kelay watershed of 
western Berau. The 56 households of Merabu consist primarily of Dayak Lebbo, and the village 
has been on its current site for several generations. The village is abutted by a timber concession, 
an oil palm plantation, and a protected forest area covering a karstic limestone escarpment, as well 
as by neighboring villages to the north and west. Merabu has only been accessible by road since 
2012, when company access roads reached the settlement. The roughly 35 households of Long 
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Duhung are predominantly Dayak Punan, who until recently were semi-nomadic and have 
traditionally relied heavily on hunting and gathering. The village has moved several times in the 
past decades, most recently from one side of the river to the other in order to avoid flooding and 
to have better access to a logging road. Long Duhung is abutted by timber concessions, as well as 
by upriver and downriver villages and a neighboring inland village of Dayak Kenyah, who settled 
in the area around 2008. For the purposes of my argument, the villages offer a contrast between a 
landscape of timber concessions with smallholder agriculture (Long Duhung) and a landscape 
undergoing conversion for plantations and mining (Merabu). 
Swidden in both Long Duhung and Merabu conforms to many of the patterns described in 
the broader literature. Especially in Merabu, however, swidden is playing a critical political role 
as a form of establishing land claims and control for villagers who feel pressured by competing 
land uses driven directly and indirectly by the plantation and mining sectors. Rapid expansion of 
mining and oil palm concessions heightens perceptions of tenure insecurity among villagers, 
leading to speculative and contentious land clearing.38 
Both villages also participate in forest governance programs with The Nature Conservancy. 
Under the community-based natural resource management component of BFCP, TNC has targeted 
Long Duhung and Merabu as pilot villages, and limiting forest clearing for swidden has been one 
component of village-level activities. The villages were selected after an evaluation of 20 villages 
in Berau based on criteria including reasonable accessibility for TNC staff, substantial remaining 
forest cover, and positive community interest. Long Duhung and Merabu were chosen in part to 
provide a contrast between working with timber concessions (Long Duhung) and working with 
																																																						
38 While contentious land change in swidden systems has received little attention, much has been written elsewhere 
on the relationship between insecure land tenure and deforestation. See for example Deacon (1994), Alston, 
Libecap, and Mueller (1999), Geist and Lambin (2002), and Margulis (2004). 
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protected forest area (Merabu), according to a TNC manager (TNC33 150318). BFCP has so far 
generally failed to engage the major corporate actors involved in deforestation and has struggled 
with lukewarm commitment from the government, yet the projects in Merabu and Long Duhung 
have been successful in constructing multi-stakeholder collaboration. I explore how and why the 
limitation of swidden has become a focus for development of forest governance. I first describe 
the swidden systems in Long Duhung and Merabu, focusing especially on the political dimension 
of household decision-making regarding swidden clearing in Merabu. I then examine village and 
district-level swidden politics under recent forest governance initiatives. 
Swidden in Long Duhung and Merabu 
Long Duhung 
The Dayak Punan of Long Duhung previously depended on sago as a dietary staple, though 
as they have become more sedentary over the past several decades their diet has shifted to hill rice, 
with sago rarely consumed outside of ceremonial occasions.39 Elders still speak of a time ‘before 
rice,’ but today the villagers are primarily swidden rice farmers. A 2013 report for TNC prepared 
by the French Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) found 
that 77 percent of villagers farm swiddens, and for 61 percent of villagers it was their primary 
livelihood activity. The most common secondary livelihood source was artisanal gold mining, 
which provided income for over half of village households (Pirard and Lapeyre 2013).  In the 
swidden cycle, villagers say they would not return to a fallow plot for a minimum of five years, 
and they prefer at least a seven-year fallow. The CIFOR survey found that between 2010-2012 and 
2012-2014 the percentage of households clearing forest remained constant at around 75 percent, 
and these households cleared an average of 1 ha/year in the first period, decreasing to 0.6 ha/year 
																																																						
39 Unless otherwise cited, details in this section on Long Duhung come from author field notes, April 2015. 
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in the second. In both periods, clearing for ladang occurs primarily in ‘natural’ (mature) forest area 
(i.e., mature old-growth forest or advanced secondary succession), as opposed to in more recent 
fallows (Anandi et al. 2014, 373), resulting in expansion of the total agricultural area of the village. 
In the longer term, the IDDRI report describes a trajectory of expanding swidden area in Long 
Duhung, from roughly five plots total per household in 2003 (including both fallows and actively 
cultivated fields) to eight plots per household in 2013, with villagers anticipating further expansion 
to 11 plots per household by 2023. Part of the reason for this expansionary dynamic in the Long 
Duhung swidden system is the relatively recent establishment of the village in its current location. 
Villagers are opening ladang for yearly rice production, but also with a view to establishing fruit 
groves and rubber or cacao gardens, which are longer-term land uses they have not yet fully 
developed in their current area. Indeed, the IDDRI study finds villagers anticipate a fourfold 
expansion of their tree gardens over the coming decade. Villagers also seek to expand the land 
base under their control as a legacy to their descendants. 
While the village is located within logging concessions, the logging companies do not 
operate within a 1-2 km radius of the village, and they respect the villagers’ right to clear swidden 
areas. There are some boundary conflicts with neighboring villages, particularly the inland village 
of recent Kenyah migrants, but these conflicts generally do not appear to affect the Long Duhung 
villagers’ swidden areas. Swidden plots are usually located along the river or on the logging road 
leading to the village. The Kenyah village is located on the road rather far from Long Duhung, so 
conflicts pertain to hunting or illegal clearing by the Kenyah in the Long Duhung forest area, but 
occur beyond the radius of Long Duhung swidden land. While logging activities around Long 
Duhung are not driving the villagers to engage in territorializing or speculative clearing, the 
conflicts with the Kenyah represent an indirect effect of plantation expansion, since the Kenyah 
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emigrated from the village of Long Segar in neighboring East Kutai district due in part to land 
conflicts caused by oil palm concessions (cf. Elmhirst, Siscawati, and Colfer, n.d.). 
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Table 5.1: Swidden Agriculture in Long Duhung and Merabu 
 Long Duhung Merabu 
Agriculture as primary livelihood 
activity, % of householdsa  61 50 
Agriculture as secondary 
livelihood activity, % of 
householdsa  
16 23 
Area of natural forest cleared, 
ha/household/year (average), 
2010-2012b,c 
1.0 0.9 
Area of natural forest cleared, 
ha/household/year (average), 
2012-2014b,c 
0.6 0.6 
Number of ladang 
plots/household (average), 
2003-2004a,d 
4.8 3.1 
Number of ladang 
plots/household (average), 
2013a,d 
7.8 3.6 
Number of ladang 
plots/household (average), 2023 
(estimate)a,d 
10.9 4.3 
a Pirard and Lapeyre (2013), b Data from CIFOR Global Comparative Study on REDD+, Module 2 on 
Subnational Initiatives, c average among households reporting any forest clearing, d total of both fallows and 
actively cultivated plots 
 
Merabu 
Merabu40 village has been in its current location for several generations and is surrounded 
by a more diverse mosaic of land uses than Long Duhung, resulting in substantially different 
swidden dynamics. Merabu villagers have overall more diversified livelihood strategies than 
villagers in Long Duhung. The IDDRI study, while only managing to survey 60 percent of Merabu 
households, found that while 73 percent of households still farmed ladang, it was the primary 
livelihood activity for just 50 percent of them. Harvesting edible birds’ nests, either individually 
or as a worker for the private company PT Walesta, which holds a concession to caves in the 
																																																						
40 Unless otherwise cited, details in this section on Merabu come from author field notes, March 2015. 
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nearby karst escarpment, provided income for 44 percent of households. Residents may also work 
for the logging company, and they are widely known for harvesting large amounts of forest honey. 
Residents of Merabu have historically tended to clear less ladang area than villagers in 
Long Duhung. IDDRI data show that while in 2003, Merabu villagers usually planted around 0.8 
ha/year, in 2013 they were planting only 0.6 ha. Merabu villagers also had comparatively fewer 
total (cultivated and fallow) swidden plots, an average of 3.6 in 2013, which they expected to grow 
only modestly over the following decade to an average of 4.3, according to IDDRI. Merabu 
villagers have received government and TNC support to plant rubber trees, and IDDRI found that 
most villagers had at least one tree garden and expected to add several more in the coming decade. 
The more limited practice of swidden in Merabu is explained in part by the longer presence of the 
village in its current location (meaning households have had time to build up a land bank for non-
swidden land uses such as fruit groves), and in part also by the greater reliance on tree crop and 
non-agricultural livelihood sources relative to Long Duhung, where villagers are more dependent 
on swiddens for subsistence. In recent years, total clearing in Merabu has increased, however. 
CIFOR data show that while in 2010-2012 only 36 percent of surveyed households cleared forest 
area, in 2012-2014 that figure jumped to 70 percent. The average annual clearing per household 
declined slightly, similar to in Long Duhung, from 0.9 ha in 2010-2012 to 0.6 ha in 2012-2014. 
These recent changes result from a combination of governance incentives and contentious land 
change processes, and are discussed further in the following sections. 
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Figures 5.19-20: 5.19) Households clearing forest in previous two years; 5.20) Average annual 
forest clearing per household of households clearing forest in previous two years. 
 
As in Long Duhung, villagers in Merabu still cleared almost exclusively mature forest areas 
when opening new ladang in 2010-2014, as opposed to returning to recent fallows. One villager 
stated succinctly the logic, saying, “We prefer to open ladang in forested areas because it’s more 
fertile and we get new land.” Returning to fallows is cheaper, but then they often experience 
problems with weeds, and they lose the chance to establish possession over a new area. Many 
fallows have also been planted with fruit trees, which villagers prefer not to fell. The desire to 
establish rights over new land through swidden clearing is motivated in Long Duhung by the need 
to establish a land bank for planting fruit groves and providing a legacy for future generations. In 
Merabu, however, swidden is a relatively smaller component of the livelihood strategies of most 
households and the area cultivated through swidden has been and is expected to remain fairly 
stable. Villagers anticipate expanding their area of tree crops, especially rubber, which is one 
motivation for opening new land, but there are two other important, non-agronomic motivations: 
the use of swidden to establish territorial control for the village, and the use of swidden to establish 
private land rights as a form of economic speculation. 
Swidden as a form of territorial control is used to counter competing claims and 
encroachment by neighboring villages. Merabu villagers have ongoing boundary disputes with 
Merapun, the Dayak Lebbo village downriver from Merabu. Encroachment by Merapun villagers 
has been exacerbated by the establishment of an oil palm plantation surrounding Merapun village, 
which has limited Merapun’s forest area at the same time as new roads have enhanced access to 
Merabu territory, making inter-village land conflict an indirect effect of oil palm expansion. 
Merabu villagers may choose to open swiddens in contested areas in order to establish territorial 
control for their village. At the same time, both Merapun and Merabu villagers have private 
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speculative interests in opening ladang in contested areas because of the expectation that an oil 
palm concession may be issued and villagers whose ladang fall within the concession would be 
able to make claims for compensation. Similar speculative clearing by Merabu villagers is said to 
have occurred in response to a coal company survey, as villagers sought to position themselves to 
gain compensation from any land that would eventually be taken over by a mine. 
Household Decision-Making: Contentious Land Change in a Swidden System 
The strategic use of swidden as a form of land control has received relatively little attention 
in the literature on drivers of change in swidden systems. It receives no direct mention, for 
example, in van Vliet et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis of 111 publications. While in Dayak 
communities, swidden clearing confers land rights under customary law, tree crops such as rubber 
and cacao have historically been more likely than swidden to be recognized as denoting a land 
claim, especially by Indonesian authorities or private companies (Dove 1993, 142). In recent years, 
however, government and corporate actors have increasingly recognized managed swidden fallows 
(i.e., fallows within a certain radius of a village and marked with hardwood or fruit trees) as village 
property, even as these same actors have sought to restrict the practice of swidden overall. The 
possibility of external recognition increases the salience of land control considerations for villagers 
in locating swidden plots. The case of Merabu highlights two separate land control functions of 
swidden – territorialization and speculation – that help determine both the location of swidden 
plots and the continued expansion of swidden into new forest areas. 
The territorializing function of swidden presents a paradox, or ‘problem of composition,’ 
since rights to a swidden plot are customarily held by the household that cultivates it, yet that 
household also belongs to a village, and so its plot may be considered a marker of village territory 
(cf. Dove 1983). Most villages in Berau do not have official territorial boundaries demarcated by 
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the government. The village as a formal administrative unit with defined cartographic boundaries 
only began to be imposed in Kalimantan in the last 35 years (Peluso 2005), and much more recently 
in upland East Kalimantan (Colfer, pers. comm.). Rather, multiple institutional layers define 
overlapping boundaries that are negotiated and contested among communities, concessionaires, 
and government agencies. In the absence of formally-demarcated cartographic boundaries and 
under conditions of rapid landscape change driven by migration and industrial expansion, 
possession may be ‘nine-tenths of the law,’ in that the occupation of an area through swidden 
clearing and the subsequent planting of hardwoods or fruit trees by a household may serve to 
reinforce village territorial claims that are contested across government and company boundaries, 
NGO land use plans, and customary areas. These claims are important not just for determining the 
spaces for villagers to carry out their livelihood activities, but also for determining collective 
payments made by companies operating in the village territory. 
The speculative function of swidden is a response to the rapid and poorly regulated 
expansion of industrial land uses around Merabu. Most of the landscape falls within the forest 
estate, whose management is under the authority of the central government’s Ministry of Forestry, 
while even in lands outside the forest estate there is rarely any formal recognition of community 
land uses (Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005; Rights and Resources Initiative 2015). The 
resulting tenure insecurity means communities have few options for resisting the conversion of 
village territory to mines or plantations (Myers and Ardiansyah 2014). In addition to providing 
collective payments or subsidies to communities that fall within their footprint, companies may 
also directly compensate households whose ladang or tree gardens are taken by a concession. 
Compensation practices vary, but in the case of oil palm plantations, compensation most often 
takes the form of certificates that entitle a household to revenue from the production of 1 or 2 ha 
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of plantation land. Companies deduct costs related to planting and management of the areas, so 
during the first five to six years a household holding a certificate may expect to receive IDR 
100,000-300,000/month.41 In circumstances where not all households in a village receive 
certificates, those whose swidden lands have been taken by the company may be able to make 
stronger claims to the company or village elites in order to receive compensation. Facing the 
possibility of expropriation of lands within the village territory, and uncertain of how 
compensation may be administered, villagers speculate on future company activities by locating 
swidden in possible concession areas to establish personal land claims that will enhance their 
prospects for compensation when the lands are expropriated.42 
The expansion of swidden as a land control strategy for territorialization and speculation 
represents a form of contentious land change within an extractive political-economic regime. 
Aldrich et al. (2012), working in the Amazon, argue that while land change science typically 
analyzes land cover change as the result of decisions made by individual rational actors, a more 
complete understanding of land change recognizes its social nature. They assert that “a component 
of deforestation in Amazônia results from contentious social interactions aimed at land possession 
in addition to what we refer to as agronomic deforestation undertaken to plant crops or pasture as 
an economic activity” (109, original emphasis). Any individual land clearing decision will 
typically combine both social and agronomic considerations. Nonetheless, the recent development 
of a village spatial plan under TNC’s project in Merabu allows for the identification of specific 
ladang plots as examples of land use change predominantly determined by contentious processes. 
																																																						
41 This sum is not insignificant, considering the national poverty line is set at just over IDR 300,000/person/month. 
42 In Merabu, speculation is evident through the location of swidden clearing, not the total amount of clearing by a 
household. Households are still clearing and planting plots of roughly 1 ha, but in some cases they are siting these 
plots strategically based in part on possible future compensation. Household resources for clearing and planting to 
establish land claims are limited, so runaway speculation involving larger-scale clearing has not been observed. 
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These clearings are explored in more detail in the following section, which examines the 
transformation of the swidden systems of Long Duhung and Merabu through the evolution of new 
structures of forest governance. 
Village and District-Level Forest Governance 
The Nature Conservancy’s Conditional Payments Agreements 
After launching BFCP with the district government in 2009, TNC began to look for ways 
to integrate communities into REDD (I. Moeliono et al. 2010), including piloting incentives 
schemes that would compensate villagers for emissions reductions (Pirard and Lapeyre 2013). 
After a participatory planning period, both Merabu and Long Duhung signed agreements in late 
2013 declaring their participation in BFCP and their commitment to protecting the forest and 
promoting environmentally-friendly livelihood activities. In Long Duhung, the bupati attended the 
signing, opening the ceremony by planting a rubber tree (Karbonhutanberau.org 2013). In 
Merabu, a plaque and totem were installed in the center of the village to commemorate the village’s 
commitment to “preserve the forest, conduct spatial and land use planning, and fight for prosperous 
living” (Figure 5.21). 
 
	
	
248 
 
Figure 5.21: Plaque and Totem Commemorating Merabu Village Agreement, 18 March 2015. 
 
The village declarations were accompanied by Conditional Grant Agreements with TNC. 
Under these agreements, villagers’ performance in meeting specified targets during the first year 
of the contract would determine the level of support provided by TNC in the subsequent year, with 
support reduced in case of failure to meet targets. The initial TNC grant to the communities, IDR 
239 million each (about $20,000), included support for forest patrols and forest management, 
rubber cultivation, chicken raising, vegetable gardening, honey production, fish farming, and 
capacity building, among other activities. In exchange, villagers agreed to “strengthening the 
enabling conditions” and “[climate change] mitigation and management of natural resources” 
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(TNC-Indonesia, n.d.). Activities under enabling conditions generally relate to village financial 
management and capacity building. Under mitigation and management, villagers agreed to carry 
out forest patrols and biodiversity and ecotourism surveys, and to limit their practice of shifting 
cultivation. Villagers agreed to open not more than 1 ha/household/year of ladang, and only to 
open ladang in fallows as opposed to in new forest areas. New forest areas could be opened 
exceptionally in the case of new households that had not yet established a land base. In Merabu, 
villagers committed to a maximum of four ladang plots per household (active or fallowed), for a 
total of 4 ha of swidden land each (“Kesepakatan Dan Komitmen Masyarakat Kampung Merabu” 
2013). In Long Duhung, the community agreed to a maximum of seven ladang per household 
(active or fallowed), totaling 7 ha of swidden land. Additionally, TNC assisted each village in the 
development of a village land use plan, specifying areas for settlement, swidden farming, rubber 
gardens, agroforestry, and reserve land. 
These agreements would appear to constitute an important change in the swidden dynamics 
of the two villages. Where prior to the agreements villagers were predominantly opening ladang 
in new forest areas, they should now only open ladang in fallows, sparing forest land through 
agricultural intensification. It was explicitly understood that this commitment was dependent on 
alternative livelihood support from TNC, which has focused most heavily on the planting of rubber 
gardens and small animal husbandry (Pirard and Lapeyre 2013).43 In fact, these agreements still 
allow for the clearing of new forest areas under several provisions, and the immediate impact in 
the first year of the agreements has been to support new clearing, albeit under the aegis of the 
village land use plan and ostensibly as a one-time occurrence. 
																																																						
43 Dove (1993) points out that rubber may not actually be understood as an ‘alternative’ to rice, since there remains 
in many Dayak communities a strong cultural emphasis on rice cultivation and the subsistence sector. 
 
	
	
250 
First, households that have not yet reached the maximum swidden land base of four or 
seven plots are permitted to clear new forest area. In addition to migrants to the village, these 
households include young adults from the village who are starting new households. While their 
parents may already have a full land allotment, these younger households are licensed to clear 
forest for new ladang up to their own allotment. Under the agreements, as population grows so 
will clearing, but in a fixed proportion of land per household. Second, TNC is supporting the 
establishment of 2 ha of rubber garden per household. While Kalimantan Dayak have a long history 
of rubber cultivation, there was previously little rubber in Long Duhung due to the recent 
establishment of the village in its current location and the more limited agricultural experience of 
the Punan inhabitants. There was previously some rubber production in Merabu, but still of a 
limited nature, in part because of the reliance of Merabu villagers on birds’ nest harvesting. The 
rubber gardens supported by TNC are not required to be established on fallows, so in the first year 
of the agreement in Merabu, many households opened 1 ha of ladang in forest area along a new 
roadway, explaining the increase in the number of households clearing forest land. After the first 
year’s rice planting, they will turn the plot over to rubber and repeat the process, so that after two 
years they will have established their 2 ha rubber allotment. According to the land use plans, after 
obtaining 2 ha of rubber land and 4 or 7 ha of swidden plots, a household should not engage in any 
new forest clearing. It will take several years to determine whether that limitation has occurred. 
CIFOR data show that while in 2010-2012, all new clearing in Merabu was devoted to rice 
cultivation, in 2012-2014, 35 percent of households planted rubber in new clearings.44 
																																																						
44 A similar shift to rubber occurred in Long Duhung, where the percentage of households planting rubber in new 
clearings went from 0 to 35 percent. Planting in new clearings is only indicative of larger land use shifts towards 
rubber, as these statistics do not reflect the planting of rubber in plots previously devoted to other crops. 
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Figures 5.22-23: 5.22) Crops planted in new clearings in Long Duhung; 5.23) Crops planted in 
new clearings in Merabu. 
 
While the TNC agreements thus permit limited expansion of swidden and rubber gardens 
into new forest areas under certain conditions, the organization’s strategy is to control and limit 
the clearing through village land use and development planning, comprising a strategy of land 
sparing via land use intensification. I focus particularly on Merabu, because of the importance of 
contentious land change processes in the village and because I was a participant observer at the 
assembly to evaluate the first year of the conditional payments agreement in March 2015. 
Evaluating the Merabu Agreement: Contentious Clearing versus Forest Governance 
In Merabu, the recent construction of the logging road to the village opened up a large area 
of land that was previously less accessible. Land along the road would almost certainly have been 
deforested in any case, but under the village land use plan, the land along the road to the northwest 
of the village was zoned for rubber gardens and divided into 2 ha plots, which were allocated to 
each household in a random drawing. The resulting arrangement asserts village control over the 
area and allows for expanding livelihood activities, but does so in an ordered way that aims to 
avoid the conflicts and inequities that often accompany the opening of a new land frontier. 
The village agreement, conditional payments contract, and land use plan have not fully 
eliminated contentious land change processes from the Merabu swidden system, however. The 
one-year evaluation of the conditional payments agreement took the form of a village assembly 
facilitated by TNC staff, where villagers discussed the activities that had taken place and evaluated 
themselves according to the agreed upon targets. While the villagers and TNC agreed that financial 
management, training, and forest patrol targets had been met, the issue of swidden clearing 
emerged as a clear dilemma for participants. At the prompting of a TNC staff member, villagers 
acknowledged that four households had cleared new swidden plots along the road to the southwest 
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of the village in the area zoned as reserve land under the village plan.45 Discussion then ensued 
about whether this clearing constituted a violation of the village agreement. 
While none of the four households that had cleared in the reserve zone were in attendance 
at the evaluation meeting, the possible violation concerned all villagers because of their collective 
commitments and the potential for violations to affect the amount of funding provided to the 
village in the coming year. Opinion among the villagers was divided. Those who viewed the 
clearings as a violation pointed to the letter of the agreements, while those on the opposite side 
advanced a variety of reasons why these clearings should not be considered a breach. The first 
justification offered was that people had opened in the reserve land in order to keep outsiders from 
encroaching. Villagers from Merapun have been challenging Merabu’s control in this area, so 
swidden was in this case viewed as a means of territorialization. It was also noted that those 
opening in the reserve land had not cleared more than 1 ha nor had they exceeded their total land 
allotments. Other villagers pointed out, however, that if the transgressors were intending to keep 
away Merapun villagers, they had opened their swiddens on the wrong side of the road. A second 
justification suggested was that the plots distributed for rubber were not all equally desirable, and 
those who had drawn worse plots might prefer to open land elsewhere. Discussion focused 
primarily on the territorial justification. On another occasion, a villager explained to me that people 
in Merabu were no longer opening ladang in new forest area except when there was a boundary 
conflict with another community, in which case they would clear forest to claim the land. The 
territorial function of swidden is clearly still considered a legitimate determinant of clearing by a 
significant proportion of the village population. 
																																																						
45 Reserve land in principle would be set aside for management by future generations. 
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This episode illustrates the encounter of competing territorializations. Territorialization 
through swidden clearing conflicts with territorialization through spatial planning. The spatial 
planning approach has the additional attribute of helping the village to elaborate village 
development plans, through which the village can access funding from the Indonesian government, 
according to a TNC manager. Enforcement of village territorial control is also supported under the 
spatial planning approach through forest patrols. Nonetheless, in an area where control is contested 
with another village, spatial plans and occasional patrols do not have the materiality or cultural 
weight of a swidden plot. This episode also illustrates the paradox of swidden as a form of 
territorialization, however. In the view of one of the TNC staff members most familiar with the 
village, the households opening ladang in the reserve land were motivated not by collective 
territorial control, but by private speculative interest. He noted that there is already an area near 
Merabu, near the reserve land and Merapun, which has been zoned as conversion forest by the 
central government (meaning it can be converted to non-forest uses), and there is an area (where 
most of the reserve land lies) that is still classified as production forest (meaning it should remain 
under forest uses). Merabu villagers fear that if people from Merapun continue entering and 
degrading the production forest, it will be rezoned to conversion forest, and then oil palm will enter 
and the village government has no authority to prevent it. The four transgressing households do 
not expect the village government to keep out the oil palm plantations. By opening swidden in the 
contested area and establishing land claims now, they may at least receive compensation if the 
land is expropriated for oil palm. 
Speculative and territorial drivers of household decision-making intersect in this case, and 
because these clearings happened contrary to the village forest governance agreements, we can 
identify contentious land change in Merabu as the cause of roughly 4 ha of new deforestation. In 
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the CIFOR sample of 33 Merabu households, 70 percent cleared forest land in 2012-2014, 
averaging 0.64 ha/household/year of clearing. Extrapolating to the village population of 56 
households, I estimate that a total of 25 ha was cleared in 2014.46 I therefore estimate that 4 out of 
25 ha of clearing, or 16 percent of the 2014 deforestation in Merabu, was determined through 
contentious land change processes. While the four transgressors would likely have cleared ladang 
within the proper zone had they not opened ladang in the reserve land, the rubber zone was slated 
for conversion, while the reserve land clearing constitutes deforestation that would not otherwise 
have occurred were it not for these specific processes of contentious land change. 
In the end, community members voted 8 to 5 that the clearings in reserve land were not a 
violation, and they gave themselves full points for compliance with the swidden clauses of the 
agreement. Most villagers in Merabu would prefer not to lose their lands to oil palm. Nonetheless, 
this account illustrates that under conditions of high tenure insecurity, hedging against future 
expropriation may be rational despite the risk of forgone payments from TNC. In this case, 
speculating households hedged against future expropriation and the village did not lose any 
payments due to their clearing, but the village authorities subsequently penalized those households 
by excluding them from further benefits under the conditional payments agreement. 
Swidden as a Focus for Eco-Modernist Forest Governance 
The attempted re-ordering of swidden practice in Merabu and Long Duhung is not limited 
to the interactions between TNC and the communities. Rather, it intersects with government policy 
and corporate practice as a nexus for the emergence of a land sparing coalition advancing eco-
																																																						
46 New clearings usually average about 1 ha in size, but not every household clears land every year, explaining 
average annual clearing of less than 1 ha/household. Clearing in 2014 may have been higher than in 2013, given 
incentives for rubber production. If all 39 households estimated to have cleared forest in 2012-2014 cleared new 
ladang in 2014 itself, then a lower bound for the proportion of contentious clearing would be 4 out of 39 ha, or 10 
percent. 
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modernist forest governance in Berau. Conspicuously, for a program aimed at reducing emissions 
from deforestation, there has been virtually no participation in BFCP by oil palm or tree fiber 
plantation companies, which are the industrial sectors most responsible for conversion of natural 
forests in Berau (Griscom et al. 2016), or the mining sector, which is responsible for relatively 
little direct deforestation, but has large secondary impacts. 
Prior to 2015, TNC had also largely failed to target these sectors in its Berau program. 
Engagement with the oil palm sector was delayed in part by changes in BFCP organization and 
negotiations between TNC and funders, a TNC staffer explains (TNC42 150709). An appropriate 
model for reining in plantation-driven deforestation has also been lacking. ‘Land swaps’ that 
would allow companies to trade forested areas within a concession for degraded lands currently 
within the forest estate were promoted as a model during the early 2010s by the World Resources 
Institute (Gingold et al. 2012), but TNC has found the model infeasible in Berau because most 
forestry concessions are active and there is little degraded area suitable for oil palm within the 
forest estate, according to provincial and national-level TNC staff (TNC42 150709; TNC32 
150302). Limiting oil palm expansion is also politically sensitive given the centrality of oil palm 
to district and provincial development plans and the payoffs that district officials receive from oil 
palm companies. In 2015, TNC launched a ‘Sustainable Palm Oil’ program with four years of 
funding from the German Federal Environment Ministry with a land use intensification logic of 
landscape-level land use planning to reduce deforestation from oil palm expansion by directing 
new plantations toward degraded lands and away from high conservation value forest 
(BLI/P3SEKPI 2016; TNC42 150709), among other goals. TNC staff acknowledged, however, 
that the oil palm sector had been a major gap in their Berau program until the time of my research 
(TNC34 150501). 
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Community initiatives and sustainable logging, meanwhile, have been the areas of most 
substantial on-the-ground activity by TNC and other environmental organizations working in 
inland Berau. Activities in the forestry and communities sector include TNC and FORCLIME 
support for logging companies to adopt reduced-impact logging methods and achieve 
sustainability certifications; logging company and community participation in collaborative forest 
management; and the government’s establishment of the Forest Management Unit (KPH) for 
western Berau and the granting of ‘village forest’ (hutan desa) rights. In 2014, Merabu was granted 
a village forest area over part of the protected forest land within village boundaries, becoming the 
first village in Berau to obtain a hutan desa designation.47 
The regulation of swidden practice is also a cornerstone of the intersecting governance 
initiatives in the community-forestry sector. The beginning of industrial logging in East 
Kalimantan in the 1970s coincided with government efforts to resettle and sedentarize upland 
populations, which on the one hand served to make those populations ‘legible’ to the state (Scott 
1998), while on the other it cleared space for industrial resource extraction. Conflicts between 
logging companies and communities have sputtered over the decades, but currently logging 
companies in Berau tend to respect communities’ rights to cultivate a certain amount of swidden 
area within their traditional territories. Further delimiting the practice of swidden remains common 
cause for a coalition of government and NGO actors in the forestry sector. While most do not view 
swidden as a major environmental problem, they nonetheless see reform of swidden as desirable 
and progressive. Both a FORCLIME employee and a district REDD coordinator claimed that 
ladang is the largest source of illegal deforestation in Berau, since conversion for plantations and 
																																																						
47 The Merabu hutan desa petition was facilitated by TNC, who led the participatory mapping process with the 
community and liaised with government bureaucracy. For more on hutan desa, see Akiefnawati et al. (2010). 
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mining occurs under government licenses (GIZ04 150416; BER04 150408). This ‘illegality’ of 
ladang speaks to the government’s desire to suppress shifting cultivation, and facilitates the 
confluence of government and NGO interest in making ladang “more effective,” in the words of a 
local NGO director (BER13 150415), or offering “alternative economies,” in the words of the 
REDD coordinator (BER04 150408; cf. Dove 1983). Government officials in the district Forestry 
Agency and Environment Agency also mention the use of fire as a danger of swidden cultivation 
(BER02 150317; BER08 150413), though Berau has not suffered fires of the same severity as East 
Kutai and other districts further to the south. In one case, the district government is reported to 
have made shifting from swidden to permanent agriculture a requirement for confirming a village’s 
administrative status (Anandi et al. 2014, 374). 
From the environmentalist side, control of swidden has been central to NGO community 
work as a land sparing strategy linking climate change mitigation with promotion of productivist 
community ‘development.’ Like TNC, FORCLIME stipulates that communities participating in 
its REDD demonstration activities should not clear new forest areas, and it encourages rubber 
planting, small animal husbandry, and commercialization of non-timber forest products such as 
honey and herbal tea. One FORCLIME employee imagines the possibility of a moratorium on 
swidden, saying, “People deforest for their stomachs, for rice. If we pay for their rice, they wouldn't 
deforest.”48 He contemplates a strategy of hill rice intensification and the development of wet rice 
production leading eventually to a moratorium on shifting cultivation. TNC’s model of village 
land use planning and alternative livelihoods development pioneered in Long Duhung and Merabu 
																																																						
48 This statement entirely neglects the cultural value of swidden, a point I owe to Carol Colfer. For more on the 
cultural value of swidden, see Colfer (2008), Dove (1993; 1998), and Gönner (2000b). 
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has been codified in SIGAP-REDD+, where swidden limitation is one among various options for 
communities to mitigate carbon emissions. 
The effect of these interlocking initiatives is that land sparing swidden control – for climate 
change mitigation, for state administrative control, and for industrial timber extraction – has 
become a central component of an emergent forest governance coalition in Berau that integrates 
government, logging companies, NGOs, and communities in managing a landscape of timber 
concessions and small-scale agricultural and hunting and gathering activities. The relatively minor 
contribution of swidden to overall deforestation in Berau makes it particularly noteworthy that 
swidden has received such emphasis in the development of forest governance in the district. One 
TNC manager explains the focus on communities, affirming that while the emissions reductions 
of community activities may not be great in themselves, the impact of community work is 
substantial because it serves as a way to attract government attention and commitment, to engage 
with companies, and to enhance the capacity of local NGOs. This multi-stakeholder coalition could 
ostensibly then expand to develop environmental governance in other sectors. 
While TNC's new oil palm project may bring change to that sector, at present the 
community-forestry environmental governance project is being undercut by the expansion of 
industrial mining and especially oil palm plantations, which introduces new ‘stakeholders’ and 
contentious processes that upset the community-forestry consensus. In Long Duhung, where 
logging is the primary industrial land use, swidden area has been expanding primarily due to 
agronomic reasons, but conflicts with the neighboring Kenyah village herald indirect impacts from 
oil palm. In Merabu, where oil palm and mining threaten to enter the village territory, the 
agronomic drivers of swidden expansion are more limited, but territorialization and speculation 
are driving additional swidden clearing in natural forest areas. 
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The emergence of a strategy of land sparing forest governance through control of swidden 
and more broadly through the conciliation of community livelihoods and industrial forestry, and 
the failure to integrate mining and plantations into the land sparing coalition, may be explained by 
the fact that community livelihoods and timber harvesting can be compatible with natural forest 
cover, while oil palm, fiber plantations, and mining require the conversion of forest to an 
alternative land cover. Government actors within the extractive regime are happy to limit the area 
under swidden as a way of sedentarizing villagers and promoting the production of commodities 
such as rubber, but officials at both the district and provincial levels view industrial plantations, in 
particular, as the key to economic development. They have no intention of limiting the overall 
expansion of plantations in favor of forest conservation. Controlling swidden does not challenge 
the expansion of extractive land uses, so it has become a site for successful coalition-building, 
while governance of the more significant drivers of deforestation in Berau remains elusive. 
Persistence of the Extractive Regime 
The expansion of the mining and plantation sectors in Berau undermines the viability of 
the small-scale rural livelihoods on which the existing district land sparing coalition is anchored. 
Even communities whose territory remains forested are challenged by landscape-level forest 
fragmentation (which affects biodiversity and species abundance), hydrological and regional 
climatic changes caused by large-scale forest clearing, and socio-economic transformations that 
trigger resource conflicts and drive contentious land change. The current status of swidden as a 
focus of eco-modernist forest governance structures in Berau may not herald the long-term 
viability of forest-dependent livelihoods so much as it indicates the inability of environmentalist 
actors to otherwise check the extractive juggernaut of coal mines, tree plantations, and oil palm 
currently steamrolling the remaining forests of Berau. 
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A TNC manager acknowledged in an interview the predicament of forest conservation on 
an extractive frontier: “BFCP doesn’t mean there will be no deforestation. We need to take into 
account the district development plan. With APL [land zoned for agriculture], it’s just a matter of 
time before they convert it to mining or oil palm. If we had shown up and said ‘you can’t have any 
more clearing,’ we would have been kicked out of Berau long ago” (TNC31 150205). Current and 
former TNC staff recount their difficulties in gaining support from the “feudalistic” Berau 
Government (TNC27 141219). Indonesia’s extractive economy is filtered through the legacy of 
the Berau sultanates in the district government, which is seen as being hierarchical, nepotistic, and 
exclusive. “There’s all sorts of deals going on [in Berau],” a former TNC manager recalled, “TNC 
wanted to get a deal for conservation. …Berau is happy to have the profile and publicity [of BFCP] 
and to have TNC spending money, but until you show success, it’s hard to get them fully on board” 
(TNC41 150611). Informants also suggest that district officials have had more favorable attitudes 
towards FORCLIME than TNC because FORCLIME funnels money directly through the 
government bureaucracy, whereas in the case of TNC, “district officials see, ‘oh, TNC has this 
money, but it doesn’t go to us’” (TNC30 150128). FORCLIME has faced identical challenges to 
TNC in bringing the district into a coalition for ecological modernization, however. As one former 
FORCLIME employee recounts, “FORCLIME shares with DPRD [the local assembly] and the 
bupati, and they’re enthusiastic, especially about supporting communities with short-term 
investments, but then they carry out contradictory activities, such as giving APL [land outside the 
forest estate] over to oil palm. It’s the same everywhere” (GIZ06 150427). 
In the rapidly expanding plantation and mining sectors, the predominance of extractive 
relations is clear. “The problem is that oil palm is massive,” the same FORCLIME employee 
laments, “…Oil palm is from the government, so we can’t do anything to stop it” (GIZ06 150427). 
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When in 2011 or 2012 TNC supported villagers in the Segah watershed to oppose an oil palm 
concession in the region, the bupati became furious and nearly kicked TNC out of Berau (TNC32 
150302; TNC30 150128). Since then, the oil palm company has courted some village leaders with 
money and travel, and succeeded in turning some of them against the conservationist agenda 
(TNC32 150302). Even those palm oil companies that wish to avoid converting forest areas are 
hamstrung by the government institutions for allocating concessions, which are a key source of 
rents for government officials. One informant reports that for an oil palm permit, a company had 
to pay IDR 25 million ($2000) each to nine different people, with the bupati also receiving a cut. 
Another informant notes that district candidates spend at least IDR 10 billion ($770,000) to get 
elected, so “once they are elected, they are thinking about returning their investment through 
natural resource permits [bribery] and district budget markups [overbilling].” Corruption is 
endemic across the extractive sectors. Officials from the district Forestry Agency reportedly used 
to demand IDR 300 million ($23,000) from companies to approve their yearly harvest plans, 
though as the large-scale timber concessions have declined, the head of the agency reportedly 
asked a company for only “‘modest’ bribes, because times are harder now.” If a company were 
not to pay bribes, it would not have its permits approved and would be investigated by the district 
agencies, a process that would be expensive and time-consuming for the company. 
Berau’s natural resources generate vast wealth that flows to companies, shareholders, 
corrupt officials, and productivist importing economies, degrading the local environment and 
generating virtually no reinvestment in enhanced productivity or articulated socio-economic 
development in the district. Coal mining is exemplary in this respect. PT Berau Coal provides 
career opportunities for its employees, many of whom are from other parts of Indonesia, and a 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) “slush fund” for the district (TNC42 150709), but as a 
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company CSR officer stated matter-of-factly, “CSR is a strategy to keep operations going and 
avoid social conflict” (BER19 150418). As coal is wrested from pits in Berau for boilers in China 
and the Philippines, hundreds of millions of dollars flow to the politically-connected Bakrie family 
or to financier Nat Rothschild, and hundreds of millions more are embezzled away (Moulds 2013; 
Kahn and Mellor 2013). Capital accumulates in Jakarta and London and carbon dioxide 
accumulates in the atmosphere, leading to more extreme El Niño droughts, more severe fires in 
Kalimantan, and more deforestation. Meanwhile, Bank of America Merrill Lynch has made well 
over $100 million through investments and financing related to Berau Coal (Appleby Global 
Group 2014; “Roger Suyama” 2015), and then advertises its efforts to address global climate 
change with a $300,000 donation to the Berau Forest Carbon Program (Bank of America 2010). 
Erik Meijaard is quite right: “everything in conservation is utterly out of control” (Meijaard 2015). 
Extraction is the law of the land. 
Conclusion 
 The discourse of East Kalimantan as a ‘green province’ has in Berau its district corollary, 
but at the district, provincial, and national levels in Indonesia, ‘green’ coalitions are overwhelmed 
by the extractive political-economic regime. TNC has operated through different forest 
conservation strategies in East Kutai and Berau districts, maintaining a protected area focus in East 
Kutai with its Wehea program while developing a district-level REDD initiative through BFCP in 
Berau. Aggregate deforestation in East Kutai is greater than in Berau, and deforestation in East 
Kutai has accelerated more rapidly. Berau has been spared the El Niño fires and district 
fragmentation (pemekaran) that helped accelerate deforestation in East Kutai, but the oil palm 
frontier has come to Berau, and extractive land conversion is on the rise there as surely as in its 
neighbor to the south. Ironically, TNC staff have told me they find the East Kutai district 
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government more progressive and easier to work with than the Berau government, with its 
feudalistic legacy (TNC33 150309; TNC27 141219). Of course, when most of the commercially 
valuable forestland in East Kutai has already been cleared or is slated for conversion, it is easy to 
make a show of protecting the forest vestiges of Wehea and the Sangkulirang karst. Deforestation 
in East Kutai and Berau is highly correlated and trending upward, though with high inter-annual 
variance (Figure 5.24), reflecting the dominance of economic factors over forest governance 
processes in determining forest clearing (Wheeler et al. 2011). 
 
Figure 5.24: Forest loss in Berau and East Kutai at >30 percent canopy density, calculated with 
Global Forest Watch (Hansen et al. 2013). Pearson’s r = 0.87. 
 
 The global green growth complex has crystallized in Indonesia in a coalition comprised 
largely of international and domestic NGOs, international institutions and bilateral cooperation 
agencies, academics, and certain corporations and government bureaucrats. In the agriculture and 
forestry sectors, land sparing policy discourse is deployed to support agricultural intensification 
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through control of swidden and improved oil palm productivity, as well as land use intensification 
through siting of plantations on ‘degraded’ lands. These land sparing strategies serve state interests 
in territorialization and control of populations and resources, as well as corporate interests in 
industrial productivity and expansion, but they have failed to fulfill environmentalist and 
community interests in forest conservation. The coalition for productivist ecological 
modernization through land sparing in Indonesia is at every level stymied by the persistence of 
political-economic institutions supporting the extraction of materials and energy. 
 Extractive political-economic regimes are the characteristic peripheral political-economic 
formation. Extraction in Kalimantan proceeds through articulated extractive frontiers of logging, 
mining, and plantation conversion. While profits in these sectors accumulate predominantly to 
domestic and international political-economic elites, profits and wages also accrue to medium-
scale oil palm investors, smallholders, and local laborers employed particularly by logging and 
plantation companies. These various processes of inclusion and (adverse) incorporation (John 
McCarthy 2010) add dynamism and resilience to extractive industries, even as they progressively 
degrade local socio-ecologies. In addition to the loss of forest land and the corresponding loss of 
forest-dependent livelihoods and biodiversity, indicators of environmental degradation include 
severe forest fire and haze events (Gellert 1998; Gönner 2000a; Koplitz et al. 2016) and increased 
erosion and flooding (J. Wells et al. 2016), both of which have strongly negative social impacts. 
Mining operations also contribute to increased flooding (J. Wells et al. 2016) and water pollution. 
River fish are an important source of protein for inland populations, and a 2015 study found that 
fish in the delta of the Mahakam River, East Kalimantan’s primary watershed, contained over 1300 
times the tolerable level of lead and over 2000 times the tolerable level of cadmium (Adri 2015). 
Pellier et al. (2014) report that children in degraded landscapes of Kalimantan have sharply 
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negative expectations of their future environmental conditions. 
 The degradation of Indonesia’s socio-ecological systems is not accidental, but rather 
systematically produced by the global capitalist dialectic of extraction and production. The 
negative socio-ecological impacts of capitalist accumulation are externalized by the productivist 
economies of the capitalist core through global circuits of capital and internalized by the humans 
and other lifeforms of the peripheries. Ecological modernization as a policy discourse of late 
capitalism wrecks against Indonesia’s extractive regime. Eco-modernist actors may be reduced to 
virtual impotence – “When power or politics comes to the arena, TNC is always the loser,” rues a 
TNC manager (TNC32 150302) – or they are reduced to greenwashing. Environmental NGO 
Fauna & Flora International (FFI), for example, receives millions of dollars from mining 
companies including Anglo-American, Rio Tinto, and Billington to work on biodiversity 
conservation and community development around mine sites. A former Billington employee 
serves as the Corporate Partnership Manager of FFI Australia’s ‘Business and Biodiversity Team,’ 
meanwhile Billington invests hundreds of millions of dollars in mining coal, a major source of 
carbon emissions, in remote rainforest areas of Central Kalimantan (Hawdon 2011). Even WWF’s 
Heart of Borneo Initiative, which began in the early 2000s as an attempt to protect an intact 
wilderness landscape, had been retooled by 2012 as a ‘green economy’ initiative (Paddenburg et 
al. 2012). 
 The Indonesian case studies in this chapter demonstrate the operation of an extractive 
regime across multiple levels and reveal how extractive regimes mediate possibilities for forest 
governance and regional development. Efforts by productivist coalitions are stymied by extractive 
structures, and even where local allies support a productivist agenda, lower level productivist 
impulses and their goals of land sparing and ecological modernization are limited and undermined 
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by the higher level extractive regimes. Jeremy Campbell, in his study of the Novo Progresso region 
in southwestern Pará, describes the political economy of Brazil’s Amazon frontier as a system 
“rigged for theft and destruction” (J. Campbell 2015a, 198). This characterization is equally apt as 
a description of the extractive political economy of Indonesian Borneo, and the extractive regimes 
of the capitalist world system in general. In the Brazilian Amazon, however, a land sparing 
complex has dramatically reduced regional deforestation as part of a strategy to shift the political 
economy of the Amazon region from extraction to productivism. Chapter 6 explores the conditions 
and processes of this socio-ecological transformation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
BRAZIL: ‘DEVELOPMENT’ 
THE TRANSITION FROM EXTRACTION TO PRODUCTIVISM49 
 
“The challenge of strengthening Brazil as an agricultural and environmental power 
must take into consideration the planning and territorial management of agriculture. 
This is the condition for gaining productivity and saving natural resources. …The 
growth of agricultural production with preservation also involves a new 
organization of ranching, where intensification of the sector is an indispensable part 
of a broad optimization of land use.” 
 
- technicians from the federal Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE) writing 
in the Brazilian trade magazine Agroanalysis (Fleury and Pereira 2013) 
 
“We are isolated, and anything we do is repressed. We have been bound in place. 
…Until the new regulations, we worked normally. We received financing from the 
bank to buy cattle, and everything was going well until 2009. …Before, 
smallholders might sell their properties under pressure from larger property owners, 
although in my region this was not the case, but now smallholders are selling to 
larger producers out of necessity. Just in my region eight smallholders have sold 
and only one person has bought all their properties.” 
 
- small farmer in São Félix do Xingu, February 2014 (SFX08 140206) 
 
 The history of capitalism is uneven development. Extractive regimes are enduring political-
economic formations integrally linked with productivist core economies, but the geographies of 
extraction and production are dynamic and evolving. The Italian city states were displaced by the 
Iberian empires, Great Lakes manufacturing became a Rust Belt, China went from the Opium Wars 
and the coolie trade to becoming one of the largest importers of tropical resources, such as timber, 
soy, and palm oil. Core and periphery are not immutable properties of particular regions, and while 
the structure of an extractive regime militates against productivist reinvestment and articulated 
development, regimes do change, and regions move from periphery to core, from extraction to 
																																																						
49 This chapter draws on material that has appeared in publication in Thaler (2017), “The Land Sparing Complex: 
Environmental Governance, Agricultural Intensification, and State Building in the Brazilian Amazon.” 
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production. Capitalist growth is also capitalist expansion, and as extraction expands at the capitalist 
frontier, so too expands the productivist frontier internal to the capitalist world system. 
For modernization perspectives, the move from extraction to production is a key stage of 
modernization and ‘development.’ A great deal of ink has been spilled explaining how this 
transformation happens. Institutionalists puzzle over why extractive regimes ‘waste’ natural 
resources. It was even the title of William Ascher’s (1999) oft-cited book, Why Governments 
Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries. ‘If only developing countries 
got their policies right, they would stop wasting resources and develop,’ the institutionalist 
perspective imagines. This perspective fails to recognize that many ‘policy failures’ are in fact 
functional characteristics of an extractive regime, but it is not wrong that institutions are at the 
crux of the differentiation between extractive and productivist economies (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson 2001). Modernization thinking goes wrong where it extends the observation that 
some places become ‘developed’ into the fallacy that over time, everywhere can become 
developed and there will be no more extraction. In the case of forests, the modernization theories 
of land sparing and the forest transition replicate this error by extending the observation that in 
some places agricultural intensification has coincided with declining deforestation to the fallacy 
that forest conservation and agro-industrial development are globally compatible. 
 Vast areas of the Brazilian Amazon have been deforested since the 1980s for cattle 
ranching and industrial field crops (Rudel, DeFries, et al. 2009); between 2004 and 2016, however, 
annual deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon declined over 70 percent,50 even as agricultural 
production in the region increased. This dramatic transition has been widely promoted as a 
																																																						
50 Deforestation figures in this chapter are from INPE (2017). Since 1988, INPE (the Brazilian National Institute for 
Space Research) has used Landsat imagery to annually report clear-cutting of areas over 6.25 ha in Amazonian 
primary forest. 
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‘deforestation success story’ (Boucher et al. 2014), a model for other countries such as Indonesia 
(Tollefson 2015), and an example of land sparing (Macedo et al. 2012). In this chapter, I use an 
incorporated comparison and organizational ethnography of TNC’s programs across four 
municipalities in two states in the Brazilian Amazon to illuminate the mechanisms and political-
economic character of Brazil’s land use transition.  
I argue that new governance arrangements reducing deforestation in the Amazon are part 
of a project of economic development and state-building through environmental regulation. This 
project is driven by a complex of government, NGOs, and corporations united by a logic of land 
sparing. The land sparing complex has deployed environmental regulation to promote state 
territorialization and agricultural intensification in a way that inverts previous territorialization and 
conservation strategies. The complex’s ultimate goal is a regional transition from an extractive 
economy that degrades local resources to a productivist economy that supports articulated socio-
economic development. This transition has been unevenly realized, and declining deforestation 
has been accompanied in some areas by economic stagnation and smallholder dispossession. 
By identifying the land sparing complex in Brazil and its socio-economic and 
environmental consequences, this chapter advances a systemic understanding of the Amazonian 
governance model, helping to illuminate the sociological organization of neoliberal 
(environmental) governance and the relationships between environmental policy, agricultural 
development, and state-building. Analysis of the Amazonian land use transition reveals one 
pathway of transformation from an extractive to a productivist regime through a key dimension of 
the capitalist metabolism, that is, land use, and specifically tropical deforestation. Simultaneously, 
by situating Amazonian transformations in regional and global perspective, we can identify the 
displacement of deforestation and extraction that is dialectically linked with the Brazilian 
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Amazon’s productivist, land sparing transition. This chapter explicates the apparent ‘decoupling’ 
of deforestation and agricultural production in the Brazilian Amazon, while Chapter 7 turns to the 
question of displacement. 
From Institutionalist to Systemic Explanation 
 Most scholarly explanations for the Amazonian transition take an institutionalist approach 
and focus primarily on enumeration of proximate causes. While macroeconomic and climatic 
factors remain important deforestation drivers (Geist and Lambin 2002), deforestation reductions 
in Brazil are attributed especially to new governance arrangements, including supply-chain 
sustainability initiatives (Nepstad et al. 2014; Gibbs et al. 2016), expansion of conservation areas 
and indigenous territories (Nepstad et al. 2006; Soares-Filho et al. 2010), and measures supporting 
compliance with environmental regulations including enhanced enforcement, restricted 
agricultural credit, and funding for sustainable agriculture (Assunção, Gandour, and Rocha 2012; 
Arima et al. 2014). Nepstad et al. (2014) review 51 different policies and programs that “may have 
influenced the decline in deforestation” in the Brazilian Amazon (S18). 
These existing explanations take a predominantly “technical” approach to policy (Li 
2007b), either attempting to quantify effects of specific policy interventions on deforestation 
(Assunção, Gandour, and Rocha 2012; Arima et al. 2014; Gibbs et al. 2016), or listing policies and 
processes out of whose interactions deforestation reductions emerge (Hecht 2011; Lapola et al. 
2013; Nepstad et al. 2014). Largely absent is a systemic political account that looks beyond 
proximate factors to the actors and interests that generate the policy environment. One exception 
is Lapola et al. (2013), who link deforestation reductions to agricultural intensification in a 
“pervasive transition of the Brazilian land-use system” (27) that consolidates agro-industry while 
reinforcing land concentration. Yet Lapola et al. focus on the national level and do not specifically 
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analyze Amazonian governance. A second exception is Baletti’s work describing how 
environmentalism and developmentalism “reterritorialize” the lower Amazon (Baletti 2012), and 
how environmental governance facilitates industrial soy “neoextractivism” (Baletti 2014). Baletti 
does not elucidate linkages between territorialization and agro-industrial development under a land 
sparing agenda, however. 
This chapter develops a theorization of Amazonian environmental governance that moves 
beyond institutionalist explanations of discrete interventions to a systemic understanding of actors, 
interests, and processes. I focus on the confluence of government, NGO, and corporate interests 
that links territorialization, agricultural intensification, and forest conservation under a land 
sparing complex in the Brazilian Amazon. While community associations, indigenous peoples, 
social movements, and others interact with the land sparing agenda, those groups’ social visions 
differ from the land sparing vision shared by government, corporate, and NGO actors in the land 
sparing complex. 
The Amazonian Extractive Economy 
 The Brazilian Amazon, like the Outer Islands of Indonesia, has historically been 
characterized by minimal presence of the central state and ‘boom-and-bust’ resource exploitation 
that fails to generate longer-term productive circuits of accumulation. Bunker (1985) developed 
his theory of extraction and production in the capitalist world system through a historical study of 
the Amazon, arguing that the Amazonian economy operates through a “mode of extraction,” where 
resources are removed from the region to be transformed and consumed in core areas that operate 
through a “mode of production.” This extractive economy destroys value in energy and material, 
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under-developing the Amazon as it builds the value and complexity of productive economies 
elsewhere.51 
 As Hecht and Cockburn write in The Fate of the Forest, their seminal work of Amazonian 
political ecology, “What is now called the environmental destruction of the Amazon is merely the 
latest surge in a long epic of annihilation” (2010, 63). The very birth of the Portuguese colonial 
endeavor in Brazil in the early 1500s was grounded in the rapacious extraction of pau-brasil 
(brazilwood), a species endemic to the Atlantic Forest region, which was exported to Europe for 
use in woodworking and the production of dye for the textile industry. Pau-brasil was exploited 
nearly to extinction, while its Atlantic Forest habitat was subsequently decimated by colonial 
agriculture, especially sugar and coffee production. In 1534, the Portuguese crown created fourteen 
hereditary captaincies (capitanias) through which members of the Portuguese nobility were 
charged with developing the territories of coastal Brazil. The capitanias reached the eastern edge 
of the Amazon region, which became a source of forest products and slaves (Schmink and Wood 
1992, 38), while the economy of the littoral revolved around sugar and the slave trade, which after 
the mid-16th century included African as well as Amerindian slaves. The search for precious metals 
was a constant of the colonial economy that continues to the present day. In the early 1700s, 
Cuiabá, which is today the capital of Mato Grosso, was a center of gold mining under the capitania 
of São Paulo. 
 From the second half of the 18th century, the Companhia Geral de Comércio do Grão-Pará 
e Maranhão, a chartered trading company, expanded the commercial linkages between Europe and 
the Amazon Basin (Almeida 2015). The principal commodities of the Amazonian trade were cacao 
																																																						
51 In Brazil, the term ‘extractivism’ often refers to harvesting of non-timber forest products such as rubber. My 
discussion of ‘extraction’ and ‘extractive regimes’ in this chapter is consistent with my usage throughout, and unless 
quoting other authors, I only use the terms ‘extractivist’ and ‘extractivism’ in relation to harvesting of non-timber 
forest products. See also Chapter 3. 
 
	
	
274 
and various ‘spices’ (known as the drogas do sertão – ‘drugs of the hinterlands’), including clove-
bark, copaíba oil, and achiote (urucu), as well as gums and latex, particularly rubber, and timber, 
pelts, and brazil nuts (castanha-do-pará). The Amazonian region, known as Grão-Pará, integrated 
uneasily into the independent Brazilian state after independence in 1822, exploding in the 
Cabanagem rebellion of the 1830s. This rebellion undermined the landed elite of the colonial 
period, who were then displaced by the commercial elite that rose with the Amazon rubber boom 
(Schmink and Wood 1992, 42). 
The Amazon Rubber Boom 
 Fine Pará rubber (borracha), coagulated from the latex of Hevea brasiliensis, a tree 
endemic to the Amazon, was an important product in Amazonian trade from the mid-18th century 
onwards. Hecht and Cockburn note that already in the 1750s army boots and knapsacks were being 
sent to Belém from Lisbon for waterproofing. By 1800, Belém was exporting rubber shoes to New 
England, and an industrial factory for making rubber goods opened in the UK in 1820, while the 
first rubber factory in the United States opened in 1828 (Hecht and Cockburn 2010, 71–72). With 
the patenting of vulcanization by Goodyear in 1845 and the advent of steam travel on the Amazon 
River after 1850, the stage was set for the massive expansion of rubber extraction from the second 
half of the 19th century into the early 20th century. Rubber proliferated in industrial applications 
and in tires for the ‘bicycle craze’ of the 1890s and the automobile industry that emerged in the 
1900s, driving an Amazon rubber boom that brought fabulous wealth to the ‘rubber baron’ elites 
of Manaus and Belém. 
 The boom in wild rubber production drove the first establishment of a non-indigenous 
population in many parts of the Amazon. Latex is extracted from rubber trees by tappers 
(seringueiros), who work ‘trails’ of trees in the forest, walking the trail early in the day to slash 
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the trees and returning in the evening to collect the latex, which they later coagulate into a ball 
(pelle) of rubber. By the late 19th century, indigenous populations in the Amazon had been 
decimated by centuries of violence, disease, and enslavement. The rubber boom touched off a new 
wave of disruption of indigenous societies, as they faced incursions by non-indigenous rubber 
tappers or were drawn into tapping themselves through enslavement or debt relations. Caboclos – 
deculturated indigenous people and people of mixed Amerindian and European descent – 
comprised a large proportion of the tapper labor force. Simultaneously, a drought in Northeastern 
Brazil collapsed the regional cotton economy, and hundreds of thousands of migrants left the 
Northeast for the Amazon, where they joined the caboclo population as rubber tappers along the 
Amazon River and its tributaries. The rubber boom also had the effect of increasing extraction of 
other forest products such as cacao and brazil nuts, which were collected by tappers during the wet 
season when rubber extraction became more difficult. 
 The rubber economy was structured through a system of debt relationships known as 
aviamento, which subjected tappers to oppressive living and working conditions and served to 
force them into permanent extractive production (Weinstein 1983). Meanwhile, in Manaus and 
Belém, the rubber barons built opera houses, decorated their homes with Portuguese tiles, and are 
said to have sent laundry to be washed in Paris. The rubber boom finally came to an end in the 
1910s, when the successful domestication of Hevea brasiliensis on British plantations in Asia 
broke the Amazonian rubber monopoly. Brazil nut extraction expanded after the rubber crash, but 
it was not until World War II that the Amazonian extractive economy again intensified, when 
Japanese action in the Pacific isolated the United States from Malayan rubber plantations, and 
Brazil was called upon to fill the gap in exchange for millions of dollars in aid.  More than 55,000 
people – mostly poor Northeasterners – were sent as ‘rubber soldiers’ to the Amazon, where nearly 
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half of them perished from disease or animal attacks before the Japanese surrender in 1945 (Rohter 
2006). 
 The Amazonian rubber boom dramatically altered the socio-ecology of the Amazon Basin. 
The boom was grounded in the extraction of non-timber forest products, however, particularly 
cacao and brazil nuts in addition to rubber, and its impacts pale in comparison to the waves of 
extraction and land cover change that have transformed the Amazon during the Great Acceleration 
of the post-World War II global economy. As Barbara Weinstein wrote in the early 1980s, “True, 
the rubber era left the Amazon substantially altered from the preboom period, bringing in new 
settlers by the hundreds of thousands, populating remote corners of the valley, wiping out whole 
tribal cultures in the search for new laborers, and creating an extensive network of commercial 
elites. Yet if the present course of events in the Amazon continues unhindered, we can expect the 
impact, both in human and ecological terms, to be far greater, far more distressing, than anything 
witnessed by the region during the rubber boom” (Weinstein 1983, 267–68). 
The Great Acceleration in the Amazon 
 In the period after World War II, a whirlwind of loggers, miners, farmers, and ranchers 
descended upon the Amazon. During the 1950s, brazil nut extraction intensified in eastern Pará 
under a system of concessions (aforamentos) (Schmink and Wood 1992; Otsuki 2013), while gold 
mining expanded in the Tapajós basin of western Pará (a center of ‘artisanal’ placer mining to this 
day). Road building from the 1950s into the 1970s, especially the construction of the Belém-
Brasília highway in 1956-1960 and the completion of the BR-364 highway to Porto Velho in 1968, 
opened vast new areas for extraction and colonization. Logging in the Caribbean and Central 
America had depleted most commercial stocks of mahogany in those regions by the early 20th 
century, but access to new populations in the Brazilian Amazon touched off a ‘mahogany rush’ in 
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the 1970s that virtually exhausted regional stocks by the 1990s and was finally terminated by a 
federal moratorium in 2001 (Grogan et al. 2010). 
 The federal government directed financing towards the development of agriculture and 
ranching with the creation of the the Superintendency for the Valorization of Amazonia (SPVEA), 
founded in 1953, and this support was redoubled after the 1964 military coup, when in 1966 the 
generals replaced SPVEA with the Superintendency for Development of the Amazon (SUDAM). 
The landed elites of the Amazon have long objected to the extractivist economy of their region, 
favoring agriculture as the basis for economic growth (Almeida 2015), a modernist perspective 
grounded in the theories of the French physiocrats of the 18th century, and in their economic and 
political interests. The rubber boom had drained labor away from the agriculture and transport 
sectors and created an “autonomous population of quasi-independent producers” illegible to state 
control and with a surplus that could not be appropriated by the landed classes (Weinstein 1983, 
42; cf. Scott 1998). As Hecht and Cockburn recount: 
“The grand families of Belém yearned for the dignified stability of agricultural 
empires to rival the sugar estates of the Northeast, the pastoral fortunes of Recife, 
but their wealth was amassed from products dragged out from the forest by slave 
or peon…. For decade after decade, agricultural ambitions expired as both labor 
and capital chased off upriver on yet another extractive jaunt…. This was a 
mercantile and bureaucratic elite in the traditional style of the Portuguese empire, 
set in its ways down the centuries. Hopes that Amazonia would gracefully submit 
to the paradigms of development and shun the raffish temptations of extraction 
survived into the 1950s when the Superintendency for the Valorization of 
Amazonia – the initial post-war development agency for the Amazon –  proclaimed 
that the region’s vulgar past would finally be extinguished and it would become a 
cornucopia of respectable crops.” (Hecht and Cockburn 2010, 64–65) 
 
The developmentalist military government that came to power in the 1960s sought finally to 
“inundate the Amazon forest with civilization” (General Golbery do Couto e Silva quoted in Hecht 
and Cockburn 2010, 116). With a mixture of tax credits and subsidies coordinated by SUDAM 
and financed by the regional development bank, Banco da Amazônia S.A. (BASA), the federal 
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government catalyzed the massive expansion of cattle ranching in the Amazon during the 1970s 
and 1980s, alongside programs encouraging the large-scale migration of small farmers to the 
region. The brazil nut concessions of eastern Pará were converted to pasture, and a new frontier 
was opened in northern Mato Grosso and western Pará with the construction of the BR-163 
Cuiabá-Santarém highway in 1971-1976. 
Mining also expanded during this period. Industrial-scale mining was driven by the state-
owned Companhia Vale do Rio Doce. Vale (as the company is known today) took over 
development of the Carajás mineral deposits from US Steel in the late 1970s to create the world’s 
largest iron ore mine (Figure 6.1),52 whose operations are powered principally by the Tucuruí 
hydroelectric dam, constructed on the Tocantins River in 1975-1984. Gold mining, meanwhile, 
will forever be remembered for the gold rush at Serra Pelada, also in the Carajás region, where at 
its peak in the early 1980s an estimated 100,000 men swarmed a giant open pit, seeking their 
fortunes in metal clawed from the earth. 
																																																						
52 Financing for the Carajás Iron Project came from the World Bank, the Brazilian National Development Bank 
(BNDE, today BNDES), the European Community, Japan, and eventually also American commercial banks and the 
USSR (Antoni 2010; Vale 2012). The world’s largest iron mine was thus developed with investments by a virtually 
complete list of the financial capitals of the global industrial core. 
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Figure 6.1: Part of the Carajás mining complex seen from the air, 28 July 2014. 
The expansion of the agricultural frontier in the Amazon entailed an upheaval in property 
relations in the region. The initial colonial occupation occurred through land grants and 
concessions, but agrarian legislation passed prior to independence in 1822 recognized private land 
rights accrued through occupation and effective use (posse), allowing for the establishment of 
independent land claims on undesignated state lands (terra devoluta) (Schmink and Wood 1992, 
42). By the end of World War II, there was a long history of often overlapping land claims by both 
small and large landholders in the Amazon. The military government, on coming to power, seized 
control over vast areas of land from the Amazonian states and sought to facilitate the distribution 
of land to private investors. Far from creating a regular, modernized tenure regime in the Amazon, 
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the interventions of the military government intensified the tenurial chaos in the region, for several 
reasons. First, the cadastral optic of agrarian tenure was layered over past extractivist land claims 
such as the aforamentos, and federal development programs clashed with elites such as brazil nut 
concessionaires (foreiros) who sought to maintain and expand their control of land (Schmink and 
Wood 1992, 65–66). Second, the military’s promotion of agriculture and ranching was beset by an 
internal tension between support for smallholder colonization programs and promotion of large-
scale ranching and agro-industrial investments. As Schmink and Wood observe, “The crux of the 
matter was the incompatibility between two opposing sets of priorities. On the one hand, there was 
an emphasis on private property and on incentives to capital accumulation and technological 
change; on the other, there were the provisions for state intervention to reduce poverty and to make 
land available to those who worked it. The contradiction lay at the heart of the so-called ‘agrarian 
question’” (Schmink and Wood 1992, 61) and generated a highly contentious agricultural frontier 
characterized by a mixture of actors and land uses. Third, existing structures of power and 
patronage in the Amazonian extractive regime and the advent of new, capitalized private investors 
to the rapidly expanding frontier created a fertile environment for corruption, rent-seizing, and all 
manner of plunder. 
 The developmentalist interventions of the military government failed to transform the 
Amazon from a zone of extraction to a zone of productivist modernization. Instead, the extractive 
regime in the Amazon was reconfigured during the 1970s and 1980s through the rise of a new 
extractive elite of large ranchers (fazendeiros) and land-grabbers (grileiros), who ruled the 
‘Faroeste’ (Wild West) of the Amazonian frontier through networks of corruption and patronage 
and waged ‘land wars’ with hired guns to dispossess small farmers, indigenous peoples, and 
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extractivist communities (Simmons et al. 2007). Land titles were multiple times forged or 
fraudulently issued and subsequently revoked, and SUDAM became a vehicle for corruption. 
One emblematic figure at the national level among the corrupt Amazonian elite is Jader 
Barbalho, who since the 1970s has served two terms each as federal deputy, senator, and governor 
of Pará. (He is currently serving his second term as senator.) Barbalho owns a newspaper and part 
of a TV station in his home state, and since democratization has been a supporter of the Sarney, 
Franco, Cardoso and Lula governments. He has also been accused of massive corruption linked to 
the operation of SUDAM in Pará, where he allegedly coordinated the diversion of over a billion 
reais, and probably an amount several times greater, almost certainly exceeding US$1 billion 
(Brasiliense 2005; O Globo 2010). Barbalho was forced to resign from the Senate in 2001 in the 
midst of the SUDAM corruption scandal, yet he has continued to be elected to national political 
offices, and today he is again under investigation for corruption, in particular related to the 
construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam on the Xingu River in Pará (M. C. Carvalho 
2016). Closer to the ground, in the ranching sector, a typical example of the extractive elite is the 
logger and rancher João Cleber de Souza Torres, whose properties have been embargoed by the 
federal government for illegal deforestation, who is widely believed to have ordered the killings 
of multiple people in land disputes (Simionato 2003), and who in 2012 was elected mayor of São 
Félix do Xingu. His brother and accomplice, Francisco Torres de Paula Filho (known as 
‘Torrinho’), was Municipal Secretary of Administration and Planning in João Cleber’s 
administration and in 2014 was elected president of the Rural Producers’ Syndicate (SPR), the 
association representing large ranchers in São Félix. 
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INPE (1989) estimates that in 1975 only 0.6 percent of the Legal Amazon53 had been 
deforested (cf. Moran 1993), and Skole and Tucker (1993) estimate that in 1978 just 1.9 percent 
of the original forest area of the Brazilian Amazon had been cleared. Between 1978 and 2004, 
when deforestation peaked, roughly 600,000 km2 of forest were cleared, an area larger than 
metropolitan France. Cattle ranching, the land use that occupies an estimated 60-80 percent of this 
deforested land (Margulis 2004; Embrapa 2011; Sy et al. 2015), was established in an extractive 
mode reinforced by speculation. The productive value of the herd in Amazonian ranching 
operations is often secondary to the ability to profit from future land sales and government tax 
breaks and subsidies (Bowman et al. 2012). Where the exchange value of land far exceeds its 
productive value, land managers have few incentives to invest in sustainable practices (Hecht 
1985). Ranchers consolidate large properties, frequently through coercive or illegal land grabbing, 
extract the fertility of deforested land through unmanaged or excessive grazing, and then as 
pastures become degraded they move on to grab and clear new areas (Rodrigues et al. 2009). From 
the mid-1980s, cattle ranching also became widespread among smallholders (Poccard-Chapuis et 
al. 2001; Smeraldi and May 2008), intensifying cycles of land degradation and frontier expansion. 
Insecure land tenure, especially for smallholders, constituted a further factor promoting 
deforestation (to establish ownership through ‘productive use’) and inhibiting agricultural 
intensification (by hindering credit access and discouraging capital investments) (Alston, Libecap, 
and Mueller 1999; W. Jepson 2006b). 
																																																						
53 The Legal Amazon is an area designated by the Brazilian Government for the purpose of regional policy, initially 
defined in tandem with the establishment of SPVEA, and currently includes the present-day states of Acre, Amapá, 
Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins, and the western part of the state of Maranhão. The 
Amazon Biome as designated by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) covers the majority of 
the Legal Amazon, though substantial portions of the states of Mato Grosso, Tocantins, and Maranhão are 
designated as falling within the Cerrado (savanna) biome. See also Chapter 2. 
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The extractive regime in the Brazilian Amazon persisted throughout the second half of the 
20th century, coopting, redirecting, and obstructing external attempts to promote productivist 
modernization. Networks of patronage and corruption, a lack of tenurial clarity, and the frequent 
use of violence allowed powerful actors to extract windfall profits through primitive accumulation 
and dispossession of indigenous and traditional populations and small farmer colonists in an 
atmosphere made more contentious by policy reversals and contradictions. This extractive regime 
enriched loggers, ranchers, miners, and land grabbers at a cost of deforestation, land degradation, 
and dispossession, without supporting regional socio-economic development. Nonetheless, the 
‘underdevelopment’ of the Amazon, as Bunker (1985) observed, was integrally linked with the 
productivist development of the Brazilian core regions of the South and Southeast, and later the 
Center-West, as well as growth in the industrialized Global North. 
Feeding the Productivist Core 
The end of the transatlantic slave trade to Brazil in 1850 coincided with political upheaval 
in Europe, and from the mid-19th century through the early 20th century Brazil attracted waves of 
immigration from Germany and Italy, and subsequently also from Japan in the 1920s-1930s. 
Immigration was initially linked to providing labor for coffee plantations, especially in São Paulo 
State, but immigrants also established farming colonies in the more sparsely populated South 
Region (in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná). These waves of 
immigration helped transform the political economy of southern Brazil from an agro-export 
platform to something more similar to a settler colony, as immigrants carved out livelihoods as 
yeoman farmers and businesspeople. The 1960s and 1970s were a period of rapid mechanization 
and intensification of agriculture in southern Brazil, driven particularly by the expansion of soy, 
which was increasingly in demand for animal feeds in Europe and North America (Fearnside 
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2002). The industrialization of agriculture in the South and Southeast displaced hundreds of 
thousands of small farmers, giving impetus to colonization programs in the Amazon and leading 
eventually to the founding of the Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores 
Sem Terra – MST) in 1984. Cattle ranching had been the principal agricultural land use in the 
Brazilian backlands since the 16th century, as it knit together the plantation economies of the 
Atlantic coast with the mining regions of the interior (Burns 1993, 71–75). With the expansion of 
industrial field cropping into former pasture areas in South and Southeast Brazil, cattle production 
in those regions intensified and extensive ranching was displaced towards the Amazonian frontier 
(cf. Arima et al. 2011; Martha, Alves, and Contini 2012). 
Agricultural intensification in southern Brazil since the 1970s has resulted in land sparing 
at the regional level. Barretto et al. (2013) find that under conditions of land scarcity in the 
consolidated agricultural zones of the Brazilian South and Southeast, intensification of pastures 
and cropland was associated with stable or declining agricultural area from 1975-2006, while in 
the frontier zones of central and northern Brazil, intensification coincided with agricultural 
expansion. Land sparing in the Brazilian core has driven a regional forest transition in the Atlantic 
Forest biome, but Walker (2012) demonstrates that this regional transition belies aggregate forest 
loss through displacement of deforestation to the Amazon region. Agricultural intensification in 
southern Brazil articulated with broader processes of industrialization to produce the ‘Brazilian 
economic miracle’ of the 1960s and 1970s. The rapid growth and industrialization of the Brazilian 
core relied on the ‘internal colony’ (Hechter 1975) of the Amazonian periphery (contra Cleary 
1993). Colonization of the Amazon served to relieve social pressures brought about by poverty 
and dispossession in the southern core and the stagnant Northeast, while energy and materials 
extracted from the Amazon in the form of timber, metals, electricity, and cattle supported industrial 
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investments and growth in the core. Amazonian extraction also fed productivist growth in the 
Global North, both directly through exports of Amazonian resources and indirectly through 
relations mediated by the Brazilian core. From 1971 to 1980, annual exports from Brazil more than 
quintupled, growing from under $4 billion to over $20 billion, driven especially by exports of soy, 
iron, and machinery (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011), and trade grew from 14.6 to 20.4 percent of GDP 
(The World Bank 2017). The ‘intensive frontier’ of productivist industrial agriculture, led by soy 
cultivation, expanded into the Cerrado biome in the Center-West during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Fearnside 2002), with continued strong effects on Amazonian deforestation (cf. Arima et al. 2011; 
Richards, Walker, and Arima 2014). Displacement effects of productivist development are 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Forest Conservation in the Amazon: Protected Areas and Socio-Environmentalism 
 While the political economy of the Amazon through the end of the 20th century was geared 
towards extraction, there were nonetheless attempts by various coalitions to conserve forest areas 
and to moderate extractive expansion, especially as deforestation accelerated after 1975. Forest 
conservation efforts during the 20th century operated largely within a protected areas model. 
Protected area creation in Brazil, as elsewhere, developed initially under a Western “cult of the 
wilderness” ideology (Martínez-Alier 2002) through which scientists and environmentalists 
interested in wilderness conservation found common cause with state efforts to control people and 
resources. The Brazilian Government began to create protected conservation areas after the 
promulgation of the first Federal Forest Code in 1934,54 and the earliest designations were made 
in the Atlantic Forest region, where protection of forested mountainsides also served important 
																																																						
54 The 1934 Forest Code was replaced by the military government in 1965. The 1965 Forest Code remained in effect 
until a revised Forest Code was passed in 2012. 
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hydrological functions by limiting erosion and regulating stream flow. The Getúlio Vargas 
government declared a national forest area in São Paulo State in 1934 and Brazil’s first national 
park, between Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais States, in 1937. The first national park in the 
Amazon biome, Araguaia National Park in present-day Tocantins, was created in 1959, followed 
by the designation of Xingu National Park in 1961, which was subsequently converted into an 
indigenous territory. Protected area creation expanded dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s, 
during which time the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Unidades de 
Conservação – SNUC) was developed, and several large parks were declared in Amazonas State 
during this period. When The Nature Conservancy entered Brazil in the early 1990s, opening its 
first South American office in Brasília in 1994, its activities were primarily related to the USAID-
funded ‘Parks in Peril’ program aimed at improving protected areas management. 
Protected area creation in Brazil contains a number of different designations in addition to 
national parks and has developed through historical processes driven by several different 
assemblages. Strictly-protected conservation areas – including National Parks, Biological 
Reserves, and Ecological Stations – correspond to the cult-of-the-wilderness model. ‘Sustainable 
use’ conservation areas and indigenous territories (which have a distinct legal status that developed 
during the early 20th century and was consolidated in the 1973 Indian Statute – Estatuto do Índio) 
allow occupation by local or indigenous populations, and their creation has generally resulted from 
advocacy by coalitions of local and indigenous people, indigenous rights and environmental 
NGOs, and government indigenous and environmental agencies (Hecht and Cockburn 1989). Prior 
to the 2000s, strictly-protected areas in the Amazon were located mainly in remote regions far 
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from the deforestation frontier, whereas indigenous territories and sustainable use areas were often 
created in direct response to frontier expansion (Veríssimo et al. 2011).55 
 Sustainable use conservation areas such as Extractivist Reserves (Reservas Extrativistas – 
RESEX)56 and Sustainable Development Reserves were the product of the socio-environmentalist 
movement that coalesced in Brazil in the 1980s. In 1981, the federal government began work on 
the Polonoroeste project, a development program to pave the BR-364 highway to Porto Velho in 
Rondônia and provide infrastructure for colonization areas. World Bank financing for the project 
included provisions for the protection of indigenous territories and conservation areas. The 
immediate effects of Polonoroeste included a surge of new migrants to the southwestern Amazon 
and corresponding jumps in deforestation and the invasion of indigenous lands and conservation 
areas. Anthropologists working with indigenous peoples in the region spoke out against the project, 
and their protest was joined by environmentalists in the United States who were seeking to use 
lending from multilateral development banks (MDBs) as a lever to affect environmental issues in 
the Global South (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 135–38). The environmentalist campaigners succeeded 
in prompting the US Congress to hold hearings on MDB lending practices, which led to 
Congressional recommendations aimed at strengthening the banks’ environmental policies. In 
1985, the World Bank suspended funding for Polonoroeste due to the violation of conditions for 
the protection of indigenous territories and conservation areas. 
 In Acre, to the west of Rondônia, rubber tappers under the leadership of Chico Mendes had 
been organizing since the mid-1970s, largely in the context of the Brazilian labor movement, in 
order to defend their livelihoods from expanding cattle ranching. Following the intense 
																																																						
55 I use the term ‘protected areas’ hereafter in this chapter to refer generically to strictly-protected and sustainable-use 
conservation areas and indigenous territories. 
56 Reserva Extrativista is usually translated as ‘Extractive Reserve,’ but in keeping with my usage, which 
distinguishes between extractivism and extraction, I translate the term literally as ‘Extractivist Reserve.’ 
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mobilization against the Polonoroeste project, environmentalist activists focused attention on the 
Rio Branco-Porto Velho Road Improvement Project, a plan financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank for paving of the BR-364 between Rondônia and Acre. Supporters of the Acre 
rubber tappers and American environmentalists formed an alliance, and at the first meeting of the 
National Council of Rubber Tappers (Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros) in 1985 a proposal 
was put forward for the establishment of Extractivist Reserves in the Amazon. The reserves, 
partially inspired by indigenous territories, would guarantee tappers’ use of the land and ensure 
the protection of the forest. Chico Mendes’ visit to Washington, DC in 1987 and his subsequent 
assassination in 1988, coupled with growing public concern over destruction of Amazonian 
forests, helped popularize the rubber tapper cause and establish the framing of rubber tappers’ 
struggle to preserve their livelihood in environmentalist terms (Keck 1995). 
 The struggle around Polonoroeste and the alliance between environmentalists and the 
rubber tappers’ movement consolidated a discourse of socio-environmentalism 
(socioambientalismo) in Brazil that linked forest conservation with the livelihoods of local peoples 
(Hochstetler and Keck 2007).57 Socio-environmental advocacy was further enabled by Brazil’s 
democratic opening, which was marked by return to civilian rule in 1985 and the promulgation of 
a new democratic constitution in 1988. Prior to the 1980s, virtually all protected areas had been 
designated by the federal government, but after 1985 the Amazonian states also began to create 
conservation areas (Veríssimo et al. 2011). The first Extractivist Reserves were created in Acre, 
Amapá, and Rondônia in 1990, and in 1992 Brazil hosted the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, which helped consolidate global sustainable development 
																																																						
57 Socio-environmentalism is an example of the environmentalist discourse that Martínez-Alier (2002) terms 
‘environmentalism of the poor.’ 
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discourse and strengthened environmentalist advocacy in Brazil and linkages between Northern 
and Southern environmental NGOs. The Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforest 
(PPG7), a multilateral cooperation program of the G7 countries administered in part by the World 
Bank, was technically founded in 1990 and became operational in 1994, directing support to 
protected area creation and environmental governance institutions (Antoni 2010). In 1994, the 
Brazilian NGO Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) was formed out of a network of environmentalist 
and indigenous rights activists. The first Sustainable Development Reserve was created in 
Amazonas State in 1996. The socio-environmentalist movement was thus responsible for the 
proliferation of ‘sustainable use’ areas within the Brazilian protected areas system, and socio-
environmentalist coalitions played a key role in the dramatic expansion of the Amazonian 
protected areas network in the mid-2000s, though I argue that socio-environmentalism was 
secondary to the land sparing complex in engineering the Amazonian land use transformation that 
took shape after 2004. 
From Remote Preserves to ‘Green Barriers’ 
Globally, neoliberalization of environmental governance during the 1990s and 2000s 
shifted mainstream environmentalism from the cult of the wilderness towards a focus on ecosystem 
services and multifunctional landscapes. TNC was one of the organizations spearheading this shift 
(e.g., Kareiva, Marvier, and Lalasz 2012), which entailed new articulations between 
environmentalists, state territorial interests, and capitalist interests. A neoliberal protected areas 
complex emerged that linked protected areas to capital accumulation for an assemblage centered 
on the natural resources and tourism sectors, financial capital, and environmental NGOs. The 
emerging linkages of protected areas to this fraction of capital under the protected areas complex 
is evident in Brazil through initiatives such as payments-for-ecosystem services in Juma 
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Sustainable Development Reserve, created in 2006 (V. Viana et al. 2008); private forestry 
concessions in National Forests, legalized in 2006; and a public-private agreement promoting 
tourism in federal conservation areas, signed in 2009 (Veríssimo et al. 2011). 
By 2002, nearly 650,000 km2 in the Amazon had been designated to state or federal 
conservation areas. In the ensuing four years, almost 500,000 km2 of new state and federal 
conservation areas were designated (Veríssimo et al. 2011, 24). This explosion in protected area 
creation was due not primarily to the protected areas complex or socio-environmentalist advocacy, 
but rather to the integration of protected areas into the land sparing complex, which reorganized 
the territorial and accumulative logics of protected area creation. 
The protected areas complex links environmentalist interests in biodiversity conservation 
with state interests in territorialization and capitalist interests in primitive accumulation within 
forest reserves. Under the land sparing complex in the Brazilian Amazon, the spatial logic is 
inverted. Forest conservation results from complementarity of biodiversity and ecosystem services 
conservation with state interests in territorialization and capitalist interests in accumulation outside 
forest reserves, through territorial constriction and agricultural intensification. This new spatial 
logic drove a geographic shift in Amazonian protected area creation. Prior to 2003, strictly-
protected conservation areas were primarily located in remote regions, but after 2003 new 
conservation areas have been located principally in areas of high deforestation pressure, where 
they operate as “green barriers” to deforestation (Soares-Filho et al. 2010). Although enclosure 
and primitive accumulation persist as capitalist interests in protected areas, the dominant logic of 
protected area creation has become territorial constriction under the land sparing complex. 
Emergence of the Land Sparing Complex 
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 The expansion of extractive peripheries and productive centers is a fundamental dynamic 
of capitalism (Bunker 1985; Moore 2000). While the Amazon remained largely an extractive 
periphery until the 2000s, the Brazilian state since World War II has been controlled by a 
developmentalist regime promoting productivist modernization. Following the democratic 
transition in the 1980s, the socio-environmental movement gained strength, and the Brazilian 
Public Ministry, a body of independent prosecutors, was restructured to become a proponent for 
environmental law enforcement (McAllister 2005). Multiple structural and conjunctural factors 
then converged in the mid-2000s to align opponents of the extractive economy, including local 
populations, environmentalists, and productivist elements of the Brazilian government and 
transnational capital, who assembled the land sparing complex as a political-economic and 
environmental project to transform the political-economic regime of the Amazon from extraction 
to productivism. 
 Structurally, infrastructure spending, agricultural research, and global commodity-chain 
development brought industrial soy and cattle production to the southern and eastern Amazon. The 
increasing role of corporate agribusiness in Amazonian land change alarmed environmentalists 
and the Public Ministry, who began to exert pressure down global supply chains to control 
deforestation (Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006). Mainstream environmental NGOs had 
corporatized during the 1980-1990s, adopting neoliberal modalities of ‘partnership’ with 
governments and corporations that facilitated a “politics of agreement” among powerful actors 
(Hecht 2011, 7). Critically, remote sensing and GIS technology for monitoring deforestation had 
advanced during the 1990s, and INPE emerged in Brazil as a center of technological capacity, 
enabling more active and targeted regulation. 
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 Conjuncturally, land sparing arguments gained prominence in academic discourse in the 
2000s. International attention to the role of forests in climate change also grew rapidly, leading to 
inclusion of REDD in UN climate negotiations in 2005. Domestic concern over climate change 
heightened in Brazil following the El Niño of 1997-1998 and the Amazon drought of 2005.58 The 
inauguration of President Lula in 2003 brought to power an administration with ties to socio-
environmental movements, installing rubber-tapper activist Marina Silva as Minister of 
Environment, but simultaneous alliances with agribusiness demanded a conciliation of 
environmental protection with agricultural production. Under these conditions, productivist 
elements in the Brazilian executive linked with environmental and enforcement agencies and NGO 
and civil society networks to articulate a new environment and development agenda for the 
Amazon. 
Land Sparing in the Amazon: Territorial Constriction and Agricultural Intensification 
Land sparing is attractive to a range of powerful actors. Agricultural intensification is 
favored by agro-industrial corporations because it improves supply-chain productivity and 
governability, integrates producers into markets for inputs and financial products like credit and 
insurance, and can bring environmentalist commendation for sustainable production as opposed to 
condemnation for deforestation. The state favors agricultural intensification because it is 
associated with higher incomes, better infrastructure, and increased public goods provision 
(VanWey et al. 2013), which are elements of increased state revenues and capacity (i.e., state-
building). Environmentalists favor intensification to reconcile forest conservation with economic 
																																																						
58 Although from a narrower perspective extreme weather events are conjunctural, the frequency of extreme events 
is predicted to increase with climate change, which is exacerbated by deforestation. These events are thus also linked 
to long-term structural changes. 
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development (Table 6.1). The question is how to stimulate agricultural intensification and avoid 
the rebound effect in order to decouple agricultural development from deforestation. 
On agricultural lands in the Brazilian Amazon, two forms of intensification predominate: 
intensification of cattle ranching through practices such as improved pasture management, and 
intensification via transition in techno-managerial system from ranching to industrial field 
agriculture (cf. Laney 2002). Other forms of intensification exist also, for instance through 
diversification of smallholder production with cacao agroforestry. Ranching intensification and 
pasture-to-cropland conversions are the most important forms of intensification for the Amazonian 
land use transition, however. As the contrast between land change trajectories in the Atlantic Forest 
and Amazon biomes illustrates, crop and pasture intensification under conditions of land scarcity 
may result in land sparing, while intensification on open frontiers may drive further agricultural 
expansion (Walker 2012; Barretto et al. 2013). Land scarcity, or territorial constriction that 
produces land scarcity, is a key variable interacting with agricultural intensification to determine 
land cover change. Intensification does not automatically spare land for nature, but when 
intensification occurs in conjunction with territorial constriction through forest protection, it may 
deliver increasing agricultural production concurrent with decreasing deforestation (Phalan, 
Balmford, et al. 2011), at least at the regional level. The land sparing strategy developed in the 
Brazilian Amazon relies primarily on territorial constriction to both stimulate intensification and 
avoid agricultural land expansion. 
Territorial Constriction and Agricultural Intensification 
The territorial character of Brazilian forest governance has been discussed by other 
scholars. Nepstad et al. (2014) describe post-2008 governance as a “territorial performance” 
approach, but their usage is limited to distinguishing municipal-level (‘territorial’) interventions 
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from policies targeting farmers individually. A more developed treatment of the territorial 
character of Amazonian governance considers ‘territorial ordering’ (ordenamento territorial), a 
discourse deployed by the federal government to orient landscape-level development and 
conservation planning. Baletti (2012) analyzes territorial ordering as a re-territorialization of the 
Amazon that reconciles environmentalism with developmentalism under ‘green capitalism.’ 
Nonetheless, she does not discuss the linkage of territorial ordering with the creation of land 
scarcity through territorial constriction as a strategy for supporting agricultural intensification. 
 Territorial constriction, i.e., land scarcity within a bounded terrain (cf. Elden 2010), is 
fundamental to interrelated processes of state-building and agricultural intensification. 
Circumscribed agricultural land has historically been a condition for emergence of institutionalized 
hierarchies that are the foundation of the state (Carneiro 1970), while constriction is also a primary 
driver of intensification. In Boserup’s (1965) classic model, rising population on limited land 
impels farmers to increase output per unit area. While in the classic model intensification occurred 
through increasing labor inputs, with decreasing output per unit labor, industrial agriculture relies 
heavily on capital investments to increase both agricultural yield and labor productivity. Capitalist 
growth rests on twin foundations of primitive accumulation and productivity gains. Where 
primitive accumulation through frontier expansion is limited by territorial constriction, 
investments in intensification to support continued growth may follow, driving a transition to a 
productivist economy. 
Land scarcity is not the only stimulus for intensification, nor is intensification the only 
response to land scarcity (G. Stone and Downum 1999). Nonetheless, the ‘induced intensification 
thesis’ that land constraints drive intensification is valid in many contexts (Turner and Ali 1996; 
Laney 2002). Intensification may exacerbate social stratification as those able to make larger 
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investments in productivity improve their relative socio-economic position (Turner and Ali 1996), 
while social stratification and state development feed back into intensification as dominant groups 
extract surplus from their subjects (Carneiro 1970). 
 Territorial constriction can therefore operate as a political-economic strategy for socio-
economic development and state-building. In addition to state, environmentalist, and corporate 
interests in intensification resulting from territorial constriction, constriction per se is attractive to 
the state because it territorializes by fixing the population in space; to environmentalists because 
it conserves forest by halting agricultural expansion; and to some agricultural capitalists because 
scarcity may increase land values (Table 6.1).59 The land sparing complex thus inverts the logic of 
the protected areas complex, shifting focus to the agricultural zone ‘outside the box’ of protected 
areas. 
Table 6.1: Actors and Interests in Amazonian Land Sparing 
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PPCDAm 
 In 2004, the federal government launched the ‘Action Plan for the Prevention and Control 
of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon’ (PPCDAm), bringing activities of 13 federal ministries 
under coordination of the President’s Office. Under PPCDAm, anti-deforestation efforts 
																																																						
59 I owe the point regarding land values to Gustavo Oliveira. 
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developed along three axes (IPEA, CEPAL, and GIZ 2011): 1) ‘territorial ordering,’ including 
protected area creation and land tenure regularization; 2) monitoring and enforcement, including 
enforcement of the Federal Forest Code, which required preservation of areas of natural vegetation 
on rural properties; and 3) support for sustainable production, including technical assistance and 
financing for agricultural intensification. Protected area creation and Forest Code enforcement 
anchored the land sparing complex with territorial constriction, while support for sustainable 
production and tenure regularization would facilitate land sparing intensification (Figure 6.2). As 
farmers and ranchers have begun to feel territorially constrained, an extractive coalition 
represented by the ‘ruralist bench’ of the Brazilian Congress has pushed back with a revision of 
the Forest Code in 2012 and efforts to weaken protected areas. 
In a typical neoliberal modality, government policies of PPCDAm form the backbone of 
environmental governance, while mechanisms for implementing these policies frequently rely on 
non-state actors. Implementation of PPCDAm has thus catalyzed and structured the assembling of 
the land sparing complex. I describe the regional-level development of PPCDAm strategies 
through the emergent land sparing complex before moving to state and municipal case studies 
illustrating implementation of these strategies on the ground by land sparing coalitions. 
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Figure 6.2: The Brazilian Land Sparing Model. This model depicts the simplified, ideal 
relationships motivating land sparing advocates. Protected area creation and Forest Code 
enforcement contribute to state-building through territorialization and produce territorial 
constriction. Territorial constriction guarantees forest conservation while inducing agricultural 
intensification, which is also supported by tenure regularization and agricultural policy. Agricultural 
intensification catalyzes socio-economic development, and development and state-building are 
mutually reinforcing. 
Protected Area Creation 
 In 2004-2007 under PPCDAm, nearly 20 million hectares of new conservation areas were 
created, primarily in zones of high deforestation pressure in the eastern Amazon. Protected area 
creation in the Terra do Meio region of Pará, between São Félix and Novo Progresso, was driven 
by a socio-environmental coalition anchored by smallholder farmers, who sought to halt the 
expansion of large-scale ranches. The planning process for Terra do Meio was facilitated by 
domestic and international environmental NGOs, including Instituto Socioambiental, Greenpeace, 
and the Woods Hole Research Center (Campos and Nepstad 2006; S. Schwartzman et al. 2010). 
During the same period, indigenous peoples and activists secured designation of 10 million 
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hectares of indigenous territories. These new protected areas act as ‘green barriers’ to agricultural 
expansion. In contrast to Indonesia, protected area status in Brazil (particularly strictly-protected 
status or designation as an indigenous territory) substantially reduces the likelihood of 
deforestation (Nolte et al. 2013), and Soares-Filho et al. (2010) estimate protected area creation 
was responsible for 37 percent of the decrease in Amazonian deforestation in 2004-2006. 
Forest Code Enforcement 
 The military government had passed a new federal Forest Code in 1965, which was 
subsequently modified by presidential decrees. At the beginning of the 2000s, the Forest Code 
required rural landowners to maintain ‘permanent protection areas’ along water courses and on 
steep slopes and to maintain an additional percentage of the property as a ‘legal reserve’ of natural 
habitat, which in the Amazon biome was set to 80 percent of the property area (Figure 6.3). These 
requirements went largely unenforced, such that by 2012, achieving compliance would have 
required restoration of 50 million hectares nationally (Soares-Filho et al. 2014). Under PPCDAm, 
the federal government intensified Forest Code enforcement, effecting territorial constriction on 
private properties through enhanced deforestation monitoring and enforcement and development 
of environmental registration systems to regulate property-level compliance. 
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Figure 6.3: Pastures and forest in southeastern Pará show the landscape created by Forest Code 
compliance, with permanent protection areas of forest along watercourses and larger blocs of 
forest that could be a legal reserve or protected area, 18 July 2014. 
The Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) exemplifies the close but contingent and 
sometimes conflictual interactions between Brazilian municipal, state, and federal governments, 
NGOs, and corporations in environmental governance. CAR developed out of the System for 
Environmental Licensing of Rural Properties (SLAPR) in Mato Grosso, a registry funded by 
international donors for managing environmental licensing with remote sensing and GIS (Rajão, 
Azevedo, and Stabile 2012). In 2006, spurred by a Greenpeace campaign, transnational soy traders 
agreed to a moratorium on purchasing soy from newly-deforested areas in the Amazon. The Soy 
Moratorium and environmentalist pressures motivated the municipal government of Lucas do Rio 
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Verde (Lucas) in Mato Grosso to partner with The Nature Conservancy to pursue environmental 
compliance, including SLAPR registration of all rural properties. The Lucas project began in 2006, 
but in 2008 the federal environmental enforcement agency (IBAMA) fined landowners in Lucas 
for violations. The fines damaged the project’s credibility with producers and led to lobbying by 
municipal leaders, TNC, and the state environmental agency, culminating in a state law creating 
CAR in Mato Grosso (Rausch 2013, 263–64). CAR divided environmental licensing into parts: 
producers first voluntarily register their properties with state environmental authorities through 
CAR and then are granted a period to achieve compliance without incurring fines for past illegal 
clearing. 
CAR spread regionally and nationally. In 2008, the Ministry of Environment (MMA) 
published a ‘priority list’ of Amazonian municipalities for combating deforestation that subjected 
priority municipalities to strict monitoring and enforcement. A requirement for exiting the list 
became completion of CAR in 80 percent of a municipality’s private property area.60 TNC, other 
NGOs, and the federal government developed CAR registration programs across the Amazon, and 
in 2009, under pressure from environmentalists and public prosecutors, meatpacking corporations 
in the Amazon began requiring CAR from producers in order to purchase their cattle. Pará 
launched a Green Municipalities Program in 2011 to encourage CAR registration, and at the 
federal level, CAR entered the 2012 Forest Code revision as a requirement for all rural properties 
in Brazil. Assunção, Gandour, and Rocha (2012) find overall that new conservation policies 
avoided over 62,000 km2 of deforestation in 2005-2009, while Arima et al. (2014) estimate that 
policies targeting priority municipalities avoided over 10,000 km2 of deforestation in 2009-2011. 
																																																						
60 The other requirements were a municipal deforestation rate of less than or equal to 40 km2 per year and a two-year 
average annual deforestation rate less than or equal to 60 percent of the average of the previous two-year period 
(MMA 2009). 
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Tenure Regularization 
Secure land tenure is a foundational institution of productivist regimes (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Lawry et al. 2017). Tenure regularization contributes to state-
building, but in relation to land sparing constriction and intensification, land titling functions to 
enable agricultural intensification. In 2009, the Brazilian Government launched the Terra Legal 
(Legal Land) program to support titling for Amazonian settlers. This program was a late addition 
to PPCDAm, and its performance has been weak. Against a goal of titling nearly 150,000 
properties, by November 2015 fewer than 20,000 titles had been issued (IPEA, CEPAL, and GIZ 
2011; Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário 2015). While many actors hoped environmental 
registration through CAR might facilitate tenure regularization, the spread of CAR has not yet 
resulted in accelerated titling. Some NGOs have sought to support tenure regularization, but titling 
depends on the government and NGOs have made little headway. 
While tenure regularization is an enabling condition for agricultural investment (W. Jepson 
2006b), it is neither sufficient for intensification (Futemma and Brondízio 2003) nor absolutely 
necessary. Formal title is one indication of tenure security, but untitled producers, especially large 
landholders, may have fairly secure tenure even without possessing legal title (J. Campbell 2015b), 
and therefore may still respond to constriction through investments in intensification. Agricultural 
credit is not necessarily dependent on definitive title, and smaller producers who lack title but have 
completed CAR may receive financing. Tenure regularization has thus far done little to encourage 
intensification at the regional level in the Amazon, and insecure tenure remains a barrier to 
investment. 
Support for Sustainable Production 
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 The final axis of PPCDAm is support for ‘sustainable production,’ including agricultural 
intensification. In 2011-2014, the Brazilian Government provided $2.7 billion in credit through its 
Low-Carbon Agriculture Program (ABC) to support activities such as restoration of degraded 
pastures and integrated ranching-cropping-forestry systems (Observatório ABC 2014). The federal 
agricultural research corporation, Embrapa, promotes ranching intensification through improved 
pasture management and environmental compliance, and the executive’s Secretariat for Strategic 
Affairs (SAE) has sought to develop a ranching intensification credit line. 
Meanwhile, environmental NGOs have expanded beyond their focus on natural areas to 
support ranching intensification and agricultural production on degraded lands. Brazilian NGO 
Instituto Centro de Vida supports ranching intensification in northern Mato Grosso, with funding 
from Fundo Vale, the foundation of Brazil’s Vale mining company. In São Félix, TNC has 
developed a Sustainable Beef project, supported by meat processor Marfrig and retailer Walmart, 
and a Cargill-funded program promoting cacao agroforestry on degraded lands. 
In general, however, support for sustainable production and tenure regularization, the two 
strategies facilitating agricultural intensification, have had weaker implementation than policies 
supporting territorial constriction. The state and municipal-level incorporated comparisons 
demonstrate how this weakness results in a partial land use transition that may realize land sparing 
goals incompletely and unevenly. Land sparing policies have effected institutional change and 
increased the productivist quotient of the Amazonian economy, but because core and periphery 
are fractal features of the geography of capitalism, uneven development ramifies at the regional 
and local levels in the Amazon as agro-industry consolidates in some areas while extractive 
economies persist and sometimes expand in others. 
TNC in the Brazilian Amazon 
 
	
	
303 
 The Nature Conservancy began working in Brazil in the early 1990s, initially with a strong 
focus on protected areas management. In keeping with the eco-regional approach of Conservation 
by Design, which was launched in 1995, TNC’s activities in Brazil were organized into eco-
regional programs with ‘biome managers’ based in Brasília. These programs coalesced into the 
Amazon Conservation Program and the Atlantic Forest and Central Savannas Program (AFCS). 
The Amazon Conservation Program office in Belém was opened in 2003, and the program was 
especially active in Pará, though given its ostensible responsibility for the entire Amazon region, 
the program included activities as far-flung as Ecuador and Colombia. AFCS opened an office in 
Curitiba in 2001, which focused on activities in the Atlantic Forest biome, while a regional office 
was finally opened in Cuiabá in 2008 to manage activities in the Central Savannas (Cerrado). 
While AFCS did occasionally work outside of Brazil, notably in Paraguay, it was less regionally 
active than the Amazon Program (TNC20 140428). The Amazon Biome of northern Mato Grosso 
represented a gray zone for TNC’s programs. While activities in the Amazon were technically the 
responsibility of the Amazon Conservation Program in Belém, northern Mato Grosso was much 
closer to the Cuiabá office, which also maintained closer relationships with government, NGO, 
and corporate actors in the state. Coordination problems abounded. 
During 2008, TNC conducted a feasibility study to identify municipalities for REDD pilot 
projects in Brazil. The study identified Northwest Mato Grosso and the São Félix do Xingu region 
of Pará, but TNC managers were unable to agree internally on a single pilot project, as the Amazon 
Program was set on working on the ranching frontier in São Félix but AFCS was eager to have a 
REDD project in Mato Grosso (TNC12 140409). TNC began working in both locations. In 
Northwest Mato Grosso, TNC was part of a REDD working group that included Instituto Centro 
de Vida (ICV), a Mato Grosso NGO, the state environmental agency (SEMA), and the 
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international arm of the French National Forest Office (ONF International). Their activities 
eventually came to focus on the municipality of Cotriguaçu, and by 2011 TNC had largely left the 
REDD initiative to ICV, which has run the Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde (Cotriguaçu Always Green) 
project in the municipality. The Amazon Program trained its primary focus on São Félix, where it 
began work in 2009 and continues to this day. 
In addition to these two municipality REDD pilots, the Amazon Program and AFCS were 
active in numerous other municipalities in Pará and Mato Grosso, in particular in support of CAR 
registration and Forest Code compliance. TNC’s involvement in CAR is also described in Chapter 
4. AFCS and the Amazon Program secured millions of dollars in financing from multiple sources, 
including PPG7 (administered by the World Bank), Brazil’s Amazon Fund (administered by 
BNDES, the Brazilian development bank), and Fundo Vale (the foundation of the Vale mining 
company), to work in dozens of municipalities, predominantly those included in the federal 
government’s ‘priority list.’ Under the project with the Amazon Fund, AFCS returned to 
Cotriguaçu to support CAR implementation in the municipality. The municipalities of Nova 
Ubiratã in Mato Grosso and Novo Progresso in Pará were also included in these programs, and 
comprise my other two municipal case studies in Brazil (Figure 6.4). In Mato Grosso, TNC AFCS 
staff in the Cuiabá office indicated Nova Ubiratã as the municipality where their program had been 
most successful, while Cotriguaçu was where they felt they had experienced greatest difficulties. 
In Pará, Amazon Conservation Program staff in the Belém office indicated São Félix do Xingu, 
site of their ongoing REDD project, as the municipality where they had achieved the greatest 
success, while Novo Progresso was the municipality where they had experienced the greatest 
difficulties. The following sections develop the state and municipal-level incorporated 
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comparisons, illustrating the differential experiences of land sparing coalitions and land use change 
across the diverse geographies of the Amazonian frontier. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Nested case selection for incorporated comparison of tropical forest governance in 
Brazil. Circles represent the national, state, and municipal levels. Borders at each level are 
porous. São Félix do Xingu and Cotriguaçu municipalities, which host jurisdictional-level REDD 
projects, are distinguished by a textured background pattern. Municipalities where TNC 
employees report their programs most successful are in green; municipalities reported most 
difficult are in orange. 
Part I: Mato Grosso 
The State of Mato Grosso lies in the Center West Region of the Brazilian interior and 
occupies the transition zone between the Cerrado tropical savanna biome in the eastern and 
southern parts of the state and the Amazon biome in the north and west. (The Pantanal wetlands 
biome lies in the extreme south of the state.) Cuiabá, present-day capital of Mato Grosso, became 
a center of gold mining in the 18th century, and extensive cattle ranching connected interior mining 
areas with the agricultural economies of the southern coast. 
Because much of Mato Grosso is a savanna region and historically connected by land with 
the Brazilian South and Southeast, it has a history somewhat distinct from the general history of 
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the Amazon Basin presented above. During the 1970s to 1990s, Mato Grosso experienced rapid 
infrastructure development, population growth, deforestation, and agricultural expansion. 
SUDECO (the Superintendency for the Development of the Center West) was established in 1967 
as the Center West counterpart to SUDAM and supported the establishment of infrastructure and 
development programs in the region. Construction of the BR-163 highway began in 1971, linking 
Cuiabá with Santarém on the main trunk of the Amazon and opening a vast new frontier in northern 
Mato Grosso and western Pará. Both the federal government and private firms launched 
colonization projects to attract small farmers to the state (W. Jepson 2006a; W. Jepson 2006b; 
Rausch 2013). At the same time, agricultural subsidies provided by developmentalist programs 
including Polocentro (the Center West counterpart to Polonoroeste) and the Japanese-financed 
PRODECER supported the growth of large-scale ranching and row crop cultivation. Research by 
Embrapa, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation, identified fertilizer and lime 
applications to counteract the acidity and aluminum toxicity of Cerrado soils and developed new 
soy cultivars (Spehar 1995; Fearnside 2002). Meanwhile, agricultural intensification in southern 
Brazil raised land values and dispossessed small farmers, pushing migration and investment into 
the Center West. These processes drove the coupled soy and cattle frontiers far into northern and 
western Mato Grosso and transformed the state into the epicenter of Brazil’s agro-export economy. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, Mato Grosso was the state with the highest annual 
deforestation rate in the Amazon, comprising roughly 40 percent of total Amazonian deforestation. 
Historical deforestation in Mato Grosso is shown in Figure 6.5. Mechanized soy production 
requires high levels of investment and its expansion in eastern and central Mato Grosso integrated 
these parts of the state into transnational commodity chains and provided a foundation for 
articulated agro-industrial development through the provision of infrastructure and inputs and the 
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production of value-added outputs such as soy meal, biodiesel, pork and poultry, and processed 
meat products. With the conversion of pasture to row crops and rising land values due to soy 
expansion, remaining ranching operations in these areas were also forced to intensify. A 
productivist economy thus emerged behind the Mato Grosso soy frontier. 
In the north and northwest of the state, however, an extractive political economy persisted 
centering on logging, mining, and extensive ranching. Rausch writes that the State Environmental 
Foundation (FEMA), Mato Grosso’s environmental regulatory agency, was “plagued by 
corruption and inefficiencies…. Therefore, farmers’ willingness to comply with its regulations, 
given that compliance usually came at the expense of profits, was also low. Farmers knew that if 
they were to be fined (unlikely, in any case, due to the expanse of the state and the few resources 
available to FEMA agents); the going-rate for a bribe to have the fine disappear was around 10 
percent of the total value of the fine” (Rausch 2013, 160–61). The effective payment rate of 
environmental fines in Mato Grosso was around only 6 or 7 percent (Rausch 2013), and in 2005 
the president of FEMA, the superintendent of IBAMA in Mato Grosso, and some 80 other officials, 
loggers, and timber traders were arrested in a bust of an illegal logging ring. This scandal led to 
the dissolution of FEMA, which was replaced by the State Environmental Agency (SEMA). 
In 2004, the year that deforestation in the state peaked and nearly 12,000 km2 of forest were 
cleared, Mato Grosso produced 29 percent of Brazil’s soy harvest and supported 13 percent of the 
national cattle herd (IBGE 2016d; IBGE 2016c). Expanding soy production and rapid deforestation 
during the late 1990s coincided with the increasing power of soy producers and agro-industrial 
interests in state-level politics and changes in state-level forest governance institutions. 
Governance in Brazil was marked by a general trend of decentralization during the 1990s, which 
included decentralization of some environmental governance responsibilities to the states. The 
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Mato Grosso State Environmental Code was approved in 1995, and in 1999 the federal government 
devolved control over forest management and environmental licensing to FEMA, though 
monitoring and enforcement powers remained with federal agencies (Azevedo 2009). 
 
Figure 6.5: Historical Amazonian Deforestation in Mato Grosso. 
In 2000, with support from PPG7 administered by the World Bank, Mato Grosso launched 
the System for Environmental Licensing of Rural Properties (SLAPR). SLAPR was built as a novel 
system for managing rural environmental licensing, monitoring, and enforcement related to the 
Forest Code using remote sensing and GIS technology (Rajão, Azevedo, and Stabile 2012). 
Registration in SLAPR occurred on a voluntary, property-by-property basis. There were numerous 
problems with the system, including low-resolution monitoring technology, reluctance of 
landowners to ‘turn themselves in’ and be fined for illegal clearing, but also reluctance of state 
authorities to fine those who registered to avoid deterring people from the system (Azevedo 2009; 
Rajão, Azevedo, and Stabile 2012). Rausch explains that SLAPR was intended by the state 
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government as a way to leverage funding for other development programs, and licensing (which 
would legalize further agricultural expansion) was favored over monitoring (which would detect 
illegal clearing) (2013, 165). SLAPR ultimately did little to constrain deforestation, though it was 
nonetheless strongly opposed by rural agricultural interests. To the contrary, Lima et al. (2005) 
found that deforestation was higher on licensed properties than on those properties without 
licenses, supporting the claim that SLAPR was intended more as an economic project than an 
environmental one, aimed at legitimizing Mato Grosso’s agricultural production for external 
markets (Azevedo 2009). As one rancher told me in Nova Ubiratã, environmental registration was 
a way for the government and agro-industry associations to “put a stop to the environmentalists” 
(NU01 140506). Deforestation continued to increase after the introduction of SLAPR, and 
opposition to the system may have contributed to the election of Blairo Maggi, Brazil’s largest soy 
producer, as governor of Mato Grosso in 2002 (Rausch 2013, 166). 
 Maggi’s election led many environmentalists to fear the worst for forest conservation in 
Mato Grosso (e.g., Fearnside 2003). Deforestation in the state increased over 13 percent from 2003 
to 2004, and in 2005 Greenpeace bestowed on Maggi its ‘Golden Chainsaw’ award for the 
Brazilian who had most contributed to the destruction of the Amazon. During 2005, however, 
deforestation in Mato Grosso began to decline precipitously, and by the time Maggi left the 
governor’s office in 2010, he had even come to be viewed as an “unlikely hero of the 
environmental movement” for his efforts to combat illegal deforestation (Perlroth 2009, 38). 
Of course, the reduction in deforestation in Mato Grosso is not attributable solely to Blairo 
Maggi. After 2004, deforestation in Mato Grosso was checked by new governance interventions 
and declining soy profitability due to a downturn in global commodity markets (Macedo et al. 
2012). Lowered economic incentives for expansion and the potential economic benefits of certified 
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legal compliance during times of reduced profitability contributed to a willingness of Mato Grosso 
soy producers to engage in new governance initiatives in the 2005-2007 period (Rausch 2013). 
Blairo Maggi’s company, Grupo Maggi, had already in 2002 begun to develop an ‘environmental 
and social management system’ for its supply chain under the conditions of a loan from the 
International Finance Corporation, to which it agreed in part with the objective of achieving 
“legitimacy and recognition for adhering to environmental and social standards that other soy 
exporters could not claim” (Stickler and Almeida 2008, 76). In 2006, in response to a Greenpeace 
campaign, the major transnational soy traders agreed not to purchase soy produced on newly 
deforested land in the Amazon, and Maggi’s company was well-prepared to comply with the 
moratorium. 
Also in 2006, TNC began to collaborate with the municipal government of Lucas do Rio 
Verde, a soy-producing municipality on the BR-163 to the north of Cuiabá, to support landholders 
to work toward compliance with the Forest Code, allowing the municipality to promote an image 
of ‘environmentally-responsible’ production (Ferreira 2010; Rausch 2013). The project received 
support from major national and transnational agribusiness corporations with operations in the 
municipality, as well as from the rural producers’ syndicate, State Public Ministry, and SEMA. 
Spiking commodity prices in 2007 drove an increase in deforestation across the Amazon, and the 
federal government responded in 2008 by creating the ‘priority list’ of municipalities for 
combating deforestation and imposing credit restrictions on properties not compliant with 
environmental regulations (Assunção, Gandour, and Rocha 2012; Assunção et al. 2013; Arima et 
al. 2014). The tightening of the federal enforcement regime posed an impediment to agro-industrial 
expansion in Mato Grosso and threatened the reputation of the state’s producers in international 
markets. These new pressures led to a public spat, with The New York Times reporting that 
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“Governor Maggi was exercised enough by the [INPE deforestation] report – which led to harsh 
measures stifling business in his state – that he asked for, and was granted, a meeting with the 
president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,” and the state government went so far as to submit a formal 
refutation of INPE’s findings (Barrionuevo 2008). 
In Lucas do Rio Verde, the fining of 15 property owners by IBAMA in September 2008 
triggered intense lobbying by municipal leaders, TNC, and SEMA. This lobbying and the general 
dissatisfaction with the federal enforcement regime culminated in a state law that officially created 
CAR in Mato Grosso, modifying SLAPR by breaking environmental licensing into stages and 
granting producers who completed CAR a grace period to bring their properties into compliance 
without being fined (Rausch 2013, 263–264). CAR was promoted by the Maggi government at the 
state level through the creation of a ‘Legal Mato Grosso’ program (Mato Grosso Legal), and was 
taken up by the federal government as a condition for municipalities to exit the priority list, and 
eventually as a requirement for all rural properties in Brazil in the 2012 Federal Forest Code. 
In addition to his support for environmental registration as a strategy for ‘legalizing’ 
agricultural production, Maggi became a strong advocate for Mato Grosso’s participation in an 
international REDD mechanism, enrolling his state as one of the founding members of the 
Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force (GCF) in late 2008. Support for REDD initiatives has 
continued under Maggi’s successors, including through the passage of a State REDD+ Law in 
January 2013, a part of which highlights the potential climate benefits of agro-industrial 
development (such as improved pasture management and cattle genetics) in supporting 
deforestation reductions (Lacerda 2012; Lacerda 2013). 
In sum, under pressure from international and national-level actors, state-level politicians 
and bureaucrats in Mato Grosso joined with international and domestic NGOs, multinational and 
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regional agribusiness companies, and proactive municipal governments to negotiate responses to 
federal environmental regulations and implement a land sparing agenda centered on territorial 
constriction and intensive agro-industrial production. With the exception of relatively minor 
increments in 2008 and 2011, annual deforestation in Mato Grosso declined steadily from 2004 
until it bottomed out in 2012 at 757 km2. While deforestation has ticked upwards since 2012, it 
remains more than 80 percent below its 2004 peak. Especially during the period of increased 
agribusiness profitability after 2007, these declines are attributable to the governance structures 
that have emerged through the operation of land sparing coalitions across multiple levels. 
 TNC’s activities in Mato Grosso traverse the boundary between the Cerrado and Amazon 
biomes, and between expanding industrial row crop cultivation and frontier logging and ranching 
areas. The following sections compare the municipalities of Nova Ubiratã and Cotriguaçu. I begin 
with Nova Ubiratã, which of the four Brazilian cases is the municipality most integrated into a 
productivist, agro-industrial economy. Nova Ubiratã experienced rapid growth in soy production 
during the 2000s, which drove large-scale deforestation as well as intensification on remaining 
cattle ranches. The municipality entered the Ministry of Environment’s priority list in 2008. In 
2010, TNC began working in Nova Ubiratã under its Amazon Fund project to support municipal 
compliance with environmental regulations, and staff report that the project was particularly 
successful. Today, Nova Ubiratã is a post-frontier agro-industrial area with little remaining forest 
land that could legally be open to conversion. 
Cotriguaçu is a newer frontier zone where a REDD project initially planned with TNC was 
subsequently led by ICV, a Mato Grosso NGO, and where TNC’s follow-up activities have been 
plagued by difficulties. In the boom and bust of frontier extraction, Cotriguaçu is a municipality 
on the bust, as timber extraction is on the decline and ranching is not very profitable due to isolation 
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and poor terrain. Governance efforts in the municipality have followed a land sparing model, 
through Forest Code enforcement and support for ranching intensification, but Cotriguaçu remains 
an area firmly in the periphery where commercial activity is primarily extractive logging and 
ranching, and there are few prospects for integration into more productivist economic circuits. 
Nova Ubiratã: Soy and the Productivist Transformation 
Nova Ubiratã, which became an independent municipality in 1995, covers 12,707 km2 in 
central Mato Grosso, in the transition zone between the Cerrado and Amazon biomes in the upper 
reaches of the Xingu watershed. The municipal seat lies on the BR-242 highway just over 80 km 
to the east of Sorriso, which is a major center of soy production on the north-south BR-163 
corridor. The municipal territory falls between the municipalities of the BR-163 to the west and 
the Xingu Indigenous Park to the east. The Rio Ronuro Ecological Station (ESEC), a state-level 
protected area, was created in 1998 in the eastern part of the municipality, with an area of 131,795 
ha, but reduced by nearly 30,000 ha in 2005 to exclude four large landholdings in the southern part 
of the reserve. The far northeastern tip of the municipality overlaps 30,000 ha of the Xingu 
Indigenous Park. Roughly 40 percent of the municipality is classified as Cerrado, while the 
remaining 60 percent is in the Amazon biome. 
Colonization of the area began in the 1950s, directed by private colonization companies 
that settled nearly 200 Japanese families with the idea of promoting production of rubber and 
pepper. Many of these initial settlers perished in a malaria epidemic, and those that survived 
migrated to more developed areas. Land speculators from the South also established holdings in 
Nova Ubiratã during this period, but it was not until the mid-1970s that a wave of permanent 
colonization began, directed by a new set of colonization companies that attracted settlers from 
southern Brazil, while the ‘urban center’ of the municipal seat was established only in 1986. The 
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colonization process followed a pattern common to Amazonian frontiers of land grabbing and 
violent land conflicts between large and small landholders. Land was cleared by logging 
operations, ranchers, and colonists who established rice and soy farms.61 Between 1996 and 1999, 
the federal government also created four agrarian reform settlements covering over 77,000 ha, 
primarily in the southwest and northeast of the municipality, where over 900 families of small 
farmers have been settled. The population increased rapidly, from 3859 residents in 1996 to 5654 
in 2000. By 2000, nearly 20 percent of the municipal territory had been deforested, an area of 2400 
km2. 
During the early 2000s, soy cultivation expanded rapidly in Nova Ubiratã, linked with the 
regional soy boom along the BR-163 corridor. The municipal population continued to grow, 
reaching 7782 in 2007. Sorriso and Lucas do Rio Verde, lying to the west of Nova Ubiratã on the 
BR-163, had become major agro-industrial centers, with Sorriso becoming the largest municipal 
producer of soy in Mato Grosso in 1997. Smaller ranchers sold their land, pastures were converted 
to soy (usually rotated with corn or cotton), and forest was felled either for direct conversion to 
soy or for new pastures and land speculation. 
Deforestation in Nova Ubiratã spiked along with soy expansion, peaking in 2004 when 383 
km2 of forest was cleared. Deforestation declined steeply after 2005, reined in by PPCDAm and a 
slump in commodity prices, but forest clearing jumped again in 2008 when commodity prices 
rebounded (Figures 6.6-7). Nova Ubiratã was included in the federal priority list in 2008, and 
producers in the municipality were subjected to credit restrictions and intensified enforcement. In 
the words of a technician with the municipal Environmental Secretariat, enforcement “comes down 
																																																						
61 Information in this paragraph on the colonization of Nova Ubiratã is based primarily on Ivo Beuter’s (2000) 
history of the municipality. 
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heavily, it’s rigid” (NU02 140506). A former municipal official reflected, “Before, Nova Ubiratã 
was at the end of the world. [You could deforest and] no one would know, no one would do 
anything. Now the regulatory deadlines are pressing” (NU08 140513). Family agriculture was 
particularly affected by the enforcement actions, and the entire agrarian reform settlements of Boa 
Esperança, home to nearly 400 families, were embargoed by IBAMA, meaning they could not 
legally access credit or sell their cattle or crops. Informants also report that the municipality’s 
status on the priority list may have deterred some agribusiness companies and businesspeople from 
investing in the municipality (NU07 140512; NU04 140507). These new enforcement measures 
caused most landowners in Nova Ubiratã to cease deforestation on their properties (NU02 140506; 
NU06 140512; NU09 140515). 
 
Figure 6.6: Annual deforestation in Nova Ubiratã, 2001-2015. 
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Figure 6.7: Commodity-driven deforestation in Nova Ubiratã. Deforestation and soy prices appear 
closely correlated until 2011, after which deforestation has remained low despite spiking 
commodity prices. Standardized soy prices were calculated from the BRL price per 60 kg in 
Paraná, provided by Cepea (2017). 
In an effort to remove the municipality from the priority list and help landowners 
‘disembargo’ their properties, the mayor of Nova Ubiratã, Osmar Rossetto (known as Chiquinho), 
sought out TNC. People in Nova Ubiratã knew of TNC’s work in the neighboring municipality of 
Lucas do Rio Verde, and Chiquinho hoped to implement a similar project in Nova Ubiratã. At first 
TNC had no funding for a project in the municipality, but when TNC received a BRL 16 million 
grant from the Amazon Fund to support CAR in 12 municipalities in Mato Grosso and Pará, Nova 
Ubiratã was included in the program (NU09 140515). The TNC project in the municipality, called 
‘Greener Nova Ubiratã’ (Nova Ubiratã Mais Verde), was implemented in partnership with the 
municipal government and the rural syndicate (the large landowners’ association). TNC hired a 
municipal manager to begin a process of mapping and database development, as well as 
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communication and awareness-raising regarding Forest Code compliance and environmental 
management. Soon thereafter the project also contracted a forestry engineer who was certified to 
formally register properties in CAR. 
The project principally supported CAR registration for small landowners and residents of 
agrarian reform settlements, since most large landowners were already registered or in the process 
of CAR registration (NU03 140506; NU06 140512). The municipal government also sought to use 
CAR to support broader governance goals. A former municipal official describes how data 
collection in support of CAR registration facilitated everything from environmental enforcement 
to tax collection to spatial planning to transportation for schoolchildren. He suggested that a 
comprehensive database of municipal properties could also be used to market the municipality and 
attract business. “You can’t do public sector work today without planning,” the official told me, 
and the CAR process helped build this municipal capacity (NU09 140515). More specifically, the 
municipal government attempted to leverage the CAR database to advance land titling in Nova 
Ubiratã. In 2012, Nova Ubiratã established a municipal council for tenure regularization 
(CONREDES) that became a pilot for regularization efforts led by the Mato Grosso Inspector 
General’s office (Corregedoria Geral da Justiça) (ExpressoMT 2012). 
Under the heavy enforcement regime of the priority list, there was little deforestation in 
Nova Ubiratã after 2008. Most areas in the municipality that could legally be cleared were already 
deforested by the time the priority list came into effect (NU09 140515). As the municipal secretary 
of environment explained, “What was there to be deforested was already deforested…. The timber 
has already been taken out. The fazendas are already industrialized” (NU03 140506). There are 
two groups responsible for what deforestation still occurs in Nova Ubiratã, according to a former 
contractor for the TNC project, “those with no option, who must produce to survive and have no 
 
	
	
318 
choice but to deforest; and those who have lots of money and can pay fines without any trouble” 
(NU04 140507). An official with the local property registry (cartório) confirms, “Remaining 
deforestation is either large actors who want to open more areas to produce more – they know that 
they can defend themselves in the courts and the profit they make will be greater than the costs of 
resolving the legal issues; or settlements where people deforest because they do not have 
conditions to develop sustainable activities” (NU07 140512). 
‘Those with no option’ have felt the brunt of federal enforcement measures. In the 
embargoed agrarian reform settlements, “Family farmers had their access to official financing 
blocked and were unable to produce. As a consequence, they were unable to sustain themselves 
from their land. Many families were obliged to abandon their lots to seek employment and income 
in the city” (Édison 2012). In 2012, the municipality negotiated with IBAMA to disembargo lots 
in the settlements that completed CAR, but when a new IBAMA superintendent arrived that year 
he refused to disembargo any more lots due to a dispute between IBAMA and SEMA (NU09 
140515). (IBAMA objected to SEMA approving CAR registrations without investigating a 
property’s on-the-ground Forest Code compliance (NU08 140513).) 
Among ‘those who have lots of money,’ the protagonist of continuing large-scale 
deforestation in Nova Ubiratã is Vademilso Badalotti. Badalotti is a large landowner who lives in 
Paraná, in southern Brazil. He owns 30,000 ha in Nova Ubiratã alone, and in 2011 he was 
responsible for six of the ten largest illegally deforested areas in Mato Grosso (Vital 2011). 
Badalotti illegally cleared nearly 6000 ha of forest in Nova Ubiratã using an illegal practice known 
as correntão, where two bulldozers are connected by a chain and driven forward together to fell 
all vegetation that comes between them. Deforestation by Badalotti, along with large-scale clearing 
by other landowners, brought a federal enforcement task force to the municipality in May 2011 (O 
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Documento 2012). Badalotti was known to be engaging in land speculation by buying and clearing 
areas in Nova Ubiratã, with the intention of renting out deforested areas for rice or soy production 
(Vital 2011; C. Carvalho 2011). “Speculators get fined, but it is still financially worth it…” a 
former municipal official explained, “They clear the land, and then fight in the courts. They are 
carpetbaggers (aventureiros) with guts and money…. If someone has an area that they don’t want 
to or can’t legalize, they may sell it to an aventureiro to clear and speculate on” (NU09 140515). 
“Have you heard of Badalotti?” a technician in the municipal Environmental Secretariat asked me 
during an interview. “Yes,” I answered, “how did he deforest such a large area?” The technician 
rubbed his fingers together: “money and guts” (NU02 140506). 
Despite the efforts of the municipal government and the Greener Nova Ubiratã project, the 
municipality failed to exit the priority list, principally due to difficulties in completing CAR in 
agrarian reform settlements, bureaucratic delays by SEMA in confirming CAR registrations, and 
deforestation by land speculators such as Vademilso Badalotti (TNC19 140502; TNC21 140516; 
TNC20 140428). Annual deforestation has been minimal since 2011, however. At the end of the 
TNC project in December 2013, 55 percent of the private property space in Nova Ubiratã had been 
registered in CAR (Fundo Amazônia 2014). The 2012 Forest Code revision made CAR a 
requirement for all rural properties in Brazil, but also changed the character of CAR in Mato 
Grosso. The Mato Grosso registry originally required documentation of land rights for completion 
of full environmental licensing, but the 2012 Forest Code instituted CAR as an unconfirmed 
declaration by property holders, which was the more flexible model that had been deployed in 
Pará. By 2017, an area of 1,212,389 ha in Nova Ubiratã had been registered in CAR, which is 
nearly 100,000 ha greater than the area legally open to registration in the municipality. These 
registries include over 4000 ha overlapping indigenous territories and nearly 74,000 ha 
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overlapping designated conservation areas (SFB/MMA 2017). The municipal population has also 
continued to grow, reaching an estimated 11,074 in 2016. 
The perceived success of the project from the standpoint of TNC staff appears principally 
linked to the strong engagement of the municipal government and in particular the active 
involvement of the mayor, Chiquinho. One TNC staff member notes that “Chiquinho was the most 
involved of all the mayors. With any question he would pick up the phone and call TNC” (TNC21 
140516). The local forestry engineer notes that Chiquinho “knew how the whole process worked, 
including the software” (NU04 140507), and another TNC employee recalls that Chiquinho would 
check for fire alerts every day on his cellphone to monitor new deforestation (TNC20 140427). 
After leaving the mayorship, Chiquinho went on to become a functionary with INCRA in Cuiabá, 
and during our interview in the INCRA offices he frequently turned to his computer to pull up GIS 
and Google Earth files to illustrate his points. Bernadete Rechmann, Chiquinho’s Secretary of 
Environment during most of the project period, was also an active promoter of the project, 
particularly in the agrarian reform settlements (TNC19 140502). Figure 6.8 shows the adjacent 
Secretariats of Environment and Agriculture on the main street in Nova Ubiratã. 
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Figure 6.8: Secretariats of Environment (left) and Agriculture (right) on the main street in Nova 
Ubiratã, 09 May 2014. At the time, there was one person serving as joint Secretary of Agriculture 
and Environment. 
While some members of the municipal Environmental Secretariat and the rural syndicate 
complain that they expected more from TNC (NU02 140506; NU06 140512), there was general 
agreement that the Greener Nova Ubiratã project had been worthwhile, deforestation was largely 
under control, and CAR registration had advanced. A former municipal government employee 
notes that national-level debates around the Forest Code revision had hindered the project, since 
industry associations had counseled landowners to wait for the new legislation before completing 
CAR. With the passage of the Forest Code revision and harmonization of state regulations, 
however, “the situation has been clarified” and even industry associations were advising farmers 
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and ranchers to complete CAR (NU09 140515). Nova Ubiratã’s position between the Cerrado and 
Amazon biomes added a wrinkle to environmental compliance as well, since properties in the 
Cerrado biome are only required to maintain 35 percent of their area as a Legal Reserve, while 
properties in the Amazon generally must maintain 80 percent. While most large landholders know 
in which biome their property falls, there are stories of small producers who deforested beyond 
their legal limit because they believed themselves to be in the Cerrado when in fact they were in 
the Amazon (NU03 140506; NU09 140515).62 
Environmental licensing and tenure regularization remain mired in the inefficient 
bureaucracies of SEMA and INCRA, but since 2012 Nova Ubiratã has become fully consolidated 
as a post-frontier zone of intensive ranching and industrial row crop agriculture under a 
productivist political-economic regime at the municipal, state, and national levels that emphasizes 
environmental compliance, tenure regularization, and agro-industrial development. The president 
of the rural syndicate, a local rancher, described to me this transformation: 
“Production has increased through the restoration or transformation of degraded 
pastures, primarily into [field crop] agriculture. The pasture area diminished. 
Ranchers became farmers and many farmers also came from outside the 
municipality, including from Sorriso and Lucas. Technology increased and people 
invested a great deal. …The character of the cattle herd changed. Cattle breeding 
[recria] diminished, but finishing [engorda – literally, ‘fattening’] stayed at the 
same level. Producers are now using confinement. …Some ranchers who became 
farmers are doing integrated [soy/maize and cattle] production. Pastures were very 
degraded, so the ranchers were going to have to take up agriculture. With the end 
of deforestation, ranchers realized they needed to intensify. Ranchers themselves 
sought out new technologies…. Old, extensive ranching is very rare today. Old 
ranchers had to give space for technology to enter. 
																																																						
62 The story of biome boundaries is a fascinating study of the relationships between ecology, science, agricultural 
production, and environmental governance. Landholders may petition SEMA to change the designation of their 
property from Amazon to Cerrado by contracting a study that conducts a full inventory of the property’s vegetation 
(including tree species, trunk sizes, and so forth). While the official biome line is not altered, SEMA may agree to 
catalog a property as Cerrado for purposes of licensing (NU04 140507). If the property is reclassified, the landholder 
gains a great deal of productive area. Of course, this process is complicated and costly enough only to be accessible 
to more capitalized famers and ranchers. 
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“The expansion of production into degraded areas is going to cease eventually [for 
lack of additional degraded areas], and further expansion will have to be from the 
opening of currently embargoed areas. After that, production will stagnate. 
Production costs have increased greatly. Oil and diesel are very expensive and 
producers can’t clear new areas. Throughout Mato Grosso, production will stagnate 
unless there are increases in technology. Since there is great demand, there will be 
new technologies. It’s the natural process of production. Instead of opening new 
areas, producers will have to produce ever more within the same area. They will 
increase production and diminish costs with technology.” (NU01 140506) 
 
This rancher’s narrative provides a remarkably complete recapitulation of the land sparing logic 
of intensification as a response to the ‘end of deforestation,’ the Boserupian logic of intensification 
as the result of land scarcity, and modernization discourse that views agricultural development as 
a process of productivist investment and technological intensification. His description of the land 
use transformation in Nova Ubiratã is borne out by statistics showing the expansion of soy 
production over an ever greater proportion of the deforested area of the municipality (Figure 6.9), 
which implies that the continuing increase in the municipal cattle herd concurrent with declining 
deforestation and increasing soy area has come from the intensification of ranching operations 
(Figure 6.10). Figure 6.11 shows an agricultural landscape typical of Nova Ubiratã today. The land 
use transition in the municipality mirrors the state-level transition in Mato Grosso that has been 
heralded as the ‘decoupling’ of deforestation and soy production (Macedo et al. 2012). A member 
of the municipal government confirmed that ranching operations were now working with 
confinement and devoted to finishing cattle, while breeding operations had moved northward 
towards the border with Pará (NU05 140509). 
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Figure 6.9: Soy expansion in Nova Ubiratã. Soy and associated row crop cultivation has 
occupied an increasing proportion of the total deforested area of the municipality (IBGE 
2016d). 
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Figure 6.10: The ‘decoupling’ of agricultural production and deforestation in Nova Ubiratã. 
While deforestation has declined, the cattle herd and soy area have continued to increase 
(IBGE 2016d; IBGE 2016c). All values standardized for comparison. 
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Figure 6.11: Industrial farming operation on the BR-242 between Sorriso and Nova 
Ubiratã. A field of maize stretches to the horizon, where remnants of forest vegetation are 
visible as thin dark lines, 05 May 2014. 
 
Affirming the prominence of a productivist, land sparing vision in the municipality, a 
former president of the rural syndicate avers, “Production does not depend on deforestation: we 
don’t have to cut down a single tree. There is degraded pasture available, and technology. Ranching 
is no longer extensive. It needs to be intensive, with pasture rotations and management. Degraded 
pasture can be used for agriculture. New techniques are changing the profile of agriculture and 
ranching, …and there are various credit lines… and agencies that help support intensification” 
(NU06 140512). With territorial constriction through environmental enforcement and an inflow of 
investment linked to the expansion of the soy frontier, Nova Ubiratã has transformed from a zone 
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of extraction to a zone of production, moving from the periphery of logging and extensive ranching 
toward the expanding agro-industrial core. Behind the modernist triumph of the soy farmers and 
intensive ranchers, however, lies the displacement of smallholders, squeezed by environmental 
regulations imposed without corresponding support for compliance and agricultural investment. 
This unevenness of the Amazonian transition is highlighted in the following case studies, where 
the productivist transition has been less complete. 
Figures 6.12-13: 6.12) Map of Nova Ubiratã showing forest loss in 2001-2005, during the peak of 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon; 6.13) Map of Nova Ubiratã showing forest loss in 2001-
2014. Protected areas are shown with 2017 boundaries. PA (projeto de assentamento) denotes 
an agrarian reform settlement. The municipal seat is denoted by a white square. The biome 
division between Cerrado and Amazon is marked. 
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Cotriguaçu: Extractive Stagnation 
 The municipality of Cotriguaçu in northwest Mato Grosso presents perhaps the starkest 
contrast to Nova Ubiratã among the four Amazonian municipal cases in terms of socio-economic 
conditions. Cotriguaçu is a municipality stagnating under an extractive regime, with little near-
term prospect for productivist modernization, despite the efforts of an active land sparing coalition. 
The municipality covers 9421 km2 on the west bank of the Juruena River in the upper Tapajós 
watershed, on the border between Mato Grosso and Amazonas State (Figures 6.14-15). The 
Escondido Indigenous Territory of the Rikbaktsa people, created in the mid-1990s, covers 1688 
km2 in the center of the municipal territory. The municipal seat lies 300 km west of the regional 
center of Alta Floresta and 445 km west of Guarantã do Norte and the BR-163. To the west of 
Cotriguaçu lies the frontier town of Colniza, known as a violent center of illegal logging (“it’s easy 
to die there,” a TNC staffer told me (TNC20 140428)), and 400 km of forest lands, parks, and 
indigenous territories before the road reaches the colonization areas of Machadinho d’Oeste in 
Rondônia. To the north lie the forests and protected areas of southeastern Amazonas, and to the 
south of Cotriguaçu, 80 km of dirt road of the MT-170 lead to the neighboring municipality of 
Juruena, and another 80 km lead at last to the growing agricultural centers of Castanheira and 
Juína. During the rainy season, roads often become impassable and bridges wash out, leaving parts 
of the municipality isolated, occasionally for days at a time. 
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Figure 6.14: Ferry to cross the Juruena River between Cotriguaçu and Nova Bandeirantes on the 
MT-208, 16 June 2014. 
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Figure 6.15: Bus on the MT-170 between Cotriguaçu and Juruena, passing through the Rohsamar 
forest management area, 30 April 2014. 
 Cotriguaçu was colonized in the mid-1980s through a project of the Cooperativa Central 
Regional Iguaçu Ltda., a company based in Paraná in southern Brazil. The first colonists arrived 
from the South in 1984, and while some initially attempted to engage in rubber production, settlers 
quickly shifted to clearing land for small-scale agriculture. In 1991, Cotriguaçu became an 
independent municipality, and over the course of the 1990s INCRA established three agrarian 
reform settlements on the municipal territory. The first INCRA settlement was established in 1992, 
the second and largest, called Nova Cotriguaçu, was established in 1995 on 100,000 ha in the 
northwest of the municipality, and the third, called Juruena, was established in the southeast in 
1997. In total, agrarian reform settlements cover 141,419 ha (15 percent of the municipality) and 
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are home to over 1800 families, many of whom came from land reform encampments in Mato 
Grosso do Sul and Rondônia (Prefeitura Municipal de Cotriguaçu, n.d.). 
 Logging was the main source of employment in the 1990s. Many colonists who came to 
the settlements ended up working for the logging companies. Some ranchers also began to arrive 
and establish large or medium-sized fazendas, and ranching began to grow in the settlements as 
well. As a director of the local agricultural cooperative (Coopercotri) recalled, “the majority of 
people came for [field] agriculture but couldn’t make it work, and so they ended up with pasture” 
(COTRI05 140620). Conservation programs also began to arrive in the municipality during this 
period. In 1999, ONF International, the international branch of the French National Forests Office, 
purchased the 10,000 ha Fazenda São Nicolau in Cotriguaçu in order to reforest 2000 ha under a 
carbon sequestration project financed by Peugeot, the French car manufacturer (which at the time 
was opening an automobile factory in Rio de Janeiro). ONF has developed the fazenda into a center 
for research and training on reforestation and sustainable forestry and has played a role in the 
environmentalist coalition that developed in Cotriguaçu after 2009. Beginning in 2001, UNDP 
also implemented a decade-long ‘biodiversity conservation and sustainable use’ project in 
northwestern Mato Grosso, which supported initiatives including the establishment of protected 
areas, harvesting of non-timber forest products such as brazil nuts, and the adoption of agroforestry 
systems by smallholders. Informants report that the project was “very top-down,” however, and it 
appears to have left few impacts on the ground in Cotriguaçu, though it has had more enduring 
effects in other municipalities in the region (D. Lima, Vivan, and Tito 2012; Nunes, Vivan, and 
May 2014; ICV02 140613). 
 Deforestation accelerated in Cotriguaçu during the early 2000s, as ranching expanded and 
smallholders cleared plots in the agrarian reform settlements, hoping to access federal financing 
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from PRONAF (the Program for the Strengthening of Family Agriculture, which was established 
in 1996). While some were successful in securing PRONAF funding, principally to support cattle 
ranching, many were not, and their deforested lots were often left unproductive for lack of credit 
(COTRI05 140620; author field notes 140625). In 2002, the Igarapés do Juruena State Park was 
created in the northern tier of the municipality, along the border with Amazonas. Most of the state 
park area in Cotriguaçu was incorporated into Juruena National Park in 2006, which was created 
as part of the expansion of protected areas under PPCDAm and supported by ARPA, the Amazon 
Protected Areas Program funded by international donors, WWF, and the Amazon Fund. The state 
and federal parks cover 1340 km2 over the entire northern portion of Cotriguaçu, effectively 
closing the northern frontier. 
 The turning point for deforestation in the municipality came in 2005 (Figure 6.16), when 
the federal government’s Curupira Operation busted a massive illegal logging network in Mato 
Grosso. The operation resulted in the arrest of the state IBAMA superintendent and the dissolution 
of FEMA, and brought logging activity in northwestern Mato Grosso to a temporary halt (Angelo 
2005; COTRI06 140623). In 2007, IBAMA embargoed the Nova Cotriguaçu settlement for illegal 
deforestation, and in 2008 Cotriguaçu entered the Ministry of Environment’s priority list. “The 
priority list was fire and brimstone,” the director of Coopercotri recounts, “Fines were handed out, 
and many people couldn’t hang on and had to give up their land to clear their names…. It was very 
difficult here. The government tried to soften things by saying that they would bring projects and 
the municipality would have priority, but it’s been five years already” (COTRI05 140620). The 
agrarian reform settlements have suffered most from enforcement actions, as settlers have been 
unable to access credit since 2008, a member of the municipal Secretariat of Economic 
Development, Agriculture, Environment, and Land Tenure (hereafter Environmental Secretariat) 
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affirmed (COTRI01 140616). Deforestation diminished as illegal logging operations were 
shuttered and landowners sought to avoid fines and maintain their access to credit. “You cut down 
a tree, and here comes the helicopter!” one logger exclaimed, describing IBAMA’s intensive 
enforcement in the municipality (author field notes, 140625).63 In the sense that the priority list 
was expected to give the municipality priority for projects supporting alternatives to deforestation, 
however, it was felt to have had no effect (COTRI03 140616). In the view of a TNC staff member, 
“There’s not much difference between [the neighboring municipality of] Juruena, which is not on 
the priority list, and Cotriguaçu, which is. IBAMA enforces in both municipalities; if you have 
CAR you can get financing, and if you don’t have CAR you can’t” (TNC20 140429). 
 
Figure 6.16: Annual deforestation in Cotriguaçu, 2001-2015. 
																																																						
63 IBAMA uses helicopters to conduct enforcement activities in remote areas. 
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 At the same time as the priority list was created in 2008, The Nature Conservancy was 
working in a partnership with ICV and SEMA to develop a REDD project in northwestern Mato 
Grosso. A project covering the whole northwestern region of the state, as the partners had 
originally imagined, proved unfeasible due to problems of logistics, security, and capacity (TNC06 
140410). The partners were narrowing their focus to Cotriguaçu and Juruena, where they could 
still work across a full landscape mosaic of indigenous territories, conservation areas, agrarian 
reform settlements, and large properties (TNC06 140122; TNC06 140410). Around this time, the 
mayor of Cotriguaçu approached ICV seeking a project to help the municipality find a path to 
socio-economic development adapted to the new environmental governance regime. In 2009, ICV 
secured funding from the Packard Foundation that supported the design of a municipal-level 
REDD project in Cotriguaçu. At this point, TNC’s Amazon Program decided to concentrate its 
focus on its nascent REDD pilot project in São Félix do Xingu, and the REDD initiative in 
Cotriguaçu was carried forward by ICV. ICV secured three years of funding from Fundo Vale, the 
foundation of Brazil’s Vale mining company, to launch the project ‘Cotriguaçu Forever Green’ 
(Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde – CSV) in 2011. As TNC had received a grant from the Amazon Fund 
to support CAR registration in Mato Grosso and Pará, Cotriguaçu was included in TNC’s Amazon 
Fund Project (along with Juruena), and ICV took responsibility for a suite of other initiatives under 
CSV (TNC06 140122; TNC12 140409). CSV was run from ICV’s regional office in Alta Floresta 
(where I also conducted interviews with ICV staff), and during the first two years of the program 
staff would spend half the month in Alta Floresta and half the month in Cotriguaçu. In 2013, 
several ICV staff members moved full-time to Cotriguaçu. 
 The robust forest carbon markets that some environmentalists had hoped for after 2007 
failed to materialize, and ICV implemented Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde as a broad ‘green 
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development’ program across multiple sectors. CSV comprised five principal components: 
municipal environmental management, sustainable forestry, integration of the Rikbaktsa 
indigenous group into municipal green development, ranching intensification, and natural resource 
governance in agrarian reform settlements (ICV 2008; ICV02 140613). Municipal environmental 
management included reactivation of the Municipal Environment Council, a multi-stakeholder 
forum for addressing environmental issues founded in 2010 but then defunct until 2012; 
strengthening of the Environmental Secretariat; and CAR registration, which was to be led by 
TNC. The sustainable forestry component of the project, led by ONF, sought to accelerate the 
approval of forest management plans in exchange for the adoption of more sustainable practices 
by logging companies, but ONF and ICV were unable to make headway with SEMA’s bureaucracy 
for logging licenses and the component did not advance well (ONF04 140619; ICV02 140613). 
The indigenous peoples component built a relationship with the Rikbaktsa, placing an indigenous 
representative on the Municipal Environmental Council and supporting the management plan for 
the Escondido Indigenous Territory. 
 In addition to support for CAR, ranching intensification and projects in the agrarian reform 
settlements are the two components of the project that most directly target the nexus of agricultural 
expansion and deforestation, constituting foci for the assembling of a land sparing coalition in 
Cotriguaçu. CSV’s ranching intensification program draws on ICV’s experience with intensive 
ranching in Alta Floresta, and seeks to improve ranching productivity through the application of 
‘best practices’ developed by Embrapa. The project worked initially with four ranchers, who made 
investments in pasture management, including liming, fencing, and forage (Equipe Projeto 
Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde and Ferreira Neto 2014, 19). According to one of the ranchers 
participating in the project, the rancher who had made the greatest investments was already in 2014 
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realizing a return, while the other three ranchers did not have resources to invest in as many 
improvements at once (COTRI06 140623). Where the average stocking rate in the municipality is 
around 0.7 head per hectare, the most intensified rancher, who received Embrapa’s first best 
practice certification in Mato Grosso, achieved stocking rates of 3.5 head per hectare or more 
(Equipe Projeto Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde and Ferreira Neto 2014, 30). This success led to great 
interest among other ranchers in Cotriguaçu, with over 40 expressing a desire to join the project. 
The president of the ranchers’ syndicate believes that the municipal herd could more than triple 
without deforestation (Equipe Projeto Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde and Ferreira Neto 2014, 30; 
COTRI06 140623). In 2015, the municipal government began implementation of an Amazon Fund 
project to support six pasture management ‘demonstration sites,’ as well as the construction of an 
independent Environmental Secretariat (no longer attached to Economic Development, 
Agriculture, and Land Tenure) and restoration of degraded permanent protection areas (Fundo 
Amazônia 2017). 
 CSV’s work in the agrarian reform settlements has involved a diverse array of activities 
including supporting community associations, promoting agroforestry, implementing a dairying 
project with 15 families (which includes improved pasture management), and installing a 
processing operation for babaçu palm. Babaçu invades pastures and had often been regarded by 
the local population as a pest, but the plant has multiple uses including as an input for animal feed, 
a source of vegetable oil, and a feedstock for charcoal. The intent of these activities is to improve 
livelihoods through alternatives to deforestation, maintaining a land sparing logic at the level of 
smallholdings. One informant in the agrarian reform settlement notes that ICV’s dairying project 
would only work with people who would not deforest or use pesticides or herbicides, and these 
requirements made it difficult for them to attract participants. ICV also required full maps of 
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participants’ properties, and many settlers were reluctant to participate for fear that this 
information would be shared with enforcement agencies (COTRI02 140618). 
 Indeed, property registration through CAR, the component of CSV led by TNC, advanced 
slowly in Cotriguaçu, and it was in this municipality that TNC’s Mato Grosso office experienced 
its greatest difficulties. TNC’s municipal CAR projects under its Amazon Fund grant generally 
proceeded by first placing a municipal manager in each municipality, attached to either the rural 
producers’ syndicate or the mayor’s office. The municipal manager’s job was to build a municipal 
basemap and develop awareness and capacity for completing CAR. Subsequently, the project 
would contract a certified technician to register CAR dossiers with SEMA. The project would also 
help train municipal government employees to complete CAR independently. In Cotriguaçu, the 
first municipal manager hired by TNC left early in the project. The second municipal manager 
stayed for a longer period, but left 6 or 7 months before the end of the project, at which point 
TNC’s municipal manager from Juruena assumed responsibility for Cotriguaçu, though he was 
rarely present in the municipality. In addition to turnover of TNC personnel, Cotriguaçu had a 
succession of three different Secretaries of Environment in 2011-2013. Nonetheless, in 2011 the 
municipality contracted a forestry engineer to work on CAR, and in 2012 TNC contracted another 
technician for the municipality. Seeing the fits and starts of TNC’s program, ICV also began to 
collaborate on CAR registration, providing a contracted technician and training for the Secretariat 
as well as support from technicians in Alta Floresta (ICV03 140613; COTRI07 140624). TNC, 
ICV, and the Environment Secretariat supported CAR registration primarily for smallholders 
(those with properties under 400 ha),64 while most large landholders completed CAR with private 
																																																						
64 While 400 ha is a large amount of land relative to most definitions of ‘smallholder,’ with 80 percent of the 
property in legal reserve, the owner of a 400 ha property could legally produce on no more than 80 ha, which is a 
modest area for extensive ranching. Most smallholders in Cotriguaçu have far less than 400 ha. Lots in agrarian 
reform settlements are roughly 50-60 ha, meaning a settler could legally clear only 10-12 ha, though settlers say they 
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contractors. When TNC’s Amazon Fund project ended in 2013, just 27 percent of the private 
property area in Cotriguaçu had been registered in CAR, the lowest percentage of the 12 
municipalities in the project. The CAR process in Mato Grosso was altered after the revision of 
the Federal Forest Code, and today CAR registrations in Cotriguaçu cover an area equal to over 
90 percent of the total private property space, albeit with over 50,000 ha of overlap with indigenous 
territory (SFB/MMA 2017). 
Municipal land use and economic activity in Cotriguaçu in 2014 were characterized by a 
dynamic of extractive stagnation. Logging continues to comprise a substantial proportion of 
municipal economic activity and is a major source of employment (Figures 6.17-18). In 2010, 
there were 20 logging companies operating in the municipality and 36 forest management areas 
covering 41,000 ha. Logging in Cotriguaçu is a quintessentially extractive activity: exploitation of 
forest management areas is generally done rapidly, 65 percent of the timber is sent to the Southeast, 
and virtually all the owners of the logging companies are originally from the South of Brazil (IFT 
2010). Illegal logging continues to occur, though at a much lower rate than in the past (Silgueiro 
et al. 2015). The logging sector is generally viewed as stagnant or in decline, and most loggers are 
investing in ranching (IFT 2010; COTRI01 140616). 
																																																						
were initially instructed by INCRA to clear at least 50 percent of their lot (COTRI05 140620). Consistent with the 
regional state of land concentration in large holdings in the Amazon, properties larger than 2500 ha make up just 1 
percent of the total number of agricultural properties in Cotriguaçu, but account for 47 percent of the total 
agricultural area, while 82 percent of properties are smaller than 100 ha (IBGE 2006). 
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Figure 6.17: Timber extraction in Cotriguaçu, 1995-2015 (IBGE 2017a). The 2005 dip coincides 
with the Curupira Operation. 
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Figure 6.18: Logging lot in western Cotriguaçu, 18 June 2014. 
 Ranching occurs on 76 percent of all properties in Cotriguaçu, generally in a very extensive 
mode with stocking rates of roughly 0.7 head per hectare (Figure 6.19) (Equipe Projeto Cotriguaçu 
Sempre Verde and Ferreira Neto 2014; COTRI06 140623). Ranching has also become common 
among smallholders. One settler explains that people prefer cattle to agroforestry because cattle 
are less work: “you just put them there and you leave them” (COTRI02 140618), though the rise 
of ranching in the settlements is also directly related to the availability of credit, the emplacement 
of the cattle commodity chain versus the difficulty of commercializing agroforestry production, 
and the cultural power of ranchers (cf. Poccard-Chapuis et al. 2001; Smeraldi and May 2008; 
Hoelle 2015). Another smallholder reported that it was possible for people in the agrarian reform 
settlements to get credit without full environmental compliance, but only for raising cattle (author 
field notes 140625). “Only those working with cattle are making a profit,” a municipal official told 
me (COTRI01 140616), and due to heavy enforcement and the examples of ‘best practices’ 
through CSV, some ranchers are now intensifying their operations. “Large producers have a 
different way [from smallholders] of relating to legal questions,” a member of the Environmental 
Secretariat observed, “they have CAR and LAU [an environmental license] and forest management 
plans,” and they are able to respond to enforcement pressures and invest in their properties 
(COTRI01 140616). 
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Figure 6.19: Dead trunk of a brazil nut tree standing in open pasture. Babaçu palms are visible at 
the back of the pasture on the left, 26 June 2014. 
Nonetheless, beef prices in Cotriguaçu are very low due to the municipality’s remoteness 
and high transport costs. JBS, the largest Brazilian slaughterhouse company, had built a processing 
plant in Juruena on the road to Cotriguaçu, with millions of reais in financing from BNDES, but 
the plant was closed within months of opening. JBS claimed that it was more viable to ship cattle 
out to the slaughterhouse in Juína. On the the unpaved MT-170, mud in the rainy season and dust 
in the dry season make it difficult to transport processed meat. Informants note than since JBS 
operates the slaughterhouse in Juína also, they effectively have a monopoly, and the additional 
transport costs are borne by the producer (COTRI01 140616). A TNC employee notes that it is not 
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uncommon to see people walking herds out along the road to Castanheira, where the asphalt starts, 
and loading the cattle on trucks there in order to reduce transport costs (TNC20 140428). 
 Small farmers suffer especially from environmental enforcement actions and lack of clear 
tenure and credit. Farmers in the agrarian reform settlements lack documentation from INCRA, 
and without documentation they were unable to complete CAR or access financing (COTRI06 
140623). One smallholder living in a settlement spoke during a meeting of the Municipal 
Environment Council: 
“I need CAR in order to get authorizations for an irrigation system for my palmito 
[heart of palm production], but I can’t get CAR because INCRA won’t give the 
documents, so in the dry season my palmito is going to dry out. When IBAMA tried 
to fine me, I can go to the Public Ministry, because I know I have complied with 
the laws, but what about other people? They get fines of 300,000 reais, which is 
more than their lot is even worth, and the fine goes on their CPF [national identity 
number]. All these people have is their good name [which the fine besmirches]. 
Today, my property is the only environmentally regular one in the settlement, but 
what good does it do me? None! I’m treated no differently than my neighbor who 
deforested his entire lot.” (author field notes 140625) 
 
While CAR registration has advanced since 2014, TNC staff note that achieving environmental 
compliance on small properties in Cotriguaçu is especially difficult because the complicated 
hydrography of the municipality means properties have many watercourses that require permanent 
protection areas under the Forest Code, limiting the legally-available agricultural area (TNC20 
140428; TNC19 140502). Heavy enforcement and embargoes and a lack of credit pose further 
obstacles for small farmers in an already remote region. “I have survived because I’m stubborn, 
and I love the land and I like to be independent,” one smallholder told me, “but there have been 
many times when I despaired, and many others have left” (author field notes 140618).65 Several 
																																																						
65 This same smallholder reported having had malaria fifteen times, leishmaniasis five or six times, and six 
venomous snake bites. Given that the informant was one of the pioneers of the settlement and has lived for over 20 
years in a remote part of the Amazon, these numbers are credible. 
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informants described an incipient rural exodus of the least capitalized smallholders and rising land 
concentration in the settlements (COTRI05 140620; ICV04 140619; author field notes 140618). 
Smallholders rent out their pasture to others, and though it is illegal, some people are said to now 
own five or six lots within the settlements, comprising emerging ‘mini-fazendas’ (COTRI06 
140623; ICV04 140619). 
Annual deforestation in Cotriguaçu averaged 47.6 km2 in 2012-2015, over 80 percent below 
the 2005 peak, but still an elevated level for a small municipality, and higher than the 40 km2 
maximum required to exit the priority list. Much of this deforestation occurs in the agrarian reform 
settlements. Deforestation has “‘diminished’ in quotation marks,” a former municipal official 
explained, “people in the settlements know they won’t be held responsible because they have no 
documentation, so they clear and burn” (COTRI06 140623). “IBAMA fines a smallholder, he 
doesn’t pay, it winds up in the courts, and things stay the way they are. The smallholder doesn’t 
have documentation to access credit anyway,” an ONF employee affirmed (ONF04 140609). 
“People are going to burn and they know they will be fined; they will contest the fine and put cattle 
on the land. There is no other competitive option for them,” a member of the Environmental 
Secretariat echoed. 
In sum, Cotriguaçu is a case where a strong land sparing coalition has emerged that includes 
federal enforcement agencies, TNC, ICV, ONF, funding bodies such as Fundo Vale and the 
Amazon Fund, the municipal government and the ranchers’ syndicate. The idea of REDD as a 
source of financing has not advanced, but territorial constriction through the creation of parks and 
the indigenous territory and the robust enforcement of environmental regulations have 
substantially reduced deforestation. Intensification is supported by ICV and increasingly by 
ranchers, who have been impressed by the results of ICV’s demonstration project. “We may have 
 
	
	
346 
raised the spirits of the ranchers,” one ICV staffer said with irony, “They were unhappy with 
ranching in the region, but then they saw that it could be profitable” (ICV02 140613). ICV is wary 
of a potential rebound effect from increasing ranching productivity, and has conditioned its 
ranching intensification work on zero-deforestation commitments from ranchers and the syndicate 
(ICV01 140613). ICV was also exploring a quality seal for zero-deforestation beef, similar to the 
one that has now been deployed by Walmart in São Félix do Xingu. 
 TNC’s difficulties in Cotriguaçu were in part a function of personnel problems, but these 
problems were also indicative of the deeper reasons why land sparing policies have failed to 
produce a productivist transformation in the municipality. Cotriguaçu is remote. This remoteness 
created a distance between TNC managers and field staff and made it more difficult to find staff 
willing to work in the municipality. Cotriguaçu is the “end of the line,” “no one wants to stay there 
long,” and the poor internet access made it difficult to work with TNC’s GIS programs (TNC20 
140417; TNC20 140428). Cotriguaçu “is a difficult place to live, because of the logistics, the 
economy, and so forth,” an ICV employee confessed, “Many people are tired out and will speak 
badly of it” (ICV02 140613). The remoteness of the municipality has helped to lock it in a dynamic 
of extractive stagnation. “The economy is stopped, not necessarily because of the embargo,” a 
TNC employee told me, “logging has declined and ranching is not expanding. New deforestation 
is mostly from settlements. …There are large external groups that own forested areas in 
Cotriguaçu. …They have not opened land here because it has not yet become economical” (TNC20 
140428). 
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Figure 6.20: Stagnation in Cotriguaçu. Cattle herd figures are from IBGE (2016c). Real municipal 
GDP per capita is calculated from IBGE’s 2010 Reference municipal GDP series (IBGE 2017b) 
with IBGE population estimates and adjusted to constant BRL using the Brazilian Consumer Price 
Index - IPCA (IBGE 2017c). 
 
“I’m sure that if I went there today, nothing would have changed,” a former TNC manager 
mused (TNC19 140502), and in many ways, she was right. The real municipal GDP of Cotriguaçu 
has been stagnant for a decade, and in 2014 it ranked 138th out of 141 municipalities in Mato 
Grosso (IBGE 2016b). Legal logging has remained more or less constant while illegal logging has 
declined, and deforestation and the cattle herd have leveled off since the late 2000s (Figure 6.20). 
Processes of land concentration continue, but without overall increases in investment or 
productivity. Even a former mayor told me that if he could, he would sell up and go someplace 
else. The land sparing coalition in Cotriguaçu has thus far failed to catalyze a productivist 
transformation in the municipality, largely due to its inability to supply capital to support 
infrastructure development and intensification. The soy frontier has begun to arrive in Juína, 160 
km to the south, but industrial field agriculture is unlikely to enter Cotriguaçu due to the rocky, 
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hilly landscape, which would make cultivation difficult even if infrastructure were improved 
(TNC20 140428). The most immediate prospect for economic transformation in the municipality 
comes from federal government proposals for hydroelectric dams in the Juruena and Aripuanã 
River basins. The dams, which could inundate substantial portions of the national park and 
indigenous territory, are still in planning stages. Nonetheless, the prospect of the hydroelectric 
projects has touched off land speculation in the Nova Cotriguaçu settlement, where residents 
expect the dams to bring jobs and improved roads and electricity (ICV04 140619). Until that time, 
Cotriguaçu appears likely to continue its trajectory as an extractive periphery of declining timber 
extraction, struggling smallholders, and extensive ranching that concentrates land in large holdings 
without increasing productivity or stimulating municipal development.  
Figures 6.21-22: 6.21) Map of Cotriguaçu showing forest loss in 2001-2005, during the peak of 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon; 6.22) Map of Cotriguaçu showing forest loss in 2001-2014. 
Protected areas are shown with 2017 boundaries. PA (projeto de assentamento) denotes an 
agrarian reform settlement. Most forest loss after 2005 occurred in settlements. The municipal 
seat is denoted by a white square. 
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Comparative Analysis: Nova Ubiratã and Cotriguaçu 
 Nova Ubiratã and Cotriguaçu illustrate two extremes on the spectrum of land sparing 
modernization in the Brazilian Amazon. In both municipalities, territorial constriction imposed by 
the federal government has led to major reductions in deforestation. Nova Ubiratã has effectively 
transitioned from an extractive logging and ranching economy to a productivist economy of 
intensified ranching and industrial row crop production, albeit with hiccups of large-scale 
deforestation by speculators. The municipality today exemplifies the land sparing narrative of 
‘decoupling’ of agricultural production and deforestation in the Amazon. Cotriguaçu, meanwhile, 
has stagnated with an extractive economy based on logging and extensive ranching. Figure 6.23 
illustrates the dramatic difference in real municipal GDP per capita between the two 
municipalities. 
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Figure 6.23: Real municipal GDP per capita in Nova Ubiratã and Cotriguaçu, calculated from 
IBGE’s 2010 Reference municipal GDP series (IBGE 2017b) with IBGE population estimates and 
adjusted to constant BRL using the Brazilian Consumer Price Index - IPCA (IBGE 2017c). 
The productivist transition in Nova Ubiratã has occurred despite the relatively weaker land 
sparing coalition in the municipality. TNC was present in Nova Ubiratã and the mayor was strongly 
engaged in promoting CAR registration, monitoring deforestation, and promoting tenure 
regularization. The scope and scale of this coalition at the municipal level pales compared to the 
land sparing coalition in Cotriguaçu, however, which was initially targeted for a REDD project, 
and where TNC, ICV, and ONF ended up working alongside a motivated Environment Secretariat 
to support not only CAR registration, but also a host of municipal governance and economic 
development interventions. 
The divergent outcomes of land sparing interventions in these two municipalities are due 
primarily to the geography of the soy frontier. Scholars have described the development of the 
coupled Amazonian soy and cattle frontiers by drawing on von Thünen’s classic model of location 
rent, which posits that land use is determined by land rents and land rents are determined by 
distance from a commercial center (Kaimowitz and Angelsen 2008; Walker et al. 2009). Under 
the von Thünen model, we would expect industrial field agriculture and intensive ranching, which 
are more productive land uses than extensive ranching, to occur closer to productivist centers, 
while in more remote areas with lower land rents, extensive ranching will be more common. The 
basic von Thünen model can be modified to take into account other factors such as land quality 
and supply chain configurations (Bowman et al. 2012). The initial establishment of agro-industrial 
centers in particular locations may be partly determined by infrastructure and state incentives and 
investments, as well as institutional factors such as land tenure and environmental regulations 
(Garrett, Lambin, and Naylor 2013a; Garrett, Lambin, and Naylor 2013b), but once those 
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commercial centers emerge, the location rents they generate structure the geography of frontier 
expansion. 
Garrett et al. (2013b) study the municipality of Sorriso as an archetypical agro-industrial 
agglomeration, and the proximity of Nova Ubiratã to Sorriso and its good land quality virtually 
guaranteed that municipal land would be reallocated to more intensive land uses. At the same time, 
the environmental restrictions of the priority list may for the time being have prevented Nova 
Ubiratã from attracting investment in storage and processing facilities that would move it further 
up the industrial commodity chain. In Cotriguaçu, meanwhile, financing from the Amazon Fund 
or Fundo Vale for a few million dollars cannot compensate for the high transportation costs and 
more broken terrain, which limit land rents in the municipality. Even if ranchers invest in more 
intensified cattle production, investments and institutional development from the state or private 
corporations would still be needed to catalyze a productivist transformation. A major hydroelectric 
project may be the most likely catalyst for ending the municipality’s extractive stagnation. In terms 
of municipal political-economic regimes, both Nova Ubiratã and Cotriguaçu have transitioned 
toward productivist municipal governments that participate in land sparing coalitions. Economic 
transformations have consolidated a more productivist political-economic elite in Nova Ubiratã, 
however, while extractive loggers and ranchers still hold political clout in Cotriguaçu, and a 
nucleus of productivist large ranchers is still in its nascency. In both municipalities, environmental 
governance has unequally impacted smallholders, and land concentration is increasing, with or 
without agricultural intensification. In Part II of this chapter, I turn to the State of Pará, where the 
municipalities of São Félix and Novo Progresso represent active deforestation frontiers that have 
been the most dynamic spaces for the application of land sparing forest governance. 
 
 
	
	
354 
Part II: Pará 
	 The history of Pará closely mirrors the history of the Amazon region recounted at the 
beginning of the chapter. While Mato Grosso poses something of an exception due to its large area 
of Cerrado, long history of ranching, and early adoption of soy agriculture, the State of Pará lies 
fully in the Amazon biome, and from its position at the mouth of the Amazon River it has been a 
conduit for the development of the entire Amazon Basin. Belém was a capital of the rubber boom, 
and southeastern Pará was a major center of mahogany and brazil nut extraction.66 Logging has 
been a mainstay of the economy since the colonial period, and mining, carried out by large 
companies such as Vale (most famously at Carajás) and by prospectors (most famously at Serra 
Pelada), has been a dominant economic sector especially since the 1970s. Extensive ranching 
supported by government credits and subsidies has driven large-scale deforestation in Pará since 
the 1970s. Between 1988 and 2016, Pará lost 143,159 km2 of forest, comprising 34 percent of total 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, and since 2006 it has been the Amazonian state with the 
highest annual deforestation rate. 
	 The extractive political-economic regime in Pará has been bolstered by systematic 
corruption and violent dispossession of indigenous peoples, other traditional populations, and 
small farmer colonists. Jader Barbalho, who has served as governor, federal deputy, and senator 
of Pará, is accused of having coordinated the diversion of billions of reais from SUDAM, and a 
former state Secretary of Environment claims that half of timber production in the state is illegal 
and corruption in SEMA, the Environmental Secretariat, is endemic (Luíse 2011). Loggers, 
ranchers, and their hired guns have expanded timber extraction and consolidated large ranches 
through violent land grabs, gaining infamy for southern Pará as “Brazil’s most dangerous badland” 
																																																						
66 Brazil nuts are known in Portuguese as castanha-do-pará, or ‘Pará chestnuts.’ 
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(Simmons et al. 2007; Simmons 2004; Souza et al. 2015). The 2005 murder of Dorothy Stang, an 
American-born nun who since the 1970s had been an advocate for small farmer land rights in Pará, 
provided a stark reminder of the dangers of challenging extractive interests in the region, and gave 
additional impetus to the implementation of PPCDAm and the creation of protected areas in the 
Terra do Meio (Abranches 2014, 24–25). 
 With the emergence of the land sparing complex in the Brazilian Amazon and the launch 
of PPCDAm, the state government of Pará has also adopted policies to limit deforestation and 
support a productivist transition, though an extractive coalition maintains considerable power in 
state-level politics. State protected areas were designated alongside federal areas, including the 
Triunfo do Xingu Environmental Protection Area in São Félix, created in 2006. In 2007, as 
deforestation ticked upward with the rise in global commodity prices, Valmir Ortega, Director of 
Ecosystems at IBAMA, was brought in to be state Secretary of the Environment. Ortega cracked 
down on illegal logging and sought to root out corruption in the Environment Secretariat – more 
than 70 SEMA employees were removed for corruption during his two years as Secretary – but he 
was opposed and undermined by logging interests to the point where he resigned in mid-2009 
(Luíse 2011; TNC09 140217). In 2008, Pará became one of the founding members of the 
Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force. 
 Pará did not have Mato Grosso’s early experience with environmental registration through 
SLAPR, but after the creation of CAR in Mato Grosso, Pará also began to develop an 
environmental registry from 2007 onwards. The Ministry of Environment’s priority list was 
created in 2008, and the municipality of Paragominas, in northeastern Pará, launched a municipal 
initiative to exit the list, with support from TNC and IMAZON, a Brazilian environmental NGO 
based in Belém. Paragominas succeeded in negotiating with the Ministry of Environment to accept 
 
	
	
356 
CAR in lieu of a full review of land titles as a criterion for leaving the priority list, and in 2010 
Paragominas became the first municipality to exit the list. The example of Paragominas’ ‘Green 
Muncipality’ project was then heavily promoted by the state and federal government and 
environmental NGOs including TNC as a model for combating deforestation and supporting 
municipal environmental governance (Guimarães et al. 2011). In March 2011, Pará launched a 
Green Municipalities Program, based on the Paragominas model, to combat deforestation and 
promote sustainable rural activities through CAR implementation and municipal capacity building. 
Other state programs have been made conditional on adhering to this program, such that by 
December 2015, 107 out of 144 municipalities in Pará had joined. 
 Prosecutors for the Federal Public Ministry (MPF) in Pará, in particular Daniel Azeredo, 
have been key actors in promoting environmental governance in the state and throughout the 
Amazon region (McAllister 2005; Pegurier 2016). In 2009, MPF began requiring slaughterhouses 
to purchase cattle only from properties with CAR, which substantially increased CAR registration 
by ranchers (Gibbs et al. 2016). MPF has also required municipalities to agree to municipal ‘pacts’ 
for the control of deforestation in order to extend environmental compliance deadlines for rural 
producers, and in 2012, Azeredo brought a civil action against INCRA for its failure to ensure 
environmental compliance in agrarian reform settlements. 
 Annual deforestation in Pará declined 80 percent from its 2004 peak to its lowest point in 
2012, but since 2012 deforestation has again accelerated (Figure 6.24), calling into question the 
completeness and durability of Pará’s land use transition. The municipal case studies of São Félix 
and Novo Progresso illustrate the actions of land sparing coalitions on the Pará frontier and the 
uneven and contested trajectory of the productivist transition these coalitions seek to realize. Since 
2003, TNC’s Amazon Conservation Program has directed its forest conservation activities in Pará 
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out of a regional office in Belém. The municipality of São Félix do Xingu has been the site of a 
major TNC REDD program, and is considered by TNC staff as the municipality where their 
programs have been most successful. TNC staff reported that their programs had been least 
successful in the municipality of Novo Progresso, where a CAR project funded by Fundo Vale 
largely failed to advance. 
	
	
Figure 6.24: Historical deforestation in Pará. 
São Félix: Effective Constriction and Stagnation 
 São Félix, covering 84,213 km2 in southeastern Pará, experienced rapid population growth 
and land cover change beginning in the late 1970s, catalyzed by construction of a highway to the 
municipality (Schmink and Wood 1992). Ranching expansion in the 1990s-2000s drove large-
scale deforestation, and almost all occupation occurred without formal land title. The soy frontier 
remains distant, and the hilly and rocky terrain is considered difficult for industrial cropping, so 
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land use change is dominated by ranching (Figure 6.25). In 2000-2007, deforestation in São Félix 
averaged 1200 km2/year, while the municipal population jumped from 35,000 to 60,000 (IBGE 
2016). During the same period, the municipal cattle herd increased from 682,000 to 1.6 million 
head (IBGE 2016c), becoming the second-largest municipal herd in Brazil. Deforestation 
advanced westward as small farmers and large ranchers moved into the Terra do Meio region west 
of the Xingu River (Castro, Monteiro, and Castro 2002), threatening to break through to the BR-
163 highway running through Novo Progresso in western Pará. 
 
Figure 6.25: Looking towards São Félix town from the far side of the Rio Fresco, 24 July 2014. 
The terrain is hilly and rocky, and most deforested land is used for extensive ranching. 
 To forestall this frontier expansion, small farmers along the Transamazon highway north 
of Terra do Meio found common ground with environmentalists in Brazilian and international 
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NGOs to work with the Brazilian Government to create a mosaic of protected areas (Campos and 
Nepstad 2006). In addition to existing indigenous territories, which today cover 53 percent of São 
Félix, the federal government in 2005 created two new strictly-protected conservation areas. Large 
ranchers organized to oppose the protected areas. They succeeded in altering some conservation 
area boundaries and in ensuring that the Triunfo do Xingu protected area, created in 2006 by the 
State of Pará, was designated as an Environmental Protection Area (APA), allowing private 
occupation and ‘sustainable use’ (Taravella and Arnauld de Sartre 2012). Nonetheless, properties 
in federally-protected zones were expropriated and cattle grazing within the areas were seized. 
With the new protected areas, 19 percent of municipal territory fell under conservation areas, 
virtually all territory west of the Xingu had protected status, and just 28 percent of the municipality 
remained unprotected private property space (Figure 6.28). 
Protected area creation and enhanced enforcement under PPCDAm drove significant 
deforestation reductions in São Félix after 2005. Deforestation declined 37 percent, from 1268 
km2/year in 2003-2005 to 800 km2/year in 2006-2008, and logging activity, which had been closely 
linked to frontier expansion, also declined significantly (Figure 6.26). In 2008, the priority list was 
created, accompanied by credit restrictions and robust enforcement. In 2009, TNC and IEB, a 
Brazilian NGO, launched projects aimed at reducing deforestation with support from Frigol, a 
local slaughterhouse, and Fundo Vale. The large ranchers initially were hostile to the NGOs, but 
when public prosecutors began forcing slaughterhouses only to receive cattle from properties with 
CAR, the ranchers’ syndicate (SPR) began to work with the NGOs and government to achieve 
environmental compliance. Deforestation bottomed out in 2011 at 140 km2, a 90 percent reduction 
from 2005 (Figure 6.26). That year, CAR registration in the municipality exceeded 80 percent of 
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private property space,67 and a Pact for the End of Illegal Deforestation was signed by stakeholders 
including municipal, state, and federal government entities; local, national, and international 
NGOs; and ranchers’, farmers’, and community organizations. In signing the Pact, rural producers 
committed not to deforest illegally and to adopt more sustainable practices, while government 
agencies and NGOs committed to provide technical assistance and credit for sustainable 
production, to maintain infrastructure, and to facilitate environmental licensing and tenure 
regularization. 
 
Figure 6.26: Annual deforestation in São Félix, 2001-2015. 
																																																						
67 As of May 2017, São Félix had over 3,800,000 ha registered in CAR, exceeding the legally available agricultural 
area by over 500,000 ha. Over 150,000 ha have been registered in indigenous territories and nearly 120,000 ha have 
been registered in conservation areas, reflecting continued contestation over tenure and protected areas in the 
municipality (SFB/MMA 2017). 
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 As this history shows, territorial constriction has been central to environmental governance 
in São Félix. Protected areas closed the western frontier, limiting and encircling the available area 
for agricultural expansion. Heavy enforcement rendered constriction effective, as fear of punitive 
measures led many to reduce or cease forest clearing. Ranching intensification is almost 
universally considered the necessary response to this new land constraint. 
 Although government officials, NGO activists, ranchers, and small farmers all recognize 
the necessity of increasing productivity on already-deforested land, intensification has not 
occurred automatically with constriction. Almost all properties lack formal title, which might 
facilitate investment, and by November 2015, Terra Legal had issued just 26 titles in rural São 
Félix (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário 2015). Some larger ranchers with access to credit 
or capital reserves have adopted more intensive practices, such as restoring degraded pastures and 
implementing pasture rotations, but many land managers lack access to necessary capital, 
equipment, and knowledge to intensify. The collateral effect of deforestation reductions has 
therefore been a freeze in the agricultural sector in São Félix. Residents speak of economic 
stagnation, and real municipal GDP per capita declined after 2006 (Figure 6.35). According to a 
small farmer living in the APA: 
“Until the new regulations, we worked normally. We received financing from the 
bank to buy cattle, and everything was going well until 2009…Now we are isolated, 
and anything we do is repressed. We have been frozen in place.” (SFX08 140206) 
Farmers cannot deforest new land to expand, nor do they receive assistance to intensify. 
 Realizing intensification might not occur spontaneously, TNC has launched initiatives 
supporting new production practices. The organization’s sustainable ranching project, established 
in 2013 in partnership with Walmart and Marfrig, has supported around 20 primarily medium and 
large ranchers to intensify and pursue tenure regularization (Figure 6.27). TNC’s sustainable cacao 
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project, begun in 2013 with financing from Cargill, works with nearly 60 smallholders to recover 
degraded lands with cacao agroforestry. These projects are intended to be replicable and scalable, 
TNC staff affirm, and have been complemented by support for sustainable production from IEB 
and MMA, but these initiatives presently reach a small proportion of the 10,000 rural properties in 
São Félix. Support promised by federal and state governments for infrastructure, technical 
assistance, credit, and land titling has mostly failed to materialize. 
 
Figure 6.27: A team from TNC’s ranching intensification project visits workers’ quarters on a 
fazenda in São Félix, 14 February 2014. 
Without substantial investments supporting intensification, and with incomes stagnating, 
two trends have emerged. First, deforestation began to rebound, climbing to 223 km2 in 2013 
(Figure 6.26). As the Municipal Secretary of Environment explained, “people are afraid of 
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enforcement actions, so they wait for public policies, but when public policies don’t come, they 
decide to run a risk and deforest” (SFX01 140129). Second, as small farmers struggle under the 
new enforcement regime, there has been an increasing tendency for smallholders to sell their 
properties and move to cities or other parts of the frontier, according to multiple informants, and 
this tendency further concentrates land in the hands of large ranchers (SFX04 140204; 
EMATER01 140130). 
 São Félix has been characterized by a relatively strong land sparing coalition of 
government, NGO, and corporate actors (Table 6.2). Command-and-control measures, including 
protected area creation and Forest Code enforcement, have dramatically reduced deforestation. 
Credit restrictions, regional legal action against slaughterhouses, and TNC and MMA projects also 
succeeded in bringing over 80 percent of private property area into CAR. Pressure under territorial 
constriction for a transition from an extensive mode of extraction to an intensive mode of 
production is widely felt. Yet ranching intensification is still incipient, and without substantial 
financial support or technical assistance, territorial constriction through environmental regulation 
has resulted in state-building in a coercive mode, but not yet agricultural intensification and socio-
economic development. Environmental governance is favoring more productivist management 
among large ranchers, while smallholders struggle – and in many cases fail – to adapt. 
Figures 6.28-29: 6.28) Map of São Félix showing forest loss in 2001-2005, during the peak of 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon; 6.29) Map of São Félix showing forest loss in 2001-2014. 
Protected areas are shown with 2017 boundaries. The municipal seat is denoted by a white 
square.  
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Figure 6.30: São Félix do Xingu and Novo Progresso. Military area in southern Novo Progresso 
not shown. Protected areas overlapping the municipalities are shown with 2015 boundaries. Data: 
MMA; Hansen/UMD/Google/USGS/NASA. 
 
	
	
367 
 
Figure 6.31: Annual timber extraction in São Félix and Novo Progresso, 1995-2015 (IBGE 2017a). 
Novo Progresso: Incomplete Constriction, Extractive Expansion, and Soy 
 Novo Progresso, in southwestern Pará, covers 38,162 km2 along either side of the north-
south BR-163 highway (Figure 6.32), which links soy-producing Mato Grosso with ports on the 
Amazon. Colonization of Novo Progresso began with the highway’s opening in the 1970s, and has 
occurred largely without formal land titling. A gold rush in the early 1980s drew settlers, followed 
by a shift toward logging and ranching. Soy expansion in Mato Grosso has driven growth along 
the BR-163 corridor, and industrial row-crop agriculture is entering southern areas of Novo 
Progresso. The municipality experienced large-scale deforestation during the early 2000s, 
averaging 465 km2/year in 2000-2005, and logging activity spiked in correlation with new forest 
clearing (Figures 6.31 and 6.33). 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
Ti
m
be
r	E
xt
ra
ct
io
n	
in
	m
3
Year
Logging	in	São	Félix	and	Novo	Progresso
Novo	Progresso São	Félix	do	Xingu
 
	
	
368 
 
Figure 6.32: The BR-163 Cuiabá-Santarém highway in the center of Novo Progresso, 21 March 
2014. 
 The implementation of PPCDAm has played out in Novo Progresso through conflicts 
between a thin land sparing coalition comprising primarily external actors and a strong coalition 
supporting frontier expansion. In 2006, the federal government created Jamanxim National Forest 
(FLONA) in western Novo Progresso at the same time as the Terra do Meio protected areas to the 
east. FLONA Jamanxim covered 13,000 km2, and when combined with a biological reserve 
created in 2005 and a restricted military area in the municipality’s southern half, there remained 
just 9898 km2 of legally-available private property space in Novo Progresso: 25.9 percent of the 
municipality’s total area, located in a 50 km-wide corridor bisected by BR-163 (Figure 6.36). The 
FLONA’s creation generated significant resistance. Demarcation occurred with little local input, 
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FLONA boundaries were not made clear to the population, and its creation expropriated people 
who had occupied the area for decades (NP04 140320; NP01 140318). Deforestation was not 
immediately reduced, rising from 254 km2 in 2006 to 348 km2 in 2007 (Figure 6.33). Novo 
Progresso entered the MMA priority list in 2008, bringing credit restrictions and enhanced 
enforcement. In 2009, as elsewhere, slaughterhouses began to purchase only from properties with 
CAR. 
	
Figure 6.33: Annual deforestation in Novo Progresso, 2001-2015. 
 Novo Progresso residents chafe at the constriction of their potential agricultural area. 
Agamenon Menezes, president of the ranchers’ syndicate, laments that Novo Progresso is left with 
“just a tiny corridor to work in, and even then they want to prohibit activities” by enforcing the 
Forest Code on private properties (NP03 140319). Ranchers and their ruralist advocates have 
sought reduction of the FLONA from the federal judiciary, executive, and legislature, and there 
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have been periodic protests by municipal residents. On the other side, IBAMA has engaged in 
numerous enforcement actions, including confiscating cattle grazing illegally within the FLONA. 
There has also been substantial resistance to CAR. Seeing CAR as a state enforcement tool, 
many landowners chose not to register in order to “stay hidden” and continue clearing, according 
to a state extension agent (EMATER03 140327; also NP01 140318). Those who completed CAR 
have generally done so to access credit or sell to slaughterhouses, but according to one rancher, 
“those who are well-prepared don’t need CAR”: they have alternative financing sources and can 
launder cattle through someone else’s CAR (NP02 140319), or they register only part of their 
property and continue to deforest in the unregistered portion (EMATER03 140327) (Figure 6.34). 
 
Figure 6.34: Painted on the wall of the rural producers’ syndicate, the quotation reads: “When the 
Law ignores reality, reality takes revenge by ignoring the Law.” Needless to say, the ranchers in 
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Novo Progresso are not very keen on the law. Georges Ripert, author of the quotation, was a 
French jurist. 24 March 2014. 
 Political leaders in Novo Progresso have abetted resistance to environmental regulation. In 
2011, when TNC prepared to enter the municipality to support CAR and Pará’s Green 
Municipalities Program, Agamenon of the ranchers’ syndicate vociferated before the town council: 
“For years we have been fighting against these international interests in the 
region… ‘Zero deforestation’ does not exist, it is impossible to accept this 
imposition by the government. If this happens, we will burn their cars and expel 
them from the city. We don’t want NGOs here.” (“Presidente Do Sindicato…” 
2011) 
Agamenon’s conflation of government and NGOs speaks to the alliance of these actors in a land 
sparing coalition seeking to change the practices of ranchers like himself. 
Osvaldo Romanholi, elected mayor in 2012, was president of the loggers’ syndicate and 
during his campaign pledged to expel IBAMA from the municipality. “Political power is in the 
hands of those who profit from illegality,” one rancher observed (NP02 140319). In 2014, the town 
council removed Romanholi for fiscal impropriety, and in 2015 the federal government arrested 
members of a local criminal ring coordinating land grabbing and deforestation, but substantial 
deforestation continued. 
 Despite the hostile context, TNC attempted to support CAR registration through a project 
funded by Fundo Vale in 2011-2012. The project encountered difficulties, largely due to weak 
support from the municipal government and antagonism from the ranchers’ syndicate, according 
to a local TNC employee (TNC14 140317). At the beginning of 2014, 60 percent of private 
property area in Novo Progresso was registered in CAR,68 and TNC planned to return, initially 
within a project funded by multinational grain trader Bunge. 
																																																						
68 As of May 2017, over 1,400,000 ha in Novo Progresso had been registered with CAR, exceeding the legally 
available area (before the reduction of FLONA Jamanxim) by over 450,000 ha (SFB/MMA 2017). 
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 Deforestation declined substantially after creation of the priority list, from 316 km2 in 2009 
to 51 km2 in 2010. There was a widespread perception, however, that federal enforcement 
primarily hurt smallholders, while some larger landowners continued to deforest with impunity, 
using wealth and political connections to evade fines and obstruct environmental policy. 
Deforestation rebounded in 2013-2014 to 139 km2/year; less than half of 2009 deforestation, but 
far short of the reductions in São Félix. Decreased deforestation has been accompanied by 
reduction of the municipal cattle herd (IBGE 2016), due partly to embargoes on illegally deforested 
areas and pasture degradation in extensive ranching operations. Large ranchers who no longer 
deforest have begun to intensify production using their own resources, but reforming degraded 
pastures and adopting intensive rotations is generally too costly for smallholders without external 
support. Tenure regularization that might facilitate agricultural investment has advanced little. 
Although Terra Legal arrived in Novo Progresso in 2009 and quickly titled 233 properties (Brito 
and Barreto 2011), the program titled just 93 properties during the ensuing six years (Ministério 
do Desenvolvimento Agrário 2015). Campbell (2015b) reports that titling has been distorted by 
large ranchers to further consolidate land and power by laundering cattle from illegal ranches 
through titled smallholder properties. 
The arrival of the soy frontier along BR-163 is deemed imminent by the local population. 
Even if soy expands only into pasture areas, it may indirectly drive deforestation by displacing 
ranching and increasing land values under conditions of ineffective territorial constriction. As an 
agricultural extension agent affirmed, “soy brings more money, more ambition, and more 
pressure” (EMATER03 140327). 
 Continued municipal economic growth in 2006-2010, when GDP per capita doubled 
(Figure 6.35), was likely driven partly by ranching expansion with illegal deforestation, as well as 
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by infrastructure improvements, logging, and high metals prices encouraging mining. Large 
landowners maintain profitability through ranching intensification, illegal deforestation, and in 
some cases a transition to field agriculture. Small farmers struggle from enforcement and lack of 
support, and the hostility of large ranchers toward NGOs damages smallholders, who are least able 
to independently afford environmental registration and investments in intensification. 
 In Novo Progresso, the land sparing coalition of federal agencies and TNC (with corporate 
support) has struggled to implement its agenda of territorial constriction and agricultural 
intensification through environmental governance. Command-and-control actions have reduced 
deforestation since 2009, but resistance to CAR, the FLONA, and NGOs, and domination of local 
politics by actors tied to illegal clearing and land speculation have stymied local land sparing 
coalition development. A shift from an extractive to a productive economy in the municipality may 
depend on an exogenous transition from ranching to field agriculture, though territorial 
constriction will be crucial to prevent intensification from driving indirect land use change in the 
FLONA and Terra do Meio. Recent events have continued to undermine constriction and reinforce 
extractive deforestation, however. In December 2016, in a victory for the extractive coalition, the 
Temer government announced a 43 percent reduction of FLONA Jamanxim, decreasing the 
strictly-protected area in Novo Progresso by 30 percent and legalizing extensive landgrabs. 
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Figure 6.35: Real GDP per capita in São Félix and Novo Progresso. Current GDP per capita 
provided by Governo do Estado do Pará (2014a; 2014b) and adjusted to constant BRL using the 
Brazilian Consumer Price Index - IPCA (IBGE 2017c). 
Figures 6.36-37: 6.36) Map of Novo Progresso showing forest loss in 2001-2005, during the peak 
of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon; 6.37) Map of Novo Progresso showing forest loss in 
2001-2014. The municipal seat is denoted by a white square. FLONA Jamanxim is shown with its 
original (pre-2016) boundaries. Encroachment in the FLONA is clearly visible.  
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Comparative Analysis: São Félix and Novo Progresso 
 The differential effectiveness of land sparing coalitions in the two municipalities, resulting 
in effective constriction and stagnation in São Félix and ineffective constriction and extractive 
expansion in Novo Progresso, is explained primarily by differential investment in governance by 
external actors, coupled with frontier geography and the indirect effects of pasture-to-cropland 
intensification. 
 As the Amazonian municipality with the highest annual deforestation rate in the mid-
2000s, São Félix was specially targeted for interventions by government and NGO actors hoping 
to set an example for the region. NGOs were attracted to São Félix by what a TNC employee called 
the “symbolic challenge” of the municipality known as the “deforestation champion” (TNC07 
140402). Government agencies targeted São Félix for enforcement, and the Environment Ministry 
took the unprecedented step of implementing a project to support Forest Code compliance in the 
municipality. These heavily-invested external actors formed a strong land sparing coalition that 
attained cooperation from local actors to reduce deforestation. Novo Progresso, although still a 
priority municipality on the MMA list, received far less investment from external land sparing 
proponents. 
At a proximate level, TNC staff attribute greater success in São Félix to stronger 
cooperation with the municipal government and ranchers’ syndicate and difficulties in Novo 
Progresso to antagonism from the ranchers’ syndicate and local political feuds, but these municipal 
political landscapes are structured by frontier geography and regional land use change dynamics. 
Territorial constriction in São Félix was facilitated by the regional geography of the frontier. The 
primary axis of economic development in eastern Pará is the north-south Belém-Brasília highway 
corridor, 250 km east of São Félix. Westward frontier expansion from São Félix advanced at ever-
 
	
	
378 
increasing distances from highways and economic poles (Garcia, Soares-Filho, and Sawyer 2007), 
though with the prospect of connecting to BR-163 in Novo Progresso and the Transamazon 
Highway to the north. This spatial configuration of latitudinal penetration made it easier to ‘close’ 
the frontier with protected area ‘barriers.’ 
 In Novo Progresso, the north-south BR-163 that runs the length of the municipality 
constitutes the main axis of development in western Pará. The highway’s bisection of the 
municipality increases access to remaining forest land in Novo Progresso, heightening the 
likelihood of deforestation (Laurance et al. 2001). As the artery connecting soy production in Mato 
Grosso with Amazonian ports, the BR-163 corridor has strong growth prospects driven by 
industrial agribusiness expansion and regional economic poles (Garcia, Soares-Filho, and Sawyer 
2007). This frontier geography hinders efforts at territorial constriction, encouraging speculative 
land grabbing and leading to strong contestation of FLONA Jamanxim and local politics hostile to 
environmental governance interventions. 
Distinct expansionary pressures and intensification dynamics in the two municipalities are 
also determined by the indirect effects of pasture-to-cropland conversions. First, expansion of soy 
on pastureland may displace ranchers to the forest frontier; second, intensification through 
cropland conversion raises land values, which drives land appreciation and speculation on forest 
margins. Richards et al. (2014) find that land appreciation effects of cropland expansion may 
explain as much as one-third of Amazonian deforestation. These indirect effects operate more 
strongly in Novo Progresso than in São Félix due to Novo Progresso’s integration with land 
markets in soy expansion zones in Mato Grosso and Santarém. Land market effects and the 
advancing soy frontier may also be driving intensification by some large ranchers in Novo 
Progresso, whereas intensification in São Félix is induced by territorial constriction and positive 
 
	
	
379 
investments from NGOs. This contrast is reflected in economic growth in Novo Progresso tied to 
extractive expansion and regional agricultural development versus economic stagnation in São 
Félix tied to insufficient support for a productivist transition. 
Part III: Discussion and Conclusion 
Comparative Analysis: Mato Grosso and Pará 
 With the emergence of the land sparing complex in the Brazilian Amazon in the 2000s, 
deforestation declined dramatically in both Mato Grosso and Pará. The expanding soy frontier in 
Mato Grosso and the domination of state politics by agribusiness interests have facilitated the 
construction of state-level environmental governance mechanisms such as SLAPR and CAR due 
to the high legibility, concentration, and capitalization of the soy commodity chain. Major soy 
traders such as Cargill and Bunge were susceptible to international environmentalist pressures and 
coordinated with each other to impose the Soy Moratorium. Soy production is highly legible for 
purposes of monitoring and enforcement due to its fixed location and concentration on large 
properties, as well as due to the integration of soy producers with trading companies in markets 
for finance, inputs, and processing. Agricultural production in Mato Grosso continued to increase 
despite declining deforestation thanks to the high capitalization and profitability of industrial field 
agriculture, which expanded into pasture areas and drove intensification in ranching operations 
pressured by territorial constriction and rising location rents. While this pattern held across much 
of the eastern and central portions of the Amazon biome in Mato Grosso, the remote northwest 
region, where Cotriguaçu is located, has largely stagnated in the absence of intensive soy 
production or other productivist investment. 
 Pará has a much more heterogeneous frontier than Mato Grosso (Pacheco 2012), dominated 
by a mixture of logging, mining, and ranching, with the expansion of industrial soy production and 
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oil palm and tree plantations in some emerging productivist centers (Butler and Laurance 2009; R. 
T. Adams 2010; Baletti 2014; Piketty et al. 2015). The cattle commodity chain is more complex 
and less legible than the soy chain, as cattle are mobile and may pass through multiple properties 
from birth to slaughter, complicating efforts to eliminate deforestation from the cattle production 
chain. Many smallholders also participate in cattle ranching, multiplying the number of actors in 
the sector. Smallholders and large ranchers and loggers in Pará are locked in persistent land 
conflicts rooted in unclear land tenure and large-scale land grabbing, and these land conflicts help 
drive deforestation through contentious land change processes (Aldrich et al. 2012) and complicate 
forest governance efforts. Extractive coalitions remain strong in Pará, and murders of 
environmental and land rights activists are common. Luiz Araújo, who was the municipal 
Environment Secretary during the first years of TNC’s project in São Félix, subsequently became 
Environment Secretary in the neighboring municipality of Altamira, a frontier of rapid 
deforestation, and was murdered by gunmen in front of his family in October 2016 (Sandy 2016). 
These ‘contested frontiers’ in Pará have been more resistant to forest governance 
interventions, and deforestation in Pará has declined less rapidly than in Mato Grosso. Annual 
deforestation in Mato Grosso declined 94 percent from 2004 to 2012, while in Pará the decline 
was 80 percent, and since 2006, Pará has been the Amazonian state responsible for the largest area 
of annual deforestation. Agricultural intensification in Pará has also lagged, as territorial 
constriction has not been matched by large-scale investments in transforming productive practices. 
Government and NGO support for ranching intensification and smallholder diversification cannot 
match the capital leveraged by industrial row-crop commodity chains, but regions in Pará where 
these supply chains have become established have begun to emerge as new productivist centers, 
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with the municipality of Paragominas in northeastern Pará being the most prominent example 
(Piketty et al. 2015; C. Viana et al. 2016). 
Despite these differences, deforestation rates in Mato Grosso and Pará are highly correlated 
(Pearson’s r = 0.86) (Figure 6.38), indicating their strong dependence on macro-level economic 
and governance processes. 
 
Figure 6.38: Annual deforestation in Mato Grosso and Pará, 1989-2016. Pearson’s r = 0.86. 
Land Sparing in the Amazon 
 Comparing these four municipalities across Mato Grosso and Pará States illuminates 
conditions for implementation of the Amazonian land sparing agenda. Territorial constriction is 
necessary but not sufficient for land sparing intensification. The effectiveness of constriction 
depends on how it is imposed and existing pressures in an area. Without constriction, deforestation 
may continue even as intensification occurs. With constriction, intensification should allow for 
increasing agricultural production over a constant area, but intensification is not the inevitable 
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outcome of land scarcity. With sufficient investments, a productivist transition can be engineered 
virtually anywhere, but because of the limited capital so far mobilized by the state and 
environmental NGOs, municipal-level productivist transitions in the Amazon have relied on 
investments by private actors. Intensification through private investment is occurring on some 
large properties in the ranching municipalities of Cotriguaçu, São Félix, and Novo Progresso, but 
more widespread intensification requires either arrival of the row-crop frontier, as in Nova Ubiratã 
and perhaps soon in Novo Progresso, or additional investments by land sparing coalitions. A key 
question for the future is thus whether the land sparing complex can effectively catalyze ranching 
intensification through constriction and positive incentives absent land pressure and investment 
from industrial row-cropping. 
 Even if intensification does not occur, command-and-control measures can substantially 
reduce extractive expansion. Punitive measures without corresponding incentives disadvantage 
smallholders, who have fewer resources to deal with fines or invest in intensification. As 
smallholders struggle, large landowners consolidate their holdings. In areas like Nova Ubiratã and 
São Félix, where it has been most successful, the land sparing project reduces deforestation and 
develops internal territorialization through territorial constriction, while support for a transition to 
more intensive, productivist agriculture comes either from investments by capitalized agro-
industry, as in Nova Ubiratã, or in a weaker form from investments by government and NGO 
actors, as in São Félix. The social effects of land sparing policies are highly uneven, favoring agro-
industry above smallholder livelihoods. The success of land sparing coalitions varies on the ground 
according to levels of investment by external actors, frontier geography, and regional dynamics of 
pasture-to-cropland conversion. In areas like Novo Progresso, where land sparing coalitions are 
weak (Table 6.2), or Cotriguaçu, which is very remote, an extractive economy still predominates. 
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Table 6.2: Selected actors in municipal-level land sparing coalitions. 
 Selected Land Sparing Coalition Actors 
 
Nova Ubiratã Cotriguaçu São Félix Novo Progresso 
State 
 
 
Municipality, 
IBAMA 
Municipality, 
IBAMA, 
Embrapa, 
Amazon Fund 
Municipality, 
MMA, IBAMA, 
Embrapa 
MMA, IBAMA, 
Embrapa 
Agro-
industrial 
capital 
SPR SPR, Vale Frigol, Cargill, 
Walmart, Marfrig, 
Vale, SPR 
Bunge, Vale 
Environmental 
NGOs 
TNC TNC, ICV, ONF TNC, IEB TNC 
Acronyms: Embrapa = Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation; IBAMA = Brazilian Institute of 
the Environment and Natural Resources; ICV = Instituto Centro de Vida; IEB = Brazilian 
International Institute of Education; MMA = Ministry of Environment; ONF = French National 
Forests Office; SPR = Rural Producers’ Syndicate; TNC = The Nature Conservancy. 
 These findings advance several strands of geographical literature on land use and 
governance. Regarding Amazonian deforestation, I respond to studies that identify policy drivers 
of deforestation reductions but lack a systemic theorization of how drivers interrelate (e.g., 
Assunção, Rocha, and Gandour 2012; Nepstad et al. 2014). These studies elide the interests 
motivating policy and the way policies interact to advance a political-economic agenda. 
Specifically, I identify the linkage between territorial constriction and agricultural intensification 
in the Amazon as the nexus on which policies and outcomes turn and through which interests are 
coordinated. Variation in the constriction-intensification relationship explains variation in 
municipal outcomes parsimoniously and dynamically. 
 Regarding the land sparing hypothesis, I expand on discussions of territorial governance, 
land sparing, and the Amazonian land use transition with an analytical framework that identifies 
the interests and processes driving a regional transition from an extractive regime to a productivist 
regime, and that exposes the collateral effects of this transition, including smallholder 
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dispossession. This analysis contributes more broadly to our understanding of when and how land 
sparing occurs, pointing to multilevel investment, frontier geography, and regional agricultural 
dynamics as determinants of constriction and intensification. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the relationships between different actors in the land sparing 
complex in Brazil, the processes through which the land sparing agenda is promoted and contested, 
and the differential realization of environmentalist, corporate, and state governance objectives 
across different states and municipalities. Despite diverse land change and governance outcomes, 
the case studies affirm the centrality of the land sparing complex and productivist political-
economic regimes at the national and regional levels to engineering reductions in deforestation in 
the Brazilian Amazon. The core of environmental governance to combat Amazonian deforestation 
comprises a project of territorialization and intensification aimed at shifting the Amazonian 
political-economic regime from extraction to productivism. This project inverts the territorializing 
and accumulative functions of environmental conservation under the protected areas model, 
instead employing a land sparing logic to engineer socio-economic development and state-building 
in the private property space outside protected areas. 
The land sparing project is implemented by coalitions deriving from a multilevel complex 
of political-economic actors including government, NGOs, and corporations. Deforestation has 
declined almost 80 percent since 2004, but extractive coalitions continue to resist constriction, 
especially in the absence of sufficient support for intensification. Moreover, a successful 
productivist transition might lead the state to relax constriction, jeopardizing forest conservation. 
If deforestation pressures come from productivist industrial agriculture that increases state 
revenues, as opposed to predatory extraction that degrades natural capital, the state might open 
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new areas for conversion. This scenario seems likely given trends in reduction and reclassification 
of Brazilian protected areas (Bernard, Penna, and Araújo 2014), and would negate the land sparing 
effects of intensification.69 Capture of Amazonian policy by an extractive complex under the 
Temer administration may also critically weaken the land sparing agenda. 
Brazil’s reduction of deforestation under the land sparing complex is promoted as a model 
for other countries. This chapter reveals the actors and interests invested in the Brazilian model, 
as well as the model’s collateral effects, including economic stagnation where intensification lags, 
and the consolidation of large-scale landholdings at the expense of family agriculture. Amazonian 
forest governance is celebrated for ‘decoupling’ agriculture and deforestation, demonstrating the 
viability of land sparing for reconciling environmental conservation and capitalist development. 
This land sparing effect is a fallacy. Reductions in Amazonian deforestation do not automatically 
imply that global deforestation has been reduced or that Brazil’s declining deforestation rate 
comprises “one of the main contributions across the world towards countering climate change,” as 
BDNES proclaims (author field notes 151206). Rather, regional land sparing in the Brazilian 
Amazon has displaced deforestation to coupled frontiers elsewhere, and global tropical 
deforestation has accelerated. Chapter 7 explains how displacement negates land sparing, and 
Chapter 8 offers concluding reflections on forest governance and global development. 
 
  
																																																						
69 This question of ‘permanence’ speaks to one of the three main criteria for the evaluation of forest conservation in 
REDD projects. For reductions in deforestation to be valid for REDD, they must have permanence, so that forest 
spared one year is not cut down the next; they must not be offset by displacement or ‘leakage’ of deforestation to 
other regions; and they must be ‘additional,’ in that they would not have happened absent the project intervention. I 
maintain that forest governance efforts in Brazil have resulted in ‘additional’ reductions in Amazonian deforestation, 
but these reductions are of doubtful permanence and are in any case offset by displacement. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISPLACEMENT 
“Soy has been displaced into the Cerrado. It’s harder to control there, harder to 
market for conservation, and harder to determine what ‘deforestation’ means there. 
There is an unspoken conspiracy between the companies and the NGOs not to talk 
about the Cerrado.” 
 
- TNC staff member, 13 July 2015 
“The queen of commodities breaks down borders, defies the limits of the 
environment, and surprises with outstanding numbers at every new harvest.” 
 
- A Granja Brazilian agricultural 
magazine soy issue, May 2015 
 
 
 A heron swoops across a bank of trees, and tribal drums pulse. “The Amazon is one of our 
most important environmental assets,” a voice intones. An eight-minute video produced by 
BNDES opens a session on Brazil’s Amazon Fund at the Global Landscapes Forum, a two-day 
gathering on the sidelines of the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015. “Brazil is proud to 
have significantly reduced deforestation in its area of the Amazon,” the voice continues. “This 
decrease is one of the main contributions across the world towards countering climate change.” 
From Paris to Jakarta, I have heard the gospel of Brazil’s success in reducing deforestation. 
“In the [Brazilian] Amazon, reducing deforestation has already made a very large contribution to 
combating climate change – more than that of any other nation on Earth,” affirms a report from 
the Union of Concerned Scientists titled “Deforestation Success Stories” (Boucher et al. 2014, 13). 
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, deforestation has accelerated dramatically over the course of the past 
decade. At a meeting in Jakarta in November 2014, Heru Prasetyo, the head of Indonesia’s REDD 
agency, lamented, “When Brazil announces deforestation is 480,000 hectares, everyone applauds. 
When Indonesia announces deforestation is 450,000 hectares, no one applauds.” Indonesia 
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exceeded Brazil in 2012 as the country with the highest annual rate of tropical primary forest loss 
(Margono et al. 2014), and Brazil’s land sparing approach is now being promoted as a model for 
other tropical forest countries, including Indonesia. “Environmentalists are also transferring their 
experience in Brazil to Indonesia,” writes Tollefson in Nature, although “Scepticism remains about 
whether these strategies will succeed in Indonesia, which is building a monitoring and enforcement 
programme from scratch. But [prominent Amazon forest scientist and REDD advocate Daniel] 
Nepstad points out that a decade ago, nobody would have believed Brazil was about to turn a 
corner. ‘There are seeds of what we saw in Brazil ten years ago in Indonesia today,’ Nepstad says” 
(Tollefson 2015, 23). This ecological modernization narrative suggests that Brazil has reconciled 
environment and development and the rest of the world can do the same. This narrative is flawed: 
Brazilian and Indonesian deforestation processes are connected, and reductions in Brazil’s 
Amazonian deforestation do not translate directly into net reductions in global deforestation or 
global carbon emissions. The land sparing model of global forest governance is based on a fallacy. 
The fallacy of socio-ecological modernization theories, including the land sparing 
hypothesis, is the idea that capitalist production occurs independently of extraction, and that 
productivist cores can grow without expanding the extractive periphery. The distinction between 
extraction and production describes fundamental flows of material and energy in the global 
economy, however. Historical processes of extraction in the Amazon fed the development of 
productivist centers like São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and the North Atlantic core. The growth of 
productivism in the Amazon under the land sparing complex, and the continued economic growth 
of the global economy, still depend on the extraction of material and energy, now being displaced 
to zones outside the Brazilian Amazon. While deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has declined, 
not only has deforestation accelerated under the extractive regime in Indonesia, it has accelerated 
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in regions directly coupled to the Brazilian Amazon, including the Cerrado and the Amazonian 
countries outside of Brazil, often due to incursions by the same assemblages of actors and capital 
that previously drove Brazil’s Amazonian deforestation. This displacement renders land sparing 
an illusion. While the global land sparing complex supports industrial expansion and state-
building, it displaces deforestation, with all of its social and environmental costs, ultimately 
producing negative global socio-ecological outcomes. 
 In the previous chapters, I have shown how during the Great Acceleration since the end of 
World War II, tropical deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia has been organized under extractive 
political-economic regimes that build the wealth and complexity of productivist economies in core 
regions while driving social and ecological degradation in the Amazon and Indonesian Borneo.  I 
have traced the evolution of ecological modernization discourse, which emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s to frame a conciliation of capitalist development and environmental protection, and I have 
explored the rise of the land sparing hypothesis as a key corollary to the ecological modernization 
perspective and a foundation of The Nature Conservancy’s tropical forest conservation programs. 
Chapter 5 explained why land sparing efforts have so far failed to reduce deforestation in 
Indonesia, which remains in the thrall of an extractive regime, and Chapter 6 demonstrated how, 
in a particular historical conjuncture, a land sparing complex emerged in Brazil to attempt to 
transform the political-economic regime in the Brazilian Amazon from extraction to productivism. 
The Brazilian land sparing complex has reduced Amazonian deforestation and engineered a partial 
and uneven productivist transition, but as I will explain in this chapter, reductions in deforestation 
and the growth of agro-industry in the Brazilian Amazon have displaced deforestation elsewhere. 
At the global level, the continued expansion and accumulation of productivist centers is integrally 
dependent on increasing degradation under the extractive regimes of the periphery. To wit, 
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although annual deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon declined by 1881 km2 per year in 2000-
2012, at the global level, annual tropical deforestation did not decline at all. Not only were 
reductions in Brazilian deforestation offset, but tropical deforestation globally increased by 2101 
km2 per year (Hansen et al. 2013). From a systemic perspective, the tropical deforestation crisis 
has grown dramatically worse, closely mirroring the accelerating degradation in other ecological 
indicators (Steffen et al. 2015). Land spared in Brazil has not been spared globally; deforestation 
has simply been displaced. 
Land Use Displacement 
 Capitalist accumulation derives fundamentally from a combination of extraction (i.e., 
primitive accumulation, or accumulation by dispossession) and production (i.e., gains in 
productivity), a marriage that Jason Moore styles “productivity and plunder” (Moore 2010b; 
Moore 2011). The geographies of extraction and production are uneven and reproduced fractally 
at multiple levels, as production concentrates in industrialized cores that draw from extractive 
peripheries. The urban centers of São Félix do Xingu and Berau draw energy and material from 
their hinterlands, the Amazon and Borneo feed southern Brazil and Jakarta, Brazil and Indonesia 
fuel the growth of China, Japan, Europe, and the United States, and every productivist core has its 
own internal peripheries. 
‘Displacement’ refers most broadly to a separation between consumption and production. 
With regard to deforestation, Meyfroidt and Lambin distinguish between ‘policy-induced leakage,’ 
which involves migration of agents of deforestation and substitution of domestic production with 
imports (e.g., of timber or animal feed) in response to environmental policies, and ‘demand-driven 
displacement,’ which refers to increasing consumption not met by domestic production, assuming 
policies remain constant (2009, 16139). This distinction is most relevant to an institutionalist 
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perspective that seeks to assess the independent effects of specific policy interventions. My 
exposition of the land sparing complex shows that changes in policy are intimately linked with 
changes in demand, since land sparing policy seeks to engineer economic transformation. From a 
systemic perspective, aggregate displacement and global outcomes are the primary concern, and 
Meyfroidt and Lambin have moved toward this more general perspective in subsequent work 
(Meyfroidt, Rudel, and Lambin 2010). 
 Capitalist production has a material throughput. Production requires inputs of materials 
and energy, which are extracted from the environment, meaning that every commodity has an 
ecological footprint (Wackernagel et al. 2002). The fundamental premise of ecological 
modernization is that the capitalist economy can grow without increasing its ecological footprint. 
This premise implies that the economy must dematerialize, achieving greater material efficiency 
but also ultimately decoupling growth from material throughput. In the history of capitalism, the 
exhaustion of extractive frontiers and their quotient of primitive accumulation has triggered the 
search for a ‘spatial fix’ and the construction of new frontiers of extraction to underpin continued 
growth and accumulation (Foster 1992; Harvey 2001; Moore 2010a). Capitalism has not before 
and is not now dematerializing; indeed, global material use has accelerated since the 1970s and 
especially since 2000, even as economic growth and population growth have slowed (Schandl et 
al. 2016). Ecological modernization in general, and the land sparing hypothesis in particular, rest 
on a fallacy of composition: they mistake the part for the whole, viewing local reductions in 
environmental degradation in ‘developed’ regions as proof of the possibility of a global green 
capitalism at the end of the ‘time/development’ axis. They fail to recognize that these 
improvements in some parts have occurred through the displacement of degradation to elsewhere 
in the whole. 
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 There is a rich literature in geographical political economy and global political ecology 
that makes exactly this point. As Mansfield et al. (2010) elucidate in their critique of forest 
transition theory, modernization discourse views “economic development as a characteristic of 
places,” while geographical scholarship views “economic development as occurring through 
dynamic relationships among places” (416). Contrary to forest transition and broader 
modernization perspectives that view capitalist development as an evolutionary process internal to 
a discrete region, and the North as a model for the South, they follow Doreen Massey in arguing 
that ‘places’ are specific, such as the Amazon or Borneo, but ‘processes’ are general, such as 
agricultural commodity production and global development. “Processes such as ‘economic 
development’ do not happen in pre-existing places,” they write, “but instead happen across space 
(and time) and produce places, their environmental-economic opportunities and constraints, and 
their connected-yet-different trajectories” (Mansfield, Munroe, and McSweeney 2010, 424 
original emphasis). Thus, the productivist core economy of Japan, where forest area has increased 
since World War II and biomass stock has nearly doubled (Kauppi et al. 2006), has a ‘shadow 
ecology’ of massive deforestation in Southeast Asia driven by Japanese timber imports 
(Dauvergne 1997). At the global level, Weinzettel et al. (2013) find that biomass use increases 
with affluence (i.e., growth is not dematerialized), 24 percent of the global land footprint is 
displaced through international trade, and there is a clear displacement of footprint from high 
income to low income countries. Jorgenson (2006) further illuminates this dynamic of unequal 
ecological exchange, showing that more-developed countries drive deforestation through trade 
relations with less-developed countries, and Lenzen et al. (2012) have found that the US, EU, and 
Japan drive biodiversity loss in the Global South, where 35 percent of threats to endangered species 
were linked to production for export. 
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 Meyfroidt and Lambin (2009) examined Vietnam, a country that has undergone a ‘forest 
transition’ since 1992, and found that conservation policies and increased timber imports had 
slowed primary forest loss within Vietnam, but that reforestation in the country was primarily of 
exotic plantation monocultures, while a large proportion of log imports were for high-quality 
natural timber, often traded illegally, and were driving deforestation and degradation in the rest of 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. In an analysis of seven countries that have undergone forest 
transitions (France, Bhutan, China, India, Vietnam, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Chile), Meyfroidt 
et al. (2010) found that net displacement in the agriculture and forestry sectors offset 22 percent 
of reforestation in those countries, but that displacement had increased in 2005-2010 to over 50 
percent, further reducing the net contribution to global reforestation. Citing the examples of China 
and France, the authors recognize that “a rise in standards of personal consumption may be driving 
the decline in net environmental benefits from forest transitions” (20921). Indeed, beyond the fact 
that reforestation says nothing of forest quality, the crucial point here is that these forest transitions 
have for the most part emerged out of productivist modernization processes, and the ratio of 
displacement increases as forest transition countries ‘develop’ and increase their consumption. 
These studies by Meyfroidt and Lambin (2009) and Meyfroidt et al. (2010), which are 
broadly representative of more institutionalist and econometric research on land use displacement, 
prompt several critical observations. The first relates to the question of deforestation versus 
reforestation. The authors note explicitly that forest cover is not an indicator of forest quality and 
that reforested areas under industrial tree plantations represent vastly different socio-ecological 
systems from old-growth natural forest. They also note that timber from primary deforestation 
often serves a different economic function from timber from tree plantations, the former used for 
higher quality construction or furniture manufacture and the latter for lower value plywood or 
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particle board production, for example. Consequently, deforestation and reforestation, as they are 
generally occurring in the contemporary global economy, represent distinct economic and socio-
ecological moments. Deforestation is an extractive process that reaps windfall profits from 
appropriation of nature’s ‘free gifts,’ while reforestation is a productivist industrial process that 
has a higher level of capitalization and lower profit rate. “There’s lots of money for planting, but 
not for preserving even 100 ha,” an official in the district government of Berau told me (BER10 
150413), which makes sense when the money for planting comes from a levy on huge profits from 
deforestation. “Replanting is expensive and not efficient,” an Indonesian logger explained, “We 
replant areas we no longer use. Reforestation is much more expensive than good forest planning” 
(BER17 150418), and by extension much less profitable than natural timber extraction. 
Displacement of deforestation is displacement of specific political-economic assemblages and 
specific forms of accumulation, and I argue that ecologically modernizing, productivist regimes 
are deeply connected with and dependent on extractive accumulation, which is a primary reason 
why local deforestation reductions are offset by displacement. 
A second critical observation regarding the forest transition perspective and displacement 
calculations of the Meyfroidt articles relates to the country level of analysis. This ‘territorial trap’ 
(Agnew 1994) imposes a discrete accounting of national production and consumption that 
obscures the transnationality of political-economic processes. If low-input, extensive beef 
production for export to Russia is constrained in the Brazilian Amazon, displacement of extensive 
ranching to Paraguay for export to Russia may not register through Brazil’s trade balance, because 
Brazil is not the source of the demand. From a systemic perspective, capitalism develops through 
the expansion of commodity frontiers, and if a frontier closes in one place but expands in another, 
and overall global consumption and land use change increase, then displacement is occurring and 
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reductions in local land use change are offset. It makes little sense to say that reforestation in 
Vietnam or Costa Rica has decreased global pressure on tropical forests when global tropical 
deforestation is rapidly increasing, just like it makes little sense to say that the preservation of 
Wehea or the expansion of industrial tree plantations has decreased pressure on forests in Borneo. 
To combine these two points, I argue that displacement is not just about the production of 
commodities, it is about modes of accumulation and rates of profit. Extraction produces windfall 
profits that subsidize productivist accumulation. With the elimination of extraction, accumulation 
depends solely on increases in productivity (or asset-stripping and the redistribution and 
concentration of existing capital (cf. Kallis 2015)), which historically leads to declining rates of 
profit and the search for new frontiers to effect a spatial fix. Even productivity increases, for 
example through agricultural intensification, require increasing material throughput. Soy 
production in Mato Grosso is dependent on phosphate and potash extraction for phosphorus and 
potassium fertilizer, as well as fossil fuels for fertilizer production and mechanized farming and 
transport (Lathuillière et al. 2014; Roy et al. 2016). Meanwhile, van Noordwijk et al. (2017) have 
calculated that increased fertilizer applications for intensified oil palm production in Indonesia 
would not lower the net carbon footprint per unit product under current conditions. 
Displacement of Amazonian Deforestation 
 The limitation of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has displaced both productivist 
and extractive expansion. Ranching intensification and industrial soy expansion in the Amazon 
draw investments from productivist centers (credit and subsidies from the government and 
commodity firms, as well as private capital reinvested by farmers and ranchers) and they profit 
from extractive processes of fossil fuel production and phosphate and potash mining (in the case 
of soy) and land grabbing and past deforestation (in the case of ranching). For land sparing to occur 
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from the shift to soy and intensified ranching, demand for soy and beef must be relatively inelastic 
and therefore diminished by increased production on limited land. In fact, rising global demand 
for beef has driven prices steadily higher since 2000, and soy is a ‘flex crop’ with especially elastic 
demand, thanks to soy consumption as both food (especially soybean oil), feed (soy meal for 
livestock), and fuel (biodiesel) (Borras et al. 2014; Oliveira and Schneider 2016). The limitation 
of soy expansion in Brazil’s Amazon biome has thus displaced soy cultivation to other regions 
such as the eastern Cerrado and the Bolivian lowlands, where investments of capital accumulated 
through soy production in Mato Grosso are helping to drive large-scale deforestation. Extensive 
ranching and other extractive sectors such as logging and mining have also been displaced to new 
frontiers of primitive accumulation, such as southeastern Peru, maintaining the flow of extractive 
rents to productivist centers. 
Scholars have previously investigated processes of ‘indirect land use change’ in Brazil, 
whereby agricultural intensification or expansion in one area may indirectly drive deforestation in 
another, whether through displacement of deforesting actors or market effects such as land 
speculation and the Jevons paradox. Until now, this dynamic has generally been studied in terms 
of the displacement of extensive land uses into the Amazon due to intensification and deforestation 
reductions elsewhere in Brazil. Several studies link agricultural intensification and forest recovery 
in the Atlantic Forest region to increasing Amazonian deforestation (Pfaff and Walker 2010; 
Walker 2012; Barretto et al. 2013). Industrial sugarcane and soy expansion in southern and Center 
West Brazil are also found to have driven Amazonian deforestation through displacement of 
individual ranchers (Andrade de Sá, di Falco, and Palmer 2013; Baletti 2014; Richards 2015) and 
regional land market effects where cropland conversion drives land appreciation and speculation 
on forest margins (Arima et al. 2011; Richards, Walker, and Arima 2014). Richards et al. (2014) 
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estimate this latter effect may be responsible for as much as one-third of Amazonian deforestation. 
With territorial constriction under the land sparing complex in the Amazon and agricultural 
intensification occurring in parts of the region, deforestation is now being displaced from the 
Amazon to other parts of Brazil and abroad. This displacement involves both deforestation by 
extractive land uses, such as logging and extensive ranching, and deforestation by intensive soy 
agriculture, which previously expanded through land conversion in the Amazon and now is 
developing on new frontiers in the Cerrado, the Bolivian lowlands, and the Atlantic Forest of 
Paraguay. 
A word is needed at this point on the relative ecological values of different forest 
ecosystems. Some might argue that the tropical humid forests of the Amazon are a uniquely special 
ecosystem, and that the protection of this ‘sacred grove’ is worth the conversion of ‘sacrifice zones’ 
(Oliveira and Hecht 2016) such as the more open, dry forests and savannas of the Cerrado or the 
Gran Chaco. There is no one clear hierarchy that captures all the variables of potential interest to 
definitively mark one forest as more worthy of conservation than another. Both the Amazon and 
Cerrado are home to populations of indigenous and traditional peoples. The Amazon forest is more 
biodiverse and carbon dense than the Cerrado, but Cerrado ecosystems are still quite carbon dense, 
extremely biodiverse with high levels of endemism, and highly threatened, with very little 
protected area and over 50 percent of the original biome already converted (MMA/IBAMA 2009; 
WWF 2011). In the Brazilian Amazon, by comparison, over 50 percent of remaining forests are 
protected and nearly 80 percent of the original forest area remains intact (Soares-Filho et al. 2010). 
Annual deforestation rates and carbon emissions from the Cerrado now exceed in some years the 
deforestation and emissions rates from the Amazon (MMA/IBAMA 2009; MMA/IBAMA 2015). 
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The environmentalist predilection for protecting the Amazon over the Cerrado emerges 
from a ‘high forest bias’ (Hecht 2005) that is grounded less in scientific criteria than in the 
fetishization of tropical rainforest as an exotic Eden within the Western colonial worldview 
(Merchant 1995; Grove 1995) and in state concerns with the territorialization of remote regions.70 
Furthermore, not all deforestation from the Brazilian Amazon is displaced to less biodiverse or 
carbon dense regions. The forests of the western rim of the Amazon Basin in Ecuador and Peru, 
where deforestation has also accelerated, are generally more biodiverse than the forests of the 
eastern Amazon in Brazil’s arc of deforestation (Bass et al. 2010). In short, if reductions in 
deforestation in the Amazon biome do not result in net reductions in tropical deforestation, the 
displacement of deforestation is not readily redeemed by arguments justifying the preservation of 
the Brazilian Amazon at the expense of other tropical forest ecosystems. Such an exercise, in any 
event, would depend on a Pyrrhic or cynical reason that is complacent toward global socio-
ecological degradation. 
 In the following sections, I trace the displacement of deforestation from the Brazilian 
Amazon. I move from the centers outwards, so to speak. First, I examine the displacement of 
intensive soy production to the Brazilian Cerrado, Bolivian Chiquitano, and Paraguayan Atlantic 
Forest. Second, I examine the displacement of extractive frontiers to the extra-Brazilian Amazon 
and the Gran Chaco of Bolivia and Paraguay, which are driven both by the closing of the Brazilian 
Amazon frontier and the expansion of intensive land uses on displaced soy frontiers. 
Displaced Productivism: Soy and Deforestation in Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay 
																																																						
70 As another indication of the extent of this bias, when The Nature Conservancy’s Latin America Region conducted 
eco-regional analysis to set its conservation priorities in the mid-2000s, it realized that while there was substantial 
conservation activity in the Amazon, the temperate grasslands of Patagonia were virtually unprotected. This finding 
led TNC to establish a Patagonia Grasslands Conservation Program in 2008 (TNC49 150811). 
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 During the 1980s and 1990s, soy cultivation expanded rapidly in the Cerrado of the 
Brazilian Center West region, which comprises the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, 
and Goiás. Beginning in 2000, soy began to expand into the Amazon biome in Mato Grosso, and 
in addition to driving indirect land use change by displacing ranching activities, soy expansion 
contributed directly to deforestation through the conversion of forests for cropland. In 2001-2005, 
26 percent of cropland expansion in Mato Grosso’s Amazon biome came at the expense of forest 
(Macedo et al. 2012), and deforestation for large-scale field agriculture accounted for 17 percent 
of total large-scale forest clearing in Mato Grosso in 2001-2004 (Morton et al. 2006). During this 
period, deforestation for cropland was directly correlated with soybean prices (Morton et al. 2006). 
In the early 2000s, forest-to-cropland conversion thus emerged as a major driver of deforestation 
in the southern Amazon, totaling over 5400 km2 in 2001-2004 and comprising fully 23 percent of 
large-scale deforestation in 2003 (Morton et al. 2006). 
After 2004, new governance measures under PPCDAm and the Soy Moratorium and 
declining soy prices virtually eliminated direct deforestation for soy in the Amazon biome. When 
commodity prices rose and soy area again began to expand after 2007, new cropland in the Amazon 
was established almost entirely over previously cleared pasture areas (Macedo et al. 2012). As of 
2016, just 372 km2 of land deforested in the Amazon biome since 2008 was planted in soy, 
representing 1 percent of the soy acreage in the biome and less than 1 percent of total Amazonian 
deforestation since 2008 (GTS Soybean Working Group 2016). While soy has continued to expand 
over pasture areas in the Amazon, the terms of the Soy Moratorium have limited soy expansion to 
areas deforested prior to 2008.71 This constriction of land availability in the Amazon region has 
																																																						
71 Originally, the Moratorium applied to all areas deforested after July 2006, but with the passage of the 2012 Forest 
Code, which amnestied most illegal deforestation that had taken place before 2008, the Moratorium requirements 
were altered to apply to areas deforested after July 2008 (GTS Soybean Working Group 2016). 
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helped drive large-scale deforestation for soy expansion in the eastern Cerrado, especially on the 
new soy frontier of Matopiba, located between the states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia 
(Figure 7.1). 
Harris et al. (2017), in their analysis of emerging hot spots of forest loss, detect a clear shift 
in 2000-2014 in the geography of Brazilian deforestation, with diminishing forest loss in Mato 
Grosso and Rondônia and new and intensifying deforestation hotspots in Matopiba. In 2007-2013, 
conversion of natural vegetation accounted for 11 to 23 percent of soy expansion in the Cerrado, 
and 40 percent of soy expansion in Matopiba (Gibbs et al. 2015). Cerrado vegetation is a mixture 
of woodland and savanna, but Gibbs et al. report that 65 percent of native Cerrado vegetation and 
81 percent of remaining natural vegetation in Matopiba match the Brazilian Government’s 
definition of forest (Gibbs et al. 2015, S4).72 In 2008-2015, as deforestation in the Amazon 
declined, 23,829 km2 were deforested in Matopiba, representing 63 percent of total Cerrado 
deforestation during this period (LAPIG 2017), and the area planted to soy expanded by thousands 
of square kilometers per year (Figure 7.1). The constriction of the soy frontier in the Amazon is 
directly linked to the expansion of the soy frontier in Matopiba through the displacement of actors 
and capital. Gustavo Oliveira, who has conducted detailed fieldwork on the Brazilian soy sector, 
reports that agribusiness managers and soy farmers assert that “their expansion plans are not 
curtailed by intensification of production [e.g., in Mato Grosso], but rather conditioned by 
favorable institutional settings for the ‘development’ of ‘new’ lands in less regulated areas like the 
northeastern edge of the Cerrado in Brazil [i.e., Matopiba]… where profits from intensified 
production are often reinvested” (Oliveira and Hecht 2016, 270; Oliveira 2013). This geography 
																																																						
72 The Brazilian Government follows the FAO definition of forest as an area of greater than 0.5 ha with trees greater 
than 5 m in height and canopy cover of more than 10 percent (Serviço Florestal Brasileiro 2010). 
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of soy production is understood explicitly by multi-national farm management companies and 
migrant soy farmers (Oliveira and Hecht 2016), as well as by environmental activists and the 
Brazilian government. Embrapa describes Matopiba as “the last Brazilian agricultural frontier” 
(Embrapa 2017), and the TNC employee quoted in the epigraph confesses to an “unspoken 
conspiracy” between soy agribusiness and environmental NGOs to ignore the displacement of soy-
driven deforestation to the Cerrado (TNC43 150713). 
 
Figure 7.1: Soy-Driven Deforestation in the Matopiba States of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and 
Bahia. Forest loss is annual forest loss at >30 percent canopy density as detected by Global 
Forest Watch (Hansen et al. 2013). Soy expansion is the increment in soy planted area relative 
to the previous year (IBGE 2016d). These figures indicate expanding soy area correlated with 
increasing forest loss after 2007 in the Matopiba states. The analysis combines the total area of 
the four states, which is larger than the Cerrado zone of Matopiba proper, but illustrates coupled 
soy expansion and deforestation driven in part by displacement from the Amazon, where 
deforestation declined sharply after 2007. 
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Figures 7.2-3: 7.2) Matopiba in 2006, showing forest loss in 2001-2005; 7.3) Matopiba in 2015, 
showing forest loss in 2001-2014, demonstrating large-scale deforestation after 2005. Data from 
Hansen et al. (2013). Forest cover is shown on a continuum between black (non-forest) and bright 
green (100 percent canopy density), meaning that less intense green coloration still denotes 
woodlands, albeit with less dense canopy cover. 
Soy and Ranching Frontiers in Bolivia and Paraguay 
 The Cerrado is not the only biome to absorb soy expansion displaced from the Brazilian 
Amazon. Since the 1990s, Brazilians have played a prominent role in the growth of soy 
agribusiness in Santa Cruz Department, in the eastern Bolivian lowlands across the border from 
Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul (Mackey 2011). While the soy frontier in Santa Cruz was 
configured prior to the closing of the frontier in the Brazilian Amazon, the period since 2005 
appears to comprise a new phase in agricultural expansion in the Bolivian lowlands, which 
comprise Chaco woodland savanna, Chiquitano dry forest, and Amazonian humid forestlands. 
Genetically-modified soybeans were legalized in Bolivia in 2005 and mechanized, high-input 
production became “ubiquitous” (McKay and Colque 2016). Müller et al. (2010) find that soy 
expansion into the Bolivian Amazon biome only began after 2000. Urioste (2012), meanwhile, 
detects a new wave of Brazilian investment after 2005, not of soy farmers but rather of ranchers 
(see also Graesser et al. 2015). The influx of ranchers makes sense given the growing scarcity of 
ranchland in Brazil after 2005 due to environmental regulations in the Amazon and soy expansion 
on former pasturelands, while Bolivia is still considered a frontier of cheap land and lax 
environmental regulation (Redo, Millington, and Hindery 2011; Urioste 2012). 
 As in Brazil, soy and ranching develop as coupled intensive and extensive frontiers in 
Bolivia. Ranching has grown as a direct driver of deforestation in the Bolivian lowlands, including 
in the Amazon biome, and has expanded even over protected areas, with investments by Brazilians 
especially in border regions (Müller et al. 2012; Müller et al. 2013). Estimates of deforestation 
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rates in eastern Bolivia vary, due in part to varying forest definitions and the lack of a consistent 
monitoring program. Nonetheless, it seems clear that deforestation in Bolivia has accelerated 
concurrently with reductions of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Redo et al. (2011) report 
rising deforestation in Santa Cruz, with particularly rapid clearing after 2005 driven in part by 
farming and ranching expansion by Brazilians. National-level deforestation estimates report steady 
or increased deforestation rates since 2005 (FAN-Bolivia 2012; Hansen et al. 2013; Tabuchi, 
Rigby, and White 2017). In particular, 2010 marked a major spike as land clearing combined with 
El Niño drought conditions to ignite massive wildfires, and Bolivia lost over 4500 km2 of forest 
cover (Hansen et al. 2013). Deforestation rates in 2008 and 2011-2012 have also been especially 
high (Hansen et al. 2013), corresponding with global soybean price spikes and suggesting that as 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has decoupled from soy prices, deforestation in Bolivia has 
become more closely coupled to them. 
 Bolivia has continued to provide an outlet for accumulation by Brazilian agro-industrial 
capital, which has helped to drive increasing deforestation in the Bolivian lowlands. Urioste (2012) 
reports that most profits realized by Brazilians in the soy and ranching sectors are repatriated to 
Brazil, and that most Brazilian farmers and ranchers with properties in Bolivia continue to own 
lands and agribusiness interests in Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. The expanding frontier 
in Bolivia profits not just individual Brazilian farmers and ranchers, but also Brazilian companies 
and government interests. Petrobras, the Brazilian parastatal oil company, has signed a $1.2 billion 
partnership with the Bolivian state oil company to develop gas fields in the Chaco (Stauffer 2016). 
BNDES has also been a major financier of Brazilian economic expansion throughout Latin 
America, typically financing infrastructure projects contracted to Brazilian construction 
companies such as Odebrecht and Andrade Gutierrez. BNDES financing to Brazilian projects in 
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Latin America and the Caribbean grew 1082 percent from 2001 to 2010. In Bolivia, the bank was 
involved in 2008-2011 in a controversial $415 million project awarded to the Brazilian 
construction company OAS for construction of a road that would have passed through an 
indigenous reserve, although BNDES eventually withdrew financing in the face of protests and 
accusations of corruption (Maisonnave 2009; BRIO Watchdog 2015). In short, even as Brazil has 
constrained Amazonian deforestation, Brazilian capital has been actively pursuing profits on new 
frontiers in Bolivia, driving increasing deforestation in the tropical forests of the eastern lowlands. 
 Paraguay presents a broadly similar picture of Brazilian capital driving deforestation on 
expanding soy and ranching frontiers, though specific actors and biomes are somewhat different. 
During the 1970s, mechanized soy farming pushed small and medium-scale farmers out of 
southern Brazil towards the Cerrado of the Center West. Many displaced Brazilian farmers also 
migrated to the Atlantic Forest region of eastern Paraguay, driving rapid deforestation and 
agricultural expansion in the region. By the early 1980s, there were over 300,000 Brazilians living 
in eastern Paraguay (Richards 2011), where they helped consolidate an export-oriented industrial 
soy economy. During the 1990s, Paraguay lost over 25,000 km2 of forest cover and the area planted 
to soy more than doubled, reaching 13,500 km2 in 2001 (Huang et al. 2009; Richards 2011). During 
the 2000s, the area under soy more than doubled again, reaching 28,000 km2 in 2010 (Elgert 2016). 
The expansion of soy cultivation in eastern Paraguay has been driven by Brazilian immigrants and 
closely linked to the soy complex across the Brazilian border in Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul. 
Raw soybeans grown in Paraguay are often exported to Brazil for crushing and shipping (Elgert 
2016), and the Brazilian Government provides technical support for Brazilian agribusiness land 
deals and production systems in Paraguay (Galeano 2012). 
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 As in Brazil and Bolivia, the expansion of intensive soy production in eastern Paraguay 
has displaced extensive ranching activities, opening up new extractive frontiers. In this case, the 
expansion of soy in the Atlantic Forest region has displaced ranching to the Chaco biome in 
western Paraguay, which has attracted ranching investments from Paraguay and abroad thanks to 
its cheap land and loose environmental regulations and enforcement (le Polain de Waroux et al. 
2016). In response to the rapid deforestation in the Atlantic Forest region in the 1990s and early 
2000s, WWF successfully lobbied the Paraguayan Government to pass a ‘Zero Deforestation Law’ 
in 2004 that prohibited new forest clearing in the eastern region of the country (Elgert 2016), 
although by this time over 80 percent of the Atlantic Forest had been lost. As in the Brazilian 
Amazon, this constriction of deforestation in the Atlantic Forest region limited soy expansion to 
the conversion of existing pastures, and displaced ranching to a new frontier of deforestation 
(Baumann et al. 2016, 223). Deforestation in the Chaco, which is dominated by open woodland 
and thorn forest vegetation, has accelerated since 2005, with an increasing number of large-scale 
clearings indicating the growing presence of a globalized, industrial cattle commodity chain 
(Caldas et al. 2015; le Polain de Waroux et al. 2016). Brazilian immigrants to the Chaco are far 
less numerous than to eastern Paraguay – Caldas et al. (2015) quote a figure of 1659 Brazilians in 
the region in the late 2000s – but Brazilian ranchers in the region are generally investing in large 
land areas, and like Brazilian soy farmers, they often export through Brazil and benefit from the 
technical assistance and political support of the Brazilian Government (Galeano 2012). 
 As the Brazilian Amazon frontier has closed, the frontier in the Paraguayan Chaco has 
opened. At the national level in Paraguay, deforestation rose from an average 2150 km2/year in 
2001-2004 to an average 3564 km2/year in 2005-2015, an increase of 66 percent, while Brazil’s 
Amazonian deforestation during this period was almost exactly inverse, declining 61 percent. In 
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2012, the low point of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon was the high point of deforestation 
in Paraguay. That year, 5102 km2 of forest was lost in Paraguay (Hansen et al. 2013), while primary 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon totaled 4571 km2. Paraguay’s forest loss in 2012 thus 
exceeded deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, despite Paraguay having an area less than one-
tenth that of Brazil’s Amazon biome. 
Figures 7.4-5: 7.4) Gran Chaco in 2006, showing forest loss in 2001-2005; 7.5) Gran Chaco in 
2015, showing forest loss in 2001-2014, demonstrating massive deforestation after 2005. 
Rectangular clearings are typical of large-scale deforestation for cattle pasture. Forest cover is 
shown on a continuum between black (non-forest) and bright green (100 percent canopy density), 
meaning that green coloration in the central and western Chaco still denotes woodlands, albeit 
with less dense canopy cover than in eastern areas near the Paraguay River. 
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Displaced Productivism versus ‘New Extractivism’ 
 The limitation of soy expansion in the Brazilian Amazon has not limited the overall 
expansion of soy in South America, and the displacement of Brazilian agribusiness from the 
Amazon region is driving rapid deforestation in the eastern Cerrado and the Chaco, Chiquitano, 
and Amazon biomes of Paraguay and Bolivia. I have characterized the growth of new soy frontiers 
as displaced productivism, which in most areas results in a cascade displacing extensive ranching 
to a new extractive frontier. Critics of agro-industrial expansion in South America might take issue 
with my characterization of mechanized soy production as a productivist economy, because they 
argue that export-oriented agribusiness amounts to a ‘new extractivism’ (in the sense of a mining 
of natural resource wealth) that does not contribute to articulated socio-economic development 
(Gudynas 2009; Baletti 2014; see also Chapter 3). I share these critics’ opposition to the social and 
ecological repercussions of industrial soy production, but I hold nonetheless that intensive soy, 
with its high level of capitalization, mechanization, and infrastructure requirements, is generally 
situated within a productivist economy that promotes reinvestment, vertical integration, and 
agglomeration, which are the hallmarks of capitalist modernization. The degree to which vertical 
integration and articulated development are achieved, of course, may depend on the facilitation of 
productivist political structures as well as economic and environmental conditions (Garrett, 
Lambin, and Naylor 2013b). 
Brazilian soy producers in Santa Cruz may repatriate most of their profits and limit 
reinvestments (Urioste 2012), and value added to soybeans grown by Brazilian producers in 
Paraguay may be captured by processors and traders in Brazil (Elgert 2016), but these are typical 
characteristics of the geography of global commodity chains. The critical distinction between 
extraction and productivism is that extraction draws down an available resource base until it is 
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exhausted and then moves on, creating a boom and bust pattern and profiting from primitive 
accumulation, while productivism invests resources in order to produce a continuous and ideally 
a growing surplus through ‘productive’ accumulation. In the real world, there are shades of gray 
between these two moments of capitalist accumulation. Urioste (2012, 444) alleges, for example, 
that soy production in Bolivia is primarily geared toward the realization of short-term profits and 
drives environmental degradation that may lead to the abandonment of soy fields to cattle pasture, 
which would give a more extractive character to the sector. A similar critique is levied against 
virtually all industrial agriculture, however, and reflects the point that intensive production is 
realized through a concentration of inputs from elsewhere, as well as from the ground beneath. 
Unlike the extensive ranching that it often displaces, industrial soy is integrated within 
productivist economies and represented discursively as a key assemblage of intensive, eco-
modernist agriculture (Oliveira and Hecht 2016). “Many of today’s large-scale producers in the 
Chaco and Chiquitano are highly educated, live in cities, travel internationally, and keep track of 
politics, taxes, and the Chicago mercantile exchange,” write Waroux and colleagues, “Most of 
them manage production remotely, and some, empowered by the soy boom, own large 
transnational companies that, after expanding into neighboring provinces and countries, are 
looking toward Angola or Mozambique” (le Polain de Waroux et al. 2016, 4023). The 
concentration of agricultural production in highly-capitalized, intensive, transnational commodity 
chains is the apotheosis of capitalist modernization, and in this sense, the expansion of soy in the 
Cerrado, Bolivia, and Paraguay comprises displaced productivism. 
Figures 7.6-7: 7.6) Map of South America showing forest loss in 2001-2005; 7.7) Map of South 
America showing forest loss in 2001-2014 and displacement from the Brazil’s Amazonian Arc of 
Deforestation to coupled frontiers. Forest cover is shown on a continuum between black (non-
forest) and bright green (100 percent canopy density), meaning that less intense green coloration 
still denotes woodlands, albeit with less dense canopy cover. 
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Displaced Extraction: The Amazon Rim 
 Displacement of soy expansion from the Brazilian Amazon drives deforestation directly 
through forest-to-cropland conversions, as well as indirectly through pasture-to-cropland 
conversions that displace ranching to new forest frontiers such as the Chaco and the Bolivian 
Amazon. The closing of the Amazon frontier did not just constrict productivist soy expansion; it 
also constricted extractive expansion by loggers, miners, and extensive ranchers. The reduction in 
Brazil’s Amazonian deforestation has not translated directly into a global reduction in extractive 
tropical forest conversion, as extractive deforestation has been displaced. Beyond ranching 
expansion in Paraguay and Bolivia, where deforestation has accelerated concurrently with 
Amazonian deforestation reductions, the most immediate examples of extractive displacement 
come from the countries of the extra-Brazilian Amazon, or the ‘Amazon Rim,’ which in addition 
to Bolivia includes Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana. 
 The Peruvian Amazon in particular has experienced accelerating deforestation due to 
displaced extraction from Brazil. A harbinger of this displacement occurred in 2001, when the 
imposition of Brazil’s federal mahogany moratorium drove a spike in Peruvian mahogany exports, 
turning Peru into the world’s largest mahogany supplier (Grogan et al. 2010). In 2006-2010, the 
remaining unpaved portion of the Southern Interoceanic Highway, in the Madre de Dios region of 
the southern Peruvian Amazon, was paved. This roadway is a continuation of the BR-364 highway 
in Brazil, whose paving was a central component of the controversial Polonoroeste project in the 
1980s. The highway through Madre de Dios connects the Brazilian Amazon and Center West with 
the Peruvian Andes and Pacific Ocean, and its completion was a central project of the Initiative 
for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), the major South 
American economic integration initiative launched in 2000. Paving of the Interoceanic Highway 
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in Peru was financed in large part by BNDES through contracts awarded to the Brazilian 
construction giant Odebrecht. 
 The paving of the highway has transformed the Amazonian department of Madre de Dios 
from a remote backwater into a new frontier of extractive logging and mining and rapid 
deforestation (Delgado 2008; Southworth et al. 2011; Farias 2016). The road has facilitated 
migration and the importation of heavy machinery, and spurred by high gold prices after 2007, 
illegal gold mining has come to dominate frontier dynamics in the region (Scullion et al. 2014). In 
addition to driving large-scale forest loss, mining is causing severe mercury pollution, which in 
2016 led the government to declare a public health emergency (Swenson et al. 2011; Ashe 2012; 
Daley 2016). Illegal mining is estimated to have increased by 540 percent in 2006-2015, while 
Peruvian authorities believe that over $1 billion worth of gold was smuggled out of the country in 
just nine months in 2014 (Daley 2016). Forest loss in Madre de Dios rose from an average of 74 
km2/year in 2001-2005 to 93 km2/year in 2006-2010, rising more rapidly after the completion of 
the highway to 147 km2/year in 2011-2015, a nearly 100 percent increase over the early 2000s 
(Figure 7.8). National deforestation rates in Peru have also nearly doubled, from an average of 
1009 km2/year in 2001-2005 to 1964 km2/year in 2011-2015 (Hansen et al. 2013). 
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Figure 7.8: Annual forest loss in Madre de Dios, Peru in 2001-2015 at >30 percent canopy density 
as detected by Global Forest Watch (Hansen et al. 2013). 
 The political economy of Madre de Dios is a typical extractive regime, currently 
experiencing a boom of accelerated logging, mining, and deforestation. The extractive character 
of the Peruvian frontier is configured through government complicity and corruption related to 
illegal logging and mining. The Pyrrhic logic of conservation efforts under this regime, the 
pervasiveness of extractive accumulation in the region, and the deep integration of extraction and 
environmental degradation with the global economy are all neatly encapsulated in the account of 
a reporter who accompanied a raid by Peruvian marines and rangers to dismantle illegal mining 
operations: “By day’s end,” she writes, “the raiders had destroyed two dozen encampments and 15 
mining derricks, and invaded mining camps far better equipped than their own. Along the way, the 
soldiers helped themselves, taking home a freezer, a satellite dish, a VCR, a television set, a soccer 
ball, a black-and-white puppy and a young pig for dinner. At night, you could hear the sounds of 
the mining derricks starting up again” (Daley 2016). Forests are felled, streams and bodies are 
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polluted, gold is ripped from the ground, smugglers and officials take their cuts, the wealthy buy 
gold, and the miners buy TVs. 
 This extractive frontier in Madre de Dios has been produced by Brazilian capital. BNDES, 
the very same bank that manages Brazil’s Amazon Fund and trumpets its contributions to reducing 
deforestation and fighting climate change, financed Odebrecht and other Brazilian construction 
firms to pave the Interoceanic Highway with a project that was initially budgeted at $800 million 
and over the course of a decade ballooned to over $4 billion (O Antagonista 2015; Casey and 
Zarate 2017). Alejandro Toledo, the president of Peru from 2001 to 2006, is accused of having 
accepted a $20 million bribe from Odebrecht related to the highway contracts (Leon and Kraul 
2017). The company has also been constructing a $7 billion natural gas pipeline in the Peruvian 
Amazon (Casey and Zarate 2017). In short, at the same time as the Brazilian Government claims 
to have contributed to the global environment by reducing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 
it has invested billions of dollars to open a new frontier in Peru that has driven a doubling in Peru’s 
Amazonian deforestation. 
Figures 7.9-10: 7.9) Madre de Dios in 2006, showing forest loss in 2001-2005; 7.10) Madre de 
Dios in 2015, showing forest loss in 2001-2014, demonstrating expanding deforestation following 
the paving of the Interoceanic Highway in 2006-2010. 
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 Looking across the 5,000 km crescent of the Amazon Rim, deforestation rates in the 
Amazon regions of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru increased between 2000 and 2010 (Song et al. 
2015), and the Terra-i monitoring system, produced by a partnership including the International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), The Nature Conservancy, and King’s College London, 
indicates increased aggregate annual deforestation in the Amazon Rim in 2008-2014, as 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon declined (Paz, Reymondin, and Tello 2015). Global Forest 
Watch data for the eight Amazon Rim countries show average aggregate deforestation of 5977 
km2 per year in 2001-2004, when Brazilian deforestation was at its peak, and an increased 
deforestation rate of 7937 km2 per year in 2005-2015, at the same time as Brazilian deforestation 
declined. An aggregate view of deforestation across the Brazilian Amazon and the major 
displacement zones of Matopiba, Paraguay, and the Amazon Rim shows that reductions in Brazil’s 
Amazonian deforestation since 2006 have been largely offset by increasing deforestation on 
closely linked frontiers (Figure 7.11). 
 
 
	
	
418 
 
 
Figure 7.11: Aggregate annual forest loss across the Brazilian Amazon and coupled frontiers, 
2001-2015. Reductions in forest loss on Brazil’s Arc of Deforestation have been largely offset 
since 2006 by increasing deforestation on coupled frontiers. The ‘Arc of Deforestation’ comprises 
Pará, Mato Grosso, and Rondônia, the three states responsible for 81 percent of deforestation in 
the Brazilian Amazon since 1988 (INPE 2017). MATOPIBA comprises the entire states of 
Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia. The ‘Amazon Rim’ comprises the entire territories of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela. Forest 
loss for all regions is at >30 percent canopy density as detected by Global Forest Watch (Hansen 
et al. 2013). 
 
Displaced Deforestation and the Land Sparing Fallacy 
 Deforestation is a complex socio-ecological process with multiple determinants. There is 
no one-to-one displacement of hectares spared in Mato Grosso and hectares cleared in Madre de 
Dios or Matopiba. Rather, my argument identifies regional and aggregate trends and explicates the 
processes that connect land use change across different regions. This analysis shows that both 
extractive (logging, extensive ranching) and productivist (soy) expansion in the Brazilian Amazon 
have been constricted by environmental governance measures, and this constriction has displaced 
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actors and capital to new frontiers where deforestation has accelerated simultaneously with 
Amazonian deforestation reductions. There are many factors shaping these new frontiers, 
including macro-level commodity prices, exchange rate fluctuations, and weather events, and a 
researcher could attempt to account for these multiple variables and extrapolate multiple 
counterfactuals to arrive at a numerical estimate of ‘leakage’ from the Brazilian Amazon to 
coupled frontiers. While this kind of estimation, in the vein of Meyfroidt and Lambin (2009) and 
Meyfroidt et al. (2010), is useful for giving an indication of the volume of different material or 
capital flows, such an exercise necessarily abstracts the actors and processes that construct 
frontiers from the transnational web through which they emerge and intersect. From the 
perspective of a geographical political economy of the capitalist world system, the Brazilian 
Amazon and its displaced frontiers are analytically inseparable. It is clear that without the 
governance measures of the land sparing complex, soy and ranching would expand massively in 
the Brazilian Amazon, and it is clear that instead of expanding in the Amazon, the same actors and 
capital are now expanding in other regions. This phenomenon is displacement. And it is clear, on 
the aggregate level, that through the web of displacement that is the global economy, while 
deforestation has declined in the Brazilian Amazon, and in France and Vietnam, aggregate tropical 
deforestation rates have accelerated. 
   Oliveira and Hecht, focusing on soy, put their fingers directly on this land sparing 
conundrum. “How can intensified production limit expansion,” they ask, “given the difficulty of 
‘good governance’ across the entire soy frontier of South America, and given that increased 
production does not aim to satisfy relatively inelastic human food needs, but rather boundless 
demands for fuels and extremely inefficient but profitable concentrated livestock production?” 
(2016, 271). Even some scholars who bolster the land sparing discourse acknowledge that 
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intensification at forest margins for the production of commodities with elastic demand is likely 
to increase deforestation (Stevenson et al. 2013). When agricultural expansion in the Global South 
is driven largely by flex crops such as soy and oil palm, coupled in the case of soy with extensive 
ranching that profits from high cattle prices and land speculation, the demand for deforestation is 
practically limitless. The key, land sparing advocates argue, is that intensification must be 
accompanied by ‘good governance’ that restricts new deforestation. As displacement from the 
Brazilian Amazon makes clear, however, ‘good governance’ in one region drives deforestation to 
areas with weaker regulations and enforcement (le Polain de Waroux et al. 2016). The construction 
of ‘good governance’ in the Brazilian Amazon under the land sparing complex, and the (partial) 
regional transformation from an extractive to a productivist regime are directly coupled with the 
expansion of extractive regimes in the Paraguayan Chaco and the Bolivian and Peruvian Amazon. 
 Furthermore, the displacements I have described in this chapter are only the most 
immediate and easily traceable. I have not considered, for example, displacement through global 
commodity markets where Brazilian soy and Indonesian oil palm slosh together as fungible 
vegetable oils and biofuels. I have also focused solely on Brazilian actors and capital, when Brazil 
is only one among many countries displacing deforestation. Argentinian capital plays a growing 
role in the Bolivian soy sector (Urioste 2012; Oliveira and Hecht 2016), for example, while forest 
transitions in China and Europe are supported by imports of soy from across South America 
(European Commission 2013; Lathuillière et al. 2014; Liu 2014; Muller and Bautze 2017). The 
national conception of capital is itself a territorial trap, though I have employed it to demonstrate 
the fallacy of Brazil’s land sparing model. One could focus instead on transnational commodity 
traders such as Cargill, Bunge, and ADM. Cargill and Bunge agreed to the soy moratorium in the 
Brazilian Amazon and now are some of the largest soy traders in Matopiba and the Bolivian 
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lowlands (Mighty 2016), while Cargill and ADM are also major traders of Indonesian palm oil. 
Recent pledges by transnational companies to build ‘zero deforestation’ supply chains (Climate 
Focus 2016) ring hollow from a world system perspective. The same displacements that have 
occurred on the jurisdictional scale will occur on the supply chain scale. Just as ranchers in the 
Brazilian Amazon launder cattle from illegal ranches through legalized properties, and just as the 
‘zero deforestation’ Brazilian Amazon is coupled with high deforestation frontiers elsewhere, 
these ‘zero deforestation’ supply chains are coupled with and fed by frontier expansion. 
 In the end, when we step back and gaze on the ‘blue marble’ of planet Earth, we are 
confronted by an inescapable fact: in 2000-2012, roughly 1,000,000 km2 of tropical forest were 
lost worldwide, representing approximately 5 percent of remaining global tropical forest cover. 
Far from slowing, the rate of tropical forest loss was accelerating by over 2100 km2 per year 
(Hansen et al. 2013). Global economic growth remains closely coupled with tropical deforestation, 
as it has been since the 1970s when the industrial agribusiness and forestry export economies of 
the Global South grew and consolidated. This present configuration of the tropical agro-industrial 
commodity frontier is not immutable. The capitalist world system has grown over time through 
expansion and extraction on practically innumerable frontiers. The contemporary corporate food 
regime that drives tropical agro-industrial expansion and deforestation shows few signs of 
restructuring, however, and rather appears to have intensified under the land rush that has emerged 
from the global financial and ecological crises of the late 2000s (McMichael 2005; McMichael 
2012; Thaler 2014). 
 It is theoretically impossible to separate high-input industrial agriculture from resource 
extraction and degradation, since the productivity of this agro-ecological system is constituted 
through a ‘metabolic rift’ that mines hydrocarbons and minerals, dumps them onto the soil, extracts 
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nutrients in the form of livestock and crops, and concentrates those nutrients in urban bodies and 
dead zones of organic waste. Gains in productivity, for example through technological innovation, 
support expanded consumption and demand expanded extraction. In moments where extraction 
becomes limited, for example through the exhaustion of fertilizer supplies or through land scarcity, 
the declining ratio of primitive accumulation leads to declining rates of profit and engenders a 
crisis of accumulation and the search for new frontiers to re-launch accumulation within revitalized 
circuits of plunder and productivity (Moore 2000; B. Clark and Foster 2009). Kátia Abreu, a leader 
of the extractive coalition of ruralistas in Brazil,73 captures this dynamic vividly in a column 
railing against the constriction of Brazil’s agricultural lands. The creation of new protected areas 
is an “insane steeplechase,” she writes, and she likens conditions in Brazil to the territorial 
limitation of other countries “that, in certain historical circumstances, impelled them to external 
wars in an effort to increase their dominions” (Abreu 2013). While the ruralistas have not gone to 
war, they have successfully revised the Forest Code, supported Dilma’s impeachment, reduced 
protected areas such as FLONA Jamanxim, and developed new frontiers of land grabbing and 
agricultural expansion across South America. Capitalism’s green paint job is not holding up very 
well. 
 And yet, land sparing discourse has not been abandoned. Instead, it travels along with 
displaced frontiers. “Our concern is in ensuring that intensive agricultural production takes place 
within a framework that also provides for sustainable forestry and protection for standing forests,” 
a director general of Bolivia’s Forestry and Land Authority blithely claims (Quoted in Tabuchi, 
Rigby, and White 2017). Visions of modernization support socio-ecological despoliation, to the 
																																																						
73 Abreu, a former senator and president of the national agricultural federation (CNA), became Minister of 
Agriculture under Dilma Rousseff’s second administration, only to be replaced by Blairo Maggi after Dilma’s 
impeachment. 
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point where perhaps some forest remnants survive in a sea of soy or oil palm, and newly 
‘developed’ centers such as Santa Cruz begin to displace their deforestation elsewhere, as Europe, 
the US, and Japan have been doing intensively for half a century, and as Mato Grosso has been 
doing for a decade. Land sparing supports state building and agro-industrial development, but it 
delivers at best the “illusion of preservation” (Berlik, Kittredge, and Foster 2002), a forest 
transition at home and the whine of chainsaws abroad. In his critique of capitalist consumption, 
Peter Dauvergne laments “the inability of environmental governance to alter, in any fundamental 
way, the global ecological effects of these drivers – such as advertising, economic growth, 
technology, income inequality, corporations, population growth, and globalization – that together 
are causing consumption, much of which is wasteful, to rise steadily worldwide. On many 
measures, policies, actions, and technologies to shape consumption appear to be ‘improving’ 
environmental management. But too often the measures are close-up snapshots that cut out a much 
bigger, more complex, global picture of crisis” (2010, 1–2). These improving close-ups concurrent 
with a deteriorating global picture comprise the fallacy of composition that lies at the heart of 
ecological modernization discourse, which conjures a vision of green development only by 
obscuring the fundamental dialectic of extraction and production that underpins the capitalist 
world system. Chapter 8 concludes by reflecting on the contributions of this study toward a clearer 
understanding of the relations between forest governance and global development, and suggesting 
directions leading away from the extraction-production dialectic. 
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PART III 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION: PYRRHUS AND THE HONEY TREE 
 
“Pyrrhus replied to one that gave him joy of his victory that one other such [victory] 
would utterly undo him.” 
  
- Plutarch, Pyrrhus (75AD [2017]) 
 
Solitary trees stand amidst the boundless oceans of oil palm in a young plantation in East 
Kalimantan. These are ‘honey trees,’ left standing by the plantation company under an agreement 
with local villagers, for whom honey is a food and a medicine and honey collection is an important 
livelihood activity. The surrounding forest is cleared, and replaced by a carpet of African palm 
that will become shampoo and candy bars. The honey trees survive, but the bees, producers of the 
honey, now live immersed in the pesticides and fertilizers of the industrial plantation. These 
chemicals are now passed on to the honey. “It is no longer medicine,” a TNC manager tells me, 
“it becomes poison” (TNC32 150302). 
Eleven thousand miles away, in the Brazilian Amazon, lone brazil nut trees (castanheiras) 
rise above expansive cattle pastures. It is illegal to fell a castanheira, so when ranchers clear the 
forest, they are all that is left standing, cut loose from the canopy and left to wander in the grass. 
They are spared the chainsaw, but face a similar fate: isolated castanheiras are often virtually 
barren. The trees are pollinated by several genera of large-bodied bees, which are capable of lifting 
the petals of the trees’ flowers to access their pollen (Almeida 2015, 40). With the destruction of 
their habitat, the bees disappear. The castanheiras are poisoned, or burned, or struck by lightning. 
Their charred trunks may one day be pulled from the pastures, along with the stumps of the long-
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dead forest, so that the pastures can be turned into fields of soy, to feed the world on a diet of 
biodiesel and chicken nuggets. 
 What victory is this, of barren trees and poisoned honey? What victory is the protected 
forest of Wehea, for the Dayak who live surrounded by mines and oil palm? And what victory 
even is Brazil’s Amazon, if it becomes the last intact forest in the tropics, to one day dry out, burn, 
and give way to savanna in the widening gyre of a changing climate (Davidson et al. 2012). Such 
victories as these, and we will be utterly undone. 
 
Figure 8.1: Honey trees in an oil palm plantation in Berau, Indonesia, 18 March 2015. 
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Figure 8.2: Brazil nut trees stand in cattle pasture in Cotriguaçu, Brazil, 26 June 2014. 
 
	
	
427 
 
Figure 8.3: Unbroken forest in southern Pará, Brazil, 18 July 2014. 
 This dissertation began with a question, of why, despite similar histories of deforestation 
and similar efforts at forest conservation, deforestation is declining in Brazil but accelerating in 
Indonesia. Three different bodies of literature offered elements for an answer. Socio-
environmental modernization theories, such as the environmental Kuznets curve, forest transition 
theory, and ecological modernization theory, suggested that trajectories of deforestation could be 
explained by socio-economic development. These theories imply that deforestation rates in 
Indonesia and Brazil have diverged because the countries are passing through different stages on 
a modernization curve. Political ecology, on the other hand, attends to contestation over access to 
and use of natural resources, and would suggest that the divergence between deforestation rates in 
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Brazil and Indonesia can be traced to the differential outcomes of environmental conflicts. 
Scholarship on multi-level commons governance, lastly, focuses on the role of institutional design 
in natural resource management, and suggests that different deforestation trends in Brazil and 
Indonesia could be explained by differences in forest governance institutions. 
 My research has shown each of these perspectives to be valid, in a way, but also 
incomplete. The answer, I found, is about development, but not in the way that socio-
environmental modernization theories believe. The global political economy develops not along 
the smooth pathway of modernization, but rather through dialectics of production and extraction, 
development and underdevelopment, that produce the uneven political-economic geography that 
defines the capitalist world system. This dialectical systems perspective then integrates the 
analyses of political ecology and commons governance scholarship. Environmental conflicts and 
environmental governance institutions emerge within a political-economic order that structures the 
spaces within which contestation and institutional development occur. To understand why 
environmental conflicts develop and play out differently, and why institutions work to facilitate 
different environmental outcomes, one must first understand the political-economic system within 
which actors and institutions have taken shape. 
 I used organizational ethnography to follow a common actor through transnational webs of 
relation, and I leveraged the organizational ethnography to structure an incorporated comparison 
across distant yet related forest frontiers. Over more than two years of fieldwork stretching from 
remote forest villages in Borneo and the Amazon to headquarters and convention centers in 
Washington and Paris, I discovered that land sparing comprises the key organizing principle of 
global forest governance. I found an explanation for the differential success of land sparing policy 
in Brazil and Indonesia in the distinction between extractive and productivist political-economic 
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regimes. As I traced land sparing policy across multiple levels, I came to understand the sociology 
of neoliberal governance as a hierarchy of regimes, complexes, and coalitions. A regime, in this 
usage, is a stabilized socio-political order articulated with a mode of production, either extractive 
or productivist, that organizes a geographically-defined subsystem of the capitalist world system. 
A complex is an assemblage of actors, institutions, practices, and discourses linked to a specific 
fraction of capital that seeks to structure accumulation in a particular way. Coalitions are the bridge 
between a complex and the implementation of policy on the ground. They are the alliances that 
emerge in specific moments and places to promote different components of a complex’s agenda. 
In Brazil, a land sparing complex has coalesced under a productivist national political-economic 
regime to attempt to shift the regional political-economic regime of the Amazon from extraction 
to productivism, while instrumentally driving agro-industrial consolidation at the expense of 
smallholders. In Indonesia, a land sparing complex comprised primarily of international actors has 
sought to shift the regional political-economic regime of Kalimantan from extraction to 
productivism, but this effort has been stymied by the persistence of Indonesia’s national, 
provincial, and district-level extractive regimes that profit from expanding logging, mining, and 
oil palm and tree fiber plantations. Thus forest governance in Brazil reduces deforestation as part 
of a political-economic project of agricultural intensification and state-building, while forest 
governance in Indonesia fails to check accelerating deforestation. 
An institutionalist perspective might suggest that the problem of tropical deforestation 
could therefore be solved if other countries could follow the Brazilian model and shift from 
extraction to productivism. The key insight of a systems perspective is that extraction and 
production are dialectical political-economic relations. Incorporated comparison recognizes that 
Brazil and Indonesia are not independent cases, but connected parts of a world-historical whole. 
 
	
	
430 
By looking at the connections between contrasting cases across states or provinces and cross-
nationally, I discovered that land sparing and productivist development in the Brazilian Amazon 
have displaced extractive deforestation elsewhere, most directly to the Cerrado and surrounding 
countries including Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru. Productivist development at the global level 
likewise depends on expanding extraction, such as in Indonesia. While deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon has declined during the past decade, tropical deforestation globally has 
accelerated. Making Indonesia like Brazil will not reduce global deforestation, because Brazil’s 
land sparing is illusory, highlighting local improvements while ignoring connections to global 
degradation. 
The ability to understand governance and landscape change in distant places as part of a 
common historical process of agricultural intensification and land use displacement within a 
capitalist dialectic of extraction and production exemplifies the strengths of incorporated 
comparison and a dialectical systems perspective. The ethnographic component of this study, 
meanwhile, cast light on the network of actors involved in the production of tropical forest 
governance. Through an understanding of how TNC staff see the world and why they act the way 
they do, I was able to link ideational and material factors for an integrated understanding of forest 
governance as a historical process. The organizational ethnography helped to highlight how 
tropical forest governance emerges through shifts in ideas about conservation science in 
articulation with shifts in environmental and political-economic relations, and it revealed the 
recursive interactions between experience and policy development. 
 Existing scholarly accounts of deforestation in Brazil and Indonesia identify important 
dynamics shaping tropical land use change, but by failing to conceive of tropical deforestation as 
a world-historical process, they are ultimately partial and insufficient for explaining the Brazil-
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Indonesia puzzle, and ill-equipped to theorize the problem of displacement. World systems 
analysis has often been criticized for its structural determinism and economic reductionism (e.g., 
Skocpol 1977), and many applications of world systems analysis have doubtless presented an 
overly static and monochromatic image of the capitalist political economy. I maintain that efforts 
to understand macro-level socio-ecological change through a handful of abstracted variables or 
reified tendencies (GDP per capita, social mobilization, ‘good governance’) fall also into a 
reductionism and determinism that ignores the relational webs and historical processes through 
which globalized phenomena emerge. By working across multiple levels and diverse landscapes, 
I have sought to offer a variegated picture of socio-ecological change, where global projects are 
contested and remade and political-economic regimes are not immutable, but subject to 
transformation through confluences of structure and agency. 
 Beyond its empirical findings on forest governance and tropical land use change, this study 
speaks to the perennial puzzle of when and why productivist development occurs. While 
institutions that provide for constraints on government expropriation, an independent judiciary, 
and property rights enforcement comprise a critical background for capitalist productivism 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), the experience of the Brazilian Amazon bolsters both 
the literature on developmental states, which emphasizes state agency in territorialization and the 
facilitation of capital investment, and the literature in economic geography, which highlights the 
influence of location rents and agglomeration economies. To the degree that the Brazilian state 
seeks to catalyze productivist development in areas isolated from current frontiers of productivist 
expansion, such as São Félix or Cotriguaçu, it must do so with higher levels of investment, whereas 
in areas adjacent to expanding productivist centers, such as Nova Ubiratã and Novo Progresso, 
intensification occurs without extraordinary state investments (though always with the state as a 
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partner to capital). Only strong governance by the state will prevent intensification in productivist 
centers from driving additional local deforestation, however. In Indonesia, it would be entirely 
possible for a ‘multidimensional conspiracy for development’ (Hirschman 1977) to emerge that 
would guarantee productivist institutions and facilitate capital investment. There were elements of 
Sukarno’s post-independence program that aimed to shift Indonesia away from its extractive 
regime, yet Suharto overthrew Sukarno and reinforced extraction, and productivist coalitions have 
yet to gain the upper hand. If Indonesia does undergo a productivist transition, then it will begin 
to displace extraction to new peripheries, just as a transitioning China has displaced extraction to 
Indonesia (Lang and Chan 2006; Liu 2014). 
 In the broadest terms, I have sought to advance a dialectical systems research framework 
that integrates governance, development, and environmental change in a fully transnational 
perspective. At a theoretical level, this study demonstrates the utility of a framework of regimes, 
complexes, and coalitions for analyzing the sociology of capitalism, especially in the neoliberal 
era. This conceptual structure is more specific and systematic than concepts of ‘assemblages’ and 
‘development coalitions,’ as it situates actors and policies in relation to multilevel dynamics of 
political-economic transformation. It also serves to locate the state within the transnational 
authority structures of neoliberal governance. The discussion of displacement, meanwhile, 
demonstrates the importance of an attention to telecouplings, though always situated within the 
broader socio-ecological web through which they are produced. 
At a methodological level, incorporated comparison proved to be an effective approach to 
studying globalized phenomena, but selection of incorporated cases for this study depended on 
transnational organizational ethnography to drive the case selection and render visible the 
connections among the cases. Transnational organizational ethnography thus served to produce a 
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three-dimensional picture of transnational webs of relation, as well as to illuminate the epistemic 
dynamics of global change. This organizational approach addressed some of the challenges of 
global ethnography by defining the ethnographic ‘field’ and facilitating access to diverse and 
distant places. While this dissertation used organizational ethnography instrumentally for a study 
of tropical deforestation, a companion project will focus on my ethnography of The Nature 
Conservancy in its own right. 
 Now from the vantage of the tropical forest conservation programs of The Nature 
Conservancy; of East Kutai, Berau, Nova Ubiratã, Cotriguaçu, São Félix, and Novo Progresso; of 
East Kalimantan, Mato Grosso, and Pará; of Brazil and Indonesia and their transnational couplings, 
what can we say of forest governance and global development? Why does the land sparing fallacy 
survive, when it produces ever-expanding environmental degradation? 
The land sparing hypothesis is presented as a scientific proposition, but land sparing, like 
ecological modernization, is also a discourse. Land sparing discourse knits together a complex of 
state, agro-industrial, and environmentalist actors through a narrative that reconciles the interests 
of each group: in territorialization, in agricultural intensification, in forest conservation. It is a 
component of the broader ecological modernization discourse that holds that there is no necessary 
contradiction between profitable business, environmental protection, and community 
development. 
In 2010, Bank of America Merrill Lynch announced a $300,000 grant to TNC’s Berau 
Forest Carbon Program. Agus Purnomo, head of Indonesia’s National Council on Climate Change, 
is quoted celebrating the grant in a Bank of America press release: “Boosting Indonesia’s economy 
and meeting its development objectives while simultaneously tackling the threats of climate 
change requires a new kind of economic planning and decision-making. Meeting these objectives 
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will not be easy. Yet these multiple objectives can and must be met. Success will require a joint 
effort and contribution of government, civil society, businesses and local communities at all levels” 
(Bank of America 2010). Of course, this harmonious vision of multi-stakeholder collaboration and 
compatible objectives fails to mention that Bank of America Merrill Lynch has made over $100 
million in profits from investments and financing for Berau Coal. With $100 million of dirty 
money and $300,000 in indulgences, there is little doubt that economic growth will come at the 
cost of people and the environment. Such win-wins as these, and we will be utterly undone. 
The myth of ecological modernization has become the hegemonic discourse of the 
productivist core, and to people living in the United States, or Europe, or Japan, who see returning 
forests and improving environmental conditions accompanying their prosperity, ecological 
modernization is apparently plausible. This discourse wrecks, however, against the bald 
degradation of extraction. From the periphery, these appeals to infinite compatibility are 
manifestly false, but they are deployed nonetheless by the green growth complex, with ‘cynical 
reason,’ to coopt opposing forces and preserve the ideological underpinnings of exploitative and 
destructive capitalist growth. 
Socio-environmental modernization theories, like the environmental Kuznets curve, forest 
transition theory, and ecological modernization, have a fundamental flaw, which is demonstrated 
in this study by the land sparing fallacy: they blind themselves to questions of scale, choosing to 
highlight local improvements while ignoring their systemic relationships to global degradation. 
Forest transitions and productivist development in the Global North have depended on the 
displacement of extractive deforestation to Brazil and Indonesia, and deforestation reductions and 
agricultural intensification in the Brazilian Amazon depend on the displacement of extraction and 
agricultural expansion to new frontiers of deforestation. 
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If the closure of one frontier simply displaces agricultural expansion and deforestation 
elsewhere, and productivist transitions, to the degree they occur, depend on extraction, then what 
is the solution if we care about tropical forests, and more broadly if we care about ecological 
integrity, diversity, and human well-being? In some ways, this is the easiest question of the 
dissertation, because it has an abundance of ready answers. There are myriad ways to live that do 
not require eating meat every day, shipping flex crops around the world, consuming always more 
and cheaper and faster, living alienated from the land and the species we depend on for subsistence. 
There is degrowth and social ecology and bioregionalism and eco-feminism. There are ecovillages 
and community-supported agriculture and Via Campesina and the Landless Workers’ Movement. 
There are numerous indigenous and traditional ways of being that still resist the genocidal 
expansion of global capitalism.74 The apotheosis of capitalist hegemony is the illusion that no other 
world is possible. Before we can open our world to these alternatives, however, we must first put 
an end to the cynical and Pyrrhic reasons that justify social and ecological degradation. We must 
abandon the myth of ecological modernization – the fallacies that intensive agriculture spares land 
for nature, forests will return with global development, and capitalism can one day be green. 
 
  
																																																						
74 The United Nations (2009) estimates that the world’s 370 million surviving indigenous people represent 5000 
different indigenous cultures. For some discussions of indigenous ways of being and knowing, see Henry and Pene 
(2001), Poirier (2008), De La Cadena (2010), Cameron et al. (2014), and Blaser (2014). For some discussions of the 
genocide of indigenous peoples as integral to the development of global capitalism, see Evans and Thorpe (2001), 
Tatz (2003), and especially Wolfe (2006). 
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